JUDGMENT Hon'ble Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. The present Second Appeal has been preferred by the defendant as against the judgement and decree rendered by the First Appellate Court of Additional District Judge/3rd Fast Track Court, Haridwar in Civil Appeal No. 50 of 2009, Ompal Singh and another vs. Shanti Devi and another, as well as against the judgement and decree dated 28.10.2009, as passed by the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Haridwar in Original Suit No. 126 of 2006 Ompal Singh and another vs. Shanti Devi and another. By virtue of the judgement put to under challenge, whereby both the Courts below have concurrently decreed the Suit for specific performance of agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 as executed by Darshani Devi and had directed the judgement debtor i.e. defendant/appellant herein to execute the sale deed within the time period as provided in the decree itself. It is these two judgements which are being impugned and put to challenge by defendant/appellant on two limited specific questions, one pertaining to the implications of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, secondly, which is also in relation to the relief sought for in the plaint, which would entail an interpretation of Section 21(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which is the another substantial question of law, on which the present Second Appeal was instituted by the defendant/appellant, and as argued before this Court. 2. The Second Appeal in question came up for consideration before this Court at an admission stage on 10.02.2012, the coordinate Bench of this Court while admitting the Appeal has formulated the following substantial questions of law:- (a) Whether in view of the provisions of section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, the relief for refund of earnest money was proper and sufficient relief and suit for specific performance could not have been decreed? (b) Whether as per section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the court is not bound to grant relief of specific performance just because it is lawful to do so? (c) Whether in view of the provisions of section 21(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the first appellate court ought to have dismissed the appeal since the plaintiffs had themselves sought the alternative relief of refund of earnest money and compensation? (d) Whether in view of the notice dated 20.9.2006, the defendant no. (c) Whether in view of the provisions of section 21(2) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the first appellate court ought to have dismissed the appeal since the plaintiffs had themselves sought the alternative relief of refund of earnest money and compensation? (d) Whether in view of the notice dated 20.9.2006, the defendant no. 2/appellant could not have executed the sale deed as his name was not mutated in the revenue record in place of Smt. Darshani Devi within the period stipulated in the agreement to sell, hence specific performance of agreement to sell cannot be decreed against him?" 3. Before venturing to answer the substantial questions of law, on which this Second Appeal has been admitted, it becomes inevitable to deal with the case as pleaded by the parties to the dispute before the Court below. 4. Briefly put, the plaintiff to the Suit i.e. defendant herein on 27.11.2006 had instituted the Suit for the grant of a decree of specific performance for execution of the sale deed in pursuance to an agreement for sale said to have been executed by the predecessor of the defendant on 25.07.2006 whereby she has agreed to sell the property in dispute which constitutes to be a land lying in khasra No. 81 M, Khata No. 68 having an area of 1.302 hectares of village Solapur, Sikrora, Phargana & Tehsil Roorkee, District Haridwar (hereinafter to be referred as “the property in dispute"). 5. In the suit thus instituted on 27.11.2006, the relief which was modulated by the plaintiff/respondent was to the following effect: - **vr% oknhx.k izkFkhZ gS fd%& ¼v½ fMØh rdehy egk;nk cgd oknhx.k cjf[kykQ izfroknhx.k vFkok muesa tks Hkh Jhefr n'kZuh e`rd dk mÙkjkf/kdkjh gksuk ik;k tkos] bl vk'k; ls ikfjr dh tkos fd os oknhx.k ls 'ks"k /kujkf'k vadu 3]56]000@& :i;s izkIr djds iz'uxr laifRr dk foØ;i= oknhx.k ds i{k esa vUnj vof/k fu/kkZfjr U;k;ky; jftLVMZ djk nsa] vU;Fkk izfroknhx.k ds [kpZ ij iz'uxr laifÙk dk foØ;i= oknhx.k ds gd esa ctfj;s U;k;ky; djk;k tkos] fodYiLo:i oknhx.k dks izfroknhx.k ls vFkok e`rd }kjk NksM+h x;h laifÙk fuEufoof.kZr dks dqdZ o uhyke djk;h tkdj vnk dh x;h jkf'k vadu 1]00]000@& :i;s ,oa izfrdj jkf'k 3]50]000@& :i;s fnyk;h tkosA ¼c½ [kpkZ eqdnek oknhx.k dks izfroknhx.k ls fnyk;k tkosA ¼l½ vU; lgk;rk tks jkt vnkyr oknhx.k ikus ds vf/kdkjh lkfcr gksa] cgd oknhx.k cjf[kykQ izfroknhx.k lkfnr Qjek;h tkosA** 6. What would be relevant for consideration before this Court while adjudicating this Second Appeal would be the impact of an alternative relief which has been sought for by the plaintiff in suit in question on which sufficient argument has been extended by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant it is that as to whether the manner in which the relief has been modulated, will it fall to be within the ambit of considerations under Section 20 or under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act or not? 7. The brief facts of the case as involved, were that one Smt. Darshani Devi had executed a registered agreement for sale on 25.07.2006, in favour of the plaintiff/respondent by accepting the earnest money to the tune of Rs. 1.00 lakh, which was agreed to be made adjustable as against the total agreed sale consideration of Rs. 4,56,000/-. As per the agreement for sale thus executed it was agreed that the sale deed would be executed within the time specified therein in the agreement i.e. by 30.09.2006. Unfortunately, before the expiry of the term to execute the sale deed, during which the sale deed could been executed by the predecessor of the defendant, Darshani Devi she met with the sad demise on 24.08.2006 i.e. even much before the scheduled date in the agreement for sale i.e. 30.09.2006, which was the upper time limit during which the sale deed ought to have been executed by the predecessor of the present defendant. 8. Admittedly, as per the plaint case the property in dispute as described in the Suit itself, the property since being the estate of a female as would be apparent from the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006, its succession would be regulated by the provisions contained under Section 172 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. As per the terminology which has been used under Section 172 on the death of a female landlord/owner of the property, when happens to be a woman and is holding an interest in the holding, it would be inherited by the heirs as chronologically described therein under Section 172. The line of succession as described under the aforesaid section is not relevant for the purposes of the present case because it is not the bone of contention of any of the parties to the Second Appeal. The line of succession as described under the aforesaid section is not relevant for the purposes of the present case because it is not the bone of contention of any of the parties to the Second Appeal. What is relevant is the interpretation of the word “vesting of the right", and inheritance on the death of the deceased woman, who was holding interest over the property in dispute which falls to be the property as defined under Section 3(14) of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950. For the said purpose Section 172 of the said Act is quoted hereunder:- “172. Succession in the case of a woman holding an interest inherited as a widow, mother, daughter, etc. For the said purpose Section 172 of the said Act is quoted hereunder:- “172. Succession in the case of a woman holding an interest inherited as a widow, mother, daughter, etc. - [(1) When a bhumidhar, [* * *] or asami who has after the date of vesting, inherited an interest in any holding- (a) as a widow, widow of a male lineal descendant, in the male line of descent, mother or father's mother dies, marries, abandons or surrenders such holding or part thereof; or (b) as a daughter, son's daughter, sister or half-sister being the daughter of the same father as the deceased [marries] dies, abandons or surrenders such holding or part thereof, the holding or the part shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir (such heir being ascertained in accordance with the provisions of Section 171) of the last male bhumidhar, [* * *] or asami.] (2) Where a bhumidhar [* * *] who has before the date of vesting inherited an interest in