JUDGMENT : BIREN VAISHNAV, J. 1. These Letters Patent Appeals arise out of a common oral Judgment dated 19/08/2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in the respective Special Civil Applications filed by the petitioners – original claimants who had lost before the Labour Court, as their references stood rejected. Under challenge before the learned Single Judge were identical awards dated 31.12.2009 passed by the Labour Court at Valsad in Reference (LCV) Nos. 147/93, 172/93, 145/93, 148/93, 146/93, 144/93, 138/93, 137/93, 10/93 and 145/93. 2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved, the facts as set out by the learned Single Judge in the Judgment under challenge, which are more or less undisputed, are reproduced as under: “3. The claimants raised an industrial dispute on the allegation that the opponent employer terminated their services with effect from 1.1.1993. The appropriate Government referred the dispute for adjudication to the learned Labour Court at Valsad. The learned Labour Court registered the dispute raised by the claimants as Reference (LCV) Nos.147/93, 172/93, 145/93, 148/93, 144/93, 146/93, 138/93, 137/93, 10/93 and 145/93. 3.1 In their respective statements of claim the claimants raised almost identical allegations and they alleged, inter alia, that they are permanent employees of the company and that their services are illegally terminated with effect from 1.1.1993 without granting any opportunity of hearing and defence and without payment of notice pay or compensation and that, therefore, the action of the respondent company employer is illegal. Except the said allegations any other details or any other connected and relevant facts are not mentioned in the statements of claim. With said allegations the claimants prayed that the action of the company of discontinuing their services with effect from 1.1.1993 may be declared illegal and unreasonable and that the company may also be directed to pay full wages until the date when they are reinstated. 3.2 The company resisted the reference cases by filing its respective written statements in the reference cases. The company claimed and asserted that it has not terminated services of the workmen either on 1.1.1993 or on any day thereafter and the allegation that the company has terminated their services with effect from 1.1.1993, is incorrect. 3.2 The company resisted the reference cases by filing its respective written statements in the reference cases. The company claimed and asserted that it has not terminated services of the workmen either on 1.1.1993 or on any day thereafter and the allegation that the company has terminated their services with effect from 1.1.1993, is incorrect. The opponent company, i.e. present respondent alleged, in its written statement, that actually, the workmen, including the claimants, had reported for work on 1.1.1993 and after recording their entry they got together near the cycle stand and did not report for duty at the designated place / machine and commenced sit down strike without any prior notice or intimation to the company and discontinued manufacturing process. The company claimed that it had displayed notice dated 1.1.1993 describing the events which started from 7.00 a.m. According to the company, despite the said notice dated 1.1.1993, the workmen did not resume their duties and continued the sitdown- strike whereas the company continued to put notice everyday from 2.1.1993 to 16.1.1993 and it had issued notice / request on 16.1.1993 in daily newspaper. According to the claim of the company, since the workmen did not respond to the notice dated 1.1.1993, on 2.1.1993 the company had asked the workmen to give an undertaking and resume the work, however, the workmen did not give the undertaking and did not resume their duties and continued the sit down strike. According to the company, slowly and gradually, in small numbers, the workmen started resuming their duties and by 16.1.1993, about 76 workmen had submitted the undertaking and resumed their duties. Some other workmen gave the undertaking and resumed duty after 16.1.1993. 3.3 It appears that ultimately, about 25 workmen did not submit the undertaking and did not resume their duties and subsequently, the said 25 workmen raised industrial dispute with the allegation that their services have been illegally terminated on 1.1.1993. 3.4 The workmen who continued to prosecute the reference cases led oral as well as documentary evidence which was followed by the evidence of the opponent company. After the stage of evidence was concluded, the learned Labour Court heard submissions by learned advocates for the contesting parties. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court considered the material on record and rival submissions and passed the orders impugned in these group of petitions with the above mentioned directions. After the stage of evidence was concluded, the learned Labour Court heard submissions by learned advocates for the contesting parties. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court considered the material on record and rival submissions and passed the orders impugned in these group of petitions with the above mentioned directions. 