JUDGEMENT : 1. A civil suit titled Tariq Ahmad Bhat and another v. Iqbala Akhter and others, for grant of declaration with consequential relief of mandatory injunction, has been filed by present petitioners/plaintiffs against respondents/defendants before the court of Additional Special Mobile Magistrate, Kulgam (for brevity “Trial Court”) on 5th May 2017. Threshold ad interim injunction was passed by Trial Court on 6th May 2017 (Annexure XI to petition), which was subject to objections from other-side. Written statement (Annexure XII to petition) was filed by respondent / defendant no.1 in opposition to the suit of petitioners before Trial Court. By order dated 19th December 2017, Trial Court made absolute ad interim order dated 6th May 2019. 2. Aggrieved of aforesaid order dated 19th December 2017, passed by Trial Court, respondent no.1 herein preferred a Civil Miscellaneous Appeal before Principal District Judge, Kulgam (for short “Appellate Court”). After considering rival contentions of parties, learned Appellate Court vide order dated 11th May 2019 set-aside the Trial Court order dated 19th December 2017, vouchsafing liberty to respondent no.1/appellant to take up the matter with bank authorities for freezing her account. It is this order, of which petitioners are aggrieved and throw challenge thereto in terms of present writ petition, filed under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K State and implore setting-aside thereof. 3. I have heard learned counsel for parties and considered the matter. 4. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners has stated that appellate Court while passing order impugned has not considered the case in its right and proper perspective inasmuch as it has not taken into account all what had been projected by petitioners before it. Learned counsel has also averred that appellate court, while passing impugned order, has relied on Clause 46 of the Agreement executed by respondent no.1 with Indian Oil Corporation, but it has lost sight of the fact that petitioners have been running petrol pump for last so many years with the consent of Indian Oil Corporation and even said Corporation has not raised any objection qua running of the petrol pump by petitioners. According to learned counsel, respondent no.1 is neither in possession of petrol pump nor operating bank accounts from the date she entered into deed of dissolution of partnership with petitioner no.1. According to learned counsel, respondent no.1 is neither in possession of petrol pump nor operating bank accounts from the date she entered into deed of dissolution of partnership with petitioner no.1. His next averment is that appellate court ought not to have set-aside Trial Court order as once the court of first instance exercises its discretion to grant or refuse relief of temporary injunction and the said exercise of discretion is based upon objective consideration of the material placed before the court and is supported by cogent reasons, the appellate court should be loath to interfere simply because on a de novo consideration of the matter it is possible for the appellate court to form a different opinion on the issues of prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury and equity. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on judgement(s) rendered in Seth Loon Karan Sethiya v. Ivan E. John and others, AIR 1969; SC 73; Dalpat Kumar and another v. Prahlad Singh and others, AIR 1993 SC 276 ; Skyline Education Institute (Pvt) Ltd. v. S. L. Vaswani and others (2010) 2 SCC 142 ; State of Jharkhand v. Surendra Kumar Srivastava and others, AIR 2019 SC 231 . 5. On the other hand, learned senior counsel representing respondent no.1 has insisted that subject-matter of the civil suit viz. land in question, has been leased out to Indian Oil Corporation for a period of 30 years in terms of a registered Lease Deed executed by respondent no.1 and therefore, no question arises for selling or alienating the said land to any person muchless petitioners. If any document with respect to already leased out land for alienation thereof, is executed, the same is per se void ab initio and unquestionably forged as well. He insists that impugned order is a well-reasoned order and, therefore, writ petition is liable to be dismissed. His further submission is that Appellate Court, in terms of Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Svt. 1977, has same powers and duties as are conferred and imposed by the CPC on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. His further submission is that Appellate Court, in terms of Section 107 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Svt. 1977, has same powers and duties as are conferred and imposed by the CPC on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. That part he has taken this Court to page 49 of writ petition that provides arbitration in the event of dispute and as a corollary thereof, according to learned senior counsel, suit is not maintainable and therefore, passing of interim order by learned Trial Court does not arise at all. 6. I have gone through the impugned order of learned Appellate Court. Petitioners, in their suit before learned Trial Court, seek passing of a decree for declaration, declaring them entitled to hold possession of suit land measuring 02 Kanals including equipments thereover for smooth running of outlet/Petrol pump with further declaration declaring them entitled to smooth operation of outlet. 