ORDER T. Rajani, J. 1. Aggrieved by the action of the 2nd respondent in issuing communication bearing No. RA/MM/SUR/GDS/SC/59/2014-15, dated 17.8.2017, this writ petition is filed seeking to set aside said proceedings. 2. The facts, briefly, which led to the dispute between the parties are as follows : The petitioner is a public limited company engaged in the business of the Oil and Gas field operations. It is also a service provider for Air and Natural Gas Compressor Services on charter-hire basis. The 1st respondent published a notice inviting tenders for hiring of Gas Dehydration System (GDS) at its Rajahmundry Asset (Phase-I) for a period of three years at five production Installations located in five different locations. The petitioner attended various pre-bid meetings conducted by the 1st respondent and sought various clarifications on the terms of the tender document. The petitioner entered into Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement, dated 27.1.2015 with Croft Production Systems Inc (hereafter, CPS), a registered and certified Natural Gas and Oil Equipments Leasing & Selling Company based in the United States of America, as its Technical Collaborator for successful execution of the contract, if awarded by the 1st respondent. The CPS has previous experience and expertise in providing technical services in various forms of GDS for which reason the petitioner entered into an agreement with CPS. The petitioner submitted a bid, for all five locations, alongwith documents, which indicate the requisite experience of the Technical Collaborator. The 1st respondent, after lot of correspondence with the petitioner, vide letter dated 13.3.2015 informed the petitioner that the petitioner qualified the technical requirements, and is therefore, shortlisted for opening the price bid of the tender. In fact, the petitioner was the only bidder, who was technically qualified and participated in the bid. Thereafter, the price opening of the bid was conducted on 13.3.2015 and the petitioner was declared as lowest bidder. The 1st respondent immediately called upon the petitioner for price negotiations. A meeting was conducted on 23.3.2015 and the petitioner agreed to reduce the quoted price to Rs. 1.752 crores. The petitioner started to mobilise the equipment to install the same at five different locations mentioned in the tender document. The 1st respondent delayed in handing over sites to the petitioner for commencement of the work. A meeting was conducted on 23.3.2015 and the petitioner agreed to reduce the quoted price to Rs. 1.752 crores. The petitioner started to mobilise the equipment to install the same at five different locations mentioned in the tender document. The 1st respondent delayed in handing over sites to the petitioner for commencement of the work. Further, due to various other defaults attributable to the respondents and other force majeure clauses, the mobilisation of equipment was delayed and the same was intimated to the respondents from time to time. Noticing the same, the respondents also granted extension of the last date of the mobilisation. The petitioner installed, commissioned and conducted a successful test run of the equipment. But, to the utter shock of the petitioner, the respondents withheld an amount of Rs. 42.00 crores payable to the petitioner as per the contract, stating that the amounts were retained towards liquidated damages and compensation/penalty towards delayed mobilisation and test run of the equipment. 3. While so, the 1st respondent floated another e-tender on 26.5.2015 with respect to four production installations in Rajahmundry Asset (Phase-II) for a period of five years. The petitioner submitted a bid document, as it already gained practical knowledge with regard to mobilization and installation of GDS, and the petitioner was declared as lowest bidder. After successful performance of the contract for a period of 1-1/2 year, the 1st respondent issued letter dated 27.2.2017 informing the petitioner that the respondents intend to negotiate the rates at which Phase-I contract was awarded. There were several communications with regard to price reduction. While so, on 31.7.2017, the 1st respondent issued notice of termination to the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner did not provide a satisfactory reply to the show-cause notice and terminated the contract with effect from 27.5.2018. The said termination was immediately followed by a notice of suspension and blacklisting, dated 3.8.2017. The petitioner approached this Court by way of filing WP Nos. 26400 and 26448 of 2017 challenging the termination notice and suspension/blacklisting notice and obtained order, dated 8.8.2017, suspending the notice dated 3.8.2017. 4. The respondents preferred Writ Appeal No. 1149 of 2017, challenging the interim orders passed by the Court in Writ Petition No. 26448 of 2017 pertaining to Phase-II of the contract. The said writ appeal was disposed of, maintaining the interim suspension granted in WP No. 26448 of 2017. 