ORDER 1. Leave granted. 2. The Judgment dated 08.02.2018 passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench in Criminal Appeal No. 2520 of 2010 confirming the judgment of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bellary in S.C. No. 48 of 2005, is called into question in this appeal. 3. The appellants are the original Accused Nos. 1 to 4. Both the Courts convicted the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 324 and 326 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, 'the IPC') and sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for three months and three years respectively, apart from payment of fine. 4. The complainant-victim as well as the accused have compromised inter-se and have even filed the Compromise Memo, and the accused have subsequently filed an application praying for permission to compound the offence under Section 326 of the IPC. The joint affidavit of the complainant and the accused has also been produced which shows that both sides have compromised in view of mediation and upon the advice of the elders of their respective families. The parties have already put an end to the acrimony between them and are living happily and harmoniously. 5. There cannot be any dispute that offences which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by the Court. The Courts draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'the Cr.P.C.'). However, the High Court can quash criminal proceedings in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. At the same time, the Supreme Court may, in order to do complete justice in a matter, in the exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, quash criminal proceedings where the offences involved are not of a grave nature, if it is shown that the same would lead to or help in maintaining peace between the parties involved. We may proceed to observe that offences which involve moral turpitude and grave offences like rape, murder, etc. will not be effaced by quashing the proceedings related thereto merely because of a compromise, in light of the consequent harmful effect on society. 6. Be that as it may, learned counsel appearing on both sides prayed before this Court that the impugned judgment be set aside, inasmuch as the parties have compromised in order to live peacefully and harmoniously in society. 6. Be that as it may, learned counsel appearing on both sides prayed before this Court that the impugned judgment be set aside, inasmuch as the parties have compromised in order to live peacefully and harmoniously in society. Their houses are in the same neighbourhood and they are already living happily. Learned counsel appearing for the State of Karnataka has no objection to the said compromise. 7. We have gone through the evidence, more particularly, the evidence of the injured eye-witness (PW9) and the Doctor (PW2) in detail to find out as to whether the parties may be permitted to compound in the matter on hand. Out of four injuries sustained by the injured, two injuries are stated to be grievous and the same are not on the vital portions of the body. Both these so called grievous injuries are lacerated wounds over the legs. There is nothing on record to show that the injured has sustained fracture, permanent privation of the sight or of the hearing etc. Though the doctor, PW2, has deposed that both these injuries are grievous in nature, in our opinion, both the injuries will not fall within any of the eight categories contained in Section 320 of the IPC. Thus, in law they cannot be termed as grievous injuries. Therefore, the offence may not fall under Section 326 of the IPC, but would fall under Section 324 of the IPC and we conclude so. 8. We do not wish to unsettle the happy and peaceful lives of the parties. We therefore accept the proposed compromise and acquit the accused. 9. Accordingly, the appeal is disposed of with the observation that the accused stand acquitted and the judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court stand set aside.