Research › Search › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 324 (CAL)

Bimalendu Sekhar Kayal v. Union Bank of India

2019-03-07

SAMBUDDHA CHAKRABARTI

body2019
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner while was working as a Senior Manager of the Union Bank of India (the bank, for short) i.e., the respondent no. 1, was served with a show-cause notice in November 1994 alleging certain acts and omissions on his part primarily with regard to sanction of loans. The petitioner gave his reply justifying his actions. 2. The respondent Bank issued a charge-sheet and a departmental enquiry was initiated by the disciplinary authority i.e., the respondent no. 3. The enquiry officer after completion of the enquiry proceedings submitted a report, inter alia, holding that the charges leveled against the petitioner in respect of procedural lapses and irregularities had stood proved. The petitioner assailed the report based on no evidence and the petitioner was no way guilty of the alleged charges. 3. The disciplinary authority i.e., the respondent no. 3 disagreed with the findings of the enquiry authority in respect of certain minor allegations. The petitioner has alleged that he was totally silent about any loss or prejudice suffered by the bank on the alleged procedural lapses. However, he had given the petitioner an opportunity to make a submission in respect of the findings of the departmental authority; the petitioner submitted his written submission. 4. Ultimately, the disciplinary authority imposed upon the petitioner the punishment of dismissal from service. From the order of the disciplinary authority the petitioner preferred an appeal but the appellate authority by an order, dated December 16, 1998 dismissed the appeal confirming the order of the disciplinary authority. 5. The petitioner has further stated that on similar and self-same charges or allegations a criminal proceeding had been started against the petitioner by the CBI at the behest of the bank. The said criminal case ended in acquittal by the CBI court on July 5, 2016. 6. The petitioner states that the said judgment has an overriding effect over the decisions of the bank authorities and, therefore, he is entitled to be compensated by way of payment of 13 years' salary with interest for the wrong and damage done to him by the bank. To that effect, he made a representation to the bank which was rejected by a communication, dated July 26, 2016. 7. To that effect, he made a representation to the bank which was rejected by a communication, dated July 26, 2016. 7. The petitioner has assailed the impugned decision as vindictive and has relied on the deposition of the then disciplinary authority in the CBI court which, according to him, reflected a vindictive mindset of the bank. His further case is that the respondent no. 3 not being the appointing authority could not remove the petitioner from service of the respondent no. 1 bank. 8. The petitioner has sought to explain the delay on the ground that on identical charges the CBI case was pending and since the outcome was uncertain he did not dare challenging the decision of the respondent. He had also financial constraint to pursue two cases at the same time. Therefore, he decided to wait till the outcome of the CBI case and has filed this writ petition after the disposal of the criminal case pending against him. 9. The petitioner further states that the bank had not suffered any financial loss nor it had been prejudiced in any manner for the allegations of procedural lapses leveled against him. All terminal benefits had been released to the petitioner, but the bank did not respond to the option exercised by him for availing himself of the pensionary benefit in lieu of provident fund. 10. The petitioner has submitted that both the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority acted illegally and with a mala fide intention imposed punishment of dismissal for which he has been suffering real financial hardship, mental agony, loss of reputation, etc. 11. The petitioner is, inter alia, prayed for a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to rescind, recall, revoke and quash the impugned charge-sheet, the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the order passed by the appellate authority respectively, a direction upon the respondents to release the full salary for 13 years' from March 1998 to June 2011 with upto date interest at the bank's rate, a direction upon the respondents to release the pension due since July 2011 with upto date interest for the exercise option in the year November, 2010 and for other reliefs. 12. The application has been contested by the respondents nos. 1 to 3 by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. 12. The application has been contested by the respondents nos. 1 to 3 by filing an affidavit-in-opposition. The respondents have taken the point about the maintainability of the writ petition on the ground that the extent of evidence or appreciation thereof would not come within the purview of this Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as well as on the ground that the disciplinary proceedings have not been impugned. The respondents have further contended that the writ of certiorari had been sought to be prayed as a cloak of an appeal in disguise and the writ petition has been brought for a rehearing of the whole matter. The writ petition is not maintainable since by this petition substitution of the decision of the administrative authority has been sought for although the said decision had been arrived at after following the principles established by law and the rules of natural justice. The respondents have primarily challenged the maintainability of the writ petition with reference to the limits of the power and jurisdiction of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but the petitioner is seeking to convert the writ court into an appellate authority which is not permissible. 