6.1. Learned Trial Court, if one goes through contents of order dated 19th December 2017, has mentioned that plaintiffs/petitioners seek declaration of ownership over the land in question. According to learned Trial Court, petitioners/plaintiffs have annexed copy of agreement to sell with the plaint, by which respondent no.1 has sold land in question in favour of petitioner no.1. 6.2. Learned Trial Court, while passing order dated 19th December 2017, has not taken into account the imperative contention that land in question has already been leased out by respondent no.1 to Indian Oil Corporation. 6.3. However, while having glance of impugned order passed by learned Appellate Court all these aspects of the matter have been taken into consideration. Some of the important excerpts of impugned order are advantageous to be noticed here: “21. From the perusal of record, it reveals that appellant herein has been appointed as a dealer of Indian Oil Corporation of his petrol pump situated at Larnoo Kulgam in the name of M/S Abshar Filling Station Larnoo. In this regard, petrol and HSD Pump Dealer Agreement has been executed between appellant herein Mst Iqbala Akhter and Indian Oil Corporation. Both the parties are bound of the terms and conditions of the agreement. ...... 22. Perusal of the record further reveals that deed of partnership was executed between Mst Iqbala Akhter appellant herein and Tariq Ahmad Bhat respondent No.1 in the appeal. ......... As per the agreement executed between the appellant Mst. Both the parties are bound of the terms and conditions of the agreement. ...... 22. Perusal of the record further reveals that deed of partnership was executed between Mst Iqbala Akhter appellant herein and Tariq Ahmad Bhat respondent No.1 in the appeal. ......... As per the agreement executed between the appellant Mst. Iqbala Akhter and Indian Oil Corporation, the business of petrol pump cannot be transferred without the consent of Indian Oil Corporation. The status of appellant is not more than a licencee of the Indian Oil Corporation. Perusal of the suit does not indicate the name of Indian Oil Corporation. The execution of the deed of partnership and deed of dissolution of partnership is a matter of fact which needs to be proved in due course of law by the parties to the suit. ..... The impugned order reveals that defendant No.1/appellant herein has been restrained from causing any sort of interference with the suit property. Further defendant No.2 and 3/respondent 3 and 4 herein have been restrained from freezing the bank account in the name and style of MS Abshar Filling station till the disposal of main suit. Now question arises whether the bank account of an individual can be operated by someone else that too without his/her consent, the answer would be negative. In this case, cause of action appears to have been exist only on the application moved by appellant herein before the Bank authorities for freezing her account as it is being operated upon by respondent No.1 herein. The question of transfer of dealershiop from the name of Mst. Iqbala to Tariq Ahmad Bhat is also the question of fact which is to be decided during trial. Whether the property in question has been sold or not is also to be proved during trial because of the reason that the land measuring two kanals falling under survey No.150 and 310/135 have been leased out to the Indian Oil Corporation and that cannot be sold to some other person without the consent of Indian Oil Corporation.....” 6.4. Whether the property in question has been sold or not is also to be proved during trial because of the reason that the land measuring two kanals falling under survey No.150 and 310/135 have been leased out to the Indian Oil Corporation and that cannot be sold to some other person without the consent of Indian Oil Corporation.....” 