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2019 DIGILAW 312 (GUJ)

ADMA Agro India Private Limited v. Union of India

2019-04-05

BHARGAV D.KARIA, HARSHA DEVANI

body2019
JUDGMENT : Harsha Devani, J. 1. In both these writ petitions under article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have challenged Notification No. 32/2015-2020 dated 30th August, 2018 issued by the Central Government restricting the import of peas classified under Exim Code 0713 10 00 (including Yellow peas, Green peas, Dun peas and Kaspa peas) till 30th September, 2018 as well as notification dated 28th December, 2018 restricting such imports from 1st January, 2019 to 31st March, 2019. 2. On 27.3.2019, the learned advocates for the respective parties were heard on the merits of the case and the following order came to be passed: "1. Heard Mr. Alok Yadav, learned counsel with Mr. Parth Contractor, learned advocate for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 15181 of 2018; Mr. M.C. Bhatt, learned counsel with Mr. R.D. Raval, learned advocate for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 15620 of 2018; Ms. Trusha Patel, learned standing counsel for the Director General of Foreign Trade in Special Civil Application No. 15181 of 2018; Mr. Nikunt Raval, learned standing counsel for the Director General of Foreign Trade in Special Civil Application No. 15620 of 2018 and Mr. Parth Bhatt, learned standing counsel for the respondent-customs authorities in both the petitions. 2. Arguments are concluded. Matters to be posted for dictation of judgment on 3rd April, 2019. 3. In the meanwhile, the learned standing counsel for the Director General of Foreign Trade and for the customs authorities shall file affidavits in Special Civil Application No. 15620 of 2018, explaining as to under what circumstances a huge quantity of 7500 MT of yellow peas were permitted to be imported by ETC Agro Processing India Pvt. Ltd. as is evident from the Bill of Entry at page 81 to page 100 of the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the petitioner within the short window that was available on 29th August, 2018. The learned counsel shall also place on record the exact time when the notifications dated 29th August, 2018 and 30th August, 2018 were published and made known to the public." 3. Since the above referred notifications restricted imports till 30th September, 2018 and 31st March, 2019 respectively, both the notifications have run their course and the period for which the import was restricted under those notifications has expired. Since the above referred notifications restricted imports till 30th September, 2018 and 31st March, 2019 respectively, both the notifications have run their course and the period for which the import was restricted under those notifications has expired. Subsequently, the Central Government in exercise of powers under section 3 of the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as "the Foreign Trade Act") read with paragraphs No. 1.02 and 2.01 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-2020, as amended from time to time, has issued a notification dated 29th March, 2019 revising the policy and permitting a total quantity of 1.5 lakh MT of peas to be imported against licence during the period 1st April, 2019 and 31st March, 2020, as per the procedure to be notified by the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT). Therefore, the petitions appear to have become infructuous as both the notifications which are the subject matter of challenge in the petitions are no longer in force. Nonetheless, the learned counsel for the petitioners in both the petitions, have insisted upon an order on merits. 4. Though the challenge in both the petitions is to the very same notifications, the facts are slightly different and hence a brief reference may be made to the facts of each case. 5. The facts of Special Civil Application No. 15181/2018 (hereinafter referred to as "the first petition") briefly stated, are as under: 5.1. The petitioner is a Private Limited Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and is engaged in the business of importing grains, pulses, oil seeds, crude oil, etc. 5.2. In the normal course of business, the petitioner entered into contracts dated 13.04.2018, 19.04.2018 and 20.04.2018 for import of 3191.185 MT of yellow peas falling under Chapter heading No. 0713 of the Customs Tariff Act. During the relevant period when these contracts were entered into, the import of yellow peas was free and was not subject to any restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-2020. 5.3. Pursuant to these contracts, consignments of 1044.4 MT, 386.650 MT, 708.455 MT, 509.630 MT and 542.050 MT came to India on 02.07.2018, 20.06.2018 and 29.07.2018 respectively. The goods have since then been stored at the Free Trade Warehousing Zone at Mundra Port. 5.4. Notification No. 50/2017-Cus, dated 30.06.2017 was issued by the Customs Department granting exemption from the import duty on various goods which inter alia included yellow peas. The goods have since then been stored at the Free Trade Warehousing Zone at Mundra Port. 5.4. Notification No. 50/2017-Cus, dated 30.06.2017 was issued by the Customs Department granting exemption from the import duty on various goods which inter alia included yellow peas. 5.5. Subsequently, Notification No. 4/2015-2020 dated 25.04.2018 was issued by the DGFT carrying the amendment in import policy against Exim Code 0713 10 00, whereby import of peas was placed from 'free' to 'restricted'. In other words, vide Notification No. 4/2015-2020 dated 25.4.2018, import of peas was restricted. With regard to the implementation of Notification No. 4/2015-2020, dated 25.04.2018, Trade Notice No. 05/2018 dated 9.5.2018 and Trade Notice No. 12/2018 dated 18.5.2018 were issued by the DGFT. 5.6. Subsequently, the Ministry of Commerce vide Notification No. 15/2015-2020 dated 2.7.2018, carried out further amendment in the import policy of peas and the restriction which was effective till 30.6.2018 as per Notification No. 4/2015-2020, dated 25.4.2018 was extended till 30.9.2018. 5.7. With regard to the implementation of Notification No. 4/2015-2020, dated 25.4.2018, Trade Notice No. 19/2018 dated 5.7.2018 was issued by the DGFT wherein it was clarified as under- "2. Many representations/applications have been received from various associations/importers requesting for allowing imports which are backed by part advance payments. Considering the hardship faced by the trade, it has been decided to allow imports of Peas under Exim Code 07131000 against advance payments for that much quantity proportional to the part advance payment made before 25.4.2018. 3. Eligible applicants may accordingly approach their concerned Jurisdictional Regional Authorities for registering their contracts under Para 1.05 of the FTP 2015-2020. RAs shall issue Registration Certificate for quantity proportionate to the amount paid in advance by the importer before 25.4.2018. In this regard, RAs shall verity the date with regard to payment made through Bank (SMH) along with the quantity and value as mentioned in the contract." 5.8. On request of the importers, vide Trade Notice No. 25/2018-19 dated 17.8.2018, a relaxation was provided and imports of up to 125MT of peas under Exim Code 0713 10 00 was allowed. 5.9. Meanwhile, a few importers in Madras had challenged Notification No. 4/2015-2020 dated 25.4.2018, Notification No. 15/2015-2020 dated 2.7.2018 and the Trade Notice No. 19/2018-2019 dated 5.7.2018 and Trade Notice No. 21/2018-2019 dated 6.7.2018 before the Madras High Court. 5.9. Meanwhile, a few importers in Madras had challenged Notification No. 4/2015-2020 dated 25.4.2018, Notification No. 15/2015-2020 dated 2.7.2018 and the Trade Notice No. 19/2018-2019 dated 5.7.2018 and Trade Notice No. 21/2018-2019 dated 6.7.2018 before the Madras High Court. The Madras High Court by an interim order dated 28.6.2018, stayed Notification No. 4/2015-2020, dated 25.4.2018. Thereafter, by an order dated 16.8.2018 the Madras High Court also stayed Notification No. 15/2015-20 dated 2.7.2018. When the matter came up for hearing on 24.8.2018, the interim stay came to be extended till further orders. 5.10. In compliance with the order passed by the Madras High Court, the DGFT issued Notification No.31/2015-2020 dated 29.8.2018 whereby the restriction on import of peas till 30.9.2018 was withdrawn. On 30.8.2018 the petitioners could file only two Bills of Entry for home consumption for 1331.05 MT of peas as against the total contracted/imported quantity of 3191.185 MT. 5.11. However, the DGFT again issued Notification No. 32/2015-2020, dated 30.8.2018 whereby it restricted the import of peas till 30.9.2018. The relevant portion of the notification reads as under: "S.O.