Mahaveer Prasad S/o Shri Ladhu Ram v. State of Rajasthan
2019-12-19
ARUN BHANSALI
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner aggrieved against order dated 21.04.2017 (Annexure-P/3), whereby, while exercising powers under Rule 19 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958 (‘Rules of 1958’) the services of the petitioner have been terminated. 2. It is, inter alia, indicated in the writ petition that the petitioner was initially appointed as Helper under the respondents on work charge basis and was made permanent on 01.04.1987; an FIR was lodged against the petitioner at Police Station, Tibbi along with his other family members by the parents of his daughter-in-law; in connection with the said matter, the petitioner was arrested; challan was filed against him & other family members and after trial petitioner was convicted by judgment dated 27.03.2017 for offence under Sections 498-A & 304-B IPC; immediately on arrest, the petitioner was placed under suspension by order dated 31.07.2013. 3. It is indicated that the petitioner has preferred an appeal against the conviction before this Court being S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 555/2017, which has been admitted and pending consideration, in the appeal the sentence awarded to the petitioner has been suspended and the petitioner has been released on bail. 4. Based on the conviction of petitioner, the order impugned dated 21.04.2017 has been passed under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 terminating services of the petitioner. 5. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the action of the respondents in passing the order dated 21.04.2017 is without application of mind and in violation of requirements of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958. It is submitted that only because the petitioner has been convicted cannot be a reason for terminating services of the petitioner and that the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing before passing the order impugned and, therefore, the order impugned deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6. Further submissions have been made that under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958 the penalty can be imposed for good and sufficient reasons, however, no reasons have been assigned in the order impugned for imposing the penalty and on that count also the order impugned is bad. 7. Reliance was placed on judgment in The Divisional Personnel Officer Southern Railway & Anr. v. T.R. Challappan : AIR 1975 SC 2216 and Likhma Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
7. Reliance was placed on judgment in The Divisional Personnel Officer Southern Railway & Anr. v. T.R. Challappan : AIR 1975 SC 2216 and Likhma Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. : 2011 (4) RLW 2812 (Raj.). 8. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the order impugned. It was submitted that only sentence of the petitioner has been suspended, the conviction stands and, therefore, the petitioner cannot seek any indulgence. 9. Further submissions have been made that the respondents acted strictly in accordance with the Rules of 1958 and on that count also the order impugned does not call for any interference. 10. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 11. The relevant part of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 reads as under:- “19. Special procedure in certain cases : Notwithstanding anything contained in rules 16, 17 and 18, (i) whether a penalty is imposed on a Government servant on the ground of conduct which has led to him conviction on a criminal charge; or (ii) ….. ….. ….. (iii) …. ….. ….. the disciplinary Authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders as it may deems fit: Provided that the Commission shall be consulted before passing such orders in any case in which such consultation is necessary.” 12. The entire argument of learned counsel for the petitioner in the body of the writ petition and oral arguments regarding violation of provisions of Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958 is based on the judgment in the case of T.R. Challappan (supra), wherein, in para 21 while interpreting the part of the provisions requiring the disciplinary authority to consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders as it deems fit, it was laid down that there should be active application of mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge and the matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority.
The word ‘consider’ postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. 13. The above determination made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of T.R. Challappan (supra) came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel : (1985) 3 SCC 398 , wherein, it was laid down as under:- “114. …. it is thus obvious that the word ‘consider’ in its ordinary and natural sense is not capable of the meaning assigned to it in Challappan case. The consideration under Rule 14 of what penalty should be imposed upon a delinquent railway servant must, therefore, be ex parte and where the disciplinary authority comes to the conclusion that the penalty which the facts and circumstances of the case warrant is either of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, no opportunity of showing cause against such penalty proposed to be imposed upon him can be afforded to the delinquent government servant. Undoubtedly, the disciplinary authority must have regard to all the facts and circumstances of the case as set out in Challappan case. As pointed out earlier, considerations of fair play and justice requiring a hearing to be given to a government servant with respect to the penalty proposed to be imposed upon him do not enter into the picture when the second proviso to Article 311 (2) comes into play and the same would be the position in the case of a service rule reproducing the second proviso in whole or in part and whether the language used is identical with that used in the second proviso or not. There are a number of orders which are of necessity passed without hearing the party who may be affected by them. For instance, courts of law can and often do pass ex parte ad interim orders on the application of a plaintiff, petitioner or appellant without issuing any notice to the other side or hearing him. Can it, therefore, be contended that the judge or judges, as the case may be, did not apply his or their mind while passing such an order? 115.
