JUDGMENT : B.R. Sarangi, J. 1. The petitioner, who was working as Deputy Director (Personnel and Administration) under the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission on probation, has filed this application to quash the order of his termination issued as per the terms of appointment and Regulation 17(d) of the OERC (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Service of Officers and Staff) Regulations, 1997 (hereinafter referred to "Regulations, 1997") dated 07.06.2016 under Annexure-10-A, and consequential notice dated 18.06.2016 published in the Odia daily "The Sarnaj" on 17.06.2016 under Annexure-10 communicating the said order of termination. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in hand, is that the Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission (OERC) is a Public Sector undertaking of Government of Odisha established under the Orissa Electricity Reform Act, 1995, as a part of the Reform Process in the State of Odisha. The Secretary, OERC-opposite party No. 2 issued an advertisement on 14.05.2015 inviting applications from eligible candidates for recruitment to the post of Deputy Director (Personnel and Administration). Pursuant to such advertisement, the petitioner, who was working as Associate Academic Administrator in International Institution of Information Technology (I.I.I.T.), applied for the post and on being shortlisted he was called, vide letter dated 23.06.2015, to appear at the interview before the selection board, along with certificates, on 23.07.2015. Consequent upon his selection, an office order was issued on 24.07.2015 appointing the petitioner as Deputy Director (Personnel and Administration) in the scale of pay of Rs. 15,600-39,100/- plus grade pay of Rs. 6,600/- with usual DA, as admissible to State Government employees, with a further condition that he will be on probation for a period of one year from the date of joining. On receipt of such appointment letter, the petitioner, having been relieved from his earlier employer, namely", I.I.I.T. on 27.07.2015, submitted his joining report on the very same day. Consequentially, vide letter "dated 19.08.2015, the petitioner was allowed to draw his basic pay and other allowances in: terms of his appointment letter from the date of his joining, i.e., on 27.07.2015. 2.1. As per the terms and conditions of the appointment letter, the petitioner was to remain on probation for a period of one year. Consequentially, vide letter "dated 19.08.2015, the petitioner was allowed to draw his basic pay and other allowances in: terms of his appointment letter from the date of his joining, i.e., on 27.07.2015. 2.1. As per the terms and conditions of the appointment letter, the petitioner was to remain on probation for a period of one year. While he was so continuing, he was issued with a letter by opposite party No. 2 on 11.05.2016 to the effect that arrangement in the room of the opposite party No. 3 was observed to be poor due to his poor monitoring and supervision of new office building which depicted his insincerity and lack of interest to work, and that he (opposite party No. 2) was directed to intimate the petitioner that the same would be recorded in his (petitioner's) performance report. In response to said letter dated 11.05.2016, the petitioner submitted a representation on 16.05.2016 to opposite party No. 2 that he was monitoring the shifting of the office related work and was inspecting the rooms of opposite parties No. 1, 3 and 4 and had taken necessary steps to keep the rooms in order. On receipt of such representation, opposite party No. 2, vide its letter dated 17.05.2016, intimated the petitioner that opposite party No. 3 was not happy on his performance, which he has to improve and gain confidence of the OERC. 2.2. After exchange of a series of letters and representations, ultimately on 07.06.2016, an office order was issued by opposite party No. 2 stating inter alia that OERC reviewed overall performance of the petitioner till that date and was of the considered view that his performance was not satisfactory and did not warrant any further continuance in the organization in the public interest. Therefore, in terms of the order of appointment and Regulation 17(d) of the Regulations, 1997, the services of the petitioner was terminated with immediate effect and in lieu of one month notice period, he was granted one month's salary. Though such order of termination dated 07.06.2016 was communicated to the petitioner, but for some reason or other the same could not be made sufficient, as the petitioner was continuing on leave. Therefore, the notice dated 17.06.2016 was published in Odia daily "The Samaj" on 18.06.2016 in Annexure-10. Hence this application. 3. Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. Therefore, the notice dated 17.06.2016 was published in Odia daily "The Samaj" on 18.06.2016 in Annexure-10. Hence this application. 3. Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. H.P. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner admitting the fact, that a probationer has no right to continue in a post, contended that if the order of termination casts stigma during the probation period the Court can interfere. It is further contended that if there is gross violation of statutory regulations, then the order of termination is to be quashed. His further contention is that as the order of termination indicates that it has been issued in the public interest, the Court is to lift the veil as to what public interest is involved so as to terminate the services of the petitioner, who was a probationer. Furthermore, as the order of termination during probation period casts stigma on the petitioner, the same cannot sustain in the eye of law. It is further contended that due to non-compliance of the Regulation 17(c) and (d) of the Regulations, 1997, the order of termination is liable to be quashed. If the action of the authority is mala fide, it goes into the root of the matter, therefore the order of termination cannot sustain, even though the same has been passed during the probation period. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the judgments in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 ; Jagdish Mitter v. The Union of India (UOI), AIR 1964 SC 449 ; Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, (1974) 2 SCC 831 ; Anoop Jaiswal v. Government of India, (1984) 2 SCC 369 ; Buddhadev Das v. The State of West Bengal, 99 CWN 797; A. Janardhan v. Chairman and Managing Director, CMC Ltd. 1997 (2) APLJ (HC) 318; Diptiprakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences Calcutta, (1999) 3 SCC 60 ; Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P., (2000) 5 SCC 152 ; V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab, (2000) 3 SCC 239 ; Pavanendra. Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences, (2002) 1 SCC 520 ; Canara Bank v. Debasis Das, (2003) 4 SCC 557 ; Union of India v. Mahaveer C. Singhvi, (2010) 8 SCC 220 ; Pradep Kumar v. Union of India (UOI), (2012) 13 SCC 182 ; and Registrar General High Court of Gujarat v. Jayashree Chamanlal Buddhbhatti, (2013) 16 SCC 59. 4. Mr. B. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the opposite parties contended that adhering to the regulation one H10IILh salary has been paid as compensation in lieu of one month notice, which the petitioner has acknowledged without any objection. Therefore, he is estopped from raising such question, at this point of time. It is further contended that though the petitioner was given several opportunities, by communicating letters under Annexures-5 and 6, he did not improve himself. Therefore, the consequential termination letter issued under Annexure-10-A IS well justified, and the petitioner, as a probationer, has no right to the post. Thereby, there is no need of compliance of principles of natural justice nor any opportunity is required to be given to the petitioner. He further contended that the impugned order is a termination simpliciter and does not cast any stigma on the petitioner. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medical Sciences, AIR 2002 SC 23 . 5. This Court heard Mr. A.K. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel appearing along with Mr. H.B. Dash learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. B. Mohapatra, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties. Pleadings having been exchanged between the parties and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 6. The facts discussed above are not in dispute. Admittedly, the petitioner was on probation when he was terminated from service. Reasons for such termination has been attempted to be explained in the counter affidavit stating inter alia that about 8 months had elapsed since the date of joining of the petitioner in the establishment of the opposite party No. 1, as such, it was legitimately expected that the petitioner should exhibit appropriate degree of administrative skill, loyalty, excellent verbal and written communication skills, willingness for hard work, maintenance of dignity becoming of the position and stature of Deputy Director (P&A). But it was revealed that the petitioner could not pick up knowledge of various Government Rules, Regulations, practices, more particularly the Electricity Act, 2003 and the Rules and Regulations made thereunder. The notings made by the petitioner in the files did not accurately reflect such knowledge, so much so, that his notings had, on occasions, required reference to Accounts Officer for the sake of clarity, even though the Accounts Officer IS equal In rank. Thereby, the petitioner was lacking administrative skills 'and clarity In verbal or written communication. As regards loyalty, the opposite party No. 1 found that the petitioner had defaulted in promptly carrying out the order of the Commission, which amounts to insubordination and indiscipline and gives rise to suspicion that the petitioner had a private agenda of his own. The allegations made against the petitioner are detailed below: "(i). That on 30.07.2015) the Opp. Party No. 1 had directed for treating the leave of Ms. P. Das as "leave on loss of pay" but the said office order was issued on 06.08.2015 by the petitioner without any reason. (ii). that on 18.12.2015 the Opp. Party No. 1 had directed absorption of Sri A.K. Jaqadev and be kept covered on OPTCL's pension scheme, but on 24.12.2015 the petitioner appears to be inserted a note in the file to the effect that the order of the Commission can wait and some gap can be maintained before sending the letter on absorption to OHPC, due to the fact that the opposite party No. 1 sought approval of extension of deputation period from OHPC on 12.11.2015 and got reply on 17.11.2015. (iii). that without getting the approval of the Opp. Party No. 1 the petitioner had introduced an imprest account of Rs. 8,000/- with his PA to meet daily petty expenses with effect from 22.09.2015 by taking approval of the then Opp. Party No. 2 without approval of