4. The respondents preferred Writ Appeal No. 1149 of 2017, challenging the interim orders passed by the Court in Writ Petition No. 26448 of 2017 pertaining to Phase-II of the contract. The said writ appeal was disposed of, maintaining the interim suspension granted in WP No. 26448 of 2017. The respondents conceded that no final decision of blacklisting was taken. The respondents were directed to put the petitioner on notice prior to such final decision. While so, on 17.8.2017, the respondents issued impugned communication dated 17.8.2017 to the petitioner stating that Phase-I contract was awarded to the petitioner on the understanding that its technical collaborator had requisite experience and that since the said technical collaborator lacks experience, the petitioner was not entitled to contractually agreed rate of Rs. 1.58 paise for Phase-I or Rs. 0.78 paise for Phase-II. Therefore, by the impugned communication dated 17.8.2017, the respondents called upon the petitioner to remit an amount of Rs. 66.95 crores excessively paid towards Phase-I contract. The said action of the respondents is illegal. Once prices have been agreed between the parties and the contract was entered into, the respondents are estopped from making alterations to the terms of the contract without consent of the petitioner. Hence, the said notice is sought to be declared as illegal. 5. The respondents filed counter raising a contention that there is an arbitration agreement between the parties under Clause 27 of the contract, whereby both the parties agreed to resolve all the disputes arising between them through arbitration and conciliation process. Hence, the petitioner cannot be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. It is further stated that considering the safety and urgency involved in the proposed operations and having regard to the claim made by the petitioner that its collaborator is having vast experience, the bid submitted by the petitioner was considered. The rate being charged by the petitioner under Phase-I contract is Rs. 1.58 paise (excluding service tax) for each Standard Cubic Meter (SCM) whereas the rate charged for the same work at other installations at Phase-II is Rs. 0.78 paise per SCM. The 1st respondent is incurring Rs. 10.00 lakhs per day on account of this price variation between the two contracts. The 1st respondent received complaints against the petitioner during the tendering process of awarding Phase-I contract. 0.78 paise per SCM. The 1st respondent is incurring Rs. 10.00 lakhs per day on account of this price variation between the two contracts. The 1st respondent received complaints against the petitioner during the tendering process of awarding Phase-I contract. But, during the tendering process of Phase-II contract, serious complaints were received against the petitioner alleging that that the Technical Collaborator of the petitioner did not have experience stipulated in the tender conditions. Since it goes to the root of the matter and determines the eligibility of the petitioner, the 1st respondent has a right to direct the petitioner to prove its eligibility and the experience of its Technical Collaborator. However, due to the urgency and safety aspects involved in having GDS Services, the 1st respondent awarded the contract to the petitioner by accepting the undertaking submitted by the petitioner. The undertaking runs as follows: Undertaking We hereby undertake that if in the process of verification/authentication of any documents submitted by us in any ONGC tender is found by ONGC to be forged or if any falsification of record has been done, or if we have violated any provision of IP which puts our reliability or credibility into question and where contract has been awarded to us against such tender, then besides termination of such contract, ONGC can take action as per provisions of the contract and the IP and we shall accept the decision of ONGC without any demur. 6. Article 36 of these contracts empowers the 1st respondent to terminate the contracts in question if it is subsequently found that any information submitted by the petitioner is not genuine. The 1st respondent referred the complaints received against the petitioner to its Vigilance Department for conducting inquiry. The Vigilance Department conducted a thorough inquiry and secured vast information to the effect that the alleged experience of the Technical Collaborator of the petitioner is not as per the requirement of ONGC tender conditions. Hence, show-cause notice dated 28.4.2017 was issued calling upon the petitioner to show-cause as to why the undertaking given by it should not be invoked and the two contracts awarded to it should not be terminated. The petitioner gave reply dated 15.5.2017 without offering any explanation, but, demanding supply of various documents. Hence, show-cause notice dated 28.4.2017 was issued calling upon the petitioner to show-cause as to why the undertaking given by it should not be invoked and the two contracts awarded to it should not be terminated. The petitioner gave reply dated 15.5.2017 without offering any explanation, but, demanding supply of various documents. In fact, ONGC need not conduct any enquiry, but to act fairly, being a Public Sector Undertaking, ONGC has undertaken the above said exercise and complied with the principles of natural justice. The respondents have decided to terminate both the contracts and accordingly orders dated 31.7.2017 were issued, terminating both the contracts. The petitioner challenged the order dated 31.7.2017 in WP No. 25400 of 2017 and WP No. 26446 of 2017 wherein orders were passed on 17.8.2017 directing the petitioner to remit the amount of Rs. 66.95 crores being the excess amount received by the petitioner, after 31.5.2017. However, since ONGC availed the services of the petitioner, as a prudent employer, ONGC has decided to pay the petitioner for the work done and work to be done at the rate being charged by the petitioner for the Phase-II contract at Rs. 0.78 paise per SCM (rounded to 2 decimal places). On the above grounds, the respondents seek this Court to dismiss the writ petition. 7. Heard Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, the Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Ms. Rubaina S. Khatoon, the Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Kakara Venkata Rao, the Standing Counsel for ONGC for the respondents. 