JUDGMENT : S. Vaidyanathan, N. Anand Venkatesh, JJ. (Prayer: Appeal filed under Section 374 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to call for the records and set aside the sentence and conviction imposed by the Hon'ble Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni in S.C.No.48 of 2011 dated 28.06.2017.) “Man, when perfected, is best of animals, but when separated from the law and justice, he is worst of all - said Plato, an Athenian Philosopher The Appellant herein, who is the Sole Accused in S.C.No.48 of 2011 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni, stands convicted by the Trial Court for an offence under Section 302 IPC as follows: Sl. No. Conviction Sentence 1. Section 302 IPC To undergo Life Imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000/- in default to pay fine to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for further period of One Year. Aggrieved by the order of the Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni, the Appellant has preferred the present Criminal Appeal before this Court. During pendency of the appeal, this Court, by its order dated 24.09.2018, had suspended the substantive sentence of imprisonment and thereby, the Appellant is on bail now. 2. The brief case of the prosecution is that the appellant / accused and the deceased are husband and wife, whose marriage was solemnized on 25.05.2009 and out of their marriage, they were blessed with a female child. It was alleged that on 20.07.2010 at about 05.30 p.m., when the accused was in his house, his wife / deceased insisted upon him to redeem her pledged jewels and annoyed by her repeated insistence, the accused had attacked on the left backside of the deceased with stick and thereafter, poured kerosene on the deceased. Immediately, the deceased was taken to the hospital, wherein she succumbed to death due to sustenance of severe injury. Though a case was initially registered for an offence under Section 307 IPC on the basis of the complaint given by the deceased herself before her death to P.W.14 (Special Sub Inspector of Police, Bodi, after the demise of the deceased, the case was altered into the one punishable under Section 302 IPC by way of an alteration report dated 27.07.2010. 3. 3. After investigation, a charge sheet was laid before the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Bodinayakanur in P.R.C.No.41 of 2010 and was subsequently, made over to the Court of Sessions as per Section 209 Cr.P.C. for trial after furnishing requisite documents to the accused in terms of Section 207 Cr.P.C. The prosecution, in order to substantiate the offence against the appellant / accused, has examined 20 witnesses, marked 16 documents and exhibited 7 Material Objects and on the side of the accused, neither any witness was examined nor documents marked. The accused was questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and he denied the charges levelled against him. The Trial Court, after analyzing the evidence let in by the prosecution, found the accused guilty of the offence and convicted him as stated supra. 4. According to the learned counsel appearing for the Appellant / accused that the dying declaration allegedly given by the deceased was a tutored one, as a cumulative reading of the depositions of P.Ws.1 to 3 discloses the fact that the dying declaration was not true and voluntary on the simple reason that they were not present on the spot at the time of occurrence. Secondly, P.Ws.1, 6 and 16 had merely stated that there was a fire, which got spread over the body of the deceased and nowhere, they had stated that the Appellant had set fire on the deceased and it was the deceased, who, in order to threaten the accused to commit suicide, had poured kerosene on her by way of self immolation, which is evident from the deposition of P.W.16. It was deposed by P.W.16 in her cross examination that prior to the death of her daughter-in-law, she had informed that for the purpose of causing fear in the minds of the accused, she had poured kerosene by herself. 5. It was also pleaded that in the complaint given by the deceased, it was stated that her jewels were pledged with Kosamattam Finance Company by the accused, which was the main root cause for the entire problem. However, the deposition of P.Ws.2 and 3 is otherwise, as they had categorically admitted in their cross that all the articles including jewels were with them and though the Manager of Kosamattam Finance Company was examined, no documents in support thereof were seized by the Investigating Officer and thereby, the prosecution had failed to prove the motive beyond reasonable doubt. However, the deposition of P.Ws.2 and 3 is otherwise, as they had categorically admitted in their cross that all the articles including jewels were with them and though the Manager of Kosamattam Finance Company was examined, no documents in support thereof were seized by the Investigating Officer and thereby, the prosecution had failed to prove the motive beyond reasonable doubt. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the Appellant / accused has submitted that the recovery of M.O.3 / Stick was spoken to by P.W.8, who is an interested witness and is the grandfather of the deceased and there are a lot of contradictions in his evidence and though he had stated in the chief examination that Police obtained his signature immediately after seizing the stick, in his cross, it was deposed that he had signed on the recovery mahazar at the Police Station. Thus, it is clear that the recovery itself is an artificial one and the Police had obtained signature from P.W.8 on the pre-written mahazar, which is fatal to the case of the prosecution. 