2.1 The dispute though was raised with respect to 25 claimants the same survived only qua 10 workmen. The terms of reference of the claimants before the Labour Court was thus: “Whether the workman should be reinstated on the original post with continuity of service and backwages.” In other words, the reference was on a premise and the allegation of the workman that the employer had illegally terminated the services of the workmen with effect from 1.1.1993. 2.2 From the Statement of Claim when appreciated in the context of its pleading, the Labour Court as well as the learned Single Judge found that the only case of the workmen was that their services were terminated with effect from 1.1.1993. There was no mention with regard to the notices issued by the Company on 02.01.1993 to 16.1.1993. It was not the case of the workmen either that they had been illegally locked out or that they had mentioned about the public notice issued in the newspaper by the Company where the company had invited the workmen to resume their duties on the basis of the signing of the undertaking, the text of which was reproduced in the notice. On the other hand, the employer company had denied the case of the workmen that their services were terminated. The company’s case was that the workmen had resorted to sit-in strike. Based on this claim, the workmen neither did shift their stand to declare the strike as illegal nor the lock out as such. 2.3 Therefore, the sole issue for consideration before the Labour Court was whether the company had at all terminated their services as per the case of the workmen and if yes, whether such termination was right. 2.4 On examination of affidavits in support of the testimonies, the Labour Court found that the only case of the workmen was that they were terminated without any notice, charge sheet or departmental proceedings. It was their case that they were stopped at the gates of the main factory and not allowed to resume their work because they did not submit an undertaking. It was their case that they were stopped at the gates of the main factory and not allowed to resume their work because they did not submit an undertaking. According to the workmen, since they refused to give the undertaking they were not allowed to report for work which amounted to termination of service. 2.5 The company examined one Shri P.C. Patidar as a witness and from the deposition of this witness, it came out that the manufacturing process of the company was continuous and therefore the production activity could not be disrupted. The Company had entered into a settlement with the workmen that they would not resort to a strike. However, the workmen had resorted to sit-in strike on 1.1.1993 by gathering outside the cycle stand and therefore the strike was a breach of the settlement. The witness of the company further pointed out that the Company had continuously issued notices on 2.1.1993 to 16.1.1993 asking the workmen to resume work and therefore the Company had not terminated the services of the workmen. It came out from his crossexamination that on 2.1.1993 the company had demanded an undertaking and the persons who refused to give an undertaking were not allowed to resume their duties. The workmen continued to gather at the main gate and were not allowed to resume their duties as they refused to give the undertaking. 2.6 On appreciation of evidence, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the Company had not passed an order of termination and there was no material to show that the company had terminated the services of the workmen. It was undisputed that the Company had demanded an undertaking on 2.1.1993 and a draft of the undertaking was given to the security personnel for the workers to sign which they refused to sign. It was an admitted fact that the company had intimated the workers to resume their duties on signing of the undertaking and such notices were regularly placed on the notice board from 2.1.1993 to 16.1.1993 and was also published in the newspaper. It was an admitted fact that the company had intimated the workers to resume their duties on signing of the undertaking and such notices were regularly placed on the notice board from 2.1.1993 to 16.1.1993 and was also published in the newspaper. 2.7 The learned Single Judge succinctly culled out the appreciation of evidence before the Labour Court as under; “18.7 Besides this, the companys witness emphasized during his deposition that (a) services of the workmen were not terminated on and from 1.1.1993 and that (b) company was regularly requesting the workmen to resume duty and that (c) the company had even addressed individual letters to all employees and asked the workmen to resume duty after submitting their undertaking and such letters were forwarded to the workmen by registered post and UPC and under postal certificate. The workman whose deposition was recorded before the learned Labour Court, accepted that the company had addressed such individual letters and that (d) from 2.1.1993 till 16.1.1993 (when public notice was issued) workmen were asked to submit undertaking and such request was made even in the public notice dated 16.1.1993; and that (e) almost 90% workmen submitted the undertaking and had resumed their duties and that (f) on reading the award it has also emerged that the learned Court has specifically recorded in the award that the workman whose deposition was recorded, accepted that the workman had tendered resignation. 