(E): In exercise of powers conferred by Section 3 of FT (D & R) Act, 1992, read with paragraph 1.02 and 2.01 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-2020, as amended from time to time, the Central Government hereby, makes the following amendment in ITC (HS) 2017, Schedule 1 (Import Policy). Import of Peas classified under Exim Code 07131000 (including Yellow peas, Green peas, Dun Peas and Kaspa peas) Is "Restricted" till 30.9.2018. Effect of this Notification: Import of Peas classified under Exim Code 07131000 (including Yellow peas, Green peas, Dun Peas and Kaspa peas) is "Restricted" till 30.9.2018." 5.12. Being aggrieved the petitioner filed the present petition challenging the said notification. Subsequently, by a notification dated 28.12.2018 the import of peas came to be restricted till 31.3.2019, moved an amendment to the petition challenging the said notification which was allowed. 6. In Special Civil Application No. 15620/2018 (hereinafter referred to as "the second petition"), the petitioner is engaged in the business of import and export of the agricultural products including the peas. It is the case of the petitioner that by a notification dated 2.7.2018, export of the peas was restricted upto 30.9.2018. 6. In Special Civil Application No. 15620/2018 (hereinafter referred to as "the second petition"), the petitioner is engaged in the business of import and export of the agricultural products including the peas. It is the case of the petitioner that by a notification dated 2.7.2018, export of the peas was restricted upto 30.9.2018. However, the petitioner came to know on 29.8.2018 that by notification No. 31/2015-2020, the restriction imposed on import of peas came to be withdrawn and as a result thereof, it was open to import the peas. Therefore, on the same day, he placed two orders and paid necessary amounts. The two orders consisted of the deal to supply 50,000 MT + 3000 MT of yellow peas. The total amount payable for 3000 MT of yellow peas was USD 6,30,000 which is approximately equal to Rs. 4,50,00,000/-+ Rs. 36,00,000/- token advance. 6.1. It is further the case of the petitioner that late in the evening on 30.8.2018, he was informed about the impugned Notification No. 32/2015-2020 which again imposed restriction on import of peas. Since the notification required the petitioner to apply for registration of contracts because he had placed the order in the evening of 29.8.2018 telephonically and arranged to make the payment through bank which led to proforma invoice being generated in the morning of 30.8.2018, the petitioner applied for registration of contract vide letter dated 1.9.2018 and also sent for registration to the DGFT by e-mail on 5.9.2018. However, the respondents did not give registration for import in view of the fact that the restrictions had been re-imposed. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the present petition. 6.2. During the pendency of the petition, the earlier notification dated 30.8.2018 came to be extended by a subsequent notification dated 28.12.2018. Hence, the petitioner was permitted to amend the petition for challenging such notification. 7. Mr. Alok Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner in the first petition submitted that the petitioner had executed the contracts prior to the restriction being introduced for the first time on 25.4.2018. It was submitted that once the withdrawal Notification No. 31/2015, dated 29.8.2018 was issued by virtue of which the restriction up to 30.9.2018 under Notification No. 15/2015, dated 2.7.2018 was withdrawn, there was no restriction on import of yellow peas. In other words, by virtue of the withdrawal notification dated 29.8.2018, there was no restriction. It was submitted that once the withdrawal Notification No. 31/2015, dated 29.8.2018 was issued by virtue of which the restriction up to 30.9.2018 under Notification No. 15/2015, dated 2.7.2018 was withdrawn, there was no restriction on import of yellow peas. In other words, by virtue of the withdrawal notification dated 29.8.2018, there was no restriction. Thus, the import of the yellow peas during the period 25.4.2018 (the date of first restriction notification) till 29.8.2018 was free. Thus, during the period June-July 2018, when the shipments came to India in terms of the three contracts dated 13.4.2018, 19.4.2018 and 20.4.2018, there was no restriction at all on import of yellow peas. According to the learned counsel there was not even a shadow of restriction prevailing on the yellow peas up to 29.8.2018 and hence the petitioner should be allowed to clear the yellow peas imported by it because there was no restriction at all before 30.8.2018. It was further submitted that Notification No. 31/2015 dated 29.8.2018 by which the restriction was withdrawn does not even refer to the first restriction Notification No. 4/2015 dated 25.4.2018 and only gives a reference to the subsequent restriction Notification No. 15/2015 dated 2.7.2018. According to the learned counsel, therefore, for the period prior to 2.7.2018, there seems to be no restriction at all. 7.1. The learned counsel further contended that Notification No. 32/2015-2020 dated 30.8.2018 is bad in law inasmuch as it is a standalone notification issued for the first time on 30.8.2018. It does not even refer to any of the past restricting notifications nor does it try to save the acts done for the past period under the earlier restricting notifications. It was contended that Notification No. 32/2015 dated 30.8.2018 creates a restriction for the first time on 30.8.2018 for the imports made prior to its date on the basis of already concluded contracts. 7.2. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in All India Steel Re-Rollers Association v. Union of India, 2017(347) E.L.T. 53 (M.P.), for the proposition that the law as to whether a circular will apply retrospectively or not, is well settled. 7.2. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in All India Steel Re-Rollers Association v. Union of India, 2017(347) E.L.T. 53 (M.P.), for the proposition that the law as to whether a circular will apply retrospectively or not, is well settled. The court held that it was not in dispute that the Government of India is empowered to make amendments with retrospective effect, thereby taking away the rights, which had already accrued in favour of the importers under a scheme. The Government has, otherwise, to amend, modify or withdraw a particular scheme, which gives benefits to a particular category of persons under the said scheme. At the same time, if some vested right had accrued in favour of the beneficiaries of the scheme thereby they became entitled, that cannot be snatched from any persons/exporters by making amendments retrospectively. 7.3. Reliance was also placed upon the decision of Bombay High Court in case of Parag Milk & Milk Products Ltd. v. Union of India, 2007 (216) E.L.T. 664 (Bom.), wherein the court held that while the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any other ulterior criteria. The basic requirement of article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat for fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for discernible reasons, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. It was held that if the contracts had been completed before the date of restriction, then a vested right accrues in favour of the beneficiaries, which cannot be disturbed by making subsequent amendments. 7.4. It was held that if the contracts had been completed before the date of restriction, then a vested right accrues in favour of the beneficiaries, which cannot be disturbed by making subsequent amendments. 7.4. The learned counsel further submitted that in the facts of the present case, undisputedly, contracts were executed and 10% advance payments for the same, as contemplated under the contracts, were made prior to the date of the first restriction dated 25.4.2018 or restriction dated 2.7.2017 and restriction dated 30.8.2018 and, therefore, these notifications cannot curtail the right of the petitioner and the petitioner had correctly imported the yellow peas. 7.5. Next, it was submitted that by issuing the impugned notification, the doctrine of legitimate expectation has been violated by the Central Government. In support of such submission, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decisions of Supreme Court in Union of India v. Asian Food Industries, 2006 (204) ELT 8 as well as decision in case of Director General of Foreign Trade and another v. Kanak Exports and another, 2015 (326) ELT 26, for the proposition that the Government cannot take away a vested right of an assessee by issuing a circular or a notification which is retrospective in effect. The attention of the court was invited to the interim order dated 28.6.2018 of the Madras High Court whereby Notification No. 4/2015-2020 dated 25.4.2018 has been stayed as well as order dated 16.8.2018 of the Madras High Court whereby Notification No. 15/2015-2020 dated 2.7.2018 had been stayed. It was submitted that when the matter came up for hearing on 24.8.2018, the interim order granted earlier was extended, and based upon these orders, the