7. It was the case put forth by the learned counsel for the Appellant that P.W.6 / neighbour of the deceased had stated that when she enquired the deceased, her mother and the aunt of the deceased, as to what happened to the deceased, as she was covered with a cloth, it was informed by them that the deceased sustained injuries on account of fire and even at that point of time, there was no mention of the name of the accused for the cause of the fire on the deceased. Even as per the version of P.Ws.1 to 3, it was the accused, who brought the deceased downstairs and it is quite ironical that he, having set fire on the deceased, would not have taken steps to rescue her. 8. Even as per the version of P.Ws.1 to 3, it was the accused, who brought the deceased downstairs and it is quite ironical that he, having set fire on the deceased, would not have taken steps to rescue her. 8. Per contra, Mr.S.Chandrasekar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State would submit that there was a motive behind the murder of the deceased on account of strained relationship between the accused and the deceased, which was duly established by the prosecution through ocular testimony and the dying declaration that was recorded from the deceased, which forms the basis for registration of an FIR in this case and it clearly points out the fact that it was the appellant alone, who had poured kerosene on the deceased and set fire and there is no ground to suspect the dying declaration. He further submitted that the evidence of the postmortem Doctor (P.W.18) and the Postmortem Certificate, marked as (Ex.P.10) clearly indicate that the deceased had died only on account of burns and its complications. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor therefore concluded his arguments by submitting that the Court below has considered the oral and documentary evidence and has come to the correct conclusion that the appellant has committed the murder and the case squarely falls under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Since the prosecution had proved the offence committed by the appellant/accused beyond any reasonable doubt, he is not entitled to any leniency from this Court and thus, prays for dismissal of this appeal. 9. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on either side and perused the materials available on record. 10. The questions that arise for consideration in this case, are: (i) Whether the prosecution, through the testimonies of witnesses, exhibits and material objects marked, is able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt? (ii) Whether the reasons assigned by the trial Court in the impugned judgment for convicting and sentencing the appellant/accused are sustainable? 11. The primary contention raised on the side of the accused was that the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate, on the basis of which, the Trial Court proceeded to convict the accused, cannot be acceptable. (ii) Whether the reasons assigned by the trial Court in the impugned judgment for convicting and sentencing the appellant/accused are sustainable? 11. The primary contention raised on the side of the accused was that the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate, on the basis of which, the Trial Court proceeded to convict the accused, cannot be acceptable. First of all, it is not correct on the part of the prosecution to have added the Magistrate as a witness for the purpose of subjecting him for cross examination in the witness box in respect of dying declaration, as it should have been done through an Investigating Officer with a corroboration of a Doctor as a witness. In fact, in the judgment relied upon by the accused, which was rendered by us in Crl.A.(MD) No.478 of 2017 [Gurusamy vs. The State Rep. by the Inspector of Police, Ettayapuram Police Station] decided on 17.09.2019, apart from the Magistrate, one more dying declaration was obtained by the Sub-Inspector of Police therein and that was not the case herein. Since the entire case of the prosecution revolves around the dying declaration obtained by the Magistrate, the foremost thing to be considered in this case is, as to whether the mandatory procedures have been duly followed by the Magistrate before getting the dying declaration in the light of several judgments of the Apex Court. 12. It was averred by the accused that the dying declaration is a tutored one, as the deceased started telling a different version, implicating the name of the accused in the occurrence, after the arrival of her mother and sister to the hospital. In support of his submission, he drew the attention of this Court to the proceedings of recording dying declaration, recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, Bodi, in which there was no answer from the mouth of the deceased to the following question posed by the Magistrate: “TAMIL” By relying on the same, an inference was drawn by the accused that there is a possibility of the deceased being tutored by her relatives, viz., mother and sister. The above point raised by the accused cannot be decided on mere surmises and conjectures and what the law requires is to apply the strictest scrutiny and the closest circumspection to the statement made by the deceased in the dying declaration before acting upon it. 13. The above point raised by the accused cannot be decided on mere surmises and conjectures and what the law requires is to apply the strictest scrutiny and the closest circumspection to the statement made by the deceased in the dying declaration before acting upon it. 13. The word “Dying Declaration” means a statement written or verbal of relevant facts made by a person, who is dead. It is the statement of a person who had died explaining the circumstances of his death. This is based on the maxim ‘nemo mariturus presumuntur mentri’ i.e. a man will not meet his maker with lie on his mouth and our Indian law recognizes this fact that ‘a dying man seldom lies.’ or ‘truth sits upon the lips of a dying man.’ Section 32 of Indian Evidence act deals with the cases related to that person who is dead or who cannot be found. 14. The Appellant / accused pleaded innocence, stating that he had been falsely implicated in this case due to enmity. It appears that the conviction of the accused depends entirely on the reliability of the dying declaration dated 20.07.2010 given by the deceased in Ex.P.9, which is undoubtedly admissible under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act. Since the statement being obtained by way of dying declaration is not on oath, its truth cannot be tested by cross-examination and therefore, the Courts have to carefully handle the matter with utmost care and caution, on the fond hope that a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lies or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person, more particularly his / her close relatives. It is true that a dying declaration is not a deposition in Court and is neither made on oath nor in the presence of the accused. Though the dying declaration cannot be tested by cross-examination on behalf of the accused, it is an admitted piece of evidence by way of an exception to the general rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence, on the principle of necessity. 15. Though the dying declaration cannot be tested by cross-examination on behalf of the accused, it is an admitted piece of evidence by way of an exception to the general rule against the admissibility of hearsay evidence, on the principle of necessity. 15. The foremost thing to be done by the Court, while analyzing a dying declaration is that the Court must ensure that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement after the deceased had a clear opportunity to observe and identify his assailants and that he was making the statement without any influence or rancour. Once the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can be sufficient to convict a person even without any further corroboration. 16. In Lallubhai Devchand Shah and others vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1972 SC 1776 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court had laid special stress on the fact that one of the important tests of the reliability of a dying declaration is that the person, who recorded it must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and observed as follows: "The Court, therefore, blamed Dr.Pant for not questioning Trilok Singh with a view to test whether Trilok Singh was in a "fit state of mind" to make the statement. The "fit state of mind" referred to is in relation to the statement that the dying man was making. In other words, what the case suggests is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the dying man was making a conscious and voluntary statement with normal understanding." 17. A scrutiny of the proceedings of recording dying declaration dated 20.07.2010 shows that pursuant to the message received from Bodi Government Hospital, the Magistrate had gone to the Hospital for recording the dying declaration on 20.07.2010 at about 06:30pm and at that time, one Dr.Anbuchezhiyan was the Duty Doctor, who certified that the deceased, though sustained 70 to 80% burns, is fully conscious enough to give dying declaration. After obtaining the said certificate from the Doctor that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration, he recorded her statement in the presence of the Duty Doctor throughout and completed the same by 06:55 hours. After obtaining the said certificate from the Doctor that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to give dying declaration, he recorded her statement in the presence of the Duty Doctor throughout and completed the same by 06:55 hours. From the above, it is very clear that all the procedures for recording a dying declaration have been duly adhered to and the deceased was properly responding to the questions put forth by the Magistrate at the time of recording the dying declaration and therefore, there is not even a slight ground to disbelieve the case of the prosecution, as there is neither rule of law nor of prudence that dying declaration cannot be acted upon without corroboration, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Munnu Raja and another vs. The State of M.P., reported in (1976) 2 SCR 764 . 18. The next aspect to be looked into is, as to whether the dying declaration is out of any tutoring or imagination or it was voluntary in nature. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of U.P. vs. Ram Sagar Yadav and Others, reported in AIR 1985 SC 416 and Ramavati Devi vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1983 SC 164 had categorically held that If the Court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary, it can base conviction on it without corroboration. The Apex Court in K.Ramachandra Reddy and another vs. The Public Prosecutor, reported in AIR 1976 SC 1994 , further went on to emphasize that the Court has to scrutinize the dying declaration carefully and must ensure that the declaration is not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination and the deceased had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailants and was in a fit state to make the declaration. 