ORDER : SHAMEEM AKTHER, J. 1. Sri Dara Bhaskar, the detenu, has filed this present Habeas Corpus petition, challenging the detention order, dated 24.10.2018, passed by the Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda Police Commissionerate, the respondent No.2, and the confirmation order, dated 03.01.2019, passed by the Principal Secretary to Government (POLL), General Administration (Spl (Law and Order) Department, Government of Telangana, the respondent No.1. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties, and perused the impugned orders. 3. Briefly, the facts of the case are that by relying on the twenty three (23) criminal cases registered against the detenu during the year 2018, the Commissioner of Police, Rachakonda Police Commissionerate, the respondent No.2, passed the detention order, dated 24.10.2018. According to the respondent No.2, the detenu is involved as many as twenty eight (28) criminal cases of automobile thefts in the limits of various police stations under Rachakonda and Cyberabad Police Commissionerates. But, relying on the twenty three (23) cases registered against the detenu in the year 2018, the detention order was passed. Subsequently, by order dated 03.01.2019, the detention order was confirmed by the Principal Secretary to Government (POLL), General Administration (Spl (Law and Order) Department, Government of Telangana, respondent No.1. Hence, this writ petition before this Court. 4. Sri Pasham Trivikram Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this Court: 5. Firstly, relying on the twenty three (23) recent cases registered against the detenu during the year 2018, the detention order is passed. 6. Secondly, curiously, all the cases registered against the detenu in the year 2018 relate to automobile thefts. 7. Thirdly, such cases can easily be tackled by the criminal justice system by holding a criminal trial. Therefore, all these cases fall within the ambit of “law and order problem”. Relying on the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 , learned counsel has pleaded that a distinction has to be maintained between “a law and order problem” and “a public order problem”. Therefore, all these cases fall within the ambit of “law and order problem”. Relying on the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 , learned counsel has pleaded that a distinction has to be maintained between “a law and order problem” and “a public order problem”. Since the cases narrated by the detaining authority do not fall within the ambit of “disturbance of public order”, the detaining authority is unjustified in invoking the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act. Therefore, the detention of the detenu is patently illegal. Hence, the detaining authority is unjustified in claiming that these cases have created a panic and have “disturbed the public order”. 8. Fourthly, the detaining authority is not justified in invoking a draconian power under the preventive detention laws. According to the learned counsel, the detaining authority has to be extremely careful while passing a detention order. For detention ipso facto adversely affects the fundamental right of personal liberty enjoyed by the people under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 9. Lastly, even while confirming the detention order, dated 24.10.2018, the respondent No.1 has not applied his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case. Instead, the confirmation order, dated 03.01.2019, has been passed in a mechanical manner. Admittedly, in the present case, the bail applications moved by the petitioner in Crime Nos.561/2018, 618/2018 and 621/2018 of Kushaiguda Police Station were dismissed by the Court concerned. Thus, the detenu continues to be in judicial custody. Despite the fact that the detenu is in custody, still the preventive detention order has been passed. Therefore, even the confirmation order deserves to be set aside by this Court. 10. On the other hand, Mr.S.Sharath, the learned Special Government Pleader, submits that the nature of offences allegedly committed by the detenu is sufficient to cause a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the people at large. Since the modus of committing the crimes was automobile thefts, it had created sufficient panic in the minds of the general public. Therefore, the detaining authority was legally justified in passing the impugned orders. Since the modus of committing the crimes was automobile thefts, it had created sufficient panic in the minds of the general public. Therefore, the detaining authority was legally justified in passing the impugned orders. Hence, the learned Government Pleader has supported the impugned orders. 11. In view of the submissions made by both the sides, the point that arises for determination in this Writ Petition is: “Whether the detention order, dated 24.10.2018, passed by the respondent No.2 and the confirmation order, dated 03.01.2019, passed by the respondent No.1, are liable to be set aside?” POINT: 12. In catena of cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had clearly opined that there is a vast difference between “law and order” and “public order”. The offences which are committed against a particular individual fall within the ambit of “law and order”. It is only when the public at large is adversely affected by the criminal activities of a person, the conduct of a person is said to disturb the public order. Moreover, individual cases can be dealt with by the criminal justice system. Therefore, there is no need for the detaining authority to invoke the draconian preventive detention laws against an individual. For the invoking of such law adversely effects the fundamental right of personal liberty which is protected and promoted by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, according to the Apex Court, the detaining authority should be wary of invoking the immense power under the Act. 13. In the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 740 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has, in fact, deprecated the invoking of the preventive law in order to tackle a law and order problem. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: “54. We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression "public order' take in every kind of disorders or only some of them? Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression "public order' take in every kind of disorders or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder. Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.” 14. In the case of Kanu Biswas v. State of West Bengal, (1972) 3 SCC 831 , the Supreme Court has opined as under: “The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. Public order is what the French call ‘order publique’ and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. Public order is what the French call ‘order publique’ and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above case, is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?” 