ORDER 1. This second appeal under section 100 of CPC has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 9.9.2017 passed by the Second Additional District Judge, Karera, District Shvipuri in Civil Appeal No. 82-A/2017, by which the appeal filed by the appellants was dismissed as barred by limitation. 2. The necessary facts for disposal of the present appeal in short are that the appellants had filed a suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction. The said suit was dismissed by the trial Court by judgment and decree dated 29.1.2013 passed in Civil Suit No. 117-A/2012. The appellants filed first appeal under section 96 of CPC on 4.4.2014 along with an application under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. The said application was dismissed by the appellate Court and consequently, the appeal has also been dismissed as barred by limitation. 3. It is submitted by the counsel for the appellants that before deciding the question of limitation, it was the duty of the appellate Court to consider the facts of the case and it should not have dismissed the application filed under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and thus, the order passed by the appellate Court, by which the application filed under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act has been rejected, is bad. To buttress his contentions, the counsel for the appellants has relied upon the judgments passed by the Supreme Court in the cases of Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 391 , Madina Begum and Another v. Shiv Murti Prasad Pandey and others reported in (2016) 15 SCC 322 and C. Venkata Swamy v. H.N. Shivanna (Dead) By Legal Representative and another, reported in (2018)1 SCC 604 . 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 5. In Vinod Kumar, Madina Begum and C. Venkata Swamy (supra), it has been held by the Supreme Court that the first appellate Court being the Court of first appeal is under a duty to deal with all issues and evidence led by the parties before recording its finding. Even before holding that the suit is barred by limitation, the First Appellate Court is under obligation to consider the pleadings and evidence led by the parties. 6. Even before holding that the suit is barred by limitation, the First Appellate Court is under obligation to consider the pleadings and evidence led by the parties. 6. The submissions made by the counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted because in the present case the appellate Court has rejected the application filed by the appellants under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and the appellate Court would get a jurisdiction to entertain the appeal only when the delay is condoned. When the application under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act was rejected, then as a natural consequence, the first appeal was also dismissed as barred by limitation. Unless and until the delay is condoned, it cannot be said that there was any appeal in the eye of law. Thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the judgments, on which reliance has been placed by the appellants, have no application to the facts of the present case, because in those cases it has been held by the Supreme Court that being the first appellate Court the appeal should not be disposed of cursorily and should be disposed of only after considering the pleadings as well as the evidence led by the parties, whereas in the present case, the question was that whether the appeal filed by the appellants before the first appellate Court was not filed because of any sufficient reason or the appellants themselves were negligent in filing the appeal. Although no argument has been advanced by the counsel for the appellants with regard to the sufficiency of reasons for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation, but in order to do complete justice, this Court has gone through the application filed under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act before the First Appellate Court. For explaining the delay of more than one year and two months it is merely stated by the appellants that since the appellants were not aware of the dismissal of the suit, therefore, they could not file the appeal within the period of limitation. The ground raised buy the appellants in the application for condonation of delay cannot be said to be sufficient warranting condonation of delay of more than one year and two months. The ground raised buy the appellants in the application for condonation of delay cannot be said to be sufficient warranting condonation of delay of more than one year and two months. Being the plaintiffs, it was the duty of the appellants to keep a track of their civil suit and in view of the fact that nowadays everybody is having a mobile phone and they have full technical facilities to contact their counsel even on mobile and having failed to do so, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellants have failed to make out any good reason before the appellate Court for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellate Court did not commit any mistake in rejecting the application filed by the appellants under section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. 7. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out warranting admission of appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. 