19. It is seen that the Magistrate had obtained the dying declaration from the deceased at about 06.45pm and as per the deposition of P.W.1 in chief, she was informed about the fire in the matrimonial house of her daughter by the neighbours at 5.30pm and therefore, this Court is of the view that in the interregnum period, there is no possibility for tutoring the deceased, as the main focus would naturally be to safeguard the life of the person, who sustained injuries on account of the fire. Moreover, it was the mother of the accused / P.W.16, who accompanied the deceased all along, which was even spoken to by the deceased in the dying declaration. That being the position, the contention of the accused that the deceased was tutored to rope the accused into the crime has no legs to stand and is liable to be brushed aside. When a dying declaration is found to be suspicious, then only it should not be completely relied upon without any corroboration as per the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rasheed Beg vs. State of M.P., reported in 1974 (4) SCC 264 . Similarly, if the Court comes to a conclusion that the deceased was not conscious at the time of giving dying declaration, then the same has to be rejected as per the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Kaka Singh vs. State of M.P., reported in AIR 1982 SC 1021 , which is not the exact position in the present case on hand. 20. It was the next contention of the accused that P.Ws.1 to 3 had gone to the scene of occurrence after the entire incident and therefore, they levelled such accusations against him only on the air without any proof, for which, the accused has relied upon the deposition given by her mother / P.W.16, who had deposed that the daughter-in-law / deceased had informed her that only to instil fear in the minds of the accused, she had poured kerosene on her own. However, there is no iota of evidence to show that the deceased had poured kerosene on her own and set fire and what had actually happened upstairs is known only to the accused, who, in his 313 statement, had not attempted to defend himself and explain what actually happened, except mechanically and casually denying the charges, as tutored by his Counsel. If the contention of the accused, that the evidence of interested witnesses cannot be accepted, is taken note of, naturally, the evidence of P.W.16, who is an interested witness insofar as the accused is concerned, will go automatically. 21. If the contention of the accused, that the evidence of interested witnesses cannot be accepted, is taken note of, naturally, the evidence of P.W.16, who is an interested witness insofar as the accused is concerned, will go automatically. 21. It is appropriate to mention here that the main object of examination of the accused under section 313 Cr.P.C. is to establish a direct dialogue between the court and the accused and to put every important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain them, as held by the Apex Court in Sanatan Naskar & Another vs. State of West Bengal (AIR 2010 SC 3507). In the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed that the examination of the accused is not a mere formality and the questions put to the accused and answers given by him, have great use. The scope of section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is wide and is not a mere formality. The object of recording the statement of the accused under section 313, Cr.P.C. is to put all incriminating evidence to the accused so as to provide him an opportunity to explain such incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution. The scope of the section 313 Cr.P.C is based on the Principles of Natural Justice “Audi Alteram Partem” which means that no one should be condemned unheard. The examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. enables the accused to explain case against him. The explanation relates to have bearing on guilt or innocence of accused. 22. The accused can be examined under section 313, Cr.P.C. in every enquiry or trial, as contemplated under Section 2(g) of the Cr.P.C., which denotes that “enquiry means any enquiry other than a trial conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court”. The Accused in this case, having missed the bus, cannot, at this distant point of time, make a huge hue and cry that he was falsely implicated in this case. Interesting aspect of the matter is that, to a question, which was posed in his favour, he had simply reiterated the one word answer “false” without application of mind and the said question is extracted below for the sake of better understanding: “TAMIL” 23. Interesting aspect of the matter is that, to a question, which was posed in his favour, he had simply reiterated the one word answer “false” without application of mind and the said question is extracted below for the sake of better understanding: “TAMIL” 23. On a perusal of the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, it could be seen that it was the accused, who poured kerosene on the accused after attacking her with stick, which was disclosed by the deceased to them, apart from stating so in the dying declaration given before the Magistrate. For the purpose of medical corroboration as to whether the deceased had died on account of burn injuries, this Court feels it appropriate to go through the Post Mortem report of the Doctor to see whether any burn injuries are found as stated by the witnesses P.Ws.1 to 3 on the body of the deceased. 