any holding as a [widow, widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent, mother, daughter, father's mother, son's daughter, sister or half-sister being the daughter of the same father as the deceased]- (a) dies and such bhumidhar [* * *] was on the date immediately before the said date an intermediary of the land comprised in the holding or held the holding as a fixed rate tenant, or an exproprietary or occupancy tenant in Avadh or as a tenant on special terms in Avadh and- (i) she was in accordance with the personal law applicable to her entitled to a life estate only in the holding, the holding shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir (such heir being ascertained in accordance with the provisions of Section 171) of the last male intermediary or tenant aforesaid; and if (ii) she was in accordance with the personal law applicable to her entitled to the holding absolutely the holding shall devolve in accordance with the table mentioned in Section 174; [(b) dies, abandons or surrenders and in the case of a widow, widow of a male lineal descendant in the male line of descent, mother, father's mother, marries such bhumidhar [* * *] on the date immediately before the said date held the holding otherwise than as an intermediary or tenant referred to in Clause (a), the holding shall devolve upon the nearest surviving heir (such heir being ascertained in accordance with the provisions of Section 171) of the last male tenant.] (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) mutatis mutandis apply to an asami who inherited the holding before the date of vesting. (4) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a person succeeding to an interest in any holding under the provisions of Section 174. Explanation. — For the purposes of this section the expression “last male bhumidhar, [* * *] or asami" includes the last male tenant, grove-holder, permanent lessee in Avadh, grantee or sir or khudkasht holder, as the case may be." 9. In the suit, when it was instituted, it was the case of the plaintiff/respondent that he was always ready and willing to get the sale deed executed for which he has issued a notice to the defendant on 20.09.2006 calling upon them to put in their appearance before the Sub Registrar on the date specified in the Notice for the purposes of execution of the sale deed and they contended that they had sufficient balance sale consideration available with them as agreed to be transferred to the defendant/appellant which was payable as a consequence of the transfer and execution of the sale deed on the basis of the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006. 10. It is the case of the plaintiff as pleaded in the suit that when despite of the notice dated 20.09.2006 when the defendant did not appear before the Sub Registrar on the specified date as given in the notice aforesaid, for getting the sale deed executed, which they as per the terms of the agreement for sale since being the heirs of the predecessor Darshani Devi, they were liable to and they were equally bound to execute the sale deed in their favour. At this stage itself, before venturing further into the controversy in question, it would be relevant to considered vital aspects which has been argued by the counsel for the appellant with regard to as to whether the heirs of deceased Darshani Devi, who had succeeded her estate under Section 172 would be bound by the terms of the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 or not and what would the actual interpretation of the word “vesting of the right" the term as used under Section 172 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950. 11. 11. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent had drawn the attention of this Court towards the terms of the agreement itself, wherein the predecessor in interest of the defendant late Darshani Devi had referred therein that the terms of the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 would be equally binding on the heirs, who succeeds her estate. The relevant part of the agreement for sale to the said effect is quoted hereunder:- **vr% nksuksa i{k o muds mÙkjkf/kdkjh fuEu fu;eksa ls ikcan jgsaxsaA** 12. Since the stipulations in the agreement itself as expressed by the predecessor of the defendant/appellant had made the terms of the agreement for sale binding on the heirs who succeed the parties, who were the signatories to the agreement, and to the heirs of the deceased Darshani Devi, this Court is of the view that in view of the stipulated/terms provided under the registered agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006, the defendants/appellants who are the successors under Section 172, would be equally bound by the terms of the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006. 13. The another answer to the said question is from the view point of the language as used under Section 172 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, wherein where there it provides a law of succession of a woman's estate, the legislature has specifically used the term “vesting of right" that it would lead to a consequence of vesting or an inheritance of “interest" in any holding. The “vesting of interest" in the wider sense when it is to be read and considered while granting the right of succession under Section 172, it would imbibe within its definition the interest not only in relation to the benefits accruing from the holdings of the deceased tenure holder, but it would also simultaneously cover the liability of the predecessor also from whom the right is succeeded, if any, which is attached to the holding itself. And that is why under Section 172, the following words have been used “inherited any interest in any holding". And that is why under Section 172, the following words have been used “inherited any interest in any holding". Hence, apart from the terms of the agreement even as per the provisions contained under Section 172, the defendant/appellant would be bound by the terms of the un-assailed agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 and simultaneously would also inherit the liability, if any also, as inheritance cannot only be unidirectional of inheriting the assets and not the liabilities attached to it i.e. the holding flowing from the predecessor. 14. The plaintiff in the suit contended that when despite of the notice issued by him on 20.09.2006 for execution of the sale deed, when the defendants/appellants have not put in appearance before the Sub Registrar on the scheduled date as provided in the notice, it gave cause of action, and the necessity arose to file the suit for specific performance for execution of the sale deed in pursuance to agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 and yet again, at this stage, this Court will have to deviate from the principal course of judgement and thinks it be appropriate to deal with the principal argument as extended by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant in relation to the impact of the provisions contained under Section 20 and 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 15. The argument of the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant as extended by him was in the light of the relief sought for by the plaintiff in the Suit, which was an alternative relief to the effect that in an event if the Court determines that the agreement for sale could not be executed, in that eventuality, an alternative relief was prayed for, for the remittance back of the earnest money, which was paid by the plaintiff/respondent to the defendant/appellant at the stage of agreement for sale. To this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent had submitted that an alternative relief, as prayed for would not attract Section 20 of the Act. 16. To this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondent had submitted that an alternative relief, as prayed for would not attract Section 20 of the Act. 16. There are two logics, which he has tried to harped upon in the light of the ratio which has been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court to the effect that when on issuance of the notices, the respondents had filed their written statement, particularly in the light of pleadings, as the pleadings as raised by the defendant/appellant in para 10 of the written statement had raised the following plea:- **10- ;g fd Jherh n'kZuhnsoh }kjk oknhx.k ds gd esa dHkh dksbZ bdjkjukek ekgnkcS; rgjhj o rdehy djds jftLVMZ ugha djk;k x;k vkSj uk gh mUgksaus dHkh Hkh iz'uxr laifÙk dks foØ; djus dk dksbZ lkSnk oknhx.k ds lkFk fd;k vkSj uk gh mUgsa iz'uxr laifÙk dks foØ; djus dh dksbZ vko';drk FkhA** Wherein it is argued by the counsel for the plaintiff/respondent that, when the defendant/appellant