Can it, therefore, be contended that the judge or judges, as the case may be, did not apply his or their mind while passing such an order? 115. The decision in Challappan case is, therefore, not correct with respect to the interpretation placed by it upon Rule 14 of the Railway Servants Rules and particularly upon the word ‘consider’ occurring in the last part of that rule and in interpreting Rule 14 by itself and not in conjunction with the second proviso to Article 311(2). Before parting with Challappan case, we may, also point out that that case never held the field. The judgment in that case was delivered on September 15, 1975, and it was reported in (1976) 1 SCR at pages 783. Hardly was that case reported then in the next group of appeals in which the same question was raised, namely, the three civil appeals mentioned earlier, an order of reference to a larger Bench was made on November 18, 1976. The correctness of Challappan case was, therefore, doubted from the very beginning.” (emphasis supplied) 14. As such, the judgment in the case of T.R. Challappan (supra), relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner stood overruled in so far as granting of opportunity of hearing before passing the order imposing penalty is concerned, in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) and, therefore, plea raised in this regard has no substance. It is unfortunate that an overruled judgment has been cited and submissions have been made based on the said judgment. Be that as it may. 15. So far as judgment in the case of Likhma Ram (supra) is concerned, the same only deals with consideration of circumstances relating to conduct before passing the order impugned and not in relation to providing opportunity of hearing. 16.
Be that as it may. 15. So far as judgment in the case of Likhma Ram (supra) is concerned, the same only deals with consideration of circumstances relating to conduct before passing the order impugned and not in relation to providing opportunity of hearing. 16. So far as submission in relation to the consideration on part of the disciplinary authority before passing the order is concerned, in the order impugned dated 21.04.2017 (Annexure-P/3), the authority has noticed that FIR was lodged in relation to murder of daughter-in-law of the petitioner and that the petitioner has been found guilty and convicted by the criminal court for offence under Sections 498-A & 304-B IPC and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment, based on which, the operative portion reads as under:- ^^vkSj ;r%] ;g fopkj fd;k x;k fd mDr Jh egkohj izlkn iq= Jh yk/kqjke] inuke lgk;d] xzkeh.k ty ;kstuk elkuh dk vkpj.k ftlds dkj.k mldks fl)nks"k fd;k x;k] ,slk gS tks mls tu lsok esa cuk;s j[kus ds fy, vokaNuh; gSA vr% vc jkT;iky dh vksj ls fuEu gLrk{kjdrkZ mDr Jh egkohj izlkn iq= Jh yk/kqjke] inuke lgk;d] dks jktLFkku flfoy lsok ¼lh-lh-,-½ fu;e 1958 ds fu;e 19 ds v/khu iznr 'kkfLr ¼n.M½ ds vuqlj.k esa ,rn~ }kjk lsok ls fnukad 27-03-2017 ls inP;qr djrk gSA^^ 17. From the above, it cannot be said that the disciplinary authority did not make consideration as required under Rule 19 of the Rules of 1958. 18. In so far as the submissions in relation to imposition of penalty for good and sufficient reasons under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1958 are concerned, the very fact that the petitioner has been convicted for offence under Sections 498-A & 304-B IPC and has been sentenced for a period of ten years, it cannot be said that anything further was required to be indicated in the order impugned by way of good and sufficient reasons for imposing the penalty. 19. In view of the above discussion, no case for interference in the present writ petition is made out. The petition has no substance, the same is, therefore, dismissed.