ORDER : 1. The present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is filed for the purpose of seeking the following reliefs: “(A) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to quash and set aside the judgment and orders dated 05.10.2017 passed in Civil Misc. Application No.12 of 2017 by 7th (ad-hoc) Additional District Judge, Panchmahal at Godhra; (B) Pending, admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, this Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to restrain the respondent for further construction on the disputed land; (C) This Hon’ble Court may kindly be pleased to call for the record and proceedings of Civil Misc. Application No.12 of 2017; (D) This Hon’ble Court may be pleased to grant such other and further relief and/or order in the interest of justice in favour of the petitioner.” 2. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner is the owner of Plot No.8, Revenue Survey No.184/3+7 paiki 27 Satkevalnagar-2 having area admeasuring 229 sq.mtrs. The respondent herein started illegal construction over the said land which, according to the petitioner, is belonging to her, as a result of this, to prevent the respondent from carrying out such illegal activity, the petitioner filed Regular Civil Suit No. 71 of 2016 in the Court of Principal Civil Judge, Godhra. It is the case of the petitioner that since the construction was continued, the petitioner filed an application at Exh.5 for seeking injunction during the pendency of the suit on 17.5.2018 and an application at Exh.23 seeking for mandatory relief in the nature of removal of encroachment on the land of the petitioner on 9.9.2016. Learned Additional Civil Judge, Godhra, consolidated both the applications Exhs.5 and 23 and by common order rejected the applications on 22.2.2017. 3. The petitioner feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the said common order preferred an appeal being Civil Misc. Appeal No.12 of 2017 in the Court of learned Principal Civil Judge, Godhra, however, said application was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge (Ad-hoc), Panchmahal at Godhra on 5.10.2017 and it is these concurrent decisions of both the courts below which are made the subject matter of present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 4. Learned advocate, Mr. 4. Learned advocate, Mr. Kumar H. Trivedi for M/s HL Patel Advocates has vehemently contended that while passing the order impugned, both the courts below have not examined the matter at length and on the contrary, has not considered the DLR maps, compared with sale documents and have erroneously come to the conclusion that no case is made out for seeking interim relief. It has further been contended that both the courts below have materially erred in appreciating documentary evidences and has adopted too technical measure without realising that on account of non-grant of interim relief, an irreversible situation will be created, hence, courts below have not exercised jurisdiction in its proper perspective, as a result of this, such a serious error of jurisdiction deserves to be corrected. Mr. Trivedi has further contended that even the reasons which are assigned by the courts below are not sufficient enough to justify the conclusion and has wrongly relied upon the decision delivered by Hon’ble Apex Court referred to in para 10.2. of the impugned order. Hence, since the findings being perverse to the record, there is hardly any case made out to justify the conclusion. No other submissions have been made. 5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the the petitioner and having gone through the materials produced on record, first of all, the learned trial Judge while rejecting both the applications i.e. Exhs.5 and 23 has specifically gone into the registered sale document which was produced at Mark 3/1 and the measurement contained therein is also evaluated so much so that other adjacent Plot No.7 as well as DLR map prepared by the office of DLR has been examined, compared and after going through the measurement of Plot No.7 and 11, map was examined which was prepared in the presence of all concerned parties. The said document at Mark 15/7 has also been considered while arriving at a conclusion that no case is made out and as such, this discretion which has been exercised by the courts below is exercised by thorough examination of factual details and only thereafter found that none of the ingredients governing the grant or refusal of injunction seem to be in favour of the petitioner as a result of this, both the fact finding authorities below have concurrently held that no case is made out by the petitioner for grant of any relief as prayed for. 6. Even Appellate Court has also thereafter applied its independent mind and re-examined the issue from the perspective of DLR map as well as sale documents and has also came to the same conclusion that no case is made out for seeking interim relief, hence, here is the case in which concurrently courts below have minutely examined the documents produced before them and after hearing and giving adequate opportunity, the discretion is exercised and as such, in no case, it appears to this Court that any material irregularity or any perversity is committed in passing the impugned order. Hence, this being a case of concurrent finding of fact, this Court is of the opinion that this is not a fit case for exercising extra-ordinary equitable jurisdiction. 7. While coming to the conclusion, the court is mindful of proposition of law which has been laid down on such exercise of jurisdiction which is effectively spelt out in a decision of Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2013)9 Supreme Court Cases 374 in the case of Sameer Suresh Gupta through PA Holder Vs. Rahul Kumar Agarwal and the relevant observations made paras 6 and 7 made therein are reproduced hereianfter: “6. In our view, the impugned order is liable to be set aside because while deciding the writ petition filed by the respondent the learned Single Judge ignored the limitations of the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 . The parameters for exercise of power by the High Court under that Article were considered by the two Judge Bench of this Court in Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai and others (2003) 6 SCC 675 . After considering various facets of the issue,the two Judge Bench culled out the following principles: “(1) Amendment by Act No.46 of 1999 with effect from 01-07-2002 in Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by the CPC Amendment Act No. 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in, and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. (3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction, i.e. when a subordinate court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction - by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none, or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction - by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified, and thereby occasioning failure of justice. (4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When the subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (i) the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident, i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis. (8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not covert itself into a Court of Appeal and indulge in re-appreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. (9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts in India unlike English courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the subordinate courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the subordinate court as to the manner in which it would act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the subordinate court as the court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 7. The same question was considered by another Bench in Shalini Shyam Shetty and another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010) 8 SCC 329 , and it was held: “(a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any event, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Courts is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, “within the bounds of their authority”. (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court’s power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgment by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court’s power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court’s jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court’s jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality.” 8. In view of the aforesaid situation which is prevailing on record and in view of the proposition of law laid down, the Court is of the clear opinion that the petition does not deserve to be entertained. Accordingly the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.