8. Two questions emerge from the rival submissions of the Counsel for both parties viz., (1) Whether this Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, when alternative remedy of arbitration is available to the parties, if so, under what circumstances. (2) Whether the impugned order issued by the 1st respondent can be sustained. Point No. 1: 9. The undisputed existence of the arbitration clause in the agreement has become a basis for the respondents' Counsel's contention that this writ petition cannot be entertained by this Court. The Standing Counsel for the respondents draws support for the said contention from three rulings of the Supreme Court. (a) The first ruling is State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22 . The Standing Counsel for the respondents draws support for the said contention from three rulings of the Supreme Court. (a) The first ruling is State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd., (1996) 6 SCC 22 . The Court, by taking into consideration the clause providing inter alia for settlement of disputes by reference to arbitration, held that the arbitrators can decide both questions of fact as well as questions of law and when the contract itself provides for a mode of settlement of disputes arising from the contract, there is no reason why the parties should not follow and adopt that remedy and invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. It also held that the existence of an effective alternative remedy-in that case, provided in the contract itself-is a good ground for the Court to decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226; the said article was not meant to supplant the existing remedies at law but only to supplement them in certain well-recognized situations. (b) The second ruling is reported in State of Kerala v. M.K. Jose, (2015) 9 SCC 433 . In the said case, the Court observed that the breach of contract, which was the point of dispute therein, involved disputed questions of fact. In such circumstance, the Court held that generally the Courts would not interfere and indulge in adjudication of disputed questions of fact. But, however, the ratio that was laid down is not to the effect of absolute ousting of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. In M.K. Jose's case (supra), the Court relied on State of Bihar v. Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216 , wherein it was reiterated that writ petition under Article 226 is not the proper proceedings for adjudicating such disputes; under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the Court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract; it is settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. But, it also observed that equally, the existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be a good ground in refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226. (c) The case of ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corpn. of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553 , which is the other case relied upon by the respondents' Counsel, was also relied by the Supreme Court in M.K. Jose's case (supra). It was noted that ABL International's case (supra), was relied upon in Noble Resources Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2006) 10 SCC 236 , alongwith other cases and opined as follows: 29. Although the scope of judicial review or the development of law in this field has been noticed hereinbefore particularly in the light of the decision of this Court in ABL International Ltd.'s case (supra), each case, however, must be decided on its own facts. Public interest as noticed hereinbefore, may be one of the factors to exercise the power of judicial review. In a case where a public law element is involved, judicial review may be permissible.... Thereafter, the Court in Noble Resources's case (supra), proceeded to analyze the facts and came to hold that certain serious disputed questions of facts have arisen for determination and such disputes ordinarily could not have been entertained by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review and ultimately the appeal was dismissed. 10. The Court referred to the above judgments, to highlight under what circumstances in respect of contractual claim a challenge to violation of contract can be entertained by a writ Court. It held that it depends upon facts of each case. Distinguishing the facts in ABL International's case (supra), the Court observed that the issue in the said case was that an instrumentality of a State was placing a different construction on the clauses of the contract of insurance and the insured was interpreting the contract differently. In those circumstances, the Court thought it apt to hold that merely because something is disputed by the insurer, it should not enter into the realm of disputed questions of fact. In fact, there was no disputed question of fact, but it required interpretation of the terms of the contract of insurance. In those circumstances, the Court thought it apt to hold that merely because something is disputed by the insurer, it should not enter into the realm of disputed questions of fact. In fact, there was no disputed question of fact, but it required interpretation of the terms of the contract of insurance. It was also held that if material come on record from which it is clearly evincible, the writ Court may exercise the power of judicial review. This was the ratio laid down in ABL International's case (supra), as understood by the Supreme Court in M.K. Jose's case (supra). In ABL International's case (supra), the Supreme Court relied on the case in Bal Krishna Agarwal (Dr.) v. State of