had denied that the predecessor in interest of the defendant/appellant had not executed the sale deed nor the same was ever registered before the Sub-registrar nor she has ever agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff/respondent as there was no necessity for it nor there was any financial dearth which was existing with the predecessor in interest of the defendant/appellant to execute the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006. Simultaneously, it would be relevant to consider the pleading raised in para 14 of the written statement also wherein the defendant has pleaded that the agreement for sale is a void document, which was executed without there being any exchange of sale consideration and the same was got executed by the plaintiff by taking advantage of the fact that Darshani Devi being an illiterate lady and she was allured to execute the agreement for sale. * *14- ;g fd dfFkr bdjkjukek ,d 'kwU; nLrkost gS tks fcuk izfrQy ds gS tks fd ,d vuiढ+ efgyk dks /kks[ks esa j[kdj cgyk&Qlykdj mldh laifÙk dks gM+i djus dh n`f"V ls rgjhj djk;k x;k nLrkost gS ftldk dksbZ ykHk oknhx.k dks izkIr ugha gksrkA** 17. * *14- ;g fd dfFkr bdjkjukek ,d 'kwU; nLrkost gS tks fcuk izfrQy ds gS tks fd ,d vuiढ+ efgyk dks /kks[ks esa j[kdj cgyk&Qlykdj mldh laifÙk dks gM+i djus dh n`f"V ls rgjhj djk;k x;k nLrkost gS ftldk dksbZ ykHk oknhx.k dks izkIr ugha gksrkA** 17. Apart from this, the subsequent predecessors of the tenure holder, in the written statement as filed before the Court below being Paper No. 42A1, had contended that there would be no cause of action for the plaintiff to institute the Suit for specific performance and if at all the plaintiff was entitled to any benefit, he could only avail the benefit of Section 35A of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. On exchange of the pleadings, the learned trial Court had framed the following issues:- **¼1½ D;k Jherh n'kZuh nsoh }kjk iz'uxr laifÙk foØ; djus dk dksbZ lkSnk gqvk ,oa dksbZ egk;nk c; oknhx.k ds lkFk fnukad 25-7-06 dks vadu 456000@& :ñ esa fd;kA ¼2½ D;k Jherh n'kZuh nsoh }kjk oknhx.k ls crkSj c;kuk jkf'k vadu ,d yk[k : izkIr djds jftñ vuqcU/kj rgjhj o rdehy djk;kA ¼3½ D;k oknhx.k vuqca/k dh 'kjk;r ds vuqlkj foØ; i= jftñ djkus gsrq rS;kj ,oa bPNqd jgsaA ¼4½ D;k Jherh n'kZuh nsoh ds LoxZokl i'pkr oknhx.k izfrñx.k ls crkSj mÙkjkfèkdkjh vuqca/k dh 'kjk;r vuqlkj foØ;i= jftñ djkus ds vf/kdkjh gSaA ¼5½ D;k izfrñx.k /kkjk 20 fof'k"V vuqrks"k vf/kfu;e dk ykHk ikus ds vf/kdkjh gSaA ¼6½ oknhx.k fdl vuqrks"k dks ikus ds vf/kdkjh gSaA** 19. The suit proceeded further based on the pleadings and in support of his contention, the plaintiff had placed on record the documentary evidence of the agreement for sale itself as Paper No. 9GA, the Nakal Khatauni, showing that the Darshani Devi, to be the recorded owner of the property in question and at the time of execution of registered agreement for sale, as well as, the copy of the registered notices as sent by the plaintiff/respondent to the defendant/appellant calling upon them to execute the sale deed by 30.09.2006. There is a specific observation which has been made by the learned trial Court, that as far as the defendants/appellants are concerned, they have not led any documentary evidence in support of their assertions which has been made in their written statement. There is a specific observation which has been made by the learned trial Court, that as far as the defendants/appellants are concerned, they have not led any documentary evidence in support of their assertions which has been made in their written statement. Besides this, the party to the dispute had also led oral evidence, wherein the plaintiff/respondent himself has appeared as PW1 and has also examined PW2 Rajendra Singh in support and the defendant had appeared in the witness box as DW1 and filed his affidavit in examination in chief as Paper No. 49Ka2. 20. For the purposes of an appropriate determination of the controversy with regard to the rights flowing from an agreement for sale deed dated 25.07.2006 and particularly, in the light of the provisions contained under Specific Relief Act, 1963, it becomes necessary for the party claiming its execution to show and prove by evidences on record that the agreement for sale was executed in relation to which issue No. 1 was framed by the learned trial Court. 21. The second issue, which becomes relevant for consideration for the instant case was as to whether in lieu of execution of the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 whether at all there was any exchange of earnest money which was to be adjusted as against the final sale consideration payable on execution of the sale deed, within the time stipulated under the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006. 22. In relation to it, the learned trial Court has framed the issues to the effect as to whether the defendant at the time of the execution of the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 had at all exchanged the earnest money and handed over the sum of Rs. 1.00 lakh which was alternatively sought to be claimed by the plaintiff while filing of the suit. 23. The third issue and which happens to be more relevant for the purposes of a suit for specific performance is the determination of a fact as to whether there had been a readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiff to get the agreement for sale executed. 24. 23. The third issue and which happens to be more relevant for the purposes of a suit for specific performance is the determination of a fact as to whether there had been a readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiff to get the agreement for sale executed. 24. The learned trial Court on these three vital issues, which are the determining factors in a suit for specific performance had recorded a finding of fact in favour of the plaintiff/respondent to the following effect:- 1) That by the evidence on record and as per the pleadings of the parties also, the registered agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 was executed and registered before the Sub-Registrar. 2) In relation to issue Nos. 2 and 3, also there was a finding in favour of the plaintiff to the effect that the plaintiff had transferred a part of the sale consideration to the predecessor in the interest of the defendant to the tune of rupees one lakh. 3) The finding on the readiness and willingness too has been recorded in favour of the plaintiff/respondent by the learned trial Court. 4) The other issues which come in for consideration and which was the bone of contention in the present Second Appeal as raised by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant, is from the view point that as to whether after the death of the predecessor in interest of the defendant prior to the expiry of the period as determined for execution of the sale deed will her successor be liable to by the terms of the agreement for sale. 5) Lastly, the issue was pertaining to as to whether any benefit under Section 20 could be extended to the defendants by directing them to return the partial sale consideration which has been received by the predecessor of the defendant/appellant. 25. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the parties to the Second Appeal that the finding which has been recorded on issues 1, 2 and 3, which was consolidated and decided together by the learned trial Court, there happens to be no dispute, because the finding recorded on it by the learned trial Court, has not been subjected to challenge by the defendants/appellants in the appeal preferred by them before the First Appellate Court. Now, the sole bone of contention would be confined to the findings which has been recorded by the Courts below would be on issue Nos. 4 and 5, wherein the successors of the predecessor in the interest of the property in question i.e. defendants/appellant herein that they are willing to return the partial sale consideration paid to their predecessor, which has been received by them by way of an earnest money by invoking Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 26. The learned trial Court, after considering the rival contentions by the impugned judgement and decree dated 28.10.2009 had decreed the suit for specific performance, directing the defendants to accept the balance sale consideration from the plaintiff/respondent and to execute the sale deed within a period of one month from the date of the judgement. 