18.8 Further, the allegations by the claimants that they were not allowed to enter the factory and they were stopped at the main gate on 1.1.1993 is not proved and not believed by the learned Labour Court. Such bald allegation, without any corroborating evidence has no probative and evidentiary value and it is not sufficient to hold that the company terminated services of the workmen and the Court did not commit error in its conclusion. Except the bald allegation the workmen did not place any evidence on record. Such bald allegation, without any corroborating evidence has no probative and evidentiary value and it is not sufficient to hold that the company terminated services of the workmen and the Court did not commit error in its conclusion. Except the bald allegation the workmen did not place any evidence on record. 18.9 Coupled with the said fact is the uncontroverted deposition of companys witness who mentioned the fact that the names of the claimants were continued on the muster roll of the company till June 1996 (i.e. almost 3 years) and during that period, the company used to mark the workmen absent from duty and it was only in June 1996 that their names were deleted from the muster roll on the said fact also establishes the fact that the services of the claimants were not terminated on 1.1.1993. 18.10 Even during the cross-examination of the companies witness, the workmen could not extract and establish that the company had terminated their services on 1.1.1993. 18.11 It is also an undisputed fact that some of the workmen did not submit the undertaking and did not report for duty along with most of the workmen. However, subsequently (i.e. during pendency of the reference case) some of them submitted the undertaking and resumed their duties and they were also allowed to resume duty. The said fact and other above discussed facts, cumulatively establish that there was no material on record to establish that the company terminated their service on and from 1.1.1993.” Based on these facts the Labour Court held against the workmen. 3. Before us, Mr. Dipak Dave, learned advocate for the appellants reiterated the submissions made before the learned Single Judge. He submitted that the Labour Court failed to appreciate that the insistence of the company that the workmen would not be allowed to resume their duties without signing the undertaking amounted to termination of service. Workmen who expressed reservations in signing the undertaking were not allowed to resume their duties and therefore looking to the text of the undertaking the demand of the company was unfair and unjust, amounting to unfair labour practice. If the Company was of the opinion that the workmen were on strike, then the strike ought to have been declared as illegal. 3.1 In support of his submissions, Mr Dave relied on several decisions. If the Company was of the opinion that the workmen were on strike, then the strike ought to have been declared as illegal. 3.1 In support of his submissions, Mr Dave relied on several decisions. The first decision relied upon by Shri Dave was in the case of Swastik Textiles Engineers Private Limited vs Rajensingh Santsingh reported in 1984 (1) GLR 470 . He also relied on a decision in the case of Vaman Maruty Gharat vs M.P.Apte [(1989) (1) LLJ 134]. The emphasis by relying on such decisions was that insistence of resumption of duties only on signing an undertaking would amount to termination. 4. The learned Single Judge considered these decisions and opined that the decisions would have no application to the facts of the case inasmuch as in the case of Vaman Maruty (supra), the strike was declared as illegal and thereafter the company had published a notice in a local newspaper asking the workmen to resume their duties on signing an undertaking. The employer terminated the services of the workmen who did not submit an undertaking. Distinguishing the facts of that case with the case on hand, it was opined by the learned Single Judge that there was no conscious act of termination in the present case. It was not even the case of the workmen that the case of an illegal lock-out be so declared. The undertaking that the workmen were asked to submit did not contain a clause that they admit that they were on an illegal strike. The distinguishing factor that was rightly reproduced by the learned Single Judge in the case of Vaman Maruty (supra) and the present case was reproduced and we would prefer to reproduce the same which goes to the root of the matter and the same reads as under: “....but to insist on 5th of May 1978 that the employee must confess that the strike was illegal or must acquiesce in the finding given by the Labour Court is wholly unjustified. If the undertaking required the employee to merely say that he was calling off the strike which had been held to be illegal, one would not have complained....” (emphasis supplied) 5. The terms of reference in the present case was at best that the workmen had