importers therein were allowed to import and clear the yellow peas. It was submitted that the orders passed by the Madras High Court have not been challenged before the Supreme Court and have not been stayed. It was submitted that the Director General of Foreign Trade by the subsequent Notification No. 32/2015 dated 30.8.2018 which is the subject matter of challenge in the present petition, cannot impose the very same restriction which was withdrawn by virtue of interim orders passed by the Madras High Court. It was contended that by issuing Notification No. 32/2015 dated 30.8.2018, the Director General of Foreign Trade is trying to overcome or circumvent the interim orders passed by the Madras High Court. It was contended that by issuing Notification No. 32/2015 dated 30.8.2018, the Director General of Foreign Trade is trying to overcome or circumvent the interim orders passed by the Madras High Court. It was submitted that Madras High Court by order dated 31.10.2018 in case of another importer, has granted an interim stay qua Notification No. 37/2015 dated 28.9.2018 and the said order of Madras High Court also stands as of now and has not been disturbed. It was submitted that therefore, the other importers had cleared the yellow peas whereas the petitioner is being singled out and discriminated. It was submitted that the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-2020 itself contemplates of a situation where in the imports or the exports are restricted by issuing a subsequent notification. The policy in Chapter 1A at paragraph No. 1.05 states that if there is a restriction which is placed subsequently to the exports or imports, then the same may not apply for the goods already transacted. It is submitted that the petitioner squarely falls under this category and therefore also, the petitioner be permitted to import the yellow peas. 8. Mr. M.C. Bhatt, learned counsel with Mr. R.D. Raval, learned advocate for the petitioner in the second petition, submitted that earlier, vide notification dated 25.4.2018, import of peas was restricted till 30.6.2018. Such period came to be extended by a notification dated 2.7.2018 till 30.9.2018. However, during the period when such notification was in force, by a notification dated 29.8.2018, the notification dated 2.7.2018 came to be withdrawn. Accordingly import of peas was free, that is, without restriction. It was submitted that since by the earlier notification, the restriction was till 30.9.2018, and the notification placing such restrictions was withdrawn on 29.8.2018, one month before the expiry of the period stipulated in the withdrawn notification, the petitioner was under the belief that import of peas would now be free at least for a period of one month, since the restriction for the period from 30.8.2018 to 30.9.2018 was lifted. It was submitted that there is nothing in the notification dated 29.8.2018 to indicate that it was ad-hoc in nature and, therefore, on the same day, that is, on 29.8.2018, the petitioner placed two orders and paid the necessary amounts. However, on 30.8.2018, he was informed that by the impugned notification, the restriction was imposed again. 8.1. It was submitted that there is nothing in the notification dated 29.8.2018 to indicate that it was ad-hoc in nature and, therefore, on the same day, that is, on 29.8.2018, the petitioner placed two orders and paid the necessary amounts. However, on 30.8.2018, he was informed that by the impugned notification, the restriction was imposed again. 8.1. It was argued that the action of the respondents of withdrawing the restriction and thereafter, imposing restriction on the next day is arbitrary and there is no logic behind it. It was submitted that the petitioner acted on the basis of the promise held out by the respondents that the restriction on import of peas was removed. However, the respondents arbitrarily once again imposed the restriction to the detriment of the petitioner. It was submitted that the action of the respondents is arbitrary and not supported by any logic, rationale or reason. Reliance was placed on the decision of Supreme Court in case of Shayra Bano v. Union of India and others, (2017) 9 Supreme Court Cases 1, wherein the court held thus: "101. It will be noticed that a Constitution Bench of this Court in Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641 , stated that it was settled law that subordinate legislation can be challenged on any of the grounds available for challenge against plenary legislation. This being the case, there is no rational distinction between the two types of legislation when it comes to this ground of challenge under Article 14. The test of manifest arbitrariness, therefore, as laid down in the aforesaid judgments would apply to invalidate legislation as well as subordinate legislation under Article 14. Manifest arbitrariness, therefore, must be something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without adequate determining principle. Also, when something is done which is excessive and disproportionate, such legislation would be manifestly arbitrary. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14." 8.2. It was submitted that the impugned notifications stand vitiated on the ground of manifest arbitrariness inasmuch as no person would have conceived that this was a stop-gap arrangement. We are, therefore, of the view that arbitrariness in the sense of manifest arbitrariness as pointed out by us above would apply to negate legislation as well under Article 14." 8.2. It was submitted that the impugned notifications stand vitiated on the ground of manifest arbitrariness inasmuch as no person would have conceived that this was a stop-gap arrangement. It was submitted that the notification dated 2.7.2018 came to be withdrawn on 29.8.2018 and acting upon it, the petitioner changed its position, however, on the very next day, the respondents again placed restrictions adversely affecting the petitioner. It was argued that the action of the respondents is barred by the principle of estoppel and therefore, the petitioner is entitled to challenge such notifications. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, AIR 1974 Supreme Court 555, for the proposition that articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that, State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant consideration because that would be denial of equality. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of The Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., (1983) 3 Supreme Court Cases 379, wherein it has been held thus: "9. It was next contended that the dispute between the parties is in the realm of contract and even if there was a concluded contract between the parties about grant and acceptance of loan, the failure of the Corporation to carry out its part of the obligation may amount to breach of contract for which a remedy lies elsewhere but a writ of mandamus cannot be issued compelling the Corporation to specifically perform the contract. It is too late in the day to contend that the instrumentality of the State which would be 'other authority' under Article 12 of the Constitution can commit breach of a solemn under-taking on which other side has acted and then contend that the party suffering by the breach of contract may sue for damages but cannot compel specific performance of the contract. It was not disputed and in fairness to Mr. It was not disputed and in fairness to Mr. Bhatt, it must be said that he did not dispute that the Corporation which is set up under Section 3 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1955 is an instrumentality of the State and would be 'other authority' under Article 12 of the Constitution. By its letter of offer dated July 24, 1978 and the subsequent agreement dated Feb. 1, 1979 the appellant entered into a solemn agreement in performance of its statutory duty to advance the loan of Rs. 30 lakhs to the respondent. Acting on the solemn undertaking, the respondent proceeded to undertake and execute the project of setting up a 4-star Hotel at Baroda. The agreement to advance the loan was entered into in performance of the statutory duty cast on the Corporation by the statute under which it was created and set up. On its solemn promise evidenced by the afore-mentioned two documents, the respondent incurred expenses, suffered liabilities to set-up a hotel. Presumably, if the loan was not forthcoming, the respondent may not have undertaken such a huge project. Acting on the promise of the appellant evidenced by documents, the respondent proceeded to suffer further liabilities to implement and execute the project. In the back drop of this incontrovertible fact situation, the principle of promissory estoppel would come into play. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co.