U.P., (1995) 1 SCC 614 , wherein it was held as follows: 10. Having regard to the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the High Court was not right in dismissing the writ petition of the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy under Section 68 of the Act especially when the writ petition that was filed in 1988 had already been admitted and was pending in the High Court for the past more than 5 years. Since the question that is raised involves a pure question of law and even if the matter is referred to the Chancellor under Section 68 of the Act it is bound to be agitated in the Court by the party aggrieved by the order of the Chancellor, we are of the view that this was not a case where the High Court should have non-suited, the appellant on the ground of availability of an alternative remedy. We, therefore, propose to go into the merits of the question regarding inter se seniority of the appellant and respondents 4 and 5. We may, in this context, mention that respondent 4 has already retired in January, 1994. At Paragraph 27 of the judgment in ABL International's case (supra), the Apex Court laid down the ratio stating that three legal principles emerge as to the maintainability of the writ petition, which are as follows: (a) In an appropriate case, a writ petition as against a State or an instrumentality of a State arising out of a contractual obligation is maintainable. (b) Merely because some disputed questions of fact arise for consideration, same cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain a writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. (c) A writ petition involving a consequential relief of monetary claim is also maintainable. 11. From the judgments relied upon by the respondents' Counsel, the ratio that emerges is that in certain circumstances, the Court can also go to the extent of deciding the monetary claim that would consequentially arise and even the disputed questions of fact cannot be a ground to refuse to entertain the writ petition in all cases as a matter of rule. 12. The Counsel for the petitioner aids the Court with some more rulings on the aspect. In Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 107 , the Supreme Court held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. It held that where the petitioner's dealership, which was bread and butter, came to be terminated for an irrelevant and non-existent cause, a writ petition can be entertained. It also held that in three contingencies, writ jurisdiction can be entertained: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; and (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. Finding that the first two contingencies existed in the case dealt with by the Supreme Court, it held that the writ petition is maintainable. 13. The other case is Union of India v. Tantia Construction (P) Ltd., (2011) 5 SCC 697 , wherein it was held that arbitration clause is not a bar to invocation of writ jurisdiction, when injustice is caused and rule of law is violated, and constitutional powers vested in the High Court or Supreme Court cannot be fettered by any alternative remedy available to Authorities. 14. In Mahanandi Coalfields Ltd. v. Dhansar Engg. Co. 14. In Mahanandi Coalfields Ltd. v. Dhansar Engg. Co. (P) Ltd., (2016) 10 SCC 571 , the Supreme Court reversed the finding of the High Court while rejecting the contention of the appellant that the High Court committed manifest error in entertaining the writ petition, in respect of a purely contractual matter and more so when efficacious remedy under Clause 31 of the contract was available to the respondent for redressal of their grievance. 15. The ratio that emerges from the above rulings is clear and it permits the High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 inspite of there being an effective alternative remedy to the parties by way of arbitration or otherwise, and inspite of existence of disputed questions of fact and the Court can appreciate the interpretations placed by the parties on the clauses of the agreement. In this case, the dispute is with regard to the reduction of the charges for the services already rendered by the petitioner than what were agreed to under the agreement between the parties. Hence, this Court does not see any embargo in entertaining the writ petition inspite of there being an arbitration clause in the agreement. Accordingly, Point No. 1 is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents. Point No. 2: 16. The services of the petitioner were engaged by the respondents for installation of GDS for five productions at Rajahmundry Asset. The petitioner was supposed to engage the services of Technical Collaborator, who possessed experience in the required service. The petitioners entered into an agreement on 24.6.2015. After deliberations, the rate was fixed at Rs. 1.58 paise per SCM excluding service tax. There was another contract between the parties subsequent to the first contract wherein the rate agreed was Rs. 0.78 paise per SCM excluding service tax. The petitioner was served with termination notice on the ground that the Technical Collaborator engaged by the petitioner was not qualified. While terminating the contract by virtue of the notice dated 31.7.2017, the effect of the termination was specified to be 300 days from the date of said notice i.e., till 26.5.2018. The reason mentioned is to avoid any disruption and to main continuity of operations. While terminating the contract by virtue of the notice dated 31.7.2017, the effect of the termination was specified to be 300 days from the date of said notice i.e., till 26.5.2018. The reason mentioned is to avoid any disruption and to main continuity of operations. Having terminated the contract, a letter was issued to the petitioner on 17.8.2017 stating that the respondents want to pay for the services availed from the petitioner at lower rate quoted by the petitioner in the subsequent contract dated 16.6.2016, which is Rs. 0.78 paise per SCM. The reason is that the Technical Collaborator of the petitioner is not experienced and qualified. 