claimed that they were terminated. If the undertaking required the employee to merely say that he was calling off the strike which had been held to be illegal, one would not have complained....” (emphasis supplied) 5. The terms of reference in the present case was at best that the workmen had claimed that they were terminated. It was not their case that they were made to sign an undertaking admitting that they were on an illegal strike or that they were illegally locked out. 6. Mr. K.M. Patel, learned Senior Advocate appearing with Mr. Palak Thakkar, learned advocate for the respondent Company reiterated the submissions made before the learned Single Judge to suggest that a mere undertaking asked for in accordance with the terms of settlement would not amount to termination from service. Demanding of an undertaking per se would not be illegal. Reliance was placed on the decision of this court in the case of Glaxo Laboratories Employees Union vs M/S Glaxo India Limited [(1995) (2) GLH 680] where this Court distinguished the judgments in the case of Vaman Maruty (supra) and Swastik Textiles (supra). The Court held as under: “8. The aforesaid undertaking seeks the employee concerned to declare that he is not on strike and therefore, he should be permitted to enter the factory premises. The employee is required to undertake that during his shift, he will not go on strike, that he will ensure normal output by performing his assigned duties and further that he will maintain discipline. In the last portion of the undertaking the employee agrees that in case he fails to abide by the undertaking, he will render himself liable to action being taken against him. On scrutinizing of this undertaking, it is clear that there is no change of any condition of service of the workmen. The undertaking is more in form of an assurance to do the normal work with discipline which was necessary having regard to the prevalent situation and the acts of the workmen, so that once they start work during the shift, they may not abandon the same in the midst and maintain discipline. As regards permission to enter the factory premises on a declaration that the concerned employee was not on strike, that too condition of service. It is not a condition of service of a workman to force his entry in the factory premises, when on strike. As regards permission to enter the factory premises on a declaration that the concerned employee was not on strike, that too condition of service. It is not a condition of service of a workman to force his entry in the factory premises, when on strike. The workmen enter the premises because of the implied licence and such permission of the employer to enter the factory premises cannot be described as change in conditions of service within the meaning of Section 9A of the said Act. Under the circumstances, the Tribunal was fully justified in holding that the undertaking asked for by the Company cannot be described as change in any service condition in violation of Section 9A of the said Act.” 6.1 Reliance was also placed on the decision in the case of Maharashtra General Kamgar Union,Bombay vs Solid Containers Ltd.& Others [1996 I CLR 106]. There an undertaking was sought as the workmen had resorted to indiscipline and violence. The Learned Single Judge reproduced the relevant paras which read as under - “22. We have already found that the allegations which are contained in the notice of lockout and the notices that have preceded the same, are well borne-out on the material on record. If this be the case, in our judgement, the insistence on the part of the management on giving of an undertaking, as has been done in the present case, cannot be said to be unjustified and, therefore, cannot be faulted.” (Emphasis supplied) “24. If the ratio of the above case is applied to the facts of the present case, the inference is irresistible that the insistence on the part of the respondent on the workers to sign an undertaking before they are permitted to resume duties, cannot be said to be unjustified. As far as the majority of workers are concerned, they have settled with the respondent and have resumed duty after signing the requisite undertaking. The question that really arises is, whether the denial on the part of 27 workers in executing the undertaking even in the form, which is reproduced above, can be said to be justified. If the insistence on the part of the respondent is to be held to be justified, the refusal to give the undertaking by the minority of the workers, who owe allegiance to the appellant- Union, has to be termed as unreasonable.” (Emphasis supplied) “26. If the insistence on the part of the respondent is to be held to be justified, the refusal to give the undertaking by the minority of the workers, who owe allegiance to the appellant- Union, has to be termed as unreasonable.” (Emphasis supplied) “26. We have given our anxious consideration to the above decision and we find that the same was a decision based on facts of that particular case. In paragraph 16, it has been emphasised that there is nothing on record and nothing was brought on record by the respondent in this regard to show that act of violence and acts of indiscipline made the respondent