(P) Ltd. v. State of U.P. And Ors. this Court observed as under: "The true principle of promissory estoppel, therefore seems to be that where one party has by his words of conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not." 10. Thus the principle of promissory estoppel would certainly estop the Corporation from backing out of its obligation arising from a solemn promise made by it to the respondent." 8.3. Reliance was also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in case of M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, (1979) 2 Supreme Court Cases 409, wherein it has been held thus: "23. It was also contended on behalf of the Government that if the Government were held bound by every representation made by it regarding its intention, when the exporters have acted in the manner they were invited to act, the result would be that the Government would be bound by a contractual obligation even though no formal contract in the manner required by Article 299 was executed. But this contention was negatived and it was pointed out by this Court that the respondents "are not seeking to enforce any contractual right: they are seeking to enforce compliance with the obligation which is laid upon the Textile Commissioner by the terms of the Scheme, and we are of the view that even if the Scheme is executive in character, the respondents who were aggrieved because of the failure to carry out the terms of the Scheme were entitled to seek resort to the Court and claim that the obligation imposed upon the Textile Commissioner by the Scheme be ordered to be carried out". It was thus laid down that a party who has, acting in reliance on a promise made by the Government, altered his position, is entitled to enforce the promise against the Government, even though the promise is not in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 and that Article does not militate against the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the Government. This Court finally, after referring to the decision in the Ganges Manufacturing Co. This Court finally, after referring to the decision in the Ganges Manufacturing Co. v. Surujmull, Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of State for India (supra) and Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay summed up the position as follows: "Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the Judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen." The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promises and, in fact, the promise, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promises, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution." 8.4. It was submitted that the public at large would be under the impression that the restriction up to 30.9.2018 is removed and therefore, import is now permissible. According to the learned counsel, if a businessman acts efficiently on the basis of the promise held out by the Government, he cannot be blamed and that the respondents are bound by the principle of promissory estoppel and the petitioner is entitled to import the goods in question. It was, accordingly, urged that the goods imported by the petitioner be permitted to be cleared as he has acted upon the notification withdrawing the restriction on import of peas. 9. Vehemently opposing the petition, Ms. It was, accordingly, urged that the goods imported by the petitioner be permitted to be cleared as he has acted upon the notification withdrawing the restriction on import of peas. 9. Vehemently opposing the petition, Ms. Trusha Patel, learned senior standing counsel for the respondent in the first petition, submitted that in this case the petitioner seeks to challenge the notification whereby restriction on import has been placed in exercise of powers under section 3 of the Foreign Trade Act read with the Foreign Trade Policy which is in the nature of policy decision and hence, the scope of interference by this court is very limited. 9.1. It was submitted that the restriction placed on import of peas is a well deliberated decision and there is an object and rationale behind the policy. The attention of the court was invited to the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondents, wherein it has inter alia been stated thus: "VI. after Inter-Ministerial Consultations among Secretary, Department of Food & Public Distribution, Department of Food & Public Distribution, Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmers, Welfare, Department of Consumer Affairs, Department of Commerce, Department of Revenue, Director General of Foreign Trade and Food Corporation of India, it was decided to restrict the import of peas (Pisumsativum), under Exim Code 0713 10 00. Accordingly the Government vide Notification NO 4 dated 25th April, 2018 amended the import policy of Peas (Pisumsativum), Under Exim Code 0713 10 00, from "Free" to "Restricted" for the period from 1st April, 2018 to 30th June, 2018 subject to the following Policy condition 4 of Chapter 7 of ITC (HS), 2017, Schedule-I (Import Policy): "During the period from 01st April to 30th June, 2018 total quantity of one lakh MT of yellow peas minus the quantity already imported from 01.04.2018 till date will be allowed against license as per procedure to the notified by DGFT" "Already imported" will include shipment already arrived from 01.04.2018 till 25.04.2018 and those shipments backed by irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit (ICLC) and Advance payment made through Banking Channel before 25.04.2018. Both these categories will be required to be registered with Jurisdictional Regional Authority as per Para 1.05 of Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-2020. VII The background to the above notification is to safeguard the interests of the farmers. Both these categories will be required to be registered with Jurisdictional Regional Authority as per Para 1.05 of Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-2020. VII The background to the above notification is to safeguard the interests of the farmers. The farmers are one of the most important stakeholders in matters related to import/export of agricultural goods and the government is required to strike a balance between the interests of domestic producers and importers. Whenever it is observed that large scale imports of any item are adversely impacting the interest of the domestic producers, due to fall in prices in the local market, the Government in consultation with all the stakeholders tries to protect the interests of the domestic producers by way of putting various kinds of restrictions viz. Port restrictions, imposition of Minimum Import Price (MIP) and Quota Restrictions. VIII Considering that despite imposition of import duty of 60% and reward of 7% under MEIS, the average domestic prices of gram in major producing states namely MP, Maharashtra and Karnataka were ruling below MSP of Rs. 4400/quintal and that the current average domestic prices of gram in MP, Maharashtra and Karnataka were Rs. 3452/quintal, 3425/quintal and Rs. 3662/quintal respectively, which was leading to considerable distress among Chana/Gram growing farmers in these states the government was constrained to take steps to soothe the farming community. IX The Government has also noted that flour of peas/yellow peas being cheaper is frequently used to mix with flour of gram for preparing besan. Significant quantities of peas/yellow peas are imported into the country and used as an alternative to gram for preparing besan. Peas constitute nearly 45-50 percent of total pulses imported by India and unit value of import of peas works out to be much below that of chana/gram despite the 50% duty, which acts as an incentive to blend pea flour with gram flour for preparing besan. X Consequently, in order to boost the mandi prices of chana/Bengal gram the Government decided to restrict the import of yellow peas (HS Code 07131000) upto one lakh tons for three months from date of issue of notification to restrict supply of peas and create demand for chana/gram which is currently being harvested in various part of the country." 