ORDER : 1. I have heard the arguments of the petitioner’s counsel and respondent’s counsel though represented, did not choose to appear and argue the case inspite of several opportunities given to the counsel. 2. The petitioner by invoking writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India r/w Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has sought the writ of certiorari or direction or order quashing the order dated 13/8/2009 and further the entire proceedings in CC No.1633/2009 pending on the file of the J.M.F.C. IV Court, Belagavi, and issue any other writ or directions to meet the ends of justice. 3. The petitioner in the writ petition mainly contended that filing of two parallel proceedings in respect of same transaction before the two different forum is an abuse of process of law. The contention that proceedings in CC No.1633/2009 is hit by the principals of Doctrine of Double Jeopardy, collateral estoppels, Res-judicata, rule of promissory estoppels, etc. The other contention that the respondent has availed civil remedy as per law by filing Arbitration case No. ARB/BGM/LOK/CAMP/469/2009 and obtained the award and filing of criminal case amounts to abuse of process. The other contention that respondent knowing fully well that the petitioner is neither borrower and nor the legal enforceable liability is exists as on the date of issuance of cheque and simultaneously, initiated two proceedings and the same amounts to violation of Articles 14, 19, 20 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 4. The counsel appearing for petitioner in his arguments also vehemently contended that along with this petition, he has produced certified copy of the complaint, the sworn statement on affidavit, order sheet and also arbitration award copy and Annexures-A to D and contend that the respondent cannot continue two proceedings in respect of a single transaction and also relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in Vinod Vs The Secretary, Jai Bhavani Mahila Co operative Belgaum reported in (2013) 1 KCCR 414 . The counsel also brought to my notice para Nos.4 to 6 of the judgment. 5. The counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2010 SC 1907 between Damodar S. Prabhu Vs. Sayed Babalal H., contending that it is mandatory for the complainant to disclose that no other complaint has been filed in any other Court in respect of the same transaction. 5. The counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court reported in AIR 2010 SC 1907 between Damodar S. Prabhu Vs. Sayed Babalal H., contending that it is mandatory for the complainant to disclose that no other complaint has been filed in any other Court in respect of the same transaction. Such a disclosure should be made on a sworn affidavit which should accompany the complaint filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C. If it is found that much multiple complaints have been filed, orders for transfer of the complaint to the first Court should be given, generally speaking by the High Court after imposing heavy costs on the complainant for resorting to such a practice and contend that these directions should be given a effect prospectively. 6. The counsel also relied upon the judgment reported in 2001 (2) SCC 247 between Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho Vs. Jagdish has brought to my notice para 33 and contend that in this judgment, the Apex Court held that to maintain judicial discipline, it is not proper to sacrifice certainty of law. The judicial decorum, no less than legal propriety forms the basis of judicial procedure and it must be respected at all costs. 7. Having heard the arguments of petitioner’s counsel and also the material on record, this Court has to examine whether this Court can quash the proceedings as sought by the petitioner in view of the grounds urged in the petition. 8. Before considering the grounds urged, first I would like to make a mention in brief factual matrix of the case. No dispute that the respondent herein has initiated two proceedings against this petitioner, one is under the Arbitration proceedings and obtained the order of award on 5/3/2012. The other proceeding is initiating of the criminal proceedings against this petitioner in CC No.1633/2009 and this complaint was filed on 13/8/2009 and the Court below has taken cognizance based on the sworn statement of the respondent and the matter is pending before the trial Court. The main contention of the petitioner is that there cannot be two proceedings in respect of the very same transaction and other contention is that he issued a cheque only as surety. The main contention of the petitioner is that there cannot be two proceedings in respect of the very same transaction and other contention is that he issued a cheque only as surety. Hence, there cannot be a criminal proceedings against this petitioner under Section 138 of N.I.Act, since the respondent knowing fully well that the petitioner is neither borrower and nor the legal enforceable liability exists as on the date of the issuance of the cheque and simultaneously complaint is filed and the same is infringes the fundamental rights of the petitioner. 9. On perusal of the contention urged by the petitioner, there is no dispute with regard to the fact that he has issued the cheque. The only contention that he is neither borrower and nor exists the legal enforceable liability and this contention cannot be accepted for the reason that he admits that he has issued the cheque as a surety and under Section 128 of Contract Act, the liability is co-extensive and the respondent can proceed against either of them. He did not dispute the fact that he has issued the cheque. The other contention that there cannot be two proceedings and mainly contended in the petition that the same is hit to the principals of Doctrine of Double Jeopardy, collateral estoppels, Res-judicata, rule of promissory estoppels, and how these principal are applicable to the case on hand has not been explained to invoke the said principals. No dispute that two processing are initiated against the petitioner herein and the petitioner also produced the copy of award passed in arbitrary proceedings. It is made to note that both the civil proceedings and criminal proceedings are distinct. The criminal proceedings depends upon the proof beyond reasonable doubt and civil proceedings depends on the preponderancy of probabilities. 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court also in the judgment reported in AIR 2008 SC 1884 in the case of Swaroopa Rani Vs. Hari Narayana, held that ‘Criminal proceedings for forgery initiated on basis of observations made in civil suit –Appeal against civil Court’s decree – Appellate Court can certainly go into correctness of observations made – But filing of an independent criminal proceeding is not barred under any statute’. 11. The Supreme Court in other judgment reported in (2009) 13 SCC 729 in the case of Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. 