JUDGMENT IRSHAD ALI, J. 1. Heard Sri Sudhir Pandey, learned Advocate and Sri Sunil Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri R.B.S. Chauhan, learned counsel for the petitioner in the connected Writ Petition No.1117 (SS) of 2017 and learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner is challenging the impugned order dated 20.7.2017 whereby the Disciplinary Authority has directed to initiate de novo enquiry proceeding against the petitioner. 3. Assailing the order dated 20.7.2017, submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that an enquiry was conducted wherein the Enquiry Officer found the charges to be not proved against the petitioner and a report was submitted in this regard on 10.3.2017. Disciplinary Authority without recording reasons to be dissatisfied with the enquiry report dated 10.3.2017, directed de novo enquiry against the petitioner vide order dated 20.7.2017. 4. Factual matrix of the case is that the petitioner was granted appointment after facing selection proceedings on the post of Engineer on 23.10.1992 in U.P. Zila Panchyat, Monitoring Cell. He was made permanent on 6.11.1998. Sri Sevaram Gupta, Deputy Director (Engineering Cadre) retired from service on 30.7.2000. The petitioner was handed over the additional charge of the post of Deputy Director by passing an order dated 31.7.2000 in accordance with the provisions under Article 2 Sub-Clause (8) of the U.P. Zila Panchayat Officer (Central Transferable Cadre) Retirement Benefit Rules, 2000. The petitioner was granted promotion on the post of Deputy Director (Engineering Cadre) vide order dated 25.2.2013. 5. One Pravin Kumar was given charge vide order dated 4.7.2014 of the work of Deputy Director (Engineering Cadre). The petitioner filed Writ Petition No.574 (SB) of 2015 challenging the appointment of Pravin Kumar on the post of Deputy Director (Engineering Cadre). This Court vide order dated 20.5.2015 issued direction that file pertaining to the work assigned to Engineers shall be routed to the State Government and not otherwise. Against the order passed by this Court on 20.5.2015, Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.19437 of 2015 was filed by the State Government before Hon'ble Supreme Court which was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 14.12.2015. After dismissal of the special leave petition filed by the State Government, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 27.01.2016 and disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him on a complaint lodged by Ex-Member of Parliament namely Ms. After dismissal of the special leave petition filed by the State Government, the petitioner was placed under suspension on 27.01.2016 and disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him on a complaint lodged by Ex-Member of Parliament namely Ms. Sushila Saroj who subsequently sent a letter denying the signature on the complaint made on the letter pad of the Ex-Member of Parliament. 6. The order of suspension was challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No.2269 (SB) of 2016 wherein this Court was pleased to pass an order on 3.5.2016 and stayed the order of suspension passed against the petitioner. 7. In pursuance to the order passed on 27.1.2016, the petitioner was served a charge-sheet on 28.11.2016. The petitioner requested to supply certain documents and in spite of demand, documents were not supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner filed Writ Petition No.4247 (SB) of 2016 before this Court, wherein direction was issued to the opposite parties to provide relevant documents within 15 days from the date of communication of the order passed by this Court on 1.3.2017. Immediately after nine days, the Enquiry Officer concluded the enquiry and submitted report on 10.3.2017 wherein the charges levelled against the petitioner were not found proved. 8. The Disciplinary Authority, without recording reasons in regard to non-satisfaction with the enquiry report, passed an order dated 20.7.2017 whereby direction was issued for de novo enquiry against the petitioner. 9. Assailing the order dated 20.7.2017 whereby the denovo enquiry was directed against the petitioner, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that no reason has been recorded in regard to the dissatisfaction with the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, thus order for denovo enquiry suffers from apparent illegality. He further submitted that once the enquiry officer found the petitioner to be exonerated from the charges, then the Disciplinary Authority would have considered the same and by recording reasons would have directed for re-enquiry on the charges levelled in the charge-sheet dated 28.11.2016. 10. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon Division Bench's judgment of this Court passed in Writ-A No.1055 of 2016 [Dr. Atul Darbari v. State of U.P. and another], wherein the similar question was subject-matter of consideration. 11. 10. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon Division Bench's judgment of this Court passed in Writ-A No.1055 of 2016 [Dr. Atul Darbari v. State of U.P. and another], wherein the similar question was subject-matter of consideration. 11. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel submitted that although the impugned order directing de novo enquiry does not contain reason but the reason has been recorded in paragraph 14 of the counter affidavit. 12. He further submitted that the impugned order does not suffer from infirmity or illegality and is just and valid order. In this view of the matter, the writ petition, being misconceived writ petition, is liable to be dismissed. 13. In rebuttal of the submissions advanced by learned Standing Counsel, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi & others reported, (1978) AIR SC 851 . 14. After having heard the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, I perused the material of the writ petition, counter affidavit and rejoinder affidavit. 15. On perusal of the impugned order, it is well established that no reasons have been recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in regard to dissatisfaction with the enquiry report submitted by the Enquiry Officer on 10.3.2017. It has further been transpired that respondent no.2-Director Panchayat Raj, Lucknow was appointed Enquiry Officer with the direction to submit enquiry report within fifteen days. In the enquiry report submitted on 10.3.2017, the Enquiry Officer found the charges to be not proved against the petitioner. In case the Disciplinary Authority was not satisfied and was not with the agreement of the enquiry report, then he would have recorded the reasons for dissatisfaction of the enquiry report and would have proceeded to appoint an Enquiry Officer for de novo enquiry. 16. While dealing with the similar issue, Division Bench of this Court in the case of Dr. Atul Darbari (supra), has held in paragraphs 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 as under: "8. Be that as it may, the question is whether the disciplinary authority could have resorted to such a practice of abandoning the enquiry already undertaken and resort to appointment of a fresh enquiring officer. 10. Atul Darbari (supra), has held in paragraphs 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 as under: "8. Be that as it may, the question is whether the disciplinary authority could have resorted to such a practice of abandoning the enquiry already undertaken and resort to appointment of a fresh enquiring officer. 10. We have occasion to peruse the order impugned and find that nothing has been enumerated in the order impugned to indicate the points of disagreement with the enquiry reports in question. While passing the order impugned the competent authority at no point of time had considered any concrete material available on record for disagreeing with the earlier enquiry reports dated 29.9.2014 and 14.10.2014. 13. The controversy in hand has been subjected to detailed scrutiny by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in K. R. Deb V/s. the Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, (1971) AIR SC 1447 in which Hon'ble Apex Court has proceeded to examine the question in the context of Rule 15 (1) Rule 15(1) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1957. It was a case where an enquiry was ordered against a sub-Inspector, Central Excise. The inquiry officer held that the charge was not proved. Thereafter the disciplinary authority appointed another inquiry officer "to conduct a supplementary open inquiry". Such supplementary inquiry was conducted and a report that there was "no conclusive proof" to "establish the charge" was made. Not satisfied, the disciplinary authority thought it fit that "another inquiry officer should be appointed to inquire afresh into the charge". In K.K. Deb's case (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that an Enquiry Officer may be asked by the Disciplinary Authority to record further evidence if there had been no proper enquiry because of some serious defect or because some important witnesses were not examined. The Court categorically held therein that the previous enquiry could not be set aside on the ground that the report of the Enquiry Officer did not appeal to the disciplinary Authority. Relevant paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment are reproduced hereinafter:- "12. The Court categorically held therein that the previous enquiry could not be set aside on the ground that the report of the Enquiry Officer did not appeal to the disciplinary Authority. Relevant paragraphs 12 and 13 of the judgment are reproduced hereinafter:- "12. It seems to us that Rule 15, on the face of it, really provides for one inquiry but it may be possible if in a particular case there has been no proper enquiry because some serious defect has crept into the inquiry or some important witnesses were not available at the time of the inquiry or for some other reason, the Disciplinary Authority may ask the Inquiry Officer to record further evidence. But there is no provision in Rule 15 for completely setting aside previous inquiries on the ground that the report of the Inquiring Officer or Officers does not appeal to the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority has enough powers to reconsider the evidence itself and come to its own conclusion under Rule 9. 