9.2. It was submitted that the impugned notification is not retrospective and does not affect any vested right of the petitioner. It was submitted that the impugned notification is not retrospective and does not affect any vested right of the petitioner. As regards the contention of the petitioner that he had already executed the contracts prior to the restrictions having come into force is concerned, the attention of the court was invited to the following averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondents: "XI. Based on the demands from the trading community and keeping in view the trade impact, the Government took a conscious decision to review the situation and their Inter-Ministerial Committee under the Chairmanship of Secretary, Department of Food & Public Distribution with Members of Department of Agriculture, Cooperation and Farmers Welfare, Department of Consumers Affairs, Department of Commerce, Department of Revenue, Director General of Foreign Trade and Food Corporation of India, decided to relax the provisions so that the traders who had made the advance payments to the suppliers do not lose their money. XII It is also mentioned that vide Trade Notice No. 10 dated 16th May, 2018, it has been clarified that the Import policy of item under Exim Code 07131000-peas (pisumsativum) includes all peas i.e. Yellow peas, Green peas, Dun peas and Kaspa peas and the effect is not restricted to only "Yellow Peas" but to all items classified under Exim Code 07131000. It is further clarified that in cases where the import shipment of peas is dated 1.4.2018 till 24.4.2018, no registration with DGFT is required for shipments with B/L prior to 25th April, 2018 (i.e. 1.4.2018-24.4.2018), as the Notification No. 4 restricting import of peas was issued only on 25.4.2018. XIII The Government considered the representations/applications received from various associations/importers requesting for allowing imports which are backed by part advance payments. Considering the hardship faced by the trade, the Government vide Trade Notice no. 19/2018-19 dated 5th July, 2018 decided to allow imports of Peas under Exim Code 07131000 against advance payments for that much quantity proportional to the part advance payment made before 25.04.2018. Considering the hardship faced by the trade, the Government vide Trade Notice no. 19/2018-19 dated 5th July, 2018 decided to allow imports of Peas under Exim Code 07131000 against advance payments for that much quantity proportional to the part advance payment made before 25.04.2018. XIV Considering that the clarification on inclusion or all kind of peas under 07131000 was issued on 16.5.2018, the issue as to how to treat the peas (other than Yellow Peas) imported during the period 25.4.2018 to 15.5.2018 was clarified vide Trade Notice No. 21/2018-19 dated 6th July, 2018 that consignments of peas (other than Yellow Peas) imported during the period 25.4.2018 to 15.5.2018 and awaiting clearance at Customs or consignments of peas (other than Yellow Peas) with Bill of Lading prior to 16.5.2018 are permitted freely. XV Further, considering the representations/applications from various small importers, the Government vide Trade Notice No. 25/2018-19 dated 17th August, 2018 decided to allow import of minimum 125 MT (5 FCL) of peas (under Exim Code 0713 10 00) per contract or less (entire quantity as applied), irrespective of the advance payment made before 25.04.2018. XVI Thus, the above sequence of events amply clarifies that despite the amendment in the import policy of "peas" from "free" to "restricted", the Government took all possible steps to address the grievances of the trade." 9.3. It was submitted that therefore, due care has been also taken to ensure that people who had placed contracts prior to the date of restriction coming into force did not have to incur losses, to the extent possible. It was submitted that insofar as the bill of entry presented by the petitioner on 30.8.2018 is concerned, in view of impugned notification having come into force, the petitioner was not permitted to import the same. It was submitted that for the purpose of considering whether the petitioner was entitled to import the goods in question, the relevant date is the date of import and that on the date when the goods were sought to be imported, they were restricted goods. 9.4. It was submitted that insofar as the validity of the impugned notifications are concerned, the same are in the nature of a policy decision taken by the Central Government and hence, the scope of interference in respect thereof in exercise of powers under article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited. 9.4. It was submitted that insofar as the validity of the impugned notifications are concerned, the same are in the nature of a policy decision taken by the Central Government and hence, the scope of interference in respect thereof in exercise of powers under article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited. In support of her submissions, the learned counsel placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Parisons Agrotech Private Limited and another v. Union of India and another, (2015) 9 Supreme Court Cases 657, wherein the Court has summarised the principles with regard to scope of judicial review in respect of the policy decisions, reference to which shall be made subsequently. Reliance was also placed upon an unreported decision dated 25.10.2018 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Siddhi Vinayak & another v. Union of India & others, rendered in Writ Petition No. 21438/2018, wherein the court has upheld the validity of the impugned notifications. Keeping in view the principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the court was of the opinion that the restrictions imposed by the Government of India were justified. The court noted that the farmers of the country were not getting the price in respect of peas produced by them and large quantity of export was affecting the farmers of the country adversely. The court observed that it was aware that in our country there are large number of suicides by farmers, they still belong to the lower strata of the society. It has become very difficult for them to meet both the ends and therefore, the restriction so imposed can never said to be in violation of article 19(6) of the Constitution of India. It was submitted that therefore, the above decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court would be squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 9.5. Insofar as the withdrawal notification dated 29.8.2018 is concerned, it was submitted that in pursuance of order dated 28.6.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in W.P. Nos. 15921 to 15924 of 2018 and W.M.P. Nos. 9.5. Insofar as the withdrawal notification dated 29.8.2018 is concerned, it was submitted that in pursuance of order dated 28.6.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in W.P. Nos. 15921 to 15924 of 2018 and W.M.P. Nos. 18916, 18917, 18919, 18920, 18922, 18923, 18925 and 18926 of 2018 and in compliance with the directions dated 24.8.2018 in WP No. 21083 and 21084 of 2018 filed by M/s. AMRR Maharaja Dhall Mill, Notification No 15 dated 2.7.2018 extending the restriction on import of peas classified under Exim Code 0713 10 00 (including Yellow peas, Green peas, Dun peas and Kaspa peas) till 30.9.2018 was withdrawn purely on technical reasons vide Notification No. 31/2015-2020 dated 29.8.2018. It was submitted that till 29.8.2018, until the notification was issued, import restriction on peas was very much in place and no import could have taken place without the import license/authorisation or the registration certificate issued by the DGFT. 9.6. It was submitted that since the notification dated 2.7.2018 had been withdrawn for technical reasons, immediately on the next day, the Central Government issued Notification No. 32/2015-2020 dated 30.8.2018 restricting the import of peas till 30.9.2018. It was submitted that the above measures taken by the Government are in pursuance of its endeavours to strike a balance between the farmers and the importers and frame policies in the larger interest of the public, safeguarding the interests of both the domestic farmers/producers and the importers and, therefore, no interference is called for by this court. 10. Mr. Nikunt Raval, learned senior standing counsel for respondents No. 1 to 4 and 7 in the second petition, reiterated the submissions advanced by Ms. Trusha Patel, learned senior standing counsel for the respondents in the first petition and further submitted that the policy makers are not concerned with the date of contract. It was submitted that, nonetheless, in case of those who had entered into contracts prior to the restriction being placed initially on 25.4.2018, their difficulties were kept in mind and transitional arrangements were made. However, insofar as the petitioner is concerned, he has taken all action from the stage of entering into contract and making payments on 30.8.2018 and applied for registration of the contract on 1.9.2018. It was submitted that the action taken by the respondents is just, legal and proper and there is no warrant for interference by this court. 11. However, insofar as the petitioner is concerned, he has taken all action from the stage of entering into contract and making payments on 30.8.2018 and applied for registration of the contract on 1.9.2018. It was submitted that the action taken by the respondents is just, legal and proper and there is no warrant for interference by this court. 