13. The respondents have also taken the point of delay as the writ petition has been filed 18 years after the order of the appellate authority had been passed and this has been done without any explanation. 14. The respondents have further stated that in the preliminary enquiry held against the petitioner he admitted that he had acted beyond the norms and accepted the procedural irregularities which were contrary to the said norms. After the preliminary enquiry a full-fledged enquiry was held and thereafter a report was submitted by the enquiry officer holding the petitioner guilty of the charges leveled against him in respect of the procedural aspects and irregularities. The disciplinary authority recorded his reasons for taking a different view from the finding of the enquiry officer and the petitioner was given opportunity to represent against the same. The disciplinary authority ultimately on a consideration of the gravity and the alleged misconduct decided to dismiss him from service. In the appeal filed by the petitioner the appellate authority on a totality of the facts and circumstances refused to interfere with the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. 15. The disciplinary authority ultimately on a consideration of the gravity and the alleged misconduct decided to dismiss him from service. In the appeal filed by the petitioner the appellate authority on a totality of the facts and circumstances refused to interfere with the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. 15. The respondents have denied all the charges leveled against them in the writ petition. It is their specific case that at the stage of disciplinary proceeding the petitioner did not raise the issue of victimization but after a lapse of two decades the plea has been taken in the writ petition for the first time. The allegations about the vagueness of the charge-sheet or that it was violative of Clause 6(3) of the Discipline and Appeal Rules of the bank has also been denied. The petitioner has not taken any point during the disciplinary proceedings which he has taken in the writ petition. 16. The respondents have further contended that the articles of charges only indicated that if they were proved the same would constitute misconduct under the relevant provisions mentioned therein. The petitioner did not take any point that they were violative of any provision or he had suffered prejudice because of that. It has been emphatically denied that the petitioner had not been given any opportunity to defend the articles of charges. The respondents have further denied that the respondent no. 3 had violated Rule 6 (5) of the relevant regulations. 17. On the contrary, the entire proceedings have been conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations of the bank and nothing has been shown that the petitioner had suffered anything during the disciplinary proceeding. The proceedings were conducted in his presence after giving the fullest opportunity to defend himself about the allegations leveled against him and the allegation of violation of principle of natural justice and the statutory rules are devoid of any substance and were denied. 18. The respondents have given details of how they had scrupulously maintained the principles of natural justice and how the petitioner was given opportunity to defend himself at every joint. The petitioner had admitted the charges during the proceedings and never took the plea that there was no admission on his part. On the contrary, in his communication to the enquiry officer he had reiterated that he admitted the procedural lapses on his part. 19. The petitioner had admitted the charges during the proceedings and never took the plea that there was no admission on his part. On the contrary, in his communication to the enquiry officer he had reiterated that he admitted the procedural lapses on his part. 19. The respondents have taken a point of contradiction in the stand of the petitioner inasmuch as that on the one hand he had alleged that the enquiry proceedings were violative in the principles of natural justice and on the other he was supporting the finding of the enquiry officer. The exercise taken by the disciplinary authority was due to the fact that he did not concur with the findings of the enquiry officer on all points. Therefore, he had come to a different finding which was based on evidence. It is immaterial whether the bank had suffered any loss when admittedly the petitioner had acted beyond the prescribed authority. This is a question of discipline of the employees of the bank, which is dependent upon its officers who must act and operate within their specific spheres. 20. The allegation that the punishment was disproportionate has also been denied. The order of dismissal would clearly show that the disciplinary authority had assigned reasons for the punishment imposed by him. An order of dismissal cannot be held to be disproportionate when admittedly the bank officer had acted disregarding the procedural aspect which can be termed as acting prejudicial to the interest of the bank. 21. The respondents have further stated in their affidavit that the standards of proof in criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are entirely different. The decision of the CBI court has no overriding effect so far as the punishment imposed by the Bank after conducting disciplinary proceedings. The claim that the petitioner is entitled to be compensated by way of 13 years' salary is baseless and against the settled principles of law. 22. The respondents contend that acquittal in criminal proceedings is no ground for interfering with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings cannot be equated. Therefore, waiting for the outcome for the criminal case to move the writ petition before this Court to challenge the order of dismissal as well as the order of the appellate authority is no explanation for the delay of nearly two decades. The respondents have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal proceedings cannot be equated. Therefore, waiting for the outcome for the criminal case to move the writ petition before this Court to challenge the order of dismissal as well as the order of the appellate authority is no explanation for the delay of nearly two decades. The respondents have prayed for dismissal of the writ petition. 