27. Being aggrieved against the said judgement rendered by the learned trial Court, the present defendant/appellant have preferred the Civil Appeal No. 50 of 2009, Ompal Singh Vs. Shanti Devi, wherein precisely, as would be apparent from the Memo of Appeal as filed by the present appellants, (which is available on record of the lower Court) that they have only questioned upon the finding which has been recorded on issue Nos. 4 and 5. For the said purpose, it becomes necessary to consider the grounds, which have been taken by the appellants in the Memo of Appeal, as filed before the First Appellate Court. 28. On scrutiny of the Memo of Appeal, apart from accepting the facts/backdrops, under which the litigation has reached to this stage, the appellants have in their Appeal only questioned the finding which has been recorded by the trial Court on issue Nos. 4 and 5 to the effect, one as to whether they would be bound by the terms of agreement for sale and secondly as to whether at all they could be extended the benefit of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 29. For the said purpose, it becomes necessary for the Court to consider the implications of Section 20, as incorporated by the legislature in the provisions as contained under Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 20 of the said Act reads as under:- “20. 29. For the said purpose, it becomes necessary for the Court to consider the implications of Section 20, as incorporated by the legislature in the provisions as contained under Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 20 of the said Act reads as under:- “20. Discretion as to decreeing specific performance.— (1) The jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary, and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. (2) The following are cases in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance:— (a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the plaintiff an unfair advantage over the defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the plaintiff; or (c) where the defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. Explanation 1.—Mere inadequacy of consideration, or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not be deemed to constitute an unfair advantage within the meaning of clause (a) or hardship within the meaning of clause (b). Explanation 2.— The question whether the performance of a contract would involve hardship on the defendant within the meaning of clause (b) shall, except in cases where the hardship has resulted from any act of the plaintiff subsequent to the contract, be determined with reference to the circumstances existing at the time of the contract. (3) The court may properly exercise discretion to decree specific performance in any case where the plaintiff has done substantial acts or suffered losses in consequence of a contract capable of specific performance. (4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party. 30. (4) The court shall not refuse to any party specific performance of a contract merely on the ground that the contract is not enforceable at the instance of the party. 30. If the provision as contained under Section 20 is read in precision, it is not a mandate which could be claimed as matter of right by the defendants/appellants to the Suit. It only gives a discretion to the Court that instead of decreeing the suit for specific performance, the Courts may based on reasonable ground and on a settled judicial principles, can order the return of the earnest money or the consideration which has exchanged hands earlier instead of decreeing the suit for specific performance. In relation thereto, in response to the argument as extended by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant that since in the relief clause itself, the plaintiff has claimed for an alternative relief under Section 20 of the Act, the Suit, if at all was to be considered by the learned trial Court, the learned trial Court should have exercised its power under Section 20, while exercising the discretion in their favour and benefit of return of earnest money should be extended to the defendant/appellant. 31. Issue Nos. 4 and 5, as framed and sought to be addressed and attacked by the plaintiff/respondent on the basis of the pleadings raised by the parties that the benefit of Section 20 as claimed by the defendant/appellant would not be attracted in the light of the pleadings raised in para 10 and 14 of their written statement. More particularly, when the defendants deny the execution of the agreement for sale, they cannot on a principal laid down as per law they are not to claim the benefit of Section 20, as it has been law enunciated by the pronouncements laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgement reported in 2015 (1) SCC 705 , Zarina Siddiqui v. Ramalingam alias R. Amarnathan, in its para 34 has held as under:- “34. In the instant case, as noticed above, although Defendant No. 2 held a registered power of attorney on behalf of Defendant No. 1 to sell and dispose of the property, but the Defendants not only made a false statement on affidavit that the power of attorney had authorized the second Defendant only to look after and manage the property but also withheld the said power of attorney from the Court in order to misguide the Court from truth of the facts. Further, by registered agreement the Defendants agreed to sell the suit premises after receiving advance consideration but they denied the existence of the agreement in their pleading. Such conduct of the Defendants in our opinion, disentitle them to ask the Court for exercising discretion in their favour by refusing to grant a decree for specific performance. Further, if a party to a lis does not disclose all material facts truly and fairly but states them in distorted manner and mislead the Court, the Court has inherent power to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction in order to prevent abuse of the process of law." Wherein it has been laid down that where the defendants in the pleadings raised in the written statement they deny the execution of agreement for sale, they are not entitled to claim for the benefit under Section 20 of the Act. 32. In another judgement which has been relied by plaintiff/respondent as reported in 2016 (1) SCC 567 , Hemanta Mondal and others v. Ganesh Chandra Naskar, the Hon'ble Apex Court in its para Nos. 14 and 17 has held as under: “14. Section 20 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 gives discretion to the court, and provides that the court is not bound to grant relief of specific performance merely, because it is lawful to do so. It further provides that the discretion is not to be exercised arbitrarily but guided by judicial principles. 14 and 17 has held as under: “14. Section 20 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 gives discretion to the court, and provides that the court is not bound to grant relief of specific performance merely, because it is lawful to do so. It further provides that the discretion is not to be exercised arbitrarily but guided by judicial principles. Sub-section (2) of Section 20 enumerates three conditions when discretion is not to be exercised to grant decree of specific performance: “20.(2)(a) where the terms of the contract or the conduct of the parties at the time of entering into the contract or the other circumstances under which the contract was entered into are such that the contract, though not voidable, gives the Plaintiff an unfair advantage over the Defendant; or (b) where the performance of the contract would involve some hardship on the Defendant which he did not foresee, whereas its non-performance would involve no such hardship on the Plaintiff; or (c) where the Defendant entered into the contract under circumstances which though not rendering the contract voidable, makes it inequitable to enforce specific performance. The three exceptions which have been carved out by the Hon'ble Court for compliance of Section 20 instead of decreeing Suit for specific performance, would not apply in the instant case, because in accordance to the circumstances of the present case, they are entirely distinct for the following reasons:- (a) The defendants in their written statement had denied the fact of execution of registered agreement for sale. (b) The defendants at no point of time had made any efforts to claim for the counterclaim under Order 8 Rule 6A, to get the agreement for sale set aside, if they contend in the written statement that it was executed taking advantage of illiteracy of Darshani Devi. (c) The exception as carved by the Hon'ble Apex Court is not available as the defendant had not assailed the findings recorded by learned trial Court on issue No. I, II and III, regarding readiness and willingness etc. (d) There is no argument or pleading raised by defendants in their written statement regarding the probable hardship to occur if the suit for specific performance is decreed, nor it was proved otherwise before both the Courts below. (d) There is no argument or pleading raised by defendants in their written statement regarding the probable hardship to occur if the suit for specific performance is decreed, nor it was proved otherwise before both the Courts below. (e) There is no evidence or pleadings with regards to the fact that plaintiff/appellant were having or enjoying any superior position or there was any chance of exercising influence of any nature in getting the agreement for sale executed. It is not their case at any stage. (f) Nor it had been the case of defendant/appellant ever that the plaintiff/respondent that the agreement for sale was inequitable in any manner. Thus in these circumstances and for the above reason the benefit of the ratio as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment relied by the plaintiff/respondent (supra) is not available. 