11. In both the petitions, what is the subject matter of challenge are notifications issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers under section 3 of the Foreign Trade Act read with paragraphs No. 1.02 and 2.01 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-2020 whereby the import of peas classified under Exim Code 0713 10 00 (including Yellow peas, Green peas, Dun peas and Kaspa peas) has been restricted. The matter, therefore, primarily falls within the domain of policy making and hence, the scope of review by this court in exercise of powers under article 226 of the Constitution of India is very limited. The Supreme Court, in case of Parisons Agrotech Private Limited v. Union of India (supra), has held thus: "14. No doubt, the writ court has adequate power of judicial review in respect of such decisions. However, once it is found that there is sufficient material for taking a particular policy decision, bringing it within the four corners of Article 14 of the Constitution, power of judicial review would not extend to determine the correctness of such a policy decision or to indulge into the exercise of finding out whether there could be more appropriate or better alternatives. Once we find that parameters of Article 14 are satisfied; there was due application of mind in arriving at the decision which is backed by cogent material; the decision is not arbitrary or irrational and; it is taken in public interest, the Court has to respect such a decision of the Executive as the policy making is the domain of the Executive and the decision in question has passed the test of the judicial review. 15. In Union of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation, this Court delineated the aforesaid principle of judicial review in the following manner: "12. 15. In Union of India v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation, this Court delineated the aforesaid principle of judicial review in the following manner: "12. There is no doubt that this Court has held in more than one case that where the decision of the authority is in regard to the policy matter, this Court will not ordinarily interfere since these policy matters are taken based on expert knowledge of the persons concerned and courts are normally not equipped to question the correctness of a policy decision. But then this does not mean that the courts have to abdicate their right to scrutinise whether the policy in question is formulated keeping in mind all the relevant facts and the said policy can be held to be beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonableness, bearing in mind the material on record. Any decision be it a simple administrative decision or policy decision, if taken without considering the relevant facts, can only be termed as an arbitrary decision. If it is so, then be it a policy decision or otherwise, it will be violative of the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution." 16. The power of the Court under writ jurisdiction has been discussed in Asif Hameed and Others v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and Others in paras 17 and 19, which read as under: "17. Before adverting to the controversy directly involved in these appeals we may have a fresh look on the inter se functioning of the three organs of democracy under our Constitution. Although the doctrine of separation of powers has not been recognised under the Constitution in its absolute rigidity but the Constitution makers have meticulously defined the functions of various organs of the State. Legislature, executive and judiciary have to function within their own spheres demarcated under the Constitution. No organ can usurp the functions assigned to another. The Constitution trusts to the judgment of these organs to function and exercise their discretion by strictly following the procedure prescribed therein. The functioning of democracy depends upon the strength and independence of each of its organs. Legislature and executive, the two facets of people's will has no power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power to ensure that the aforesaid two main organs of State function within the constitutional limits. It is the sentinel of democracy. The functioning of democracy depends upon the strength and independence of each of its organs. Legislature and executive, the two facets of people's will has no power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power to ensure that the aforesaid two main organs of State function within the constitutional limits. It is the sentinel of democracy. Judicial review is a powerful weapon to restrain unconstitutional exercise of power by the legislature and executive. The expanding horizon of judicial review has taken in its fold the concept of social and economic justice. While exercise of powers by the legislature and executive is subject to judicial restraint, the only check on our own exercise of power is the self-imposed discipline of judicial restraint. 19. When a State action is challenged, the function of the court is to examine the action in accordance with law and to determine whether the legislature or the executive has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution and if not, the court must strike down the action. While doing so the court must remain within its self-imposed limits. The court sits in judgment on the action of a coordinate branch of the government. While exercising power of judicial review of administrative action, the court is not an appellate authority. The Constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in matters of policy or to sermonize qua any matter which under the Constitution lies within the sphere of legislature or executive, provided these authorities do not transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers." 19. We would also like to refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Premier Tyres Limited v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation wherein this Court held that when a policy decision is taken in the public interest, Courts need not tinker with the same. 20. The locus classicus allowing freedom to the Executive to take economic decisions is remarkably dealt with by this Court in R.K. Garg v. Union of India and the following discussion from the said judgment is again worth quoting: "8. Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. Another rule of equal importance is that laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion etc. It has been said by no less a person than Holmes, J., that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation than in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. Nowhere has this admonition been more felicitously expressed than in Morey v. Doud, 354 US 457: 1 L Ed 2d 1485 (1957) where Frankfurter, J., said in his inimitable style: 'In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct. When these are added to the complexity of economic regulation, the uncertainty, the liability to error, the bewildering conflict of the experts, and the number of times the judges have been overruled by events--self-limitation can be seen to be the path to judicial wisdom and institutional prestige and stability.' The Court must always remember that "legislation is directed to practical problems, that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry"; "that exact wisdom and nice adoption of remedy are not always possible" and that "judgment is largely a prophecy based on meagre and uninterrupted experience". Every legislation particularly in economic matters is essentially empiric and it is based on experimentation or what one may call trial and error method and therefore it cannot provide for all possible situations or anticipate all possible abuses. There may be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid." 12. There may be crudities and inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation but on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid." 12. Thus while examining the validity of a policy decision made in an economic matter, the court would be very slow in interfering except in case where such decision is vitiated by arbitrariness or irrationality or is otherwise not in public interest. In the present case, vide notification dated 25.4.2018 issued in exercise of powers conferred by section 3 of the Foreign Trade Act read with paragraphs No. 1.02 and 2.01 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-2020, as amended from time to time, import of peas which under the existing policy was free came to be restricted under the revised import policy. Subsequently, by a notification dated 2.7.2018, the restriction came to be extended till 30.9.2018. However, it appears that since such notifications were signed by the DGFT, certain orders came to be passed by the Madras High Court from time to time staying such notifications, mainly on the ground that the DGFT had no power to issue a notification under section 3 of the Foreign Trade Act. It appears that the court was taking a strict view of the matter and hence, with a view to comply with such orders, as is evident on a plain reading of the notification dated 29.8.2018, the notification dated 2.7.2018 extending the restriction on import of peas classified under Exim Code 0713 10 00 till 30.9.2018, came to be withdrawn. The said notification reads thus: "Government of India Ministry of Commerce & Industry Department of Commerce Udyog Bhawan, New Delhi Notification No. 31/2015-2020 Dated the 29 August, 2018 Subject-Withdrawal of Notification No. 15 dated 02.07.2018 regarding amendment in import policy of Peas under Chapter 7 of the ITC (HS) 2017, Schedule-I (Import Policy) S.O.