23. The petitioner has filed an affidavit-in-reply largely reiterating his stand in the writ petition. Apart from denying the contentions of the respondents the petitioner has stated that if the writ petition is carefully considered it would appear that the irregularities committed by the bank in initiating the disciplinary proceeding was contrary to its own rules and regulations and violative of principles of natural justice. It has been specifically stated in the writ petition why it had been filed after 13 years. With specific reference to the point taken by the respondents about the limit of the court's jurisdiction while exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has stated that the court has the jurisdiction to appreciate evidence, the reasonableness of charges, the disciplinary proceedings and the imposition of punishment. 24. The petitioner has reiterated that the charges in the charge-sheet as well as in the criminal proceeding were identical and hence the decision of the court should supersede the decision of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. The petitioner has also reiterated that he is entitled to pension in lieu of provident fund as retiral benefit which is his right. The bank has not sustained any financial loss, but the petitioner has sustained enormous pecuniary loss for long 13 years. 25. The petitioner's challenge to the disciplinary proceeding has been occasioned by his acquittal in the criminal case. The enormous delay in challenging the disciplinary proceedings has been sought to be justified by the petitioner that since no third party right has been affected, the bank would not be put to any prejudicial position and the arrears of payment may be restricted to such period which the court might decide in its discretion. Mr. Majumdar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that setting aside the order of dismissal will have the continuing effect of his entitlement towards certain additional post retirement benefits. 26. Mr. Majumdar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that setting aside the order of dismissal will have the continuing effect of his entitlement towards certain additional post retirement benefits. 26. The primary thrust, however, of the petitioner's case is the effect of the order of acquittal on the order of dismissal. The petitioner was prosecuted under Sections 120B/420/468 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code as well as under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In the criminal proceeding the evidence of the witnesses for the bank were appreciated. He has laid great emphasis on the evidence of P.W. 2. The bank Manager refunded a certain sum of money to the petitioner. Although, the witnesses for the management in the disciplinary proceedings did not expose themselves for cross-examination, in cross-examination in the criminal case they admitted that the petitioner was not guilty. The petitioner submits that the acquittal in the criminal case was not a technical one, rather arrived at after appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses and other documents. 27. Mr. Majumdar seems to be crucially aware of the differences in the standard of proof between a disciplinary proceeding and a criminal trial. But he has addressed the court on a point whether in the peculiar facts of the case the finding in the criminal proceeding supersedes the order of dismissal and, therefore, the satisfaction arrived at by the employer for imposition of the penalty warrants a revisit once the said employee has been acquitted in the criminal trial. 28. Mr. Majumdar has relied on the judgment in the case of Corporation of the City of Nagpur, Civil Lines, Nagpur and Another Vs. Ram Chandra and Others, (1981) 2 SCC 714 , where the Supreme Court observed that normally where the accused is acquitted, and completely exonerated of the charges, it would not be expedient to continue a departmental enquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence. But the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue with the departmental enquiry is not taken away nor its discretion in any way fettered. But the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue with the departmental enquiry is not taken away nor its discretion in any way fettered. However, where quite some time had elapsed since the departmental enquiry had started the authority concerned was directed to take into consideration this factor in coming to the conclusion if it is really worthwhile to continue with the departmental enquiry in the event of the acquittal of the respondents. If, however, the authority felt that there was sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the enquiry it could certainly do so. 29. Mr. Majumdar further relied on the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy and Another Vs. Superintendent of Police and Another, (2015) 2 SCC 365 . There a question cropped up for consideration was whether the dismissal orders were liable to be set aside in view of the judgment and order passed by the criminal court after the trial in which the appellants were acquitted when the charges in both the proceedings were similar. The Supreme Court observed that the trial judge had categorically recorded the finding of fact on proper appreciation and evaluation of evidence on record and held that the charges in the criminal case were not proved. Therefore, the dismissal orders passed against the appellants were liable to be set aside. 30. Mr. Majumdar also relied on the case of General Manager (Operations), State Bank of India and Another Vs. B. Periyasamy, (2015) 3 SCC 101 to which reference will be made latter. 31. Mr. Majumdar next relied on the case of State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Vs. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006 for a proposition that setting aside the order of dismissal will have the continuing effect of the petitioner's entitlement towards certain additional post retiral benefits. That judgment, however, does not really say in so many words anything of the sort to be projected by the petitioner. The subject matter of the decision did not concern itself with the service jurisprudence where the order as sought to be argued by the petitioner could be made. There were 31 appeals filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh against the orders passed by the High Court on petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by dealers in tobacco. There were 31 appeals filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh against the orders passed by the High Court on petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by dealers in tobacco. The petitioners contended that the taxing provisions under which the tax was assessed and collected from them was unconstitutional and they prayed for refund of all these taxes that had been collected from them. It was in this context that the Supreme Court had observed that if a right has been infringed and the aggrieved party comes to the Court for enforcement of his right it will not be giving complete relief if the court merely declares the existence of such right or the fact that that existing right has been infringed. The High Courts' power to give consequential relief by ordering repayment of money improperly released by the Government has been recognized by the judgment. From the existence of this power to grant consequential relief, Mr. Majumdar sought to apply it to the fact of the present case that setting aside the order of dismissal will have the continuing effect of the petitioner's entitlement to certain post retiral benefits. 32. While making this submission, the petitioner seems to have been oblivious of a very settled proposition of law that a judgment in a case is an authority on what it decides and not what can be inferentially deduced from it. That a High Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has the power to grant consequential relief in appropriate cases is too well-settled to be reiterated. But a very careful reading of the judgment in the above case and the ratio decided there in one sense go against the petitioner. The Supreme Court observed that the power to give relief under Article 226 of the constitution of India is a discretionary power which is particularly true in the case of issuing writs in the nature of mandamus. Among the several matters which the High Courts rightly take into consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the delay made by the aggrieved party in seeking the special remedy. It may be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. It may be stated as a general rule that if there has been unreasonable delay the court ought not ordinarily to lend its aid to a party by the extraordinary remedy of mandamus. It has further been observed that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. The Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for that remedy but where the delay is more than the period it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable. 33. Judged by that standard the delay of the petitioner in the present case in approaching the court must be held to be a fatal in getting the reliefs he prayed for. 34. The primary emphasis of the respondent is on the point of delay. Mr. Dey, the learned Advocate for the respondents relied on the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T. T. Murali Babu, (2014) 2 Scale 163 , for a proposition that a writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Supreme Court relied on the case of Maharashtra State Road Transport Corportaion Vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, Amravati and Others, ARI 1969 SC 329 where the court referred to the principle stated by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. Vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, Abram Farewall and John Kemp, 1874 (5) PC 221]. It was observed in the latter case that the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy. 35. The Supreme Court in that case observed that as a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the right of a citizen but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances, delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Such delay may have an impact on others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability may have been treated to have attained finality. 36. The petitioner has taken a point that because of his acts the bank has not suffered any financial loss. This is hardly a sustainable defence. In the case of State Bank of India Vs. Bela Bagchi, (2005) 7 Scale 60 , the Supreme Court observed that a bank officer is required to exercise higher standard of honesty and integrity. The charge against employee not being casual in nature the plea about the absence of loss of the bank is without any substance. 37. After all an employee of a bank is required to take all possible steps to protect its interest and have to act with utmost integrity, honesty and diligence. It is no defence that the bank did not suffer any financial loss when there was infraction in discharge of his duties which by itself, as observed by the Supreme Court, is unbecoming of an officer of any bank. The main thrust of the petitioner's submission is that since he has been acquitted in the criminal case, the entire disciplinary proceeding against him should be set aside. The main thrust of the petitioner's submission is that since he has been acquitted in the criminal case, the entire disciplinary proceeding against him should be set aside. In support of that contention, the petitioner relied on the judgment in the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy and Another (Supra), in that judgment the specific finding of the Supreme Court was that at the trial by the criminal court the appellants were honorably acquitted and the charges at the disciplinary proceeding as well as the criminal one are similar. The learned Trial Judge categorically recorded the finding of fact on proper appreciation and evaluation of evidence on record and held that the charges framed in the criminal case were not proved and, therefore, they were acquitted. 