JUDGMENT : 1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 5th September, 1996 passed in Title Appeal no.259 of 1993 by the Learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Howrah reversing the judgment and decree dated 28th September, 1993 passed by the Learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, the then Munsif, 7th Court, Howrah in Title Suit no.52 of 1988 at the instance of the plaintiff/appellant. 2. The appellant as plaintiff filed the suit for eviction under West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 against the defendant/respondent on the ground of reasonable requirement and for causing nuisance and annoyance, which was registered as Title Suit no.52 of 1988 in the 7th Court of the Learned Munsif, Howrah. 3. The defendant/respondent contested the said suit by filing written statement denying the material allegations made out by the plaintiff in the plaint. The parties led evidence in support of their respective contentions in the suit. 4. The Learned trial Judge after considering the pleadings of the parties and evidences adduced by them held that the plaintiff/appellant had been able to prove that he reasonably required the suit premises and he had no reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. Accordingly, the suit was decreed. The defendant/respondent preferred an appeal in the 2nd Court of the Learned Additional District Judge, which was registered as Title Appeal no.259 of 1993. 5. The Learned Judge, 1st Appellate Court allowed the said appeal by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Learned Munsif, 7th Court at Howrah. 6. The said judgment and decree passed by the 1st Appellate Court in Title Appeal no.259 of 1993 is assailed in the instant appeal. 7. It is pertinent to mention at the outset that vide order dated 30th April, 1997, the Division Bench of this Court admitted the instant appeal for hearing under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure by passing the following order. "This appeal will be heard on the ground taken in the Memorandum of Appeal." 8. Thus it is found that at the time of admission of the appeal for hearing the Division Bench of this Court did not frame substantial questions of law involved in the instant appeal. 9. In Santosh Hazari -vs- Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , the Supreme Court held: "9. Thus it is found that at the time of admission of the appeal for hearing the Division Bench of this Court did not frame substantial questions of law involved in the instant appeal. 9. In Santosh Hazari -vs- Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs, (2001) 3 SCC 179 , the Supreme Court held: "9. The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without furnishing the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so, it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on Court. The existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100 of the Code." 10. In course of hearing of the instant appeal, substantial questions of law is framed as hereunder:- (1) Whether the Learned 1st Appellate Court committed substantial error in law in holding that notwithstanding the plaintiff/appellant having proved the bona fide need and requirement, he was not entitled to a decree for eviction on the ground that the room under occupation of the appellant would not be an answer for the requirement of the plaintiff/appellant? (2) Whether the 1st Appellate Court committed substantial error in law in setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court holding, inter alia, that the requirement of the appellant would not be fully satisfied even if a decree of eviction was passed against the respondents? 11. Mr. Debasish Roy, Learned Advocate for the appellant draws my attention on the relevant portions of the judgment passed by the Learned Additional District Judge, 2nd Court at Howrah in Title Appeal no.259 of 1993, which are reproduced below :- 12. The Learned Judge on the appreciation of the pleadings of the parties as well as the evidence on record came to a specific finding in the following words: "I shall now come straight way to the main point of dispute between the parties. The plff/respdt. has virtually wanted the decree of eviction on the grounds of reasonable requirement and the ld. court below, has passed a decree of eviction on that ground only and the defdt/appellt. has challenged that ground with all force, we find from the original plaint vide para 4 that the plff. placed his demand for four rooms and through subsequent amendment of the plaint the plff. court below, has passed a decree of eviction on that ground only and the defdt/appellt. has challenged that ground with all force, we find from the original plaint vide para 4 that the plff. placed his demand for four rooms and through subsequent amendment of the plaint the plff. has increased the demand and in fact the plff. has wanted one room for himself and his wife one room for study room for the daughter, one room for coaching centre of his wife and one room for Thakurghar and one room for store room and one room for his guest and brother and sister and one room for his full time servant from the nature of the requirement of the requirement as urged by the plff. cannot be stated that his requirement is not genuine, but the question would be whether such requirement can be fulfilled by evicting the tenant/appellt. There is no hard and fast rule to determine the reasonableness of their equipment of the landlord and in each case the court is required to make both subjective and objective analysis to satisfy itself that the landlord has a genuine requirement and which is also reasonable in the background of the facts and circumstances and by evicting the tenant all alone such requirement can be fulfilled. There is a report of the commissioner which has been marked Exbt.11 of from this report we get that the plff/resides with his family in a compact block with concrete roof and there are several rooms with R.T. shed not used by anybody. From the report of the commissioner it is available the plff. at present occupies a standard size bed room with other amenities the report of the commissioner has disclosed that the defdt./appellt. occupies a room with low height and the condition of the room is absolutely bad with damaged roof made of titles, damage window and walls, with kantacha floor