JUDGMENT : Ramesh Ranganathan, J. 1. The petitioner, hitherto employed as Manager (HR) in the first respondent bank, filed this Writ Petition questioning the order passed by the second respondent on 9.5.2016, accepting her resignation, as illegal and without jurisdiction. She also sought a mandamus commanding respondents 1 and 2 not to give effect to the letter dated 9.5.2016 issued by the second respondent; and for a writ of mandamus commanding the first respondent to allow the petitioner to work as a Manager (HR), and to regularly pay her salary w.e.f. April, 2016. 2. While Sri I.P. Gairola, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the letter, which the respondents have construed as a letter of resignation, is merely an expression of anguish by the petitioner and nothing more, Sri Alok Mahra, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, would submit that, since the first respondent is not even an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and it is not even the petitioner's claim that there is any violation of a statutory provision - plenary or subordinate, the writ jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot be invoked; and the Writ Petition as filed is not maintainable. Learned Counsel would rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S.S. Rana v. Registrar, Cooperative Societies, (2006) 11 SCC 634 in this regard. In S.S. Rana, the Supreme Court observed thus: "It is not in dispute that the Society has not been constituted under an Act. Its functions like any other Co-operative Society are mainly regulated in terms of the provisions of the Act, except as provided in the bye-laws of the Society. The State has no say in the functions of the Society. Membership, acquisition of shares and all other matters are governed by the bye-laws framed under the Act. The terms and conditions of an officer of the Co-operative Society, indisputably, are governed by the Rules. Rule 56, to which reference has been made by Mr. Vijay Kumar, does not contain any provision in terms whereof any legal right as such is conferred upon an officer of the Society. It has not been shown before us that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the Society for deep and pervasive control. The State furthermore is not the majority shareholder. Vijay Kumar, does not contain any provision in terms whereof any legal right as such is conferred upon an officer of the Society. It has not been shown before us that the State exercises any direct or indirect control over the affairs of the Society for deep and pervasive control. The State furthermore is not the majority shareholder. The State has the power only to nominate one director. It cannot, thus, be said that the State exercises any functional control over the affairs of the Society in the sense that the majority directors are nominated by the State. For arriving at the conclusion that the State has a deep and pervasive control over the Society, several other relevant questions are required to be considered, namely, (1) How was the Society created?; (2) Whether it enjoys any monopoly character?; (3) Do the functions of the Society partake to statutory functions or public functions?; and (4) Can it be characterized as public Authority? Respondent 2, the Society does not answer any of the aforementioned tests. In the case of a non-statutory society, the control there over would mean that the same satisfies the tests laid down by this Court in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 722 ]. It is well settled that general regulations under an Act, like Companies Act or the Co-operative Societies Act, would not render the activities of a company or a society as subject to control of the State. Such control in terms of the provisions of the Act are meant to ensure proper functioning of the Society and the State or statutory authorities would have nothing to do with its day-to-day functions. The decision of the seven-Judge Bench of this Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra), whereupon strong reliance has been placed, has no application in the instant case. In that case, the Bench was deciding a question as to whether in view of the subsequent decisions of this Court, the law was correctly laid down in Sabajit Tewary vs. Union of India & Ors. (1975) 1 SCC 485 , and if not whether the same deserved to be overruled. The majority opined that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. (1975) 1 SCC 485 , and if not whether the same deserved to be overruled. The majority opined that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. This Court noticed the history of the formation thereof, its objects and functions, its management and control as also the extent of financial aid received by it. Apart from the said fact it was noticed by reason of an appropriate notification issued by the Central Government that CSIR was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal in terms of Section 14(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It was on the aforementioned premises this Court opined that Sabhajit Tewary (supra) did not lay down the correct law. This Court reiterated the following six tests laid down in Ajay Hasia vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi. "(1) One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. (2) Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost the entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with Governmental character. (3) It may also be relevant factor ...whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is State-conferred or State-protected. (4) Existence of deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the corporation is a State agency or instrumentality. (5) If the functions of the corporation are of public importance and closely related to Governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government. (6) 'Specifically, if a department of Government is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference' of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government." This Court further held: (Pradeep Kumar Biswas) "The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be - whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory, whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State." (Emphasis supplied) As the respondent No. 1 does not satisfy any of the tests laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (supra), we are of the opinion that the High Court cannot be said to have committed any error in arriving at a finding that the respondent Bank is not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India." (Emphasis supplied) 3. Even in the present case, the petitioner has not been able to show how the first respondent would fall within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, and since the first respondent is not an instrumentality of the State under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as no statutory provision has been violated by respondents 1 and 2 in issuing the proceedings dated 9.5.2016, the Writ Petition as filed is not maintainable. The Writ Petition must, therefore, fail on the ground that no writ would lie against the first respondent. 4. Sri I.P. Gairola, learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that the petitioner would fall within the ambit of the provisions of the Uttarakhand Shops and Establishments Act; she, at least, be permitted to invoke the jurisdiction of the authority under the said Act; and the authority be directed to condone the delay in invoking its jurisdiction, in view of the pendency of the Writ Petition before this Court. 5. While fairly stating that the petitioner is governed by the provisions of the Uttarakhand Shops and Establishments Act, Sri Alok Mahra, learned Counsel for respondents 1 and 2, would submit that the question whether the petition, if any, filed by the petitioner under the provisions of Uttarakhand Shops and Establishments Act, is belated, are matters for the competent authority to examine. 6. 6. While we see no reason to issue a mandamus to the authority, under the Uttarakhand Shops and Establishments Act, to condone the delay in invoking its jurisdiction, suffice it to observe that the competent authority shall bear in mind that the petitioner has been agitating, the validity of the impugned order dated 9.5.2016, before this Court ever since 21.12.2016 till date. 7. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the Writ Petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.