24. P.W.18 / Dr.Prabhusankar, who had commenced the post-mortem at about 01.10 a.m., on 20.07.2010, had noted the following features in his Post Mortem Certificate, dated 27.07.2010, which is marked as Ex.P.10: “Identification and caste mark: Could not be made out due to II, III burns with severe wound infections. ******* Appearances found at the Post-mortem Well-nourished body of a female, aged 19 yrs, lying on her back, mouth & eyes closed. External Examination:- (1) II, III burns with severe would infections all over the body involving head, both upper limbs, Front & back of chest, back of abdomen, right lower limb, Left thing, genitals & right foot, nearly 80% involvement. Hair Partially burns. Facial burns present. (2) Contusion 3 x 5 cm (NC) the Occipital region underlying skull intact. ***** Opinion as to cause of death: The deceased would appear to have died of Burns & its complications 3-5 hrs prior to autopsy.” 25. From the above, it could be easily understood that the deceased had died on account of severe burns and its complications and thus, the deposition given by P.Ws.1 to 3 was duly proved / corroborated with the medical evidence. 26. From the above, it could be easily understood that the deceased had died on account of severe burns and its complications and thus, the deposition given by P.Ws.1 to 3 was duly proved / corroborated with the medical evidence. 26. To controvert the contention put forth by the learned counsel for the Appellant / accused that there is a contradiction in recovery of M.O.3 / stick, which is artificial in nature, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, on the other hand, has taken us through the record to point out that all the procedures as mandated by law were duly followed by the prosecution while effecting recovery and therefore, the finding given by the Trial Court does not call for any interference by this Court, on that ground. 27. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a recent judgment in Kamlakar vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2019 (7) SCC 260 , while dealing with a case in respect of recovery, has observed as follows: “7....The blood-stained clothes of the deceased and also blood stained 'katti' was recovered at the instance of the Appellant from his house in the presence of panchas under the memorandum panchnama which are marked as Exhibits 39 and 40, which was in the presence of Subhash Waghmare (PW-13). The same had been sent to the Regional Forensic Laboratory, Aurangabad and a report had been obtained. In that circumstance, when the weapon used for committing the offence had been recovered in the manner known to law and the appropriate reports were also obtained, the contention on behalf of the Appellant that the recovery of the weapon is not believable cannot be accepted. 8. Insofar as the evidence of eye witnesses, namely, Baburao (PW-1) and Rashtrapal (PW-8) the same indicates that the entire sequence of the events as contained in the complaint have been stated. It is no doubt true that PW-1 in his cross-examination had stated that the wooden cot in the map i.e., the spot panchnama is not visible unless one enters into the house of the Accused No. 3 Dilip. He has also stated that the victim Dhammanand was killed on the spot by the Kamlakar by inflicting blow with' katti'. Further, the said witness has also been chased with intention to attack. He has also stated that the victim Dhammanand was killed on the spot by the Kamlakar by inflicting blow with' katti'. Further, the said witness has also been chased with intention to attack. As rightly taken note by the Sessions Court as well as the High Court, that even if it is assumed that the Accused Nos. 5 and 6 were at the door and had prevented Baburao (PW-1) and Rashtrapal (PW-8) at entrance of the door of the house of Accused No. 3 - Dilip, it would only indicate that they were standing at the threshold of the entrance to the house and in such circumstance there was every possibility of witnessing the occurrence of the incident in the house of the Accused. Furthermore, all other aspects relating to the earlier sequence of events which had led to the incident having occurred in the house of Dilip is taken note and when the Appellant as also the deceased were inside the house and in the circumstance the death on the spot had occurred, the death in the manner as contended by the prosecution and spoken to by PW-1 and PW-8 is to be accepted. Further the said witnesses PW-1 and PW-8 were also chased by the Appellant from the very spot where the incident occurred. That apart, the 'katti' was recovered and the forensic report also supported the case of the prosecution.” 