JUDGMENT : Rashid Ali Dar, J. 1. Appellant-Mudasir Ahmad Dar S/o Ghulam Mohammad Dar R/o Banderpora Tehsil Bijbehara District Anantnag (for short 'detenue') calls in question legality of a judgment passed on 13.03.2019 by the learned Single Bench of this Court (for short ‘impugned judgment’) dismissing the Habeas Corpus Petition No.384/2018 filed on his behalf, questioning his detention under the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978 (for short the ‘Act’). The detention order was passed on 11.10.2018 by respondent No.2 in the writ petition (District Magistrate, Anantnag) holding that the detenue was involved in the militancy related activities, besides disruption of peaceful atmosphere and to motivate the people to work against the interests of the State. Opinion has also been framed that the detenue is a threat to ‘security of the State’ and so to prevent him from indulging in similar activities it had become imperative to detain him under the provisions of the Act. 2. The main ground of challenge in the writ petition was non-compliance with the mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 13(2) of J&K Public Safety Act, 1978 (for short ‘the Act’). Explaining the same, it is being stated:- (i) That the detenue was arrested on 04.09.2018 and was produced before the learned Executive Magistrate, Sirigufwara on 05.09.2018, who remanded him for 20 days custody. He was to be produced before the Executive Magistrate again on 26.09.2018 but due to non-availability of escort he could not be produced. Bond was submitted on his behalf before the said Magistrate and the said Magistrate directed the police to release the detenue on furnishing bond of Rs.5,000/- for appearing in the court on 29.09.2018. Reference in this regard is made to the complaint filed before the Executive Magistrate, Sirigufwara and consequent order passed thereon (copies annexed with the appeal as well as writ petition). (ii) That in the grounds of detention the date of arrest has been shown as 01.10.2018 in FIR No. 168/2018, which has not been considered by respondent No.2 while preparing the grounds of detention. The detaining authority did not ascertain as to whether the detenue had filed any bail application or whether he was likely to be released on bail and repetition of the activities referred to him. The detaining authority did not ascertain as to whether the detenue had filed any bail application or whether he was likely to be released on bail and repetition of the activities referred to him. (iii) Another ground taken in the writ petition was that the order of detention has been passed by respondent No.2 on the basis of the letter dated 09.10.2018 of respondent No.3 with which he had produced with ‘dossier’ and other connected documents before him. However, neither the copy of said letter nor any other material has been provided to the detenue by the detaining authority while detaining him. Also the order of detention has neither been read over or explained to the detenue by respondent No.2 or anybody on his behalf in the language which the detenue understood viz. Urdu/Kashmir. (iv) That the learned counsel for the petitioner while making submissions, referred to the law laid down in the case titled and reported as A.K.Roy Vs. Union of India (1982 SC 710). 3. Respondents, who were represented by Mr. N.H.Shah, learned Sr.AAG, resisted the writ petition on the ground that the impugned order of detention was well founded and there was nothing bad about it. He further contended that the detenue was provided all the material relied on by the detaining authority while detaining him. He had further contended that the detenue was already informed about his right of making representation against his detention. His next limb of argument was that while as in the grounds projected by the learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant submitted that the detenue was not explained the grounds of detention in Urdu, while as on the other hand it was submitted that the detenue was a Ph.D scholar. In support of his arguments, learned State counsel has referred the judgments reported in 2011(2) JKJ 213 , Mohammad Yousuf Khan Vs. State & Ors., 2012(1) JKJ, 332, Ghulam Hassan Malik Vs. State of J&K and 2013(1) SLJ 303, Vainder Gupta Vs. State of J&K & Ors.. 4. In their detailed counter affidavit filed in the writ petition, respondents have contended that the detenue has completed his Ph.D in DAVV Indore. M.P. Thereafter, he built up his contacts with the militants and was working with them as OGW. State of J&K and 2013(1) SLJ 303, Vainder Gupta Vs. State of J&K & Ors.. 4. In their detailed counter affidavit filed in the writ petition, respondents have contended that the detenue has completed his Ph.D in DAVV Indore. M.P. Thereafter, he built up his contacts with the militants and was working with them as OGW. Substance of grounds as put-forth by the respondents is precisely :- (i) That on reliable information that some miscreants are busy in planning to spread anti-election propaganda in the area and warned people to remain away from the Municipal/Panchayat elections, which were going on in the area, the detenue along-with other four persons was arrested and a case FIR No. 168/2018 under Section 13 ULA(P) Act was registered in Police Station, Bijbehara. (ii) That while examining the dossier and other material, it was found necessary to deter the detenue from indulging in such activities prejudicial to the security of the State, and so his preventive detention was accordingly ordered. 