33. On the judgement as relied by the plaintiff/respondent, the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgement as reported in 2000 (6) SCC 420 , Motilal Jain v. Ramdasi Devi (Smt.) and others in its para 12 held as under:- “12. The last contention of Mr. Choudhary that because the plaintiff has claimed compensation in lieu of specific performance so he is disentitled to claim the specific performance of the contract, is to be noted to be rejected. The plaintiffs claim was in accord with the provisions of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Merely because the plaintiff claims damages in a suit for specific performance of contract as alternative relief, it cannot be said that the is not entitled to the main relief of specific performance of contract itself." 34. The second question, which though this Court has already dealt with earlier but at the risk of repetition, it is submitted that in terms of the agreement for sale as quoted above, as well as, the interpretation which has been assigned to the implications of Section 172 of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act earlier, the successors i.e. defendants/appellants the agreement for sale would be binding on the heirs of the predecessor/owner of the property in question. 35. In reference thereto, the reliance has been placed by the defendants/appellants on the judgement reported 2015(5) SCC 223 , Rathnavathi and another v. Kavita Ganashamdas. “49. 35. In reference thereto, the reliance has been placed by the defendants/appellants on the judgement reported 2015(5) SCC 223 , Rathnavathi and another v. Kavita Ganashamdas. “49. In our considered opinion, the High Court being the last Court of appeal on facts/law while hearing first appeal Under Section 96 of Code of Civil Procedure was well within its powers to appreciate the evidence and came to its own conclusion independent to that of the trial court's decision. One can not dispute the legal proposition that the grant/refusal of specific performance is a discretionary relief, and, therefore, once it is granted by the appellate court on appreciation of evidence, keeping in view the legal principle applicable for the grant then further appellate court should be slow to interfere in such finding, unless the finding is found to be either against the settled principle of law, or is arbitrary or perverse." 36. The ratio as relied was a case where the Hon'ble Apex Court was dealing with a case where the first Appellate Court has exercised its discretion under Section 20. The Hon'ble Apex Court has propounded the scope of interference by the next Appellate Court which is a last court of fact and law has, declined the decree of specific performance and has granted direction contemplates under Section 20. This is not the case here; in the present case both the Courts have concurrently decreed the suit for specific performance, and has given the reason why it will not be covered under Section 20 due to denial by defendant of having executed the agreement for sale. 37. Since there happens to be a specific averment in the agreement for sale and particularly, when in the written statement itself the defendants have claimed their right over the estate of the predecessor Darshani Devi, they would also simultaneously be bound by the terms of the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 and any liability towards the holding which is vested with them under Section 172 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act after the death of female tenure holder. 38. 38. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant had also argued the controversy from the view point of the ratio as propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgement as reported in AIR 1992 SC 1604 , Jagdish Singh v. Natthu Singh, where reference has been specifically made to paras 10 and 11 of the said judgment, which are quoted hereunder for convenience:- “10. Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 corresponding to Section 19 of 1877 Act enables the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance also to claim compensation for its breach either in addition to or in substitution of, such performance. Sub-sections (2), (4) and (5) of Section 21 are material and they provide : “(2). If, in any such suit, the Court decides that specific performance ought not to be granted, but that there is a contract between the parties which has been broken by the defendant, and that the plaintiff is entitled to compensation for that breach, it shall award his such compensation accordingly. (3) [Omitted as unnecessary.] (4) In determining the amount of any compensation awarded under this section, the Court shall be guided by the principles specified in Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, 9 of 1872. (5) No compensation shall be awarded under this section unless the plaintiff has claimed such compensation in his plaint :Provided that where the plaintiff has not claimed any such compensation in the plaint, the Court shall, at any stage of the proceeding, allow him to amend the plaint on such terms as may be just, for including a claim for such compensation. Explanation-The circumstance that the contract has become incapable of specific performance does not preclude the Court from exercising the jurisdiction conferred by this section." (emphasis added) So far as the proviso to Sub-section (5) is concerned, two positions must be kept clearly distinguished. If the amendment relates to the relief of compensation in lieu of or in addition to specific performance where the plaintiff has not abandoned his relief of specific-performance the court will allow the amendment at any stage of the proceeding. That is a claim for compensation falling under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the amendment is one under the proviso to Sub-section (5). That is a claim for compensation falling under Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the amendment is one under the proviso to Sub-section (5). But different and less liberal standards apply if what is sought by the amendment is the conversion of a suit for specific performance into one for damages for breach of contract in which case Section 73 of the Contract Act is invoked. This amendment is under the discipline of Rule 17 Order 6, C.P.C. The fact that Sub-section (4), in turn, invokes Section 73 of the Indian Contract Act for the principles of quantification and assessment of compensation does not obliterate this distinction. The provisions of Section 21 seem to resolve certain divergences of judicial opinion in the High Courts on some aspects of the jurisdiction to award of compensation. Sub-section (5) seeks to set at rest the divergence of judicial opinion between High Courts whether a specific claim in the plaint is necessary to grant the compensation. In England Lord Cairn's (Chancery Amendment) Act, 1858 sought to confer jurisdiction upon the Equity Courts to award damages in substitution or in addition to specific performance. This became necessary in view of the earlier dichotomy in the jurisdiction between common law and Equity Courts in the matter of choice of the nature of remedies for breach. In common law the remedy for breach of a contract was damages. The Equity Court innovated the remedy of specific performance because the remedy of damages was found to be an inadequate remedy. Lord Cairn's Act, 1858 conferred jurisdiction upon the Equity Courts to award damages also so that both the reliefs could be administered by one court. Section 2 of the Act provided : “In all cases in which the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction to entertain an application for specific performance of any covenant, contract or agreement it shall be lawful for the same Court if it shall think fit to award damages to the party injured either in addition to or in substitution for such specific performance and