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2019 DIGILAW 320 (AP)

Lajaras Reddy Tummuru v. State of A. P.

2019-11-13

CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY

body2019
JUDGMENT : Cheekati Manavendranath Roy, J. 1. This revision is preferred against the order dated 26-7-2019 passed in Crl. M.P. No. 260 of 2019 in S.C. No. 142 of 2018 whereby the learned Sessions Judge, Manila Court, Vijayawada, dismissed the petition filed under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. to discharge the petitioners from the case under Section 307 of IPC. 2. Briefly stated, it is the case of the prosecution that the petitioners, who are accused 1 and 2 in S.C. No. 142 of 2018 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Vijayawada, are the husband and mother-in-law of the de facto complainant. They have harassed the de facto complainant demanding to bring dowry. 3. On 04-5-2016, accused No. 1 brought the de facto complainant to his house at ESI Hospital for Anna Prasanna function of their son. When the de facto complainant refused to come, he made her to believe him and brought her to the house. After the function, both accused 1 and 2 forced the de facto complainant to do house hold work and also to bring dowry. As she refused to comply with the said demand, they bore grudge against her. 4. Thereafter, on 24-6-2016 at about 08.00 a.m., both accused 1 and 2 commented the de facto complainant that she is not leaving the house though they asked her to leave the house and threatened that they would kill her on that day at any cost. Accused No. 2 beat the de facto complainant with idly stand and accused No. 1 beat her with iron rod on her head with an intention to kill her as she is not paying heed to their words. The de facto complainant sustained bleeding injuries on her head and she fell unconscious. 5. When the said case is at the stage of framing charges against the accused, accused 1 and 2 who are the petitioners herein, filed a petition under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. to discharge them from the said case under Section 307 of IPC on the ground that the medical certificate issued by the doctor discloses that the de facto complainant sustained only simple injuries and the weapons used in the case to cause injuries are only the iron rod and the idly-stand and as such no offence under Section 307 of IPC is constituted. 6. 6. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor opposed the said petition and he has filed counter denying the averments made in the petition. 7. After hearing both the parties, the learned Judge by the impugned order dismissed the said petition. 8. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioners have preferred the present revision case assailing the legality and validity of the impugned order. 9. Heard Sri P. Anand Seshu, learned counsel, representing Sri Chalasani Ajay Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the 1st respondent/State. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that there are no eyewitnesses to the incident and all the witnesses cited as witnesses to the offence are only the neighbours of the accused and admittedly they did not witness the incident. He would further submit that the wound certificate issued by the doctor would show that the de facto complainant has only sustained a simple injury and as such it cannot be said that any attempt to commit murder was made to frame a charge under Section 307 of IPC against the petitioners and thereby prayed to allow the revision case and set aside the impugned order and discharge the petitioners from the case under Section 307 of IPC. 11. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor opposed the revision case. He would submit that the mere fact that the witnesses cited are neighbours of the accused and they are not eyewitnesses to the incident cannot be a valid ground to discharge the petitioners. He submits that even the evidence of P.W. 1 is sufficient if ultimately found to be true to arrive at a conclusion regarding the guilt of the accused in the case. He submits that even the evidence of P.W. 1 is sufficient if ultimately found to be true to arrive at a conclusion regarding the guilt of the accused in the case. He further contends that the weapon that was used by accused No. 1 is an iron rod and he caused injury with the said iron rod on the head of the de facto complainant and she sustained bleeding injury and the statements of the witnesses show that she fell unconscious after sustaining the said bleeding injury and the weapon that was used by accused No. 2 is the idly-stand and there is a clear allegation that both the petitioners have attacked the de facto complainant and beat her and caused the said injuries with an intention to kill her and the truth or otherwise of the said allegations are to be decided in the final adjudication of the case after trial is concluded and there are no sufficient grounds to discharge the petitioners for the offence under Section 307 of IPC and thereby prayed for dismissal of the revision case. 12. Perused the record. 13. The petitioners sought discharge from the offence under Section 307 of IPC primarily on two grounds: (1) That the witnesses cited in the charge-sheet are all neighbours of the accused and they are not eyewitnesses to the incident; and (2) The wound certificate issued by the doctor shows only a simple injury was sustained by the de facto complainant and as such no charge under Section 307 of IPC holding that the petitioners have attempted to kill the de facto complainant can be sustained. 