5. After considering the rival arguments of the parties, learned Writ Court made the observation that as per the settled position of law if a detention order is issued on more than one ground independent of each other, the detention order will survive even if one of the grounds is found legally unsustainable. The learned writ court held that in the present case the detention order is issued on more than one ground, independent of each other, therefore, the detention order does not get vitiated even if one of the grounds taken in support of the petition turns affirmative. The learned writ court had made reference of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case Gautam Jain v. Union of India & Anr., 2017(1) Jammu Kashmir Law Times, Vol.1 (SC) p.1. Accordingly, the learned writ court dismissed HCP No. 384/2018 by virtue of the judgment dated 13.03.2019, impugned in the instant appeal. 6. The contention raised before the learned writ court regarding non- furnishing of requisite material was not found to be substantiated by the record. Similarly the absence of ‘compelling’ reasons was also held to be not sufficient to adjudge the detention order bad. 7. 6. The contention raised before the learned writ court regarding non- furnishing of requisite material was not found to be substantiated by the record. Similarly the absence of ‘compelling’ reasons was also held to be not sufficient to adjudge the detention order bad. 7. Appellant herein feeling aggrieved of the said writ court order dated 13.03.2019 filed the instant appeal, reiterating among other grounds the following grounds:- “(a) That the order of the writ court is legally perverse and based on surmises and conjectures. (b) That the case of the appellant before the writ court was that after his arrest by the police on 04.09.2018 and the subsequent production before the Executive Magistrate, 1st Class, Sirigufwara, who was pleased to pass numerous orders including order dated 26.09.2018, the detenue was neither released nor produced before the court. It was therefore submitted that the allegations leveled in FIR No.168/2018 are totally false. It was also stated that no mention of the complaint filed by the police against the appellant in the court of Executive Magistrate 1st Class, Sirigufwara has been made by the respondents either in the grounds of detention or else in the reply affidavit filed before the court. It was also stated that the order of detention of the detenue was outcome of the non-application of mind. The writ court has not however returned any finding on the aforesaid aspects of the case rendering the impugned judgment liable to be set aside. (c) That it was also the case of the appellant that he had not applied for bail in FIR no.168/2018 as such there was no likelihood of his being released from detention. The writ court has not examined that aspect of the matter as well and has passed the impugned judgment in clear violation of law.” 6. Mr. M.A. Qayoom, learned counsel for the appellant, while placing reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in Sama Aruna V. State of Telangana & Anr. ( AIR 2017 SC 2662 ) raised the argument that since the detenue was in the custody of the police at the time of passing of the detention order, therefore, he could not be ordered to be kept in preventive custody. Para 24 of the judgment which is being relied to substantiate the contention, reads as:- “24. There is another reason why the detention order is unjustified. Para 24 of the judgment which is being relied to substantiate the contention, reads as:- “24. There is another reason why the detention order is unjustified. It was passed when the accused was in jail in Crime No. 221 of 2016. His custody in jail for the said offence was converted into custody under the impugned detention order. The incident involved in this offence is sometime in the year 2002-2003. The detenue could not have been detained preventively by taking this stale incident into account, more so when he was in jail. In Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah and Ors., this Court observed as follows: "6. On a reading of the grounds, particularly the paragraph which we have extracted above, it is clear that the order of detention was passed as the detaining authority was apprehensive that in case the detenue was released on bail he would again carry on his criminal activities in the area. If the apprehension of the detaining authority was true, the bail application had to be opposed and in case bail was granted, challenge against that order in the higher forum had to be raised. Merely on the ground that an accused in detention as an under-trial prisoner was likely to get bail an order of detention under the National Security Act should not ordinarily be passed." 7. Another judgment relied on by Mr. Qayoom is reported in AIR 2017 SC 2625 , V.Shantha Vs. State of Telangana & Ors., wherein their lordships’ have held that:- “Recourse to normal legal procedure would be time consuming and would not be an effective deterrent to prevent the detenue from indulging in further prejudicial activities in the business of spurious seeds, affecting maintenance of public order, and that there was no other option except to invoke the provisions of the preventive detention Act as an extreme measure to insulate. No doubt the offences alleged to have been committed by detenue are such as to attract punishment under the prevailing laws but that has to be done under the said prevalent laws and taking recourse to preventive detention laws would not be warranted. Preventive detention involves detaining of a person without trial in order to prevent him from committing certain types of offences. Preventive detention involves detaining of a person without trial in order to prevent him from committing certain types of offences. But such detention cannot be made a substitute for the ordinary law and absolve the investigating authorities of their normal functions of investigating crimes which the detenue may have committed. After all, preventive detention cannot be used as an instrument to keep a person in perpetual custody without trial.” 