6.4. It may not be out of place to mention here that learned Appellate Court,while examining the case set up by parties before it, has considered all facets of the matter that were required to be kept in mind by an appellate Courtin deciding an Appeal.It has been noticed by Appellate Court that respondent no.1 has executed a Lease Deed with respect to the land in question with Indian Oil Corporation. Respondent no.1 has an Account in J&K Bank Branch Unit Kulgam, which is to be exclusively operated by respondent no.1. He executed lease agreement and other documents/indentures with Indian Oil Corporation. Any subsequent document, if wished to be executed by respondent no.1, is to be executed only after getting consent from Indian Oil Corporation as per the terms and conditions of the agreement(s) executed with it. Learned Appellate Court has rightly said that status of respondent no.1 is not more than a licencee of Indian Oil Corporation because all those document(s) including agreement(s) that respondent no.1 has executed in favour of Indian Oil Corporation, are in force and have not been annulled. Execution of subsequent documents, including deeds of partnership and/or dissolution, according to Appellate Court, is rightly a matter of fact which needs to be proved in due course of law by parties to the suit. 7. It is worthwhile to mention here that an injunction is a judicial remedy prohibiting persons from doing a specified act called a restrictive injunction, or commanding them to undo some wrong or injury called a mandatory injunction, and may be either temporary, interim or interlocutory, or permanent. Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with temporary, interim or interlocutory injunction and orders. Order XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with temporary, interim or interlocutory injunction and orders. Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree, or that defendant threatens, or intends, to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defrauding his creditors, or that defendant threatens to dispossess plaintiff or otherwise cause injury to plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal or disposition of the property or dispossession of plaintiff, or otherwise causing injury to the plaintiff in relation to the property in dispute in the suit as the Court thinks fit, until the disposal of the suit or until further orders. 7.1. Injunctions are of two kinds, temporary or perpetual. Insofar as temporary injunctions are concerned, the same are governed by Rules 1 and 2 of Order XXXIX CPC, whereas perpetual injunctions are regulated by the Specific Relief Act. A party, against whom a perpetual injunction is granted, is thereby restrained for ever from doing the act complained of. A perpetual injunction can only be granted by a final decree made at the hearing and upon the merits of a suit. A temporary or interim injunction, on the other hand, may be granted on an interlocutory application at any stage of a suit. The injunction is called temporary, for it endures only until the suit is disposed of or until the further orders of the court. Injunction being in the nature of preventive relief, is generally granted taking note of the equity. However, the court has no jurisdiction to grant by way of interim relief what could never be granted in the main suit itself. Both the parties, plaintiff as well as defendant, can approach the court beseeching vouchsafe of temporary injunctions and an order granting temporary injunction, i.e. a stay order preserves the rights of the parties for the period it remains in operation, but it does not confer any right which it does not recognise. Both the parties, plaintiff as well as defendant, can approach the court beseeching vouchsafe of temporary injunctions and an order granting temporary injunction, i.e. a stay order preserves the rights of the parties for the period it remains in operation, but it does not confer any right which it does not recognise. In interlocutory proceedings, the court can express only its tentative view, which does not cause any prejudice to concerned party. [Vide: Prem Chand v. Manak Chand AIR 1997 Raj 198 ; Sathyabhama Ammo v. Vijaya Amma AIR 1995 Ker. 74 ; Ashok Kumar Aseri v. University of Jodhpur AIR 1995 Raj 33 (DB)]. 8. In the above milieu, thus, grant or refusal of interim injunction determines the fate of a suit. Due care and caution has, therefore, to be bestowed by court while granting or refusing an injunction. Measures should be taken by the court to ensure even-handed justice to both parties. Expanding thet view on the issue, it was opined by Dr Dalveer Bhandari, J., speaking for the Court, in Maria Maargarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira (2012) 5 SCC 370 , that “Experience has shown that all kinds of pleadings are introduced and even false and fabricated documents are filed in civil cases because there is an inherent profit in continuation of possession. In a large number of cases, honest litigants suffer and dishonest litigants get undue benefit by grant or refusal of an injunction because the courts do not critically examine pleadings and documents on record. In case while granting or refusing injunction, the court properly considers pleadings and documents and takes the pragmatic view and grants appropriate mesne profit, then the inherent interest to continue frivolous litigation by unscrupulous litigants would be reduced to a large extent.” 