14. As regards the first ground that the witnesses cited are all neighbours and they are not eyewitnesses to the said incident, it is not a valid ground to discharge the petitioners. Even the sole testimony of the victim if ultimately found to be true, trustworthy and reliable, the same can be acted upon and relied on by the Court for the purpose of arriving at the guilt of the accused. It is not the quantity of evidence that is required and it is only the quality of evidence that is required to prove an offence as required under Section 137 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It is not the quantity of evidence that is required and it is only the quality of evidence that is required to prove an offence as required under Section 137 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Whether the evidence of the victim i.e. the de facto complainant is true, trustworthy and reliable is the matter for appreciation of the evidence by the trial Court after trial is concluded and the same has to be decided in final adjudication of the said case. Therefore, the accused cannot be discharged on the ground that the witnesses cited are not eyewitnesses to the said incident. 15. As regards the second ground is concerned that the wound certificate reveals that only simple injury was sustained by the de facto complainant also, in the considered view of this Court, the same is also not a valid ground to discharge the petitioners for the offence under Section 307 of IPC. The record reveals that the weapon that was used by accused No. 1 is an iron rod and the allegation is that he has attacked the de facto complainant with the said iron rod and beat her on her head and she sustained a bleeding injury. Further, there is a clear allegation that he has attacked her with the iron rod and caused bleeding injury to her with an intention to kill her. The allegation is also that both the petitioners have attacked the de facto complainant with an intention to kill her. Therefore, when there is medical evidence on record to show that the de facto complainant sustained a bleeding injury on her head, as rightly held by the learned Judge in the impugned order that the statements of the witnesses recorded during the course of investigation show that the victim was found coming out of the house with the bleeding injury on her head and thereafter fell down unconscious, they prima facie show that she was attacked by the petitioners herein and she sustained bleeding injury on her head and she fell unconscious. The truth or otherwise of the allegation that they have attacked her with an intention to kill her or not, is again a matter for appreciation of evidence by the trial Court, after the trial is concluded in the final adjudication of the case. The truth or otherwise of the allegation that they have attacked her with an intention to kill her or not, is again a matter for appreciation of evidence by the trial Court, after the trial is concluded in the final adjudication of the case. At the time of framing charges, the Court cannot make a roving enquiry regarding the veracity of the evidence of the witnesses and appreciate the evidence. It is the task of the trial Court to appreciate the said evidence in the final adjudication of the matter. 16. When there is prima facie evidence on record to frame a charge for the offence under Section 307 of IPC, charge to that effect has to be framed leaving the truth or otherwise of the said charge to be considered in the final adjudication of the matter. Therefore, it cannot be said under any stretch of reasoning in this case that the charge under Section 307 of IPC is completely groundless. Therefore, the learned Judge, after considering the evidence produced by the prosecution and after dealing with the legal position regarding framing of charge under Section 307 of IPC has arrived at a right conclusion that the petitioners cannot be discharged for the said offence and thereby dismissed the petition. This Court do not find any legal flaw or infirmity in the impugned order warranting interference in this revision. 17. As far as the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioners viz., Brahma nand @ Brahmajeet Singh v. State of MP, Hari Kishan, State of Haryana v. Sukhbir Singh 1988 Law Suit (SC) 501 and Jai Narain Mishra v. State of Bihar (1971) 3 SCC 762 , they are all relating to cases where the accused were acquitted of the said charge under Section 307 of IPC after trial is concluded and after appreciating the evidence in the final adjudication of the case. So, the said judgments are of no help to the petitioners to discharge the petitioners from Section 307 of IPC. As already observed supra, whether a case under Section 307 of IPC is made out as alleged by the prosecution from the evidence that was adduced during the course of trial is a matter to be decided in the final adjudication of the trial. 18. In the result, the criminal revision case is dismissed at the stage of admission. As already observed supra, whether a case under Section 307 of IPC is made out as alleged by the prosecution from the evidence that was adduced during the course of trial is a matter to be decided in the final adjudication of the trial. 18. In the result, the criminal revision case is dismissed at the stage of admission. However, the trial Court shall independently appreciate the evidence on record in the final adjudication of the case without being swayed away by any of the observations made in this revision case incidentally.