8. It is also the contention of learned counsel for the appellant herein that the detention order is stated to have been passed to prevent the detenue from indulging in the activities prejudicial to the ‘security of the State’, whereas in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the detaining authority, reference is also made that the detention was warranted to prevent the detenue in acting in any manner prejudicial to the ‘public order’. To substantiate his arguments, learned counsel has also placed reliance on the following judgments:- (i) Amrit Lal Seth Vs. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3675 ; (ii) Surya Prakash Sharma vs. State of U.P & Ors., 1994 Supp (3) SCC 195; (iii)G.M.Shah Vs. State of J&K, 1980(1) SCC 132 ; (iv) Rushikesh Tanaji Bhoite Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2012) 2 SCC 72 . 9. In Surya Prakash’s case, their lordships have observed that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenue is already in detention and there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenue is already in detention. Para-5 shall be relevant to be quoted hereunder:- “5. The question as to whether and in what circumstances an order for preventive detention can be passed against a person who is already in custody has had been engaging the attention of this Court since it first came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, [1964] 4 SCR 921. The question as to whether and in what circumstances an order for preventive detention can be passed against a person who is already in custody has had been engaging the attention of this Court since it first came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate, Burdwan, [1964] 4 SCR 921. To eschew prolixity we refrain from detailing all those cases except that of Dharmendra Suganchand Chelawat v. Union of India, AIR (1990) SC 1196 wherein a three Judge Bench, after considering all the earlier relevant decisions including Rameshwar Shaw (supra) answered the question in the following words: ‘The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detention can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the detenue is already in detention: and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenue is already in detention. The expression "compelling reasons" in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implied that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenue is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenue, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities." 10. In Rushikesh Tanaji’s case, the Hon’ble Apex Court had observed and held that in a case where the detenue is released on bail and is enjoying his freedom under the order of the court at the time of passing the order of detention, then such order of bail, in our opinion, must be placed before the detaining authority to enable him to reach at the proper satisfaction. Relevant Paras of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder:- “8. Relevant Paras of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder:- “8. It would be, thus, seen that the order releasing the detenu on bail in the crime registered on August 14, 2010 and the order relaxing the bail condition were passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dharangaon much before the issuance of detention order dated January 10, 2011. However, the detention order or the grounds supplied to the detenu do not show that the detaining authority was aware of the bail order granted in favour of the dentenu on August 15, 2010. 9. In a case where detenu is released on bail and is enjoying his freedom under the order of the court at the time of passing the order of detention, then such order of bail, in our opinion, must be placed before the detaining authority to enable him to reach at the proper satisfaction. 10. In the present case, since the order of bail dated August 15, 2010 was neither placed before the detaining authority at the time of passing the order of detention nor the detaining authority was aware of the order of bail, in our view, the detention order is rendered invalid. We cannot attempt to assess in what manner and to what extent consideration of the order granting bail to the detenu would have effected the satisfaction of the detaining authority but suffice it to say that non-placing and non-consideration of the material as vital as the bail order has vitiated the subjective decision of the detaining authority. 11. A three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Rekha vs. State of Tamil Nadu Through Secretary to Government and Another, reported in (2011) 5 SCC 244 , decided recently held as under: "In this connection, it may be noted that there is nothing on the record to indicate whether the detaining authority was aware of the fact that the bail application of the accused was pending on the date when the detention order was passed on 08.04.2010. On the other hand, in para 4 of the grounds of detention it is mentioned that "Thiru. Ramakrishnan is in remand in crime No. 132/2010 and he has not moved any bail application so far". On the other hand, in para 4 of the grounds of detention it is mentioned that "Thiru. Ramakrishnan is in remand in crime No. 132/2010 and he has not moved any bail application so far". Thus, the detaining authority was not even aware whether a bail application of the accused was pending when he passed the detention order, rather the detaining authority passed the detention order under the impression that no bail application of the accused was pending but in similar cases bail had been granted by the courts. We have already stated above that no details of the alleged similar cases has been given. Hence, the detention order in question cannot be sustained." 