13. In our view the rules do not contemplate an action such as was taken by the Collector on February 13, 1962. It seems to us that the Collector, instead of taking responsibility himself, was determined to get some officer to report against the appellant. The procedure adopted was not only not warranted by the rules but was harassing to the appellant." 14. In Union of India and others V/s. P. Thayagarajan, (1999) 1 SCC 733 = 1999 2 AIR 106 (SC), the Supreme Court reiterated the principle that the disciplinary authority could order a denovo enquiry when it found that the enquiry officer had not followed the correct procedure in taking the evidence of witnesses and not merely because the Enquiry Officer's report did not appeal to the said authority. 15. In Kanailal Bera V/s. Union of India and others, (2007) 11 SCC 517 , the Supreme Court observed: "6. . . . . . . Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges leveled against him or not. . . . . . . Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges leveled against him or not. In a given situation further evidences may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the selfsame charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry. " 16. It appears that the respondent no.1 dissatisfied with such earlier enquiry reports, ordered a de novo enquiry under the impugned order dated 4.2.2016 and appointed Shri Rudra Kumar Gupta, Special Secretary, Labour Department, Government of UP as Enquiry Officer. This practice of the respondent no.1 in carelessly and callously discarding enquiry reports, which are not to its liking and ordering for denovo enquiry without even disclosing the reasons, which weighed with it for rejecting the findings of the previous enquiry Officer, is a clear transgression of the law and requires to be deprecated in the strongest terms. 17. In Union of India V/s. M. L. Capoor and others, (1974) AIR SC 87, the Supreme Court observed: "28. . . . Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. . . . " 17. In the case of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in paragraph 8 as under: "8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge get validated by additional grounds later brought out. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji, (1952) AIR SC 16 (at p.18): "Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself." Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older." 18. The same view has also been approved by Hon'ble Apex Court in Nand Kumar Verma v. State of Jharkhand and others reported in, (2012) 3 SCC 580 and Vijay Shankar Pandey v. Union of India and another reported, (2014) 10 SCC 589 . 19. The Disciplinary Authority could order a de novo enquiry when it found that the enquiry officer had not followed the correct procedure in taking the evidence of witnesses and not merely because the Enquiry Officer's report did not appeal to the said authority. 20. Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges leveled against him or not. In a given situation further evidences may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the selfsame charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry. 21. On perusal of the impugned order, it is reflected that there is no reason recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in regard to dissatisfaction with the enquiry report, thus the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is fully applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case. 22. 21. On perusal of the impugned order, it is reflected that there is no reason recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in regard to dissatisfaction with the enquiry report, thus the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner is fully applicable to the present facts and circumstances of the case. 22. Perusal of the order impugned and the record in question, this much is accepted position that at no point of time, Disciplinary Authority has proceeded to give any reason for disagreement with the earlier enquiry report dated 10.3.2017. Therefore, in these circumstances, there is no justification for conducting a second enquiry on the very charges. 23. In view of the law reports relied upon, it is well established that the Disciplinary Authority, if is not satisfied with the enquiry report, he is not permitted to appoint another Enquiry Officer without recording reasons for dissatisfaction with the enquiry report. If it is permitted, there shall be harassment of the employee which will not in the interest of public service. 24. In view of the law-reports cited above, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the impugned order dated 20.7.2017 for de novo enquiry against the petitioner on the same charges without recording reasons of dissatisfaction is illegal and arbitrary, thus is liable to be set aside. 25. Accordingly, order dated 20.7.2017 is set aside and the writ petition succeeds and is accordingly allowed. The respondents are directed to take appropriate decision in the light of enquiry report dated 10.3.2017 within a period of two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.