8.1. In the present case, conjoint reading of impugned order dated 11th May 2019 as also Trial Court order dated 19th December 2017, divulges that learned Appellate Court has discoursed in a lucid manner all contours qua grant or refusal of ad interim injunction. Impugned order is eloquent and well-reasoned. 9. It is pertinent to mention here that in the words of White CJ: “The granting of a temporary injunction under the powers conferred by this (rule) is a matter of discretion. True it is a matter of judicial discretion. Impugned order is eloquent and well-reasoned. 9. It is pertinent to mention here that in the words of White CJ: “The granting of a temporary injunction under the powers conferred by this (rule) is a matter of discretion. True it is a matter of judicial discretion. But if the court which grants the injunction rightly appreciate the facts and applies to those facts the true principles, then that is a sound exercise of judicial discretion.” [See: Subba v. Haji Badsha (1903) ILR 26 Mad 168, 174 White CJ per]. One of those principles is that the court in granting a temporary injunction must first see that there is a bona fide contention between parties, and then, on which side, in the event of success, will lie balance of inconvenience if injunction does not issue. Or, as stated in the judgment of Cotton LJ in Preston v. Luck (1887) 27 CD 497, 506, to entitle a plaintiff to an interlocutory injunction, the court should be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried at the hearing and that on the facts before it there is a probability that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. 10. The real point, upon an application for a temporary injunction, is not how the question ought to be decided at the hearing of the case, but whether there is a substantial question to be investigated and whether matters should not be preserved in status quo until that question can be finally disposed of. The object of the injunction is to preserve the status quo. In issuing a temporary injunction, the tests to be applied are: (i) Whether the plaintiff has a prima facie case; (ii) Whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the plaintiff; and (iii) Whether the plaintiff would suffer an irreparable loss if his prayer for temporary injunction is disallowed. 11. The phrases ‘prima facie case’, ‘balance of convenience’, and ‘irreparable loss’, are words of width and elasticity to meet myriad situations presented by man’s ingenuity in given facts and circumstances but they must always be hedged with a sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet ends of justice. A prima facie case implies the probability of plaintiff obtaining a relief on material placed before the court. Every piece of evidence produced by either party has to be taken into consideration in deciding existence of a prima facie case. A prima facie case implies the probability of plaintiff obtaining a relief on material placed before the court. Every piece of evidence produced by either party has to be taken into consideration in deciding existence of a prima facie case. For establishing a prima facie case, it is not necessary for a party to prove his case to the hilt and if a fair question is raised for determination, it should be taken that a prima facie case is established. Plaintiff must also establish balance of convenience in the event of withholding relief of temporary injunction will, in all events, exceed that of defendant in case he is restrained. Plaintiff must also show a clear necessity for affording protection to his alleged right which would otherwise be seriously injured or impaired. The principle of balance of convenience implies the evenly balancing of scales. The term ‘irreparable injury’ means injury which is substantial and could never be adequately remedied or atoned for by damages, injury which cannot possibly be repaired. It implies a substantial and continuous injury for which there does not exist any standard for ascertaining the actual damage likely to be caused. Qua case in hand, important cardinal principles lack in the case of present petitioners. It is most apposite to mention here that irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, that cannot be adequately remedied or compensated by way of damages. [Vide: Subodli Gopal Bose v. Province of Bihar AIR 1950 Pat 222 ; Raju Maheshwar Dayal Sseth v. Yuvraj Dutta Singh AIR 1946 Oudh 42; Doherty v. Allman (1878) 3 App Cas 709; Subba v. Haji Badsha (1903) ILR 26 Mad 168, 175; Firm Ram Kishun Shah Itwari Sahu v. Jamuna Prasad AIR 1951 Pat 469 ; Israil v. Shamser (1914) ILR 41 Cal 436, 442-43, 21 IC 861; Nanabhai v. Janardhan (1888) ILR 12 Boim 110; Hemanta v. Baranagore (1914) 19 CWN 442, 24 IC 313; Civil Station Sub-Committee, Nagpur v. Govindrao 1937 ILR Nag 33, 170 (C 239, AIR 1937 Nag 137; LD Meston Society v. Kashi Nath Misra AIR 1951 All 558 ; Sitaram Banwari Lal AIR 1972 Cal 105 ]. 