12. In the case of Rekha (supra), the detention order was held to be bad as the detaining authority was not aware of the fact that the bail application of the detenu was pending on the date when the detention order was passed. In the present case, the detenu was already released on bail but the detaining authority was not aware of the fact of grant of bail to the detenu. 13. A reference to the decision of the majority view in the case of Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar and Others, reported in (1984) 3 SCC 14 , may not be out of the context. In paragraph 32 of the Judgment, Venkataramiah, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the majority observed as follows: "32…When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising the validity of an order of preventive detention which is based on the very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court." 14. The other offences referred to in the order of detention suffer from remoteness and want of proximity to the order of detention. None of the criminal cases, except the offence registered on August 14, 2010, referred to in the grounds for detention, can be said to be proximate to the order of detention.” 11. On the other hand, Mr. Mir Suhail, learned AAG vehemently argued that it was pleaded in the writ petition that the grounds of detention were not explained to the detenue in Urdu language but in the same breath it was stated that the detenue is a Ph.D scholar. On the other hand, Mr. Mir Suhail, learned AAG vehemently argued that it was pleaded in the writ petition that the grounds of detention were not explained to the detenue in Urdu language but in the same breath it was stated that the detenue is a Ph.D scholar. How come it is possible for a Ph.D scholar to understand only Urdu language, is being also contented by the learned AAG. 12. Learned AAG has also placed reliance on the judgment reported in 2015 CRI.L.J.1364 (Supreme Court), The Secretary to Government Public(Law and Order-F) and Anr. V. Nabila & Anr. Their lordships’ in the said judgment have referred the observation of the Constitution Bench in Haradhan Saha v. State of West Bengal & ors. (1975)3 SCC 198 : ( AIR 1974 SC 2154 ), which reads as:- "32. The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be, made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no [pic]bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. 13. The writ court according to learned AAG, was right in dismissing the petition after noting down that the relevant documents have been furnished to the detenue and he was well in a position to present a meaningful representation for which he was afforded opportunity which he has not utilized. The principle of law laid down in Gautam Jain’s case has been rightfully applied, according to the learned AAG. 14. Considered the rival arguments. 15. On perusal of the record it emanates that the compliant dated 05.09.2018 had been filed before the Executive Magistrate, Sirigufwara under Section 109 Cr.PC, wherein the allegation was leveled against the detenue herein that he was roaming suspiciously on the public road and was arrested tactfully by the SHO, Police Station, Bijbehara. 14. Considered the rival arguments. 15. On perusal of the record it emanates that the compliant dated 05.09.2018 had been filed before the Executive Magistrate, Sirigufwara under Section 109 Cr.PC, wherein the allegation was leveled against the detenue herein that he was roaming suspiciously on the public road and was arrested tactfully by the SHO, Police Station, Bijbehara. It is further stated that there is threat to peace from the detenue and so is required to be bound down so that peace and tranquility of the State is not disturbed. Copy of the order of Executive Magistrate, Sirigufwara reveals that he having been ordered to be released on bail in pursuance of order dated 26.09.2018 while being also noted therein that he had been directed to be kept in custody for 20 days w.e.f. 05.09.2018 to 26.09.2018. The detenue is stated not having been produced before the Magistrate due to absence of manpower on the fixed date. Reference is also made of submission of surety by Mukhtar Ahmad Ganie, brother in law of the detenue. Date of arrest of detenue along-with three associates is however, referred in the grounds of detention as 01.10.2018 and it is stated that some incriminating material like letter pad/poster of some militant organization had been recovered from him, which contained threatening for the people to stay away from the Municipal elections and they were given warnings not to participate in the elections and publically apologize. The FIR referred above is also stated to have been registered against the detenue. 16. Inference has been drawn that the detenue is deeply involved in the militancy related activities and disruption of peaceful atmosphere and to motivate the people to work against the interests of State. This has lead the detaining authority to opine that the detenue is a threat to the security of the State. It is further stated that he is working with the aim to motivate the people to work for seceding the State of J&K from rest of the country. The particulars of separatist parties are not given at whose instance he had been working. 17. It is true that in view of Section 10-A of Public Safety Act, detention order would not be questioned merely because one or some grounds are found vague/irrelevant/invalid/non-existent etc. The particulars of separatist parties are not given at whose instance he had been working. 