such damages may be assessed as the Court shall direct." This is the historical background to the provisions of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and its predecessor in Section 19 of the 1877 Act. 11. In Mohamad Abdul Jabbar and Ors. v. Lalmia and Ors. 11. In Mohamad Abdul Jabbar and Ors. v. Lalmia and Ors. specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 16th January, 1934, was sought by the institution of a suit on 15th January, 1937. During the pendency of the suit, on 20th April, 1937, the provincial Government started land acquisition proceedings respecting the subject-matter of the suit and the same was acquired. The High Court upheld the dismissal of the suit for specific performance and referred an amendment for award of damages. On the obvious impermissibility of specific performance the Nagpur High Court said (para 14 of AIR): “We accordingly conclude that specific performance is now impossible and we cannot decree it for “equity like nature does nothing in vain." We cannot hold the plaintiffs-appellants entitled to the compensation money into which the property was converted because they had no right or interest in that property...." Refusing the amendment for the relief for payment of money the High Court held (para 14 of AIR): “…We would not allow amendment also because on the facts found by the trial Court (with which we see no reason, whatever, to differ) we would have refused specific performance, and the claim for damages on this account would also have been negatived because damages could have been awarded only if specific performance could rightly have been claimed. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs." Support for these conclusions was sought from the oft-quoted, but perhaps a little misunderstood, case of Ardeshir H. Mama v. Flora Sassoon, A.I.R. 1928 PC 208. The passage in Sassoon's case relied upon by the Nagpur High Court is this ( AIR 1947 Nagpur 254 , para 10: “In a series of decisions it was consistently held that just as its power to give damages additional was to be exercised in a suit in which the Court had granted specific performance, so the power to give damages as an alternative to specific performance did not extend to a case in which the plaintiff had debarred himself from claiming that form of relief, nor to a case in which that relief had become impossible. The case of ILR 52 Bombay 597 :( AIR 1928 PC 208 ) fell within the first category of cases described above under the alternative relief of damages. This case falls within the second part where the relief of specific performance has become impossible. The case of ILR 52 Bombay 597 :( AIR 1928 PC 208 ) fell within the first category of cases described above under the alternative relief of damages. This case falls within the second part where the relief of specific performance has become impossible. (emphasis supplied) The second part of the observation of the Nagpur High Court, with great respect to the learned Judges proceeds on a fallacy resulting from the non-perception of the specific departure in the Indian law. In Lord Cairn's Act, 1858 damages could not be awarded when the contract had, for whatever reason, become incapable of specific performance. But under the Indian law the explanation makes a specific departure and the jurisdiction to award damages remains unaffected by the fact that without any fault of the plaintiff, the contract becomes incapable of specific performance. Indeed, Sassoon's case is not susceptible of the import attributed to it by the Nagpur High Court. Sassoon's case itself indicated the departure made in Indian Law by the Explanation in Section 19 of the 1877 Act, which is the same as the Explanation to Section 21 of the 1963 Act. The Judicial Committee, no doubt, said that Section 19 of the 1877 Act “embodies the same principle as Lord Cairn's Act and does not, any more than did the English Statute enable the court in a specific performance suit to award ‘compensation for its breach' where at the hearing the plaintiff debarred himself by his own action from asking for a specific decree". But what was overlooked was this observation of Lord Blanesburgh. “except as the case provided for in the explanation-as to which there is introduced an express divergence from Lord Cairn's Act, as expanded in England". (emphasis supplied) Indeed the following illustration of the Explanation appended to Section 19 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 makes the position clear : “Of the Explanation-A, a purchaser, sues B, his vendor, for specific performance of a contract for the sale of a patent. Before the hearing of the suit the patent expires. The Court may award A compensation for the non-performance of the contract, and may, if necessary, amend the plaint for that purpose." When the plaintiff by his option has made specific performance impossible, Section 21 does not entitle him to seek damages. Before the hearing of the suit the patent expires. The Court may award A compensation for the non-performance of the contract, and may, if necessary, amend the plaint for that purpose." When the plaintiff by his option has made specific performance impossible, Section 21 does not entitle him to seek damages. That position is common to both Section 2 of Lord Cairn's Act, 1858 and Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. But in Indian Law where the contract, for no fault of the plaintiff, becomes impossible of performance Section 21 enables award of compensation in lieu and substitution of specific performance. We, therefore, hold that the second contention of Sri Manoj Swarup is not substantial either." 39. The judgement relied in case of Jagdish Singh (Supra) by the defendant/appellant will not be applicable in the present case, because as per ratio laid down by the said judgement would apply only when there exists of precondition of breach of an agreement of which specific performance is sought, here Section 21 only provides entitlement of compensation when there is breach of the terms of an agreement of sale. “Breach" is precondition for attracting Section 21 to alternative payment of compensation to the plaintiff. In the present case, there is no such condition prevailing as its no one's case that the terms of the agreement was breached by any party to the agreement to deal with determination of compensation to be payable as per the provisions of Section 73 of Indian Contract Act, 1872. Thus sub Section (2) of Section 21 will not be attracted. 40. Similar would be situation prevailing for attracting Section 21(5) of the Act. In the said case, it was a case where the relief of compensation was alternatively claimed by amendment, the question arose that whether the amendment in relief alternatively claiming relief for compensation would not mean an abandonment of the relief of specific relief which was principally sought in the suit. Because the scope of compensation under Section 21, is when the relief for amendment of Suit leads to the conversion of Suit for specific performance in a suit for damages for the breach of the terms of contract. Both the situations i.e. breach of condition of contract or amended relief for compensation as dealt with in the judgement relied existed in the present case. Thus authority is of no help to the defendant/appellant. Both the situations i.e. breach of condition of contract or amended relief for compensation as dealt with in the judgement relied existed in the present case. Thus authority is of no help to the defendant/appellant. 41. The Hon'ble Apex Court also has held in a judgement as reported in 2012 (5) SCC 712 , Narinderjit Singh v. North Star Estate Promoters Limited in its paras 17,18,19,20,24 and 25 held as under:- “17. The trial Court comprehensively analysed the pleadings and evidence of the parties and held that the Respondent has succeeded in proving execution of the agreement by the Appellant's father and receipt of Rs. 1,00,000/- by him. The trial Court then considered the question whether the Respondent was ready and willing to pay the balance price and observed: ...Perusal of the terms and conditions of the agreement to sell in question reveals that the Plaintiff had to pay an amount of Rs. 9 lacs as part payment amount on or before 23.11.1996 and the Defendant No. 2 in turn was schedule to deliver the vacant physical possession of the property in dispute to the Plaintiff i.e. on 23.11.1996. The specific stand taken by the Plaintiff is that he remained ready with the said amount of Rs. 9 lacs to be paid to the Defendants on 23.11.1996, but, the Defendants refused to accept the said amount on pretext or the other. The Plaintiff sent a telephonic message through STD to the Defendant No. 2 besides sending the other phonogram message to the Defendant No. 2 on the same day at 11.00 a.m. More significantly, the Plaintiff had prepared a draft of Rs. 9 lacs bearing No. BC/F322341 dated 23.11.1996 in this regard. Had the Plaintiff not been having ready cash amount of Rs. 9 lacs and not ready and willing to pay the amount of Rs. 9 lacs to the Defendants, then, he would have prepared the said draft. Rather, Defendants have denied the execution of any such agreement dated 22.10.1996 and therefore, Defendants cannot take the plea that Plaintiff never offered an amount of Rs. 9 lacs. The Defendants are also estopped from taking the plea that Plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that the Plaintiff did not have the capacity to make the payment when the Defendants have denied the very execution of the agreement in question. 