company to insist upon the undertaking of the type involved in this case. This however, is not the case in the case at hand. We have, on facts found that the workers have been guilty of acts of violence and indiscipline causing harm to the officers of the first respondent company and causing damage to the property. Hence, on facts of the present case, we have no hesitation in holding that the insistence on the part of the first respondent company, in taking an undertaking is fully justified.” (Emphasis supplied) 6.3 On consideration of the judgments referred to hereinabove, the learned Single Judge derived the following principles:- “11.1 From relevant statutory provisions and from the observations in the decided cases following common principles can be derived: (a) Any strait-jacket formula for determining legality and propriety of employers demand for undertaking / bond for good behaviour and discipline before allowing the workmen to resume work by the workmen, cannot be laid down; (b) there is no blanket prohibition against such demand and the legality and propriety of such demand and its sustainability depends on the facts of the case. In appropriate case the facts and circumstances may justify the demand for an undertaking and without having regard to facts of each case such demand cannot be mechanically termed or branded unjustified, however there should be good ground and sufficient justification for such demand; (c) unless the good conduct bond or such undertaking is demanded as pre-condition from workmen who are / were on legal strike the demand would not be construed even unfair practice inasmuch as according to entry No.8 of first part of Fifth Schedule such demand would be unfair labour practice if the demand is made in respect of legal strike; (d) demanding undertaking in appropriate case is, in itself, and per se not illegal; (e) it would be hazardous for the Court to act on or to apply a general principle or a thumbrule for all cases and/or for determining legality and propriety of such demand in all cases and it is neither feasible nor advisable to prepare an exhaustive list of the circumstances which may justify the employers decision; (f) however it is equally clear that in cases where the workmen are asked and made to admit illegality of strike and they are required to admit that they resorted to / participated in illegal strike, the demand for such bond / undertaking would be considered unjustified and would not be approved by the Court; (g) there is a very thin distinguishing line between justified and unjustified demand and so also between the instances with reference to which such demand and condition by employer may be considered justified. The Court must be very cautious and vigilant in identifying and maintaining the distinguishing line and it should be scrupulously and jealously enforced by the Court so that legitimate means of the workmen may not be crippled; (h) in some cases depending on facts of the case such demand may amount to illegal change in service condition i.e. it may amount to breach of section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, but such allegation contention can be examined in light of the facts of the case instituted under section 33A of the Act; (i) an employer may demand such undertaking / bond from a person who is in its service employment but employer cannot demand the undertaking / bond from a person with whom the relationship of employer-employee is served and the relationship does not subsist.” 7. In juxtaposition to the legal principles arrived at and applying them to the facts of the case what emerges from the record is that the reference that was raised was only a restricted one to declare the termination as illegal. There was no pleading as to sit in strike or issuance of notices by the company on 02.01.1993 to 16.1.1993. The case of the company was that the workmen had resorted to a sit-in strike. It was not thereafter the case of the workmen that the lockout be declared as illegal. Their only case was that the demand of termination be declared as illegal when in fact there was no conscious termination by the employer. 7.1 It has come on record through the evidence of the witnesses of the Company that there was a settlement arrived at with the workmen that they will not proceed on strike. Even in absence of any violence preceding the sit-in strike, it was open for the company to fall back on the binding settlement which prohibited the workman to go on strike. The learned Single Judge reproduced the terms of settlement which read as under: “19. The workers will not resort to any direct action like go-slow, strike, work to rule, gherao during the tenure of this settlement and will resolve any dispute regarding interpretation of this settlement or any dispute regarding their service condition by negotiation with management or by lawful and constitutional measures only.” (Emphasis supplied) “23. As the manufacturing process of the company is of continuous nature, no workmen will leave his place of work without the express consent and permission of their superiors and will continue to perform his duties at his place of work till he is relieved by workmen of his succeeding shift, even