17. The Counsel for the petitioner draws the attention of this Court to the terms of the contract at Clause 6.3, which deals with Modification in Contract. It is specified that all modifications leading to changes in the contract with respect to technical and/or commercial aspects, including terms of delivery, shall be considered valid only when accepted in writing by ONGC by issuing amendment to the contract. Even otherwise, when there are two parties to a contract or agreement, novation of contract is permitted only by the consent of both the parties. Unilateral modification of the contract is not permitted by the Indian Contract Act. The fact remains that the services of the petitioner were found satisfactory and a certificate was also issued on 17.7.2017 to the effect that the plants given to the petitioner are running satisfactorily from September, 2015. From the termination notice itself, it can also be understood that there was no defect in the services rendered by the petitioner. Though the contract was terminated on knowing that the Technical Collaborator did not possess adequate experience, it was terminated only with effect from, after 300 days of the termination notice. The reasons stated are to avoid any disruption and to main continuity of operations. The conduct of the respondents would show that the services of the petitioner were upto the mark and with the help of the Technical Collaborator, the petitioner is able to render services and conduct operations to the satisfaction of the respondents. 18. The ground taken in the counter that the High Court passed orders in WP Nos. 25400 and 26446 of 2017 directing the petitioner to remit Rs. 18. The ground taken in the counter that the High Court passed orders in WP Nos. 25400 and 26446 of 2017 directing the petitioner to remit Rs. 66.95 crores is not correct as it suppresses the subsequent order that is passed by the High Court setting aside the notice issued for recovery of the said amount. The present writ petition (WP No. 28527 of 2017) was allowed on 19.9.2017, setting aside the impugned communication dated 17.8.2017 demanding reimbursement of Rs. 66.95 crores. The Court in the said order observed that the respondents had to depend on the petitioner and desired the petitioner to carry out the work for a period of 300 days even after the termination of the contract, which indicates the indispensable nature of the services of the petitioner atleast for a period of 300 days. Against the order dated 19.9.2017 in WP No. 28527 of 2017, a writ appeal was preferred in WA No. 1549 of 2017. The Division Bench disposed of the appeal remanding the writ petition for fresh disposal and granting interim order. 19. The Counsel for the petitioner submits that the act of the respondents is de hors any power. The power of the respondents has to be traced to either the contract between the parties or to any statute. But the respondents' Counsel, except contending that due to the Technical Collaborator being not qualified, the petitioner would not be entitled for the charges as agreed under the first contract and hence, the rate which was agreed by the petitioner in the second contract was fixed for the first contract also. The argument only goes in support of arbitrary exercise of power. The argument of the petitioner's Counsel that less rate was agreed in the second contract as by that time expertise in GDS was gained by some of the companies and hence to stay in the competition, the petitioner had to reduce the rate. The situation existing as on the date of the first contract is that there was no one experienced in the process of GDS, which fact can be evidenced from the single tender that was received in that regard, which is that of the petitioner. The situation existing as on the date of the first contract is that there was no one experienced in the process of GDS, which fact can be evidenced from the single tender that was received in that regard, which is that of the petitioner. It is irrational to argue that the rate agreed by the petitioner in the second contract was taken as a basis to fix the rate in the first contract, as the Technical Collaborator of the petitioner was not found qualified. If the subsequent contractor was other than the petitioner, perhaps the respondents would not have had the aid of such an argument. The reasons for reduction of rate for the second contract are obvious. In a competitive world of commerce, the same person would gain different prices for the similar work, depending upon the level of competition, that he encounters. The two contracts of the respondents with the petitioner are two independent contracts. The terms of one contract cannot influence the change of terms of the other contract, which is already concluded between the parties. Services of the petitioner were availed without any adverse remark and hence the petitioner has to be paid as per the terms of the 1st contract. 20. Hence, in the above circumstances, this Court deems it fit to set aside the impugned notice dated 17.8.2017 reducing the rate per SCM. 21. In the result, the writ petition is allowed, setting aside the communication dated 17.8.2017 issued by the second respondent. 22. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending consideration if any in the writ petition shall stand closed.