JUDGMENT : 1. On 18th January, 2013 the writ application (WP 375 of 2010) Shreekant Phumbhra versus Union of India & Ors., was dismissed for default with vacation of all interim orders. On 22nd November, 2018 the restoration application was dismissed. The learned Judge while dismissing the restoration application observed that fault for the delay had been ascribed to the learned lawyer for the writ petitioner. It was for the party concerned to conduct his litigation through his advocate by giving him necessary instructions etc. The petitioner had not been able to explain his conduct. 2. Hence, the point in this appeal from this order is very short. We are hearing out the appeal itself without insisting on any formality regarding the preparation of paper books etc. 3. The facts of this case are quite extraordinary. 4. On 19th March, 2002 the appellant had obtained a refund order in respect of income tax. The amount was Rs.7,33,224/-. 5. It appears from the letter of the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle 30, Kolkata, dated 16th March, 2009 to the appellant that his claim for refund was rejected primarily on the ground that it was submitted on 10th October, 2008 beyond the period of limitation. 6. The instant writ application was filed some time on or about 19th March, 2010. 7. Therefore the questions to be answered are whether there was sufficient cause which prevented the petitioner from attending court when the writ was dismissed and whether there was sufficient cause for the delay in filing the restoration application? 8. The Supreme Court has laid down some important dicta to be followed by the courts for consideration whether sufficient cause has been shown to explain the delay in filing a proceeding or in failing to attend Court to conduct his litigation. The learned Single Judge was only partially correct when he remarked that it was the duty of the litigant to constantly instruct his lawyer and keep vigil over the litigation. The highest Court has said in Rafiq & Anr. versus Munshilal & Anr. reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 that since the lawyer was a professional, it was sufficient if the client handed over the papers to him with sufficient instructions. Thereafter, it was for this professional to take care of the litigation without negligence and keep his client informed. The highest Court has said in Rafiq & Anr. versus Munshilal & Anr. reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 that since the lawyer was a professional, it was sufficient if the client handed over the papers to him with sufficient instructions. Thereafter, it was for this professional to take care of the litigation without negligence and keep his client informed. However, we feel that no busy professional is able to function properly without periodic reminders and assistance. The Supreme Court never took away this part of the duty from the litigant. In Collector Land Acquisition … vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 the Supreme Court has also said that a litigant does not ordinarily stand to gain by delaying a litigation. In fact, he has every thing to lose, unless it is very clearly shown that this delay is caused deliberately or on account of palpable negligence, mala fidies etc. Therefore, in the matter of condoning delay the Court should take a liberal attitude. 9. In Pralhad Shankarrao Tajale versus State of Maharashtra reported in (2018) 4 SCC 615 the Supreme Court observed: “15. This case reminds us of the apt observations made by the learned Judge of this Court, Vivian Bose, J., in Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal. His Lordship, speaking for the Bench, in his distinctive style of writing with subtle power of expression reminded the courts as to how the code of procedure should be construed in the context of rights of the parties to the lis, which affects their lives and properties. His Lordship reminded that procedural laws should not be construed like a penal provision to punish the parties as far as possible. The following is the classic passage, which is always followed for doing substantial justice to the parties to the lis: (AIR p.429, paras 16-17) “16. . . . a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. 17. . Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. 17. . .our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that mean should not be condemned unheard that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle. 16. In our opinion, keeping in view the aforementioned observations and further having regard to the nature of controversy involved in the case, the High Court should have been liberal in taking a view in the matter and accordingly should have condoned the delay and granted the appellants one more opportunity to cure the defects. The interest of justice demanded one more opportunity to the appellants to comply with the orders of the Registry. 18. The delay in filing the application filed by the appellants before the High Court is hereby condoned. The appellants are granted one month’s time as an outer limit to cure the defects pointed out by the Registry in their review application.” 10. In Dhiraj Singh (D) TR versus Haryana State reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127 the Supreme Court also similarly observed that a liberal approach should be taken. 11. There was a refund order dated 19th March, 2002 in favour of the appellant. Why he did not obtain refund in accordance with law and procedure is a source of great wonder to us. He waited for seven years to lodge this claim for refund. When it was turned down on 16th March, 2009 on the ground of limitation, he filed a writ in 2010 which was dismissed for default on 18th January, 2013. He again wasted five years to make the restoration application which was also promptly dismissed by the Court. 12. He waited for seven years to lodge this claim for refund. When it was turned down on 16th March, 2009 on the ground of limitation, he filed a writ in 2010 which was dismissed for default on 18th January, 2013. He again wasted five years to make the restoration application which was also promptly dismissed by the Court. 12. The appellant has put the blame on his lawyer for not keeping him apprised with the developments in this case, but his learned Counsel Mr. Murarka has been fair enough to concede that there was contributory negligence on the part of his client. Of course, Mr. Bhowmick for the respondents opposed the restoration application on the ground that there was inordinate delay and negligence on the part of the appellant. 13. Whatever may have been the case for such an inordinate delay on the part of the appellant, we observe that he has not taken any advantage of the delay for dismissal of the writ application or that his conduct was mala fide or palpably bad. If that be the case then we are minded to follow the dictum of the Supreme Court in N. Balakrishnan versus M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7 SCC 123 : “A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and State of W.B. v. Administrator, Howrah Municipality. It must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy, the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning the delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a loser and he too would have incurred quite large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the applicant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.” 14. For those reasons we allow the appeal (APO 390 of 2018). We dispose of the stay application (GA No.109 of 2019). The impugned judgment and order dated 22nd November, 2018 is set aside. The application (GA No.1989 of 2018) is allowed. The writ application (WP No.375 of 2010) is restored upon setting aside the order dated 18th January, 2013. 15. Let the writ application be heard out as expeditiously as possible upon exchange of affidavits according to the following directions. 16. Affidavit in opposition by 5th April, 2019. List this writ application on 22nd April, 2019. Affidavit in reply may be filed in the meantime. 17. Liberty to mention before the appropriate Bench for early hearing. 18. This order is conditional upon payment of costs assessed at 300 GMs. to be paid by the appellant to the State Legal Services Authority.