(E): In pursuance of the Order dated 28th June, 2018 of the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Madras in W.P. Nos. 15921 to 15924 of 2018 and W.M.P. Nos. 15921 to 15924 of 2018 and W.M.P. Nos. 18916, 18917, 18919, 18920, 18922, 18923, 18925 and 18926 of 2018 and in compliance with the directions dated 24th of August, 2018 in WP No. 21083 & 21084 of 2018 filed by M/s. AMRR Maharaja Dhall Mill, the Notification No 15 dated 02.07.2018 extending the restriction on import of Peas classified under Exim Code 0713 10 00 (including Yellow peas, Green peas, Dun peas and Kaspa peas) till 30.09.2018 is withdrawn. 2. Effect of this Notification: Notification No. 15 dated 02.07.2018 extending the restriction on import of Peas classified under Exim Code 0713 10 00 till 30.9.2018 is withdrawn. (ALOK VARDHAN CHATURVEI) Director General of Foreign Trade & Ex-Officio Additional Secretary to the Government of India" 13. On a plain reading of the above notification, it is clear that the same has been withdrawn with a view to comply with the directions issued by the Madras High Court. Ms. Trusha Patel, learned senior standing counsel for the respondents had furnished a copy of the noting on file prior to the withdrawal of the notification dated 02.07.2018, for the perusal of this Court which reveals that an email has been received from the RA Chennai informing that the Madras High Court has viewed the matter very seriously on the matter of issue of notification dated 2.7.2018 when it had already granted stay against the notification dated 25.4.2018 directing the DGFT to either withdraw the notification dated 2.7.2018 or appear in person before the court on 31.8.2018. After discussion, a decision was taken to withdraw the notification for technical reasons to comply with the court's order. 14. A perusal of the order dated 28.6.2018 passed by the Madras High Court in WP No. 15921 of 2018 and allied matters shows that it was contended before the court that the powers under sections 3, 5 and 6 of the Foreign Trade Act can be exercised only by the Central Government and cannot be delegated to the DGFT or an officer subordinate to him. The court following the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Director General of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports (supra) had granted interim relief staying the notification. The court following the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Director General of Foreign Trade v. Kanak Exports (supra) had granted interim relief staying the notification. Since the main ground for staying the notification was that such powers were to be exercised by the Central Government and not by the DGFT, it appears that to remove this technical objection, the notification dated 2.7.2018 came to be withdrawn by a notification dated 29.8.2018 and another notification came to be issued on 30.8.2019 after removing the technical defect. 15. In the opinion of this Court, the withdrawal of the notification in compliance of the order passed by the Madras High Court cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed a promise held out by the respondents that the import of peas would be free henceforth. In fact, the notification itself clearly states as to why it has been issued. 16. At this juncture, reference may be made to the judgment and order dated 24.10.2018 passed by this court in BPS Minerals Export Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India rendered in Special Civil Application No. 15342/2018, wherein this court held thus: "11. Regarding the second contention, we may recall that Government of India has recalled the said restriction in order to protect the local farmers against cheaper imports. The notification was withdrawn only in view of the interim order passed by the Madras High Court and presumably to cure a technical defect. Very next day, the same set of restrictions was reimposed. The petitioner cannot argue that in this window of one day, the petitioner's imports should have been cleared. The petitioner had not made the imports during the period when even if we accept the petitioner's contention to be true, such restrictions did not apply." 17. Insofar as the reason as to why the restriction on import of peas is required to be placed is concerned, the same has been set out in detail in the affidavit-in-reply of the respondents as extracted hereinabove, which clearly shows that after due deliberation, a policy decision has been taken considering the economic situation in that regard. In the opinion of this court, the matter would fall solely within the realm of policy making and it is not for this court to substitute its opinion in place of the wisdom of the policy makers. The policy applies to all the importers alike. In the opinion of this court, the matter would fall solely within the realm of policy making and it is not for this court to substitute its opinion in place of the wisdom of the policy makers. The policy applies to all the importers alike. There is nothing arbitrary or capricious about the policy which appears to have been made in the public interest. 18. On behalf of the petitioners, it has been urged that the policy is being made effective retrospectively because it affects contracts already entered into by them prior to the introduction of such policy. In the opinion of this court, policy decisions cannot be formed taking into consideration the contracts which parties may have entered into prior to such decision being taken. On a plain reading of the impugned notifications, it is evident that the restrictions have been imposed from the date of the notifications and, therefore, such notifications cannot be said to be retrospective in nature. It has been argued that as the petitioners had already entered into contracts for importing peas, the notifications affect their vested and accrued rights. This court is of the considered view that no person has a vested right to import any goods and it is always permissible for the Government to impose reasonable restrictions in accordance with law in public interest. From the averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the respondents, it is evident that the decision has been taken in the public interest. Besides, the respondents have also taken care that the interests of people who had entered into contracts prior to the restrictions being imposed is also taken care of, to the extent possible. 19. Insofar as decision of the Supreme Court in case of Union of India v. Asian Food Industries (supra), on which reference has been placed by Mr. Alok Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner in the first petition is concerned, in that case the notification was issued on 27.6.2006 but was sought to be made applicable with effect from 22.6.2006 when the policy was announced. Therefore, in facts of the said case, in fact, the policy was sought to be made applicable retrospectively. Hence the said decision would have no applicability to the facts of the present case. 20. It may be noted that restriction on import of peas came to be imposed initially by a notification dated 25.4.2018. Therefore, in facts of the said case, in fact, the policy was sought to be made applicable retrospectively. Hence the said decision would have no applicability to the facts of the present case. 20. It may be noted that restriction on import of peas came to be imposed initially by a notification dated 25.4.2018. The notification provides that during the period from 1st April to 30th June, 2018 total quantity of one lakh MT yellow peas minus the quantity already imported from 1.4.2018 till date would be allowed against license as per procedure to be notified by DGFT. The notification further provides that 'already imported' will include shipment already arrived from 1.4.2018 till 25.4.2018 and those shipments backed by Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit (ICLC) and Advance Payment made through Banking Channel before 25.4.2018. Both these categories will be required to be registered with Jurisdictional Regional Authority as per Para 1.05 of the Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-2020. The effect of the notification was that the import policy of Yellow Peas under Exim Code 0713 10 00 was revised from 'free 'to 'restricted 'for a period of three months only. Thereafter, by Trade Notice No. 5/2018 dated 9.5.2018, it was provided that, as already notified, total quantity of peas available for import during the period from 1st April to 30th June, 2018 is one lakh MT minus the quantity already imported from 01.04.2018. Accordingly, to assess the remaining balance, importers who have already contracted for import of peas before the date of issue of the notification and have paid in advance (full or in part) for the same or have opened irrevocable letters of credit for such imports before 25.4.2018, they may furnish such documents indicating the quantity contracted and amount paid so as to enable this Directorate to lay down further procedure for import of the remaining quantity. 