11. The Supreme Court in other judgment reported in (2009) 13 SCC 729 in the case of Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Sapra, discussing the reported judgment of the Apex Court in K.G.Premshanker Vs. Inspector of Police and Another held that the ‘previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act, in civil suits between the same parties, principles of res-judicata may apply, in a criminal case, Section 300 Cr.P.C. makes provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied; if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil court would relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein’ and in detail discussed in the judgment that ‘if judgment of a civil court is not binding on a criminal court, it is incomprehensible that a judgment of a criminal court will be binding on a civil court. Section 43 of the Evidence Act categorically states that judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41 and 42 are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant in some other provisions of the Act, no other provisions of the Evidence Act or for that matter any other statute had been brought to our notice’. 12. Further in the judgment observed that referring to P.Swaroopa Rani case, held that ‘it is well settled that in a given case, civil proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case and categorically held that the principles of res-judicata are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.’ 13. The Delhi High Court in the case of Vipin Jain and Others Vs. Whether civil proceedings or criminal proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and circumstances of each case and categorically held that the principles of res-judicata are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.’ 13. The Delhi High Court in the case of Vipin Jain and Others Vs. Yogesh Jain decided on 1/12/2008 in para 18 held that, ‘it is settled principle of law, thus, is that there is no constitutional or legal bar or prohibition for both the civil as well as the criminal proceedings, to go on simultaneously. There is no rigid straight-jacket fixed formula for staying proceedings in a criminal case while civil proceedings are pending and it would depend on the facts of each case. Indeed, as observed by the Apex Court in M.S.Sheriff’s case the public interest demands that criminal justice should be swift and sure so that the guilty are punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind. Therefore, criminal matters should be given precedence over the civil matters. Besides, ordinarily, decision of a civil court is not binding on a criminal Court. Nor is a criminal court’s decision binding on the civil court. In a criminal case all the ingredients of the offences have to be established in order to secure the conviction of the accused’. 14. In this judgment, Swaroop Rani’s case is also discussed. 15. This Court also in Crl.P.No.6472/14, considered the very same issue and held that ‘it is up to the criminal Court on an analysis of the relevant facts and appreciation of evidence to determine whether the cheques were issued by the accused towards the outstanding liability or otherwise and also to determine to what extent the pendency of the civil case has its bearing on the conclusion of the cheque bounce case. As such, the finding in the cheque bounce case will be on the rule of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” while a civil case will be adjudicated on the principle of “preponderance of probability”’ and dismissed the petition filed under Section 482 for quashing of the proceedings. 16. For having taken note of the principles laid down in the judgments referred to supra and also the factual aspects of this case, no doubt there is no dispute with regard to the two independent proceedings against the petitioner herein. 16. For having taken note of the principles laid down in the judgments referred to supra and also the factual aspects of this case, no doubt there is no dispute with regard to the two independent proceedings against the petitioner herein. The criminal proceedings are initiated as cause of action has been arisen when the petitioner herein did not comply the demand made in the legal notice within the stipulated time and when the payment has not been made, the cause of action has been arisen and the criminal proceedings has been initiated, i.e. with regard to the non-compliance of the demand. Other proceedings which has been initiated before the arbitrary is with regard to the recovery of the amount and also for enforcement of civil rights. This Court has already discussed with regard that both the matters are distinct and may be arising out of the same transaction, but, the civil case is depends upon preponderance of probability and criminal case depends upon beyond reasonable doubt. 17. Having considered the factual aspects and also the question of law involved in the matter on hand, the question of invoking writ jurisdiction to quash the proceedings does not arise and contention that the res-judicata and Doctrine of principals of Double Jeopardy, attracts cannot be accepted. Res-judicata applies only if there are two suits in respect of the same transaction, parties are one and the same and Double Jeopardy also does not apply in the case on hand as contended by the petitioner’s counsel and there is no any multiple complaints against this petitioner. The judgment relied upon by the petitioner reported in AIR 2010 SC 1907 is not applicable to the case on hand and the same is in respect of multiple complaint have been filed and only in the present case one criminal complaint is filed. The other judgment is also not applicable to the case on hand and the judgment of this Court in Vinod Vs The Secretary, Jai Bhavani Mahila Co-operative Belgaum is also not applicable to the case on hand since the Apex Court in the judgment of Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Sapra and in Swaroopa Rani Vs. Hari Narayana’s case, categorically held that the proceedings cannot be stayed and filing of a independent criminal proceedings is not barred under any statute. 18. Daya Sapra and in Swaroopa Rani Vs. Hari Narayana’s case, categorically held that the proceedings cannot be stayed and filing of a independent criminal proceedings is not barred under any statute. 18. Under these circumstances, I do not find any ground to quash the proceedings initiated against the petitioner as sought in the petition by invoking Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and THE contention of cheque issued for security and not for debt or liability has to be decided only after the trial and under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. the defence OF the accused cannot be entertained and decided and the same is question of fact and the scope of Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is limited and the same is not a rule and if is an exception and the same has to be exercised only if any abuse of process and miscarriage of justice. 19. In view of the discussions made above, I pass the following: ORDER The petition is rejected.