JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. The appellant is the complainant, who aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondent in a case instituted by him under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short the 'Act'), has filed the instant appeal. 2. It is averred that the appellant and respondent were having friendly relations as the respondent was doing the business of fast food and milk made items, whereas the appellant was supplying milk to him for the aforesaid purpose. After settlement and reconciliation of accounts, the respondent issued cheque No.275900 dated 31.8.2011 amounting to Rs.2,20,000/- payable at Kangra Co-operative Bank Ltd. Branch Office, Katrain. However, the same was dishonoured due to "insufficient funds" in the account of the respondent. Thereafter, the appellant issued a statutory legal notice to the respondent on 13.10.2011, which was duly replied by the respondent wherein it was alleged that cheque book of the respondent from serial Nos. 275893 to 275900 was misplaced. 3. After recording the preliminary evidence, the respondent was summoned; notice of accusation under Section 138 of the Act was put to the respondent, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 4. The appellant examined himself as CW-1 and he also examined CW-2 Rahul. The statement of respondent under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded to which he denied the case of the appellant and thereafter the respondent led evidence and in addition to examine himself, examined two additional witnesses. The learned trial Court after evaluating the same, dismissed the complaint, constraining the appellant/complainant to file the instant appeal. 5. It is vehemently contended by Mr. G.R. Palsra, learned counsel for the appellant that the findings recorded by the learned Court below are perverse as it has failed to take into consideration the presumption attached to the Negotiable Instrument under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act as the accused/respondent has not been able to dispel such presumption by establishing probable defence whereby the onus would again shifted to the complainant. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent would vehemently argue that since a false case has been fastened against the respondent, therefore, he is rightly acquitted by the learned Court below. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material placed on record. 7. Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, read as under "118. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the material placed on record. 7. Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, read as under "118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments.-Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:- (a) of consideration - that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; (b) as to date that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; (c) as to time of acceptance that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity; (d) as to time of transfer that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity; (e) as to order of endorsements that the endorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon; (f) as to stamps that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped; (g) that holder is a holder in due course that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course: Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him. 1 [139. Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.]" 8. In Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated and summarized the principles relating to presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and rebuttal thereof in the following manner: "26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent-claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat, (2008) 4 SCC 54 may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. 27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. 28. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. Keeping this in view, it is a settled position that when an accused has to rebut the presumption under Section 139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of "preponderance of probabilities". Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. As clarified in the citations, the accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own." 9. Judged in light of the aforesaid exposition of law, it would be noticed that the specific case of the appellant is that he had supplied milk to the respondent and it was in lieu thereof that the respondent had issued cheque Ext. CB to him. However, in the entire complaint or earlier thereto in the notice issued under section 138 of the Act, the appellant has failed to mention the rate of milk, payment if any due and place on record the alleged settlement. In absence of such details, it would not be proper for the Court to expect the respondent to answer such vague claim. Nonetheless, the respondent has led sufficient evidence to prove that his cheque book containing signed and unsigned cheque was lost. On 30.8.2010 the respondent in fact had not only lodged complaint to his banker Ext. D-1 but had also lodged a complaint with the police Ex.DW-3/A. The version putforth by the respondent is duly corroborated by DW-1 Kusam Chand, Branch Manager, Kangra Central Cooperative Bank, Katrain and DW-3 HHC Uttam Chand. 10. Apart from the above, in case the appellant/complainant had in fact supplied milk to the respondent, even then the least that was expected from him was to have maintained some accounts. 11. Having failed to do so, obviously I find no illegality with the orders passed by the learned Court below whereby the respondent has been acquitted. Thus, in the given circumstances, even the presumption as is attached to the Negotiable Instruments Act under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act is of no assistance to the appellant. 12. No infirmity much less illegality can be found in the judgment passed by learned Magistrate and the same warrants no interference. 13. Accordingly, there is no merit in this appeal and consequently the same is dismissed, so also the pending application(s) if any.