21. In Trade Notice No. 12/2018 dated 18.5.2018, reference was made to the Notification No. 4 dated 25.4.2018 wherein the following was provided for transitional arrangement: "Already imported" will include shipment already arrived from 01.04.2018 till 25.04.2018 and those shipments backed by Irrevocable Commercial Letter of Credit (ICLC) and Advance Payment made through Banking Channel before 25.04.2018. Both these categories will be required to be registered with Jurisdictional Authority as per Para 1.05 of Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-20. Both these categories will be required to be registered with Jurisdictional Authority as per Para 1.05 of Foreign Trade Policy, 2015-20. It was stated that clarifications were sought by some Regional Authorities (RAs) whether 'advance payment' in the above paragraph will include part advance or only full advance payment. It is further stated therein that it has been decided that apart from ICLC, only those shipments which are backed by 100% advance payments before 25.4.2018, will qualify to be registered by the Regional Authorities of DGFT. 22. Subsequently, by the Trade Notice No. 19/2018-2019 dated 5th July, issued in relation to implementation of Notification No. 04 dated 25.04.2018, it was stated that many representations/applications have been received from various associations/importers requesting for allowing imports which are backed by part advance payments. Considering the hardship faced by the trade, it has been decide to allow imports of peas under Exim Code 0713 10 00 against advance payments for that much quantity proportional to the part advance payment made before 25.4.2018. It is an admitted position that the petitioner in the first petition has availed of the benefit under such trade notice. Thus the impugned notification restricting the import of peas has not put a blanket ban on import of peas but has taken care of those contracts which have been issued prior to issuance of notification. 23. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner in the first petition that transitional arrangements contemplated under paragraph 1.05 of Chapter 1A of the Foreign Trade Policy and Handbook of Procedures have not been followed in the present case. A perusal of clause (b) of paragraph 1.05 which provides for transitional arrangements shows that the same provides that in case an export or import that is permitted freely under FTP is subsequently subjected to any restriction or regulation, such export or import will ordinarily be permitted, notwithstanding, such restriction or regulation, unless otherwise stipulated. This is subject to the condition that the shipment of export or import is made within the original validity period of an irrevocable commercial letter of credit, established before the date of imposition of such restriction and it shall be restricted to the balance value and quantity available and time period of such irrevocable letter of credit. This is subject to the condition that the shipment of export or import is made within the original validity period of an irrevocable commercial letter of credit, established before the date of imposition of such restriction and it shall be restricted to the balance value and quantity available and time period of such irrevocable letter of credit. For operationalising such irrevocable letter of credit, the applicant shall have to register the Letter of Credit with the Jurisdictional Regional Authority (RA) against computerized receipt, within 15 days of the imposition of any such restriction or regulation. Thus, the promise, if any, held out by the Central Government is to the extent as contained in paragraph 1.05 of the Handbook of Procedure. 24. In light of what is referred hereinabove, it is manifest that the respondent authorities have taken due care in terms of paragraph 1.05 of the Handbook of Procedure. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the impugned notifications suffer from any legal infirmity so as to warrant interference. 25. The petitioner in the second petition has pointed out that within the short window between 29.8.2018 to 30.8.2018 when the restrictions came to be lifted, two parties were permitted to import considerable quantity of peas. Therefore, this court had called upon the respondents to explain this position, whereupon the Development Commissioner, AP and SEZ, Mundra has filed an affidavit regarding import of yellow peas in the interregnum period when the notification of withdrawal of the ban on import was issued on 29.8.2018 till 30.8.2018 when the restriction on import was again imposed. It is averred in the affidavit that the said Bills of Entry were filed on 29.8.2010 when there was no restriction in the on-line system for processing the Bills of Entry which verifies three aspects (i) Valuation of goods. (ii) Whether there is any restriction on import. (iii) Duty payable. It is averred that since the Bills of Entry were filed when there was no restriction, the Assessing Officer assessed the same in accordance with law and cleared them. 26. A perusal of the Bills of Entry reveals that they were presented between 7:20 pm to 8:05 pm and at a later period than that. (iii) Duty payable. It is averred that since the Bills of Entry were filed when there was no restriction, the Assessing Officer assessed the same in accordance with law and cleared them. 26. A perusal of the Bills of Entry reveals that they were presented between 7:20 pm to 8:05 pm and at a later period than that. From the details furnished by the learned counsel for the Central Government, there is nothing to show that as to at what time the letter dated 29.8.2018 was received by the Government of India Press for the purpose of publishing the same in the Official Gazette. Be that as it may, the respondents have come up with a plausible explanation insofar as the manner in which the Bills of Entry in case of two parties were cleared within the short window between the time of withdrawal of the restriction and re-imposition thereof. Besides, just like the petitioner came to know about the notification withdrawing the restriction and placed import orders immediately, the said parties upon coming to know of such withdrawal appear to have acted immediately to take advantage of the same. Therefore, no further inquiry is required to be made in this regard by this court. 27. In the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the petitioner of the second petition, it has been stated that the petitioner had initiated process of entering into deals to import yellow peas and all his payments had reached the overseas suppliers and the business contract was concluded in accordance with law. That the petitioner had made such payments as he did not know that in such a short period, the import would again be restricted and is therefore, trapped for no fault on his part and as per the law, the notification does not come into operation till it is published. In effect and substance, what the petitioner wants to contend is that as he had entered into contracts when there was no restriction, hence, he is entitled to import the same. In the opinion of this Court, in light of what is discussed hereinabove, the contention of the petitioner that he had entered into contract on the date when the restriction came to be removed and, therefore, he is entitled to import of such goods, does not merit acceptance. In the opinion of this Court, in light of what is discussed hereinabove, the contention of the petitioner that he had entered into contract on the date when the restriction came to be removed and, therefore, he is entitled to import of such goods, does not merit acceptance. The relevant date for the purpose of import of peas as described in the impugned notifications is the date of import and the date on which the contract has been entered into by the petitioner is not relevant for the present purpose. 28. Moreover, in case of the petitioner in the second petition, no contract was entered into prior to the date when the restriction was initially imposed and the petitioner has only entered into contract within the short window between the date when the restriction was withdrawn and the again re-imposed. In the opinion of this court, in the light of the clear language of the notification dated 29.8.2018 withdrawing the notification dated 2.7.2018, the petitioner in the second petition had no reason to believe that import of peas would be free thereafter and that there would be no restriction thereon. 29. In light of the above discussion, no case is made out so as to warrant interference. The petitions, therefore, fail and are accordingly dismissed. Notice is discharged in each of the petitions with no order as to costs.