38. I quite agree with Mr. Dey that in the present case the charges leveled against the petitioner in the disciplinary proceeding and the criminal proceeding were quite different. The allegation in the FIR, as mentioned in the judgment of the criminal court, was that the petitioner as the branch Manager of the concerned bank had entered into a criminal conspiracy with his brother who was the proprietor of a ration shop to cheat the bank. In pursuance thereof they dishonestly issued a pay order of Rs. 65,049.60 in favour of the Food Corporation of India from the sundry deposit account of another corporation under the head of Education Fund. The said amount was encashed by the Food Corporation of India in the year 1994. But subsequently to compensate that other corporation the accused forged various securities and thereby intended to defraud and falsify the account by putting a half-yearly interest to the sundry deposit account of the corporation with his full knowledge that there was no provision of giving such interest and he thereby cheated the bank by abusing his official capacity for pecuniary gain for himself and his co-accused brother. 39. If this is read against the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner by the respondent bank one has to conclude that apart from what has been alleged against him in the criminal case, there were other acts of omissions and commissions mentioned against him in the memorandum of charged issued by the respondent bank. 39. If this is read against the charge-sheet issued to the petitioner by the respondent bank one has to conclude that apart from what has been alleged against him in the criminal case, there were other acts of omissions and commissions mentioned against him in the memorandum of charged issued by the respondent bank. For example, there is allegation about the impropriety in sanctioning housing loan to one Smt. Aloka Bose, it was alleged in the memorandum that there was no evidence on record to show that the borrower had any business and no application, document, sanction advice, stock statement etc. were held on bank's record. 40. That apart, the purposes of the two proceedings, criminal and disciplinary were entirely different. In the criminal case the charge against the petitioner was of cheating, falsification of books of accounts etc. but in the departmental enquiry the primary allegation against the petitioner was that he had exceeded his delegated powers and sanctioned various loans to borrowers beyond his authority which were to constitute misconducts warranting a disciplinary action against him. 41. The reliance on the judgment of S. Bhaskar Reddy must also have to fail on a very major ground. In that case the charges against the accused persons were not proved at all and the Supreme Court specifically used the expression that they were "honorably acquitted". In the case of the petitioner the learned trial judge observed that the prosecution had not been able to prove the ingredients of the offences alleged against the accused persons beyond all reasonable shadow of doubts. The accused persons were acquitted as they were entitled to get the benefit of doubt. Thus, the factual substratum of the two cases and the nature of acquittal being very different, the judgment in the case of S. Bhaskar Reddy cannot be said to have any application to the facts of the present case. 42. In the case of Southern Railway Officers Association and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, (2010) AIR SCW 548, the Supreme Court observed that acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent officials had been acquitted of the criminal charge. 43. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent officials had been acquitted of the criminal charge. 43. Again in the case of State of West Bengal and Others Vs. Shankar Ghosh, (2013) 14 Scale 245 , the issue that cropped up for consideration was whether the respondent who was dismissed from service following disciplinary proceedings was liable to be reinstated on acquittal by a criminal court on the ground of identity of charges in the departmental as well as criminal proceedings. On several charges the respondent was proceeded against by the disciplinary authority. He was dismissed from service and filed an unsuccessful appeal from the said order. A criminal proceeding was also initiated against him in which he was ultimately acquitted. The respondent on his acquittal in the criminal case initiated proceedings for his reinstatement. Both the Tribunal and the High Court directed his reinstatement. That was challenged in the Supreme Court, inter alia, on the ground that the respondent was not honorably acquitted. The acquittal was by way of giving benefit of doubt. The Supreme Court after considering the rival contentions and a number of judgments relied on by the parties was of the view that even in case of self-same charges if a person is acquitted in a criminal proceeding he has no inherent right to be reinstated unless the rule permits for the same. 44. Thus, one thing stands out very clearly that unless the service regulations provide that on acquittal by the criminal court an employee who has been acquitted in a criminal case may not be reinstated. If the service regulation provides for any such after his acquittal in the criminal trial reinstatement becomes almost automatic. In the present case the petitioner has not been able to show any such service regulation providing for an automatic reinstatement after acquittal in a criminal case. 45. A far more difficult issue for the petitioner to overcome is the question of delay. The petitioner has approached this court about 18 years after his dismissal from service by the disciplinary authority. The reasons sought to be provided for the delay was that the outcome of the CBI court was uncertain and, therefore, the petitioner did not dare challenging the decision of the respondent authorities. Moreover, he had financial difficulties to pursue two cases simultaneously. 