28. In the present case, the recovery was spoken to by P.W.8 and in his examination in chief, he had stated as follows: “TAMIL” In the cross examination, it was deposed by P.W.8 as under: “TAMIL” 29. Of course, it is true that there is a contradiction in the above depositions with regard to the manner, in which the signature was obtained and the same can be justified from the fact that the cross examination was conducted after a lapse of nearly three years from the date of chief examination. Of course, it is true that there is a contradiction in the above depositions with regard to the manner, in which the signature was obtained and the same can be justified from the fact that the cross examination was conducted after a lapse of nearly three years from the date of chief examination. Leaving the said defect aside, it has to be ascertained as to whether the stick used for attacking the accused and the one recovered from the bushes are one and the same or not, for which it is apposite to have a glance at the Chemical Examination report marked as Ex.P11, in which it was affirmed that Item No.5, a stick was received for chemical examination and after its examination, it was found that there was no kerosene detected on the stick, even though kerosene was detected in other items. The deceased in her dying declaration had stated that the accused, after beating her with stick, had poured kerosene on her and therefore, it could be inferred that the accused would not have touched the stick after pouring kerosene on the deceased and as a result, there was no kerosene detected on it, but however the factum of attack with stick and its recovery cannot be denied on that ground. 30. Moreover, it is not known as to why there is enormous delay between the examination of witnesses both in chief as well as cross examination on the part of the accused, as the date of chief examination of P.W.1 was 06.08.2013 and she was cross examined only on 13.02.2017 after filing an application for recalling P.W.1. Similarly, P.W.2 was examined in chief as early as on 06.08.2013 and the accused had taken a very prolonged time of more than 3 years to cross examine him, that too after filing an application for recall of P.W.2. The same is the position with P.W.3, who was examined in chief on 06.08.2013 and cross examination was done on 13.02.2017, followed by an application for recall. 31. It was the next contention put forth by the learned counsel for the accused that despite receipt of all articles, including jewels, the plea that the murder had taken place on account of the repeated pressure of the deceased for redemption of her jewels pledged by the accused, cannot be accepted. 31. It was the next contention put forth by the learned counsel for the accused that despite receipt of all articles, including jewels, the plea that the murder had taken place on account of the repeated pressure of the deceased for redemption of her jewels pledged by the accused, cannot be accepted. It was further contended that in the cross examination of the Manager of Kosamattam Finance Company / P.W.12, he had deposed that no documents were handed over to the Police in respect of pledging of jewels by the accused. 32. The cross examination of P.W.12 has to be read in conjunction with his examination in chief, in which he had deposed that a gold jewellery was pledged in the name of one Govindaraja for Rs.10,400/- and the same was redeemed in the year 2010. Though he was not in a position to identify the accused, there was a mention about another person by name Ayyanar, who is said to be the brother-in-law of the said Govindaraja and this Court do not want to investigate as to whether the said Govindaraja is the accused himself or not and the prosecution must have got rid of stale and the musty smell in that regard, but failed to do so. However, the case cannot be decided only on the basis of the deposition of P.W.12, who conceded that he was unable to recognize the accused. 33. On the other hand, a careful and thorough reading of the chief examination of P.W.1 unfolds the fact that the deceased was taken to her parental home on account of difference of opinion between the accused and the deceased, when she was six months pregnant along with certain articles, which could have been seedhana properties and there is no whisper about carrying jewels with them. We feel it appropriate to extract the relevant passage of the deposition of P.W.1 during her cross, which reads thus, “TAMIL” 34. In addition to the above, in the Accident Register marked as Ex.P.4, the Duty Doctor had indicated that the deceased was beaten by her husband with wooden rod over the head and she was conscious at the time of admission in the hospital and after ascertaining her consciousness, the Magistrate also obtained her dying declaration, wherein she had narrated as to what had happened exactly on the fateful day, by stating as follows: “TAMIL” 35. When a person is on the verge of his / her death, no such false story can be penned down or concocted by that person. Hence, all the circumstantial and incriminating evidences reveal the fact that it was the accused, who had poured kerosene on the deceased and caused her death. Considering the totality of the circumstances and the ocular testimony adduced on the side of the prosecution, we are of the view that there is no ground made out in the memorandum of appeal to interfere with the judgment of the Trial Court and the Appellant / accused does not deserve any mercy at the hands of this Court. 36. In fine, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed, confirming the conviction and sentence awarded vide judgment made in S.C.No.48 of 2011 dated 28.06.2017, by the learned Sessions Judge, Fast Track Mahila Court, Theni. It is made clear that the appellant shall be entitled for set off in accordance with Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the period of detention already undergone by him, if any. The appellant is directed to immediately surrender before the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate and on such surrender, the appellant shall be confined in jail to undergo the life imprisonment in view of dismissal of the appeal. It is made clear that if the appellant fails to surrender before the concerned Court, the respondent police shall secure the appellant and produce him before the Magistrate and thereafter, he shall be confined to the prison.