9 lacs. The Defendants are also estopped from taking the plea that Plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and that the Plaintiff did not have the capacity to make the payment when the Defendants have denied the very execution of the agreement in question. It may be pertinent to mention here that Plaintiff had also served a legal notice upon the Defendants through his counsel Sh. G.K. Verma, Advocate on 24.11.1996, but, the Defendants refused to accept the said notice. The Plaintiff was scheduled to make further payment on different dates to the Defendants after 23.10.1996, but, since the Defendants have denied the execution of the agreement, therefore, the question where, the Plaintiff was ready with the subsequent payment of Rs. 10 lacs, Rs. 18 lacs and Rs. 42 lacs to be paid on subsequent dates becomes meaningless and loses its significance. DW1 Narinderjit Singh has himself stated that document was forged and fabricated, but, he has failed to prove this averment on record. Although, the Defendants have examined an expert witness namely DW3 Navdeep Gupta, who has stated that agreement to sell dated 22.10.1996 did not contain the signatures of Defendant No. 2 Gurcharan Singh, but, his testimony cannot be given much weightage in the wake of the positive oral as well as documentary evidence led by the Plaintiff. Rather, the Plaintiff has also examined PW6 Jassy Anand, Finger Prints and Handwriting Expert, who has specifically stated on oath before the Court that in the present case, she has examined the disputed signatures of Defendant No. 2 on the agreement in question with the standard signatures and he was of the opinion that signatures of Col. Gurcharan Singh, Defendant No. 2 tallied with the disputed signatures of Col. Gurcharan Singh, Defendant No. 2 on the agreement in question which means that signatures on the disputed agreement and the and the same person. ... So, the agreement in question dated 22.10.1996 EX.PW3/A duly stands proved in accordance with provisions of law. It stands sufficiently proved on record that Defendants on 22.10.1996 had executed an agreement to sell in favour of the Plaintiff after receiving earnest amount of Rs. one lacs from the Plaintiff in the presence of marginal witnesses. (Emphasis supplied) 18. The Appellant did not question the aforesaid findings of the trial Court by filing an appeal. It stands sufficiently proved on record that Defendants on 22.10.1996 had executed an agreement to sell in favour of the Plaintiff after receiving earnest amount of Rs. one lacs from the Plaintiff in the presence of marginal witnesses. (Emphasis supplied) 18. The Appellant did not question the aforesaid findings of the trial Court by filing an appeal. Not only this, he did not file cross-objection in the appeal filed by the Respondent. Therefore, the lower appellate Court was not required to consider whether execution of the agreement for sale has been proved and whether Respondent was ready and willing to perform its part of the agreement, but it considered both the questions and observed: “The learned trial Court has specifically held that due execution of the agreement in question has been proved and there is no defect in the findings recorded by the learned trial Court in this regard. The version of the Appellant/Plaintiff in this regard has been proved by PW3 Vijay Bhardwaj who is marginal witness of the agreement in question. So far as readiness and willingness on the part of the Appellant/Plaintiff to perform its contract is concerned, the learned trial Court has recorded findings in favour of the Appellant/Plaintiff and the said findings are based on proper appreciation of evidence. The evidence produced by the Appellant/Plaintiff shows that the Appellant/ Plaintiff had got issued a demand draft of Rs. 9,00,000/- on 23.11.1996 for payment of the said amount to the Defendants/Respondents but they did not receive the said amount. The Appellant/ Plaintiff had sent message and also phonogram Ex.PW3/1 to the Defendants/Respondents on 23.11.1996 vide receipt ex.PW3/H. Even a notice Ex.PW3/D was sent to the Defendants/Respondents through courier vide receipt Ex.PW3/C and even a legal notice had been sent to the Defendants/Respondents by the Appellant/Plaintiff through its counsel. Further the statement of M.K. Jain Director of the Appellant/Plaintiff in this regard finds corroboration from the testimony of Vijay Bhardwaj. On the other hand, the Defendants/Respondents have denied the agreement in question and it is not their plea that Appellant/Plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform its contract. Further the statement of M.K. Jain Director of the Appellant/Plaintiff in this regard finds corroboration from the testimony of Vijay Bhardwaj. On the other hand, the Defendants/Respondents have denied the agreement in question and it is not their plea that Appellant/Plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform its contract. Under these circumstances, the evidence produced by the Appellant/Plaintiff to prove their readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract can be accepted without any hesitation and in this regard I find support from the judgment of Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Santa Singh v. Binder Singh and Ors. 2006 (4) CCC 608 wherein it was held as under: (RCR p. 163, para 10) ‘10. Since the case of the Defendant is that of one of denial, therefore, the statement of the Plaintiff that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract is sufficient to infer that Plaintiffs were ready and willing to perform their part of contract. It was a meager amount of Rs. 2000/- alone which was required to be paid at the time of registration of the sale deed. The substantial amount was paid at the time of execution of the agreement. More than Rs. 12000/- was kept for payment to the mortgagee. Therefore, the argument raised by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that the Plaintiffs have led evidence to prove his ready and willingness to perform the contract is not tenable.' 19. The learned Single Judge also considered the issue of readiness and willingness of the Respondent to perform its part of the agreement and observed: “The factum of readiness and willingness to perform the Plaintiff's part of the contract is to be adjudged with the conduct of the parties and the attending circumstances. In the present case, it may be noticed that according to the terms and conditions of the agreement in question, the Plaintiff-Respondent was to make a payment of Rs. 9,00,000/- to the Appellant on 23.11.1996 and on receipt of the aforesaid payment, the Appellant was to allow the Plaintiff-Respondent to carry out the development activities. However, it has been established on record that the Appellant refused to receive the aforesaid amount of Rs. 9,00,000/- on 23.11.1996. There is no evidence on record that the Appellant ever allowed the Plaintiff- Respondent to carry out development activities in the land in question. However, it has been established on record that the Appellant refused to receive the aforesaid amount of Rs. 9,00,000/- on 23.11.1996. There is no evidence on record that the Appellant ever allowed the Plaintiff- Respondent to carry out development activities in the land in question. Thus, thereafter, there was no occasion for the Plaintiff-Respondent to further perform its part of the contract on subsequent dates as argued. Still there is no evidence on record placed by the Appellant to prove the fact that the Plaintiff- Respondent was not ready to get the sale deed executed on subsequent dates as per the terms and conditions of the agreement in question. There is a distinction between readiness to perform the contract and willingness to perform the contract. By readiness, may be meant the capacity of the Plaintiff to perform the contract which includes his financial position to pay the purchase price whereas determining the willingness to perform his part of the contract, the conduct of the parties has to be scrutinized. In the present case, there is no evidence placed on record to show that the Plaintiff-Respondent was not having the capacity to pay the purchase price for execution of the subsequent sale deeds. The Plaintiff-Respondent had demonstrated his willingness to pay Rs. 9,00,000/- on 23.11.1996 by placing on record the demand draft of Rs. 9,00,000/- in favour of the Appellant. However, as noticed above, since the Appellant refused to accept the same, the Plaintiff-Respondent was prevented from performing its part of the agreement by offering money for execution of the sale deeds on subsequent dates." 