2019 (I) MPWN 28 (SUPREME COURT) Ranjan Gogoi, CJI, R. Banumathi and Navin Sinha, JJ. Jagdish Chand v. State of Haryana Criminal Appeal No. 767 of 2012; Decided on 7.1.2019* Penal Code, 1860 -- Ss. 304B and 498A -- Evidence Act, 1872 -- S. 113B -- incident took place within seven years of marriage -- demands for dowry by accused appellants and husband -- evident from evidence -- death on account of burn injuries caused by Kerosene -- Courts below rightly convicted and sentenced appellants. [Para 7 naM lafgrk] 1860 & /kkjk 304[k rFkk 498d & lk{; vf/kfu;e] 1872 & /kkjk 113[k & fookg ds lkr o’kZ ds Hkhrj ?kVuk ?kfVr & vfHk;qä vihykFkhZx.k rFkk ifr }kjk ngst dh ek¡x & lk{; ls izdV & dSjksflu ls tyus dh {kfr;ksa ds dkj.k e`R;q & fupys U;k;ky;ksa us vihykFkhZx.k dks Bhd­gh fl)nks’k rFk naMkfn’V fd;kA [iSjk 7 JUDGMENT Gogoi, CJI.--1. The appellants who are the father­in­law and motherin­law of the deceased, one Shanti Devi, have been convicted under sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’). They have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence under section 304B IPC and for a period of one year for the offence under section 498A IPC. They have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years for the offence under section 304B IPC and for a period of one year for the offence under section 498A IPC. Sentences of fine for each of the offences had also been imposed. In appeal, the High Court, while affirming the conviction of the accused appellants, had, however, reduced the sentence so far as the offence under section 304B IPC is concerned from a period of ten years custody to a period of seven years custody. Aggrieved, this appeal has been filed. 2. The FIR in the present case was lodged by one Kalu Ram, father of the deceased, who was working as a Clerk in Government Girls High School, Pataudi. According to the complainant, the marriage between his daughter Shanti Devi and accused Raj Kumar, son of the appellants, Jagdish Chand and Mishri Devi, was solemnised on 19.4.1988. Immediately after the marriage and despite giving of sufficient gifts by the complainant to the accused party, there were demands of further dowry including demands for a scooter and television. As the complainant was unable to fulfil the demands, the deceased was turned out from the matrimonial home whereafter she stayed with her parents. This had happened on several occasions. According to the complainant, on all such occasions, the deceased returned to her matrimonial home only to be turned out again. Finally, in the night intervening 6th and 7th December, 1994, death of Shanti Devi on account of burn injuries had occurred leading to institution of the FIR in question. 3. The evidence of PW1, Dr. S.K. Gupta, who conducted the post mortem on the dead body of Shanti Devi on 8th December, 1994; the evidence of PW6, the complainant Kalu Ram; the deposition of PW7, Sarjit Singh, a co­employee of PW6; and the evidence of PW8, Sanjay, son of the complainant would be relevant to be noticed. 4. From the evidence of PW1, it transpires that the death was on account of shock due to ante mortem burns which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course. According to PW1, the extent of burns on the dead body was 100 per cent and were caused by kerosene. 5. 4. From the evidence of PW1, it transpires that the death was on account of shock due to ante mortem burns which were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course. According to PW1, the extent of burns on the dead body was 100 per cent and were caused by kerosene. 5. PW6, Kalu Ram, the complainant and father of the deceased reiterated the version stated by him in the FIR including the details of what was reported to him by the deceased with regard to her ill­treatment on account of dowry demands. PW6 also had deposed that on several occasions the deceased Shanti Devi had been turned out from the matrimonial home and she had come to stay with her parents only to go back on assurance of good behaviour finally culminating in the incident of 6th­7th, December, 1994 resulting in her death. PW7 and PW8 corroborated the evidence of PW6. 6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we have considered the matter. We have also considered the judgments of the Trial Court and that of the High Court, presently under challenge in this appeal. 7. Admittedly, death in the instant case took place within seven years of the marriage which was solemnised on 19.4.1988 and the incident of death had occurred on 7.12.1994. Though the defence had tried to prove otherwise, namely, that death had occurred beyond seven years of marriage, no concrete evidence in this regard has been forthcoming. Demands for dowry by the accused­appellants as well as the husband and ill­treatment/cruelty on failure to meet the said demands is evident from the evidence of PW6. From the evidence of PW1, it is clear that the death was on account of burn injuries suffered by the deceased which injuries were caused by use of kerosene. In the light of the aforesaid evidence, this Court has no hesitation in holding that all the three ingredients necessary to draw the presumption of commission of the offence under section 304B IPC have been proved and established by the prosecution. Consequently, the presumption under section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act has to be drawn against the accused and in the absence of any defence evidence to rebut the same, the Court has to hold the accused guilty of the offence under Section 304B IPC. Consequently, the presumption under section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act has to be drawn against the accused and in the absence of any defence evidence to rebut the same, the Court has to hold the accused guilty of the offence under Section 304B IPC. On the basis of the same consideration, the offence under section 498A must also be held to be proved against the accused persons. We, therefore, have no hesitation in dismissing the appeal and in affirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the High Court. 8. The appeal is dismissed accordingly.