12. 12. At the stage of deciding an application for temporary injunction, the court is not required to go into the merits of the case. What the court has to examine is: (i) the plaintiff has a prima facie case to go for trial; (ii) the protection is necessary from that species of injuries known as irreparable before his legal right can be established; and (iii) that the mischief of inconvenience likely to arise from withholding injunction will be greater than what is likely to arise from granting it. Where no violation of the rights of the plaintiff is involved, the interim injunction should not be granted. [See: Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh AIR 1993 SC 276 ; Shiv Shanker Goyal v. Municipal Council, Ajmer AIR 1997 Raj 176 ; Sanjay Tandon v. Sarabjit Singh AIR 1997 Del 380 (DB)(; Gadadhar Mishra v. Biraja Devi AIR 1999 Ori 226 ; Graftek Pvt. Ltd v. Shri Lord Lingaraj Mahaprabhu AIR 1999 Ori 49 ; Kirloskar Diesel Recon Pvt Ltd v. Kirloskar Proprietory Ltd AIR 1996 Bom 149 ; Multichannel India Ltd v. Kavitalaya Productions Pvt Ltd AIR 1999 Mad 59 ; Sanjeev Kumar & Co v. Bishnu Prasad AIR 1999 Ori 90 ; CJ International Hotels Ltd v NDMC AIR 2001 Del 435 ]. 13. In a case of Zenit Mataplast P. Ltd v. State of Maharashtra (2009) 10 SCC 388 , the Supreme Court has held that an interim injunction should be granted by the court only after considering all the pros and cons of a case. The order can be passed on settled principles taking into account the three basic grounds, i.e. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The delay in approaching the court can be good ground for refusal to grant interim relief. 14. This Court in Masood Ahmad v. Arif Ahmad Shah 2012 (4) JKJ 231 [J&K], has held that grant of injunction is an equitable relief. A person who had kept quiet for a long time and allowed another to deal with the properties exclusively, ordinarily would not be entitled to an order of injunction. The court will not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one. Grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequence, depending upon the nature thereof. The courts, dealing with such matters, must make all endeavours to protect the interest of the parties. The court will not interfere only because the property is a very valuable one. Grant or refusal of injunction has serious consequence, depending upon the nature thereof. The courts, dealing with such matters, must make all endeavours to protect the interest of the parties. For the said purpose application of mind on the part of the courts is imperative. Contentions raised by the parties must be determined objectively. This Court also said that the relief claimed, if they succeed in the suit, can be measured by money and plaintiffs can be compensated in terms of money. In terms of mandate of Specific Relief Act read with mandate of Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when amount is ascertained and can be calculated, no ad interim relief can be granted. This is so for the simple reason that if tomorrow plaintiff succeeds in the suit, he can be properly compensated by directing defendants concerned to pay the amount of compensation. So is the position in the present case, given supra discussion. 15. Germane to mention here that injunctions and stay orders should not be granted mechanically without realising the harm likely to be caused to opposite party. It is only when a claim is made in the suit which, if established, would entitle plaintiff to relief by way of injunction, that interim relief could be granted by way of temporary injunction, so that a relief in the suit might not be rendered infructuous. Accordingly, if no such relief is claimed, no interim injunction could be granted. An injunction will not be granted where plaintiff has a remedy by way of damages. The injury must be irreparable and it must be continuous. 15.1. It is well settled law that while passing ad interim injunction, the Court is to keep in mind the guiding principles, viz. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The Courts have to consider grant of interim relief at an interlocutory stage when the existence of legal rights, assailed by plaintiff and its alleged violation, are both contested and remain uncertain till they are established at trial. prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. The Courts have to consider grant of interim relief at an interlocutory stage when the existence of legal rights, assailed by plaintiff and its alleged violation, are both contested and remain uncertain till they are established at trial. While considering grant of interim injunction to mitigate risk of injustice, the Court has also to weigh the corresponding need of defendant to be