20. In our view, the concurrent findings recorded by the trial Court and the lower appellate Court on the issues of execution of the agreement by the Appellant's father and the Respondent's readiness and willingness to perform its part of the agreement were based on correct evaluation of the pleadings and evidence of the parties and the learned Single Judge of the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to upset those findings. The argument of the learned senior Counsel for the Appellant that in the absence of specific pleading about continued readiness and willingness of the Respondent to perform its part of the agreement and availability of funds necessary for payment of the sale consideration, the High Court should have set aside the concurrent finding recorded by the Courts below sounds attractive but on a careful scrutiny of the record we do not find any valid ground to entertain the same. 24. It is significant to note that the Appellant and his father had set up the case of total denial. They repeatedly pleaded that the agreement for sale was a fictitious document and the Respondent had fabricated the same in connivance with Col. Harjit Singh and Vijay Bhardwaj. However, no evidence was adduced by the Appellant to substantiate his assertion. That apart, he did not challenge the finding recorded by the trial Court on the issue of readiness and willingness of the Respondent to perform its part of the agreement. Therefore, we do not find any valid ground much less justification for exercise of power by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the judgment of the lower appellate Court which was approved by the High Court. 25. We are also inclined to agree with the lower appellate Court that escalation in the price of the land cannot, by itself, be a ground for denying relief of specific performance. In K. Narendra v. Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd. (supra), this Court interpreted Section 20 of the Act and laid down the following propositions: Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides that the jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; the discretion of the court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable, guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a court of appeal. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the Defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the Plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. Performance of the contract involving some hardship on the Defendant which he did not foresee while non-performance involving no such hardship on the Plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine of comparative hardship has been thus statutorily recognized in India. However, mere inadequacy of consideration or the mere fact that the contract is onerous to the Defendant or improvident in its nature, shall not constitute an unfair advantage to the Plaintiff over the Defendant or unforeseeable hardship on the Defendant. (Emphasis supplied)" 42. In the Appeal in question, both the Courts below had upheld the findings on issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3 which remain unquestioned by the defendants/appellants. Accordingly, this Court reaches to the stage to answer the questions, as formulated by the coordinate Bench of this Court at the time of admission of the Second Appeal dated 10.02.2012. 43. The first question, pertaining to the effect of Section 20 and the relief for refund of earnest money whether there was proper and sufficient relief rather than granting a decree for specific performance is answered in negative. The reason as given above and being that the implications of Section 20 is not as of right that the defendant/appellant would be entitled for the benefit under Section 20 but rather it would be a discretion of the Court depending upon the circumstances of the each case, particularly, in the instant case when the finding on issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3 has attained finality pertaining to the execution of the sale deed, pertaining to the remittance of the partial sale consideration i.e. the earnest money and with regard to readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiff, in such an eventuality where there is no breach, the provisions of Section 20 cannot be claimed as a matter of right because in the entire pleadings, which has been raised by the defendants/appellants before the Court below, no hardship, as such, which was being faced as a consequence of execution of the sale deed, had ever been pleaded or proved by the defendant/appellant at any stage. Once the execution of an agreement for sale, which was registered before the Sub-Registrar on 25.07.2006 stands established, then the benefit of Section 20 would not be attracted in the light of the fact that the defendants had in written statement denied the execution of agreement for sale which was concurrently proved against him by both the Courts, which has attained finality due to non challenge to the findings as issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3 by the defendant/appellant. 44. The second substantial question of law too is interlinked with the first substantial question of law pertaining to the factual of remedy of Section 20 as the same has been formulated in a fashion that whether the Court is bound to grant the relief of specific performance just because it is lawful to do so and when the claim has been raised with regard to an alternative remedy under Section 20. Particularly, when the finding on the execution for agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 has been proved concurrently by both the Courts below and when the appellant had not been able to succeed or lead any evidence to the contrary to show that the agreement for sale dated 25.07.2006 was executed under an extraneous circumstances, it would lead to an inference that the agreement for sale was validly executed by the predecessor in interest of the defendants and it was lawful for the Court to pass the decree of specific performance in the absence to the challenge given to the findings on issue Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and also in the light of the fact that when no documentary evidence, whatsoever has been filed by the defendants/appellants in the proceedings before the Court below to support and substantiate their arguments raised in their written statement. 45. After having considered the substantial questions of law as framed therein, the substantial question No. 3, on which this Second Appeal was admitted was pertaining to the effect of the provisions contained under Section 21(2). 45. After having considered the substantial questions of law as framed therein, the substantial question No. 3, on which this Second Appeal was admitted was pertaining to the effect of the provisions contained under Section 21(2). The provisions of Section 21(2) which was alternatively framed as one of the substantial question of law to be considered by the Court was to the effect that whether instead of decreeing the Suit for specific performance, the Court was to consider as to whether the plaintiff could be sufficiently compensated for the breach of the contract, in fact, as per the relief claimed in Suit, it was never claimed as an alternative relief by the plaintiff/respondent. Herein in the case as already observed above, when the factum of agreement for sale, non existence of any hardship on part of the executor i.e. the predecessor in the interest of the defendants is pleaded, nor there is any other alternative pleading raised at any stage with regard to any hardship which would be accruing as a consequence of the execution of the sale deed and when there is no plea of breach of any terms of agreement, this Court is of the view that the implications of sub-Section (2) of Section 21 will not be attracted and thus Section 21(2) will not come into play. Consequently, this Court is of the view that the Second Appeal lacks merits and is accordingly dismissed. However, there would be no order as to cost.