15. In the present case, the detaining authority relied on twenty three (23) cases registered against the detenu in the year 2018 for preventively detaining him, vide Crime Nos.214/2018, 397/2018, 517/2018, 516/2018, 513/2018, 463/2018, 561/2018, 768/2018, 629/2018, 641/2018, 620/2018, 632/2018, 621/2018, 638/2018, 622/2018, 617/2018, 508/2018, 399/2018, 772/2018, 618/2018, 774/2018, 777/2018 and 639/2018. We shall present them in a tabular column the date of occurrence, the date of registration of FIRs, the offences complained of and their nature, such as bailable/non-bailable or cognizable/ non-cognizable. Sl. No. Crime No. Date of Occurrence Date of registration of FIR Offences Nature 1. 214/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 31.03.2018 02.04.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 2. 397/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 19.05.2018 09.06.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 3. 517/2018 of Neredmet PS 01.06.2018 27.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 4. 516/2018 of Neredmet PS 03.06.2018 27.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 5. 513/2018 of Neredmet PS 04.06.2018 26.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 6. 463/2018 of Ghatkesar PS 29.07.2018 30.07.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 7. 561/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 02.08.2018 04.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 8. 768/2018 of Jawahar Nagar PS 05.08.2018 24.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 9. 629/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 09.08.2018 27.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 10. 641/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 10.08.2018 29.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 11. 620/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 12.08.2018 25.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 12. 632/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 14.08.2018 27.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 13. 621/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 16.08.2018 25.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 14. 638/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 16.08.2018 28.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 15. 622/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 17.08.2018 25.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 16. 617/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 19.08.2018 24.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 17. 621/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 16.08.2018 25.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 14. 638/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 16.08.2018 28.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 15. 622/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 17.08.2018 25.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 16. 617/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 19.08.2018 24.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 17. 508/2018 of Neredmet PS 21.08.2018 24.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 18. 399/2018 of Alwal PS 21.08.2018 27.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 19. 772/2018 of Jawahar Nagar PS 22.08.2018 25.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 20. 618/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 22.08.2018 24.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 21. 774/2018 of Jawahar Nagar PS 23.08.2018 26.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 22. 777/2018 of Jawahar Nagar PS 26.08.2018 27.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 23. 639/2018 of Kushaiguda PS 28.08.2018 29.08.2018 Section 379 of IPC Cognizable/ Non-Bailable 16. A bare perusal of the detention order clearly reveals that the bail applications filed by the detenu in Crime Nos.561/2018, 618/2018 and 621/2018 of Kushaiguda Police Station, vide Crl.M.P.Nos.1650/2018, 1651/2018 and 1652/2018 respectively, were dismissed by the Court concerned. Thus, the detenu continues to be in judicial custody. However, the apprehension of the detaining authority that there is every possibility of the detenu moving bail petitions again in all the cases to come out of the prison and in the event of his release on bail in due course, there is every likelihood of his indulging in similar prejudicial activities, which are prejudicial to maintenance of public order, unless he is detained by an appropriate order of detention, is highly misplaced. In such an event, it is the bounden duty of the Police to inform the learned Public Prosecutor about the conduct of an accused and to handover the history-sheet of the accused. The police are supposed to be vigilant in collecting the whole data against the detenu and furnish the same to the Public Prosecutor/Additional Public Prosecutor to defeat the bail applications of the detenu. When the detenu has not been released from the judicial custody, the apprehension of his coming out from the prison and committing similar offences is misplaced. It is appropriate to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Rekha Vs. When the detenu has not been released from the judicial custody, the apprehension of his coming out from the prison and committing similar offences is misplaced. It is appropriate to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in Rekha Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244 , wherein it is held as follows: “Where a detention order is served on a person already in jail, there should be a real possibility of release of a person on bail who is already in custody, provided he has moved a bail application which is pending. It follows logically that if no bail application is pending, then there is no likelihood of the person in custody being released on bail, and hence, the detention order will be illegal.” 17. Grave as the offences may be, they relate to automobile thefts. So, no inference of disturbance of public order can be drawn. These type of cases can certainly be tried under the normal criminal justice system. And, if convicted, can certainly be punished by the Court of law. Thus, these cases do not fall within the ambit of the words “public order”. Instead, they fall within the scope of the words “law and order”. Hence, there was no need for the detaining authority to pass the detention order. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the impugned order is legally unsustainable. 18. Even while passing the confirmation order, dated 03.01.2019, the Principal Secretary to Government (POLL), General Administration (Spl (Law and Order) Department, Government of Telangana, the respondent No.1, has failed to notice that the detenu continues to languish as under-trial in the jail. Once the detenu was already confined, the question of confirming the detention order would not even arise. 19. For the reasons stated above, the Writ Petition is hereby allowed. The impugned detention order, dated 24.10.2018, passed by the respondent No.2, and the confirmation order, dated 03.01.2019, passed by the respondent No.1 are hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to set the detenu, namely, Dara Bhaskar, S/o. Yellaiah, at liberty forthwith, if he is no longer detained in the judicial custody in the criminal cases, which have been registered so far against him. 20. The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. 21. There shall be no order as to costs.