protected, against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights, for which he could not be adequately compensated. The balance of convenience has to be evaluated on said touchstone. Irreparable loss is another condition for grant of interim injunction and constitutes third important principle. It means that irreparable injury, likely to occur as a result of withholding of injunction, must be such that it cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages recoverable in the action if the uncertainty were resolved in his favour at the trial. The need for such protection has, however, to be weighed against the corresponding need of defendant to be protected against injury resulting from his having been prevented from exercising his own legal rights, for which he could not be adequately compensated. Same is true about the present case. The court must weigh one need against another and determine whether the balance of convenience lies. Reference in this regard is made to DDA v. Skipper Construction Co (Pvt) Ltd AIR 1996 SC 2005 ; Abbobucker v. Kunhamoo 1958 ILR Mad 720; Kittamma v. Subba Rai AIR 1959 Mys 75. In the present case, learned Appellate Court has lucidly dealt with all aspects of the subject-matter of the case for grant or refusal of ad interim injunction and has rightly said that Trial Court order suffers from vice of non-application of mind. 15.2. From the above discourse, the principle that occurs is that where some relief by way of social justice, though in law such relief is not permissible, is granted by High Court on equitable grounds without violating the rights of other parties, the Supreme Court would not interfere in its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 if the order under appeal advances the cause of justice and if it is just and equitable so to do. While holding so, however, the Supreme Court has cautioned that same that shall not be the position in the cases where adversarial litigations are involved as in such cases the relief has to be granted to the parties on the basis of their pleadings and no relief should be granted in interlocutory proceedings beyond the scope of the suit. (Vide: Sree Jain Swetambar Terapanthi Vid (S) v. Phundan Singh and others (1999) 2 SCC 377 ]. It has been held that where the trial court grants temporary injunction without recording its prima facie satisfaction on merits, the appellate court can set-aside the trial court’s order even without examining the merits of the case. Given ratio emanating from supra judgement vis-à-vis the present case, learned Appellate Court has considered all aspects of the matter while passing impugned order and has rightly set-aside the Trial Court order. 15.3. It is settled law that grant of injunction is a discretionary relief and exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is a probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court’s interference is necessary to protect the party from species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. For that reason, burden is on plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is “a prima facie case” in his favour, which needs adjudication at the trial. Existence of prima facie right and infraction of enjoyment of his property or right is a condition for grant of temporary injunction. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case, by itself, is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in “irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that “balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if injunction is refused and compare it with that, it is likely to be caused to other-side if injunction is granted. After saying so, qua present case, learned Appellate Court has taken into account and considered all aspects of the matter. It is apt to mention here that learned Appellate Court is not prevented by law to determine all the aspects of the matter that have been kept in mind by it and squared off by it while deciding the appeal. It is settled that that the Appellate Court, in terms of Section 107, CPC, has not only the power to determine a case finally but also has the same power as are available with the Court of original jurisdiction. Section 107 falls under the caption “General provisions relating to appeal”. Therefore, this Chapter has application not only to appeals from original decrees but also to appeals from appealable orders. [See: Chamber of Commerce and others v. Ashok Kumar Gupta and others, 2004 (1) JKJ HC 81]. In that view of matter, instant petition is liable to be dismissed. 16. Based on the foregoing discussion, I do not see any reason to interfere with the order dated 11th May 2019, passed by learned Appellate Court while allowing the appeal and setting-aside the Trial Court Order dated 19th December 2017. 17. In view of the above, petition on hand sans any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed with connected CM.