17. It is true that in view of Section 10-A of Public Safety Act, detention order would not be questioned merely because one or some grounds are found vague/irrelevant/invalid/non-existent etc. The condition precedent for application of Section 10-A of Public Safety Act would be however, that an order of detention under Section 8 of Public Safety Act has been made on two or more grounds. Order is to be treated separate for each of the grounds and if one ground is found to be falling within the mischief referred in Section 10-A, the said order would not become bad. Proper it may be to have a glance of the said provision:- “10A. Grounds of detention severable. – Where a person has been detained in pursuance of an order of detention under section 8 which has been made on two or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly- (a) such order shall not be deemed to be in valid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are- (i) vague, (ii) non-existent, (iii) not relevant, (iv) not connected or not proximately connected with such person, or (v) invalid for any other reasons whatsoever, and it is not therefore, possible to hold that the Government or officer making such order would have been satisfied as provided in section 8 with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the order of detention.” 18. In State of Bombay Vs. Atmaram Shridhar Vidya, AIR 1951 SC 157 , while interpreting the word ‘grounds’ same has been said to mean the conclusion drawn by the authority from the facts or particulars. Pertinent observations in the said judgment are:- “We think that the position will be clarified if it is appreciated in the first instance what are the rights given by Article 22 (5). Pertinent observations in the said judgment are:- “We think that the position will be clarified if it is appreciated in the first instance what are the rights given by Article 22 (5). 'The first part of Article 22, clause (5), gives a right to the detained person to be furnished with "the grounds on which the order has been made" and that has to be done "as soon as may be." The second right given to such person is of being afforded "the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." It is obvious that the grounds for making the order as mentioned above, are the grounds on which the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to make the order. These grounds therefore must be in existence when the order is made. By their very nature the grounds are conclusions of facts and not a complete detailed recital of all the facts. The conclusions drawn from the available facts will show in which of the three categories of prejudicial acts the suspected activity of the particular person is considered to fall. These conclusions are the "grounds" and they must be supplied. No part of such "grounds" can be held back nor can any more "grounds" be added thereto. What must be supplied are the "grounds on which the order has been made and nothing less.” 19. In the instant case, the detaining authority, after giving the narration of the involvements of the detenue in FIR No.168/2018 has concluded that for preventing the detenue from indulging in the activities similar to that which is the subject matter of said FIR, it is imperative to detain the detenue under the provision of Public Safety Act. Precisely, therefore, the detention order has been passed only on single ground of involvement of the detenue in FIR No.168/2018 and so there being requirement for further preventive detention of the detenue. 20. The learned Single Judge has given reference of the grounds taken in the petition and examined the merit of two pleas; firstly furnishing of the material to enable the detenue to submit representation; and secondly about non-application of mind, and so the detention order has been stated to be proper. 21. 20. The learned Single Judge has given reference of the grounds taken in the petition and examined the merit of two pleas; firstly furnishing of the material to enable the detenue to submit representation; and secondly about non-application of mind, and so the detention order has been stated to be proper. 21. It has been as noted above, vehemently contended on behalf of the appellant, that he has not been provided, copy of the letter dated 09.10.2018 sent by respondent No.3 to respondent No.2(detaining authority) along-with dossier, for examining the case under Section 8 of J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, for detaining him in order to restrain him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the ‘security of the State’. In the counter affidavit, same has been denied. Rather the record as produced reflects the interpolation having been made about the number of leaves furnished to the detenue. It, however, is sought to be suggested that five(5) leaves were furnished to the detenue but particulars of the documents furnished to the detenue for making effective representation have not been quoted therein. 22. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant that he has not been furnished essential documents, which forms bases for the grounds of detention prepared by the detaining authority, gets substantiated. Copy of the letter dated 09.10.2018 and dossier has not been furnished to the detenue. Infraction of right guaranteed to the appellant under Section 22(5) of the Constitution of India is, thus, manifest along-with the right guaranteed under Section 13(2) of the Act. 23. In the grounds of detention the activities attributed to the detenue are quoted as :- “Whereas on 01.10.2018 you were apprehended by SHO P/S Bijbehara along-with three associates from Padshahi Bagh Bijbehara and some incriminating material viz. letter pad/poster of HM outfit was recovered whereby the people in general were threatened to stay away from the Municipal Elections and contesting candidates were warned to resign