and the commissioner has observed that open sky is visible from the room and there appears polythene sheet inside the room to prevent water dropping. I have observed earlier of our demand of several rooms placed by the plff. by subsequent amendment and that demand appears to be reasonable and in making such observation, I have moderate assessment regarding the status of the plff/respdt. I have observed earlier of our demand of several rooms placed by the plff. by subsequent amendment and that demand appears to be reasonable and in making such observation, I have moderate assessment regarding the status of the plff/respdt. and keeping that moderate status in my mind, I am really perplexed to answer whether the room of the tenant/appellt. would be at all habitual and fit for the plff/respdt." [Quoted from the Paper Book as it stands] On hearing both the sides and on careful analysis of the evidence and with special reference to the report the ld. Commissioner which has not been disputed by the plff/respdt. I hold that the plff. may have reasonable requirement for other rooms besides the present accommodation but by no stretch of imagination it can be stated that the room under occupation of the appellt. would be any answer for the requirement of the plff/respdt." 13. Thus, it is urged by Mr. Roy that the Learned Judge in the 1st Appellate Court concurrently found that the appellant had bona fide need of accommodation. 14. It was also found that the existing accommodation of the plaintiff was not sufficient to satisfy his genuine need. However, the Learned Judge in the 1st Appellate Court on consideration of Commissioner's report held that the respondent was in occupation of a room having low height. Condition of the room is such that the appellant could not conveniently use the said room for his own use and occupation and thirdly, the appellant's genuine need of four rooms could not be satisfied by evicting the defendant/respondent who was in possession of one room which was at the relevant point of time in damaged and dilapidated condition. 15. In my considered view the approach of the Learned Judge in 1st Appellate Court in arriving at his decision is not only erroneous but also perverse. 16. In Satyendra Nath Tagore -vs- Barindra Kumar Datta, reported in 92 CWN 758, this Court held that in a suit for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement for his own use and occupation, the landlord has to answer the two questions, namely, (1) why does he require and (2) how much does he require. It has also been held that first question is a question of law and second question is a question of fact. 17. It has also been held that first question is a question of law and second question is a question of fact. 17. In the impugned judgment, it was held by the Learned Judge in the 1st Appellate Court that the appellant had reasonable requirement and present accommodation of the appellant was not sufficient. It is needless to say that when there was some accommodation, under occupation of a tenant, that might have been available to the plaintiff and thereby would satisfy his need even partially, Court should and must pass a decree for eviction against the tenant. 18. It is not for the Court to decide as to whether the appellant would be able to use the premises in suit in its existing condition or whether he would use the same after making necessary repairing, suitable for his convenient use. 19. In a suit for eviction, landlord is the dominus litis and requirement of landlord should be given due regard, when it is established that the landlord reasonably requires additional accommodation for his own use and occupation. 20. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Babu vs. T. K. Vasudevan and ors., (2001) 8 SCC 110 is relevant for our purpose. Paragraph 14 of the aforesaid decision is reproduced below : "In our view, once it is held that the landlord requires additional accommodation for his personal use, he is entitled to utilise it to best suit his requirement. The condition in which the additional accommodation is to be used by the landlord cannot be dictated by the tenant. The first respondent may use it as it exists or he may use it after necessary repairs, additions or alterations to suit his requirements. The appellant has no say in such matters." 21. Similarly, the Court cannot refuse decree to the landlord on the ground that the tenanted premises would not be sufficient to meet the genuine need of the appellant who, according to the learned 1st appellate Court, reasonably required more accommodation than what is under the occupation of the defendant/respondent. 22. The appellant has no say in such matters." 21. Similarly, the Court cannot refuse decree to the landlord on the ground that the tenanted premises would not be sufficient to meet the genuine need of the appellant who, according to the learned 1st appellate Court, reasonably required more accommodation than what is under the occupation of the defendant/respondent. 22. The impugned judgment also suffers from gross illegality in as-much-as even after arriving at a finding in favour of the appellant on the issue of reasonable requirement, the learned Judge held that the appellant did not approach the Court in clean hand because even if the defendant/respondent is evicted, landlord's need would not be fully satisfied. 23. In view of the above discussion, the impugned judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal no.259 of 1993 by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Howrah on 5th September, 1996 can not be sustained and is liable to set aside. 24. The instant Second Appeal be and the same is thus allowed exparte without cost. 25. Judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal no.259 of 1993 dated 5th September 1996 by the learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Howrah is set aside and the judgment and decree passed in Title Suit no. 52 of 1988 is restored. 26. Respondent is directed to quit, vacate and deliver peaceful possession of the suit property within one month from the date of this judgment, failing which the appellant will be at liberty to execute the decree passed by the learned Munsif, 7th Court, Howrah dated 8th October, 1993. 27. Urgent photostat certified copy of the judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on compliance of necessary formalities.