46. The reasons sought to be provided for the delay was that the outcome of the CBI court was uncertain and, therefore, the petitioner did not dare challenging the decision of the respondent authorities. Moreover, he had financial difficulties to pursue two cases simultaneously. 46. The reasons do not appear to be sufficiently convincing for the court to give any relief after such an inordinate delay. It may be mentioned that when the writ petition was admitted on February 23, 2017, the point of maintainability was kept open. I quite appreciate the point taken by Mr. Dey that the petitioner cannot invoke the writ jurisdiction of this court by assailing the decision of the departmental proceeding after 18 years. 47. The petitioner has to answer a very fundamental question as well: what did exactly make him aggrieved? If he was aggrieved by the dismissal from service he should have approached the court long before. He cannot come and say that after being acquitted by the CBI Court his right has accrued to challenge an order of dismissal which was passed about two decades ago. Alternatively, did the acquittal by the criminal court make him aggrieved about the order passed by the disciplinary authority? The projected explanation relating to the uncertainty about the outcome of the criminal trial is hardly any answer to the delay. The respondent has raised an issue that the petitioner cannot also be certain of the fate of the present writ petition after the lapse of 18 years and he also cannot challenge the order of dismissal passed in such distant past. The order of acquittal by the criminal court cannot make him aggrieved afresh. If he was aggrieved 18 years ago and had not taken any step it must be deemed that he had waived his right to challenge the order. 48. Mr. Dey has also quite seriously contested the plea regarding financial difficulties in filing the writ petition 18 years before. 49. The petitioner has relied on the case of General Manager (Operations), State Bank of India and Another (Supra) to which reference was made earlier. That decision if read in its proper context does not really help the petitioner. That was a case where the order of dismissal of a bank employee was set aside by a learned Single Judge and it was affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court. That decision if read in its proper context does not really help the petitioner. That was a case where the order of dismissal of a bank employee was set aside by a learned Single Judge and it was affirmed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The learned Single Judge approached the issue by embarking upon an enquiry whether the findings arrived at by the disciplinary authority were based on acceptable evidence or not. The Supreme Court laid down the parameters of the exercise of jurisdiction by a writ court in service matters. The Supreme Court observed that permissible enquiry was whether there was any evidence on which findings were arrived at or whether there was any perversity in the findings and not whether evidence was acceptable or not unless question of admissibility was raised. The question of adequacy of evidence could not have been gone into to conclude that evidence was insufficient to hold the employee guilty. Thus, the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot go into the question of sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to set aside the finding of fact. In the process the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and dismissed the writ petition of the employee. 50. This, however, is a case where the petitioner seeks to challenge the finding of the disciplinary authority as well as the appellate authority on merits. The petitioner cannot take us into the adequacy of evidence adduced at the enquiry stage. The scope of the writ jurisdiction to intervene in a service matter is circumscribed by the well-settled limits as mentioned above. This is all the more applicable to a case where the petitioner seeks to challenge the order of dismissal after 18 years. Thus, he has not only based his case on the acquittal by the criminal court he wants to establish his right that the acquittal has given him an authority to challenge the findings of the departmental authorities after 18 years. That is plainly not the law. 51. Thus for the reasons aforesaid, I am of the view that the petition is not sustainable. The petitioner has not been able to make out any case for the grant of reliefs prayed for by him. That is plainly not the law. 51. Thus for the reasons aforesaid, I am of the view that the petition is not sustainable. The petitioner has not been able to make out any case for the grant of reliefs prayed for by him. Even if in the case relied on by the petitioner, the order of dismissal was set aside on the basis of the acquittal in the criminal case, the facts therein being different from the present one it cannot be cited as a precedent for an order seeking reinstatement in service on the basis of the order passed by the CBI court. It has already been found that the charges in the criminal case and the disciplinary proceeding were not the same and the petitioner having been given the benefit of doubt in the criminal case this is not a fit case where the court may direct reinstatement on the basis of acquittal in the trial. Over and above everything there is an insurmountable hurdle of an inordinate delay which has been sought to be explained in a manner which has not been found to be convincing enough. 52. For the reasons aforesaid, I find no merit in the writ petition. 53. The writ petition is dismissed. 54. There shall be no order as to costs. 55. Urgent Photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all requisite formalities.