and publicly apologize, failing which they have to face consequences. letter pad/poster of HM outfit was recovered whereby the people in general were threatened to stay away from the Municipal Elections and contesting candidates were warned to resign and publicly apologize, failing which they have to face consequences. In this behalf FIR No.168/2018 u/s 13/ULA(P) Act stands registered in P/S Bijbehara; and Whereas in view of the above it is amply clear, that you are involved in militancy related activities besides disruption of the peaceful atmosphere and to motivate the people to work against the interests of the State; and Keeping in view your involvement in aforementioned activities, it is clear that you are a threat to the security of the State. You are working on the directions of separatist parties whose aim is to disrupt the peaceful atmosphere and to motivate the people to work for seceding the State of Jammu and Kashmir from rest of the country. Therefore, in order to prevent you from indulging in similar activities it has become imperative to detain you under the provision of J&K Public Safety Act, 1978.” 24. The scope for severity of the grounds as permitted under Section 10-A of PSA does not arise. The detention order in essence is based on only one ground. The facts have been narrated in four different paragraphs. Once the subjective satisfaction being arrived on was cumulative result of all what was stated in the said paragraphs, it cannot be opined that the said order of detention is based on various grounds, some of which have to be separated. Section 10-A of Public Safety Act, 1978, is para matria of Section 5-A of COFEPOSA (Conservation of Foreign Exchange And Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act), 1974. Section 10-A of PSA has already been quoted above. It may be proper in this regard to rely on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2000 SC 2662 , A.Sowkath Ali Vs. Union of India & Ors. and 2001 CRI.L.J 3285, P.Sarvanan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. and to hold that there was only one ground pressed into service by the detaining authority to pass the detention order and the paragraphs mentioned there did not constitute separate grounds. 25. The conclusion drawn by the learned writ court about furnishing of the record and the implied application of Section10-A of the Act was not properly placed, thus, in the fact situation. 26. 25. The conclusion drawn by the learned writ court about furnishing of the record and the implied application of Section10-A of the Act was not properly placed, thus, in the fact situation. 26. There is also force in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the grounds were vague in nature and so it could not be reasonably expected from the detenue to prepare effective representation in terms of Section 13 of PSA. 27. The names of three associates with whom the detenue was arrested or ‘some incriminating material’ has not been explained. The allegation regarding involvement of the detenue in militancy related activities besides disrupting the peaceful atmosphere, has not been made in intelligible manner and so there is base to opine that there was non-application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. When it is so, the detention order stands vitiated. For this reliance is placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in case Chaju Ram Vs. State of J&K, AIR 1971 SC 263 . 28. One more plea taken to sound that the detention was bad is about the absence of compelling reasons on the part of detaining authority to spell out as to what was the necessity to detain the detenue when he was already in custody on a complaint filed under Section 109 Cr.PC. The detenue has been categoric in stating that he was not set free after directed to be released on bail by the Executive Magistrate, 1st Class, Sirigufwara vide order dated 26.09.2018 and continued to be in detention even on the date when the impugned detention orders was passed. 29. In the counter affidavit, the fact, what is and what can be deduced from the documents placed in support, is not being refuted. The date of arrest in the detention order is put-forth as 01.10.2018 whereas the contention has been raised in terms of the writ petition that the detenue has been arrested on 04.09.2018. No reference of the order passed by the Executive Magistrate, Sirigufwar is given in the detention order, regarding authorization of the detention of the detenue under Section 109 Cr.PC. Principle of law laid down in Surya Prakash case(supra) along-with Rushikesh Tanaji case(supra), vividly sound that the impugned detention order was bad. 30. Record testified copy of letter dated 09.10.2018 and dossier has not been furnished to the detenue. Principle of law laid down in Surya Prakash case(supra) along-with Rushikesh Tanaji case(supra), vividly sound that the impugned detention order was bad. 30. Record testified copy of letter dated 09.10.2018 and dossier has not been furnished to the detenue. Certainly the detenue stands incapacitated to submit a representation within time prescribed. He being a literate would not render the breach insignificant. The impugned order of detention has to be treated as non-est on this count. Reliance on the judgments of “Sophia Gulam Mohd. Bham V. State of Maharashtra & Ors. ( AIR 1999 SC 3051 ) and Ramchandra A.Kamat V. Union of India & ors.( AIR 1980 SC 765 )”, are placed in this regard. 31. In Kamla Kanyalal Khushalani Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 814 , it is held that:- “…In this view of the matter unless the materials and documents relied on in the order of detention are supplied to the detenue along-with the grounds, the supply of grounds simpliciter would give him not a real but merely an illusory opportunity to make a representation to the detaining authority.” 