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2019 DIGILAW 307 (HP)

Punjab Singh v. State Of Himachal Pradesh

2019-03-25

TARLOK SINGH CHAUHAN

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JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeks quashing and setting aside of FIR No. 22/16, dated 27.01.2016, registered at Police Station, Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P., under Sections 354, 451, 323, 504, 506 and 34 IPC and consequential proceedings now pending before learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class-2, Kangra, H.P. 2. The case of the prosecution is that on 24.01.2016 one Veena Devi, mother of respondent No.2, made a complaint on phone to the police station, Nagrota Bagwan, which was entered in the 'Roznamcha' vide rapat No.24, complaining therein regarding the beatings administered to her by the sons of Punjab Singh, pursuant to which she was medically examined and thereafter the impugned FIR came to be registered. 3. After completion of investigation, the petitioners were charged with the offences punishable under Sections 354, 451, 323, 504, 506 and 34 IPC and final report to this effect stands filed before the trial Magistrate. 4. Shri Ajay Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, has vehemently argued that the proceedings initiated by the complainant apparently appear to be nothing, but a ploy to subjugate the petitioners and, therefore, should be quashed as even the statements of the witnesses recorded by the prosecution during the course of investigation have not supported the case as set out by the complainant. 5. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the following judgments:- (i) Waryam Singh and another versus Amarnath and another, (1954) AIR SC 215; (ii) Nagendra Nath Bora and another versus Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and others, (1958) AIR SC 398; (iii) Babhutmal Raichand Oswal versus Laxmibai R. Tarte and another, (1975) AIR SC 1297; (iv) State of Haryana and others versus Ch.Bhajan Lal and others, (1992) AIR SC 604; (v) Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj and another versus Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another, (1996) AIR SC 309. 6. On the other hand, the State has opposed the petition on the ground that the contents of the FIR coupled with the statements of Raj Kumari and other witnesses clearly make out a case for commission of the offences under the aforesaid sections and, therefore, the proceedings ought not be quashed. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the investigation and other material placed on record. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the investigation and other material placed on record. 8. At the outset, it needs to be stated that law as regards the scope of section 482 Cr.P.C. is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions out of which I need only refer to the case of Indian Oil Corporation versus NEPC India Ltd. and others, (2006) 6 SCC 736 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court after considering its earlier judgments, laid down the following principles governing the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C., as under:- "Re : Point (i) 12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few - Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 , State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal, (1992) Supp1 SCC 335, Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194 , Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., (1996) 5 SCC 591 , State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agrawalla, (1996) 8 SCC 164 , Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259 , Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 269 , Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 , M. Krishnan vs Vijay Kumar, (2001) 8 SCC 645 , and Zandu Phamaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122 . The principles, relevant to our purpose are : (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out : (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceedings are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not." 9. The principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction particularly with regard to quashing of charge or criminal proceedings in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 Cr.P.C. or together, as the case may be, were thereafter summarized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor versus Ramesh Chander and another, (2012) 9 SCC 460 as follows:- "1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. 2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. 3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. 4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. 5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. 6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. 7. The process of the Court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. 8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a 'civil wrong' with no 'element of criminality' and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the Court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 9. Even in such cases, the Court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. 9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction, the Court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. 10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. 11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. 12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. 13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. 14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. 15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. {Ref. State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors., (1982) AIR SC 949; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. {Ref. State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Swapan Kumar Guha & Ors., (1982) AIR SC 949; Madhavrao Jiwaji Rao Scindia & Anr. v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre & Ors., (1988) AIR SC 709; Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., (1993) AIR SC 892; Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr. v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Ors., (1996) AIR SC 309; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2000) AIR SC 754; Ajay Mitra v. State of M.P., (2003) AIR SC 1069; M/s. Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors.,1988 AIR SC 128; State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, (1996) 7 SCC 705 ; Ganesh Narayan Hegde v. s. Bangarappa & Ors., (1995) 4 SCC 41 ; Zundu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Ors., (2005) AIR SC 9; M/s. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. M/s. Biological E. Ltd. & Ors., (2000) AIR SC 1869; Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 466 ; V.V.S. Rama Sharma & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2009) 7 SCC 234 ; Chunduru Siva Ram Krishna & Anr. v. Peddi Ravindra Babu & Anr., (2009) 11 SCC 203 ; Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1987) AIR SC 877; State of Bihar & Anr. v. P.P. Sharma & Anr., (1991) AIR SC 1260; Lalmuni Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar & Ors., (2001) 2 SCC 17 ; M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh & Anr., (2001) 8 SCC 645 ; Savita v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 12 SCC 338 ; and S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat & Anr., (2001) 7 SCC 659 }. 16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance of the requirements of the offence." 10. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance of the requirements of the offence." 10. It would be noticed that the judgments referred to above in fact take into consideration the majority of the judgments that have been relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 11. Now, bearing in mind the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, if the allegations made in the FIR coupled with the statements of some of the complainant witnesses are taken into consideration, it would be noticed that prima facie a case against the petitioners is clearly made out as many of the witnesses have supported the case of the complainant. No doubt, some of the witnesses examined have not supported the case as set out by the complainant, but that cannot be a ground to quash the proceedings. I need not to delve and deal with such statements, lest it causes prejudice to either of the parties, more particularly, the petitioners. Moreover, the medical evidence and the recoveries effected during the course of the investigation, prima facie, support the case of the complainant. The version put-forth by the complainant is duly corroborated by her mother Smt. Veena Devi and brother Jitender Kumar whose statements have been video graphed. 12. This Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not function as a Court of appeal or revision and would normally refrain from prima facie decision in a case like the one in hand where some of the witnesses support the case of the victim, whereas, some of them do not. The powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution. 13. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition and the same is dismissed as such. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of. 14. However, it is made clear that this Court has not expressed its opinion on the merits of the case and the trial Court shall proceed to decide the same uninfluenced by any of the observations made hereinabove.