after the conclusion of his shift. No workman will leave his place of work till he is relieved by his successor, and his charge is taken over by him. No workman will leave his place of work till he is relieved by his successor, and his charge is taken over by him. For the interval of rest or for lunch when the workman is to leave his place of work he will give the charge of his works to his coworker.” (Emphasis supplied) 7.2 Appreciating the concept of collective bargaining and industrial peace, the learned Single Judge opined that in view of violation of these terms of settlement, it was justifiable for the Company to demand an undertaking as a result of the settlement and looking to these clauses when the workmen acted in breach of the settlement, the company’s decision to demand an undertaking was justified. The learned Single judge summarised the evidence on this issue which reads as under: “31. From foregoing discussion and in light of above mentioned facts and reasons it has come out that (a) the workmen failed to prove that their services were terminated on 1.1.1993. The said finding / conclusion by the learned Labour Court is justified and correct and it is not arbitrary or perverse; (b) the contention that the demand for the undertaking and the condition prescribed by the company amounts to termination of service of all workmen is without merits and not sustainable; (c) The workmen have failed to make out any ground against the award and they have also failed to persuade and convince this Court to take a view different from the findings recorded by the learned Labour Court and to set aside the award. They have also failed to point out any material from record which would convince this Court to hold that finding recorded in the award are incorrect or perverse and/or that the Court has committed any error of law or jurisdiction.” 7.3 It was found from the evidence on record that the names of the workmen continued on the register of the company till June 1996 and till then the Company used to mark the workmen as absent. The names were thereafter deleted. This finding of fact established by the Labour Court and confirmed by the learned Single Judge would establish that the case of the workmen that their services were terminated with effect from 01.01.1993 would not be sustainable. There was no conscious termination as the workmen were asked repeatedly to resume their duties which they did not. This finding of fact established by the Labour Court and confirmed by the learned Single Judge would establish that the case of the workmen that their services were terminated with effect from 01.01.1993 would not be sustainable. There was no conscious termination as the workmen were asked repeatedly to resume their duties which they did not. In fact, the Company had demanded an undertaking with effect from 2.1.1993 and therefore it was not a case of termination. The learned Single Judge went on to examine the contention by examining the distinction between “termination” and “lockout”. 7.4 In the event of termination, once the relationship of master-servant is severed there would be no reason for the employer or a justification or a right to demand an undertaking and therefore the contention of the workmen that they had been terminated and demand of an undertaking as rightly held by the learned Single Judge would not go hand in hand. When the employer therefore demands an undertaking it pre-supposes a relationship of employer and employee and therefore enforcement of an undertaking from a terminated employee would not arise. 7.5 The Learned Single Judge also considered the case from the perspective of the term “lock out” as defined in Section 2(l) which reads as under: 2(l) "Lock-out" means the a [Temporary closing of a place of employment] or the suspension of work, or the refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him; 7.6 The case of the workmen was never that the undertaking was unjustified. It was their sole case that they were terminated with effect from 1.1.1993. Demand of an undertaking as discussed above cannot be said to be unjustified especially in the facts of the case when there was a settlement arrived at between the parties. 8. Having therefore considered the submissions made by the learned advocates for the respective parties and having perused the award of the Labour Court and having summarised the findings of the learned Single Judge as above, at the cost of reiteration, we are in complete agreement with the findings concurrent in nature arrived at by the Labour Court and so confirmed by the learned Single Judge. The main grounds for the agreement are as below: (I) Terms of Reference clearly restricted the scope of the inquiry. The main grounds for the agreement are as below: (I) Terms of Reference clearly restricted the scope of the inquiry. The case of the workmen was not based on the premise that the company had declared a lock out or the lock out was illegal. It was in this context that the demand for asking for an undertaking was to be considered. (II) The cases of Vaman Maruty (supra) was clearly distinguishable as in the case on hand the workmen did not seek a declaration to declare the lock-out as illegal. The workmen