32. In Dr. Ram Krishan Bhadary Vs. The State of Delhi & Ors. AIR 1953 SC 318 , their lordships’ have enunciated that:- “….Preventive detention is a serious invasion of personal liberty and such meagre safeguards as the Constitution has provided against the improper exercise of the power must be jealously watched and enforced by the Court. In this case, the petitioner has the right, under Article 22 (5), as interpreted by this Court by a majority, to be furnished with particulars of the grounds of his detention “sufficient to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may give relief to him.” We are of opinion that this constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect to each of the grounds communicated to the person detained, subject of course to a claim of privilege under Clause (6) of Article 22. That not having been done in regard to the ground mentioned in sub-paragraph (e) of paragraph 2 of the statement of grounds, the petitioner’s detention cannot be held to be in accordance with the procedure established by law within the meaning of Article 21. The petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.” 33. The petitioner is therefore entitled to be released and we accordingly direct him to be set at liberty forthwith.” 33. We would also like to reiterate that Section 10-A of the Act would be attracted only when one or more of the grounds of detention is/are found vague, irrelevant or non-existent or stale along-with grounds which could be severed and is/are relevant extant, specific or proximate. Its mischief is not attracted in a case of present nature when detention order is based on single ground, may be it has different paras. It would also not apply when constitutional mandate of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India or Section 13(2) of the Act is found to have been observed in breach by non-furnishing of the material by the detaining authority. Omission to furnish documents goes to the very root of the matter and resort to Section 10-A of the Act would not validate the detention order. To reiterate, it would be in fundamental breach of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to disable a detenue to submit a meaningful and effective representation and so cannot be countenanced on any count. 34. In Smt. Icchu Devi Choraria Vs. Union of India & Ors. ( AIR 1980 SC 1983 ), the Hon’ble Apex Court spoke of the judicial commitment as :- “The court has always regarded personal liberty as the most precious possession of mankind and refused to tolerate illegal detention, regardless of the social cost involved in the release of a possible renegade.” “This is an area where the court has been most strict and scrupulous in ensuring observance with the requirements of the law, and even where a requirement of the law is breached in the slightest measure, the court has not hesitated to strike down the order of detention or to direct the release of the detenue even though the detention may have been valid till the breach occurred.” 35. In “Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors.” reported in 1984 AIR 1334, the majority view which was taken by their Lordships Hon’ble Justice Venkataramiah and Hon’ble Mr. In “Vijay Narain Singh vs. State of Bihar & Ors.” reported in 1984 AIR 1334, the majority view which was taken by their Lordships Hon’ble Justice Venkataramiah and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Chinnappa Reddy, the role of the Court and the power of judicial review in regard to the satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority was noted as: “…In particular, I do not agree with the view that ‘those who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of public order must be the sole judges of what the national security or public order requires.' It is too perilous a proposition. Our Constitution does not give a carta blanche to any organ of the State to be the sole arbiter in such matters. Preventive detention is considered so treacherous and such an anathema to civilized thought and democratic polity that safeguards against undue exercise of the power to detain without trial, have been built into the Constitution itself and incorporated as Fundamental Rights. There are two sentinels, one at either end. The legislature is required to make the law circumscribing the limits within which persons may be preventively detained and providing for the safeguards prescribed by the Constitution and the courts are required to examine, when demanded, whether there has been any excessive detention, that is, whether the limits set by the Constitution and the legislature have been transgressed. Preventive detention is not beyond judicial scrutiny. while adequacy or sufficiency may not be a ground of challenge, relevancy and proximity are certainly grounds of challenge. Nor is it for the court to put itself in the position of the detaining authority and to satisfy itself that the untested facts reveal a path of crime. I agree with my brother Sen, J. when he says, "It has always been the view of this Court that the detention of individuals without trials for any length of time, however, short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our Government and the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law" 36. For what is stated above and in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of judgments, we find that the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 13.03.2019 is not within the parameters of law. Same is set aside. The detenue namely Mudasir Ahmad Dar S/o Ghulam Mohammad Dar R/o Banderpora, Tehsil Bijbehara, District Anantnag, is directed to be set free, if otherwise not required in any other cases.