were asked to give an undertaking but not on a condition that the strike was illegal. (III) There could be no strait jacket formula for deterring the legality and propriety of demanding an undertaking. In the facts of this case, the learned Single Judge rightly held that the term of the settlement particularly clauses 19 and 23 thereof bound the workmen and therefore a demand for an undertaking as the workmen had resorted to a sit-in strike was not an unfair labour practice, though it was not so even pleaded by the workmen. (IV) The fact that 90% of the workmen on the basis of the undertaking had resumed their duties after public notices were issued asking them to resume their duties, it was not sufficient to hold that the company had terminated the services of the workmen. (V) Examining the evidence in context of the definition of the term “termination” and “lock-out”, the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, rightly held that demand of an undertaking is plausible only in a subsisting employer-employee relationship and therefore the case of the workmen that they were terminated was ill-founded and rightly negated by the Labour Court. 9. Looking to the extensive reasons set out by the learned Single Judge and without reproducing the same extensively and for the reasons set out hereinabove, we see no reason to interfere with the oral judgment of the learned Single Judge particularly in view of the fact that the learned Single Judge made certain observations in Paras 33 and 33.1 which read as under: “33. However before concluding it is necessary and relevant to mention that during hearing of this petition and even while dictation of this judgment, the Court had inquired from the learned senior counsel for the company as to whether the company was ready to engage the workmen at this stage in view of the fact that the workmen are out of employment with the company for more than 22 years after taking instructions from the competent authority of the company informing the Court that though almost 22 years have passed since the claimants stopped reporting for work, the company would not have any objection to re-engage them and since so many years have passed after the incident, the company at this stage may not insist for the undertaking, however, the workmen should not demand backwages for the period in question and that the engagement of the workmen would be as fresh employees. So far as later part of the stipulation by learned Senior Counsel for the company is concerned, this Court, being of the view that the past service of the workmen should not be wipedout (at least for the purpose of gratuity and other similar benefits) asked the learned Senior Counsel that though the interregnum, i.e. the period from January 1993 upto the date of actual reengagement of the workmen, may not be considered continuous, however, at the end of the service employee (e.g. on superannuation) at least the period for which the workmen had actually worked prior to January 1993 should be included for the purpose of computing gratuity so that the service put-in by the workmen is not wiped out. Having regard to the said perspective of the matter, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the company shall count and add the period of actual service prior to January 1993 for payment / calculation of gratuity. Mr. Dave, learned counsel for the claimants, submitted that for the interregnum i.e. right from January 1993 until now their service should be considered continuous. The said demand translates into the position and would result into granting all benefits for almost 30-33 years i.e. from 1987 to 2016. In view of the facts of the case, the said condition put by the workmen did not find favour with the company. The said demand translates into the position and would result into granting all benefits for almost 30-33 years i.e. from 1987 to 2016. In view of the facts of the case, the said condition put by the workmen did not find favour with the company. 33.1 However, the Court is of the view that the company should abide by the offer, if it is acceptable to the workmen and such consent is conveyed by the workmen within reasonable time, i.e. about 8 weeks. Therefore, it is directed that if the workmen conveys their consent to the offer made by the company during hearing of these petitions, then, the company will accept the said communication and it will honour and abide by its offer i.e. to re-engage the workmen and at the time of payment of gratuity, the period for which the workmen had actually worked with the company prior to January 1993 should be included and the gratuity for the said period would also be paid to the claimants. With aforesaid clarifications and directions, the impugned awards, in light of foregoing discussion and for above mentioned reasons, are not disturbed and the petitions are not accepted and the petitions are hereby rejected. Rule discharged. Orders accordingly.” 10. During the course of hearing, an additional alternative offer to pay compensation of Rs.50,000 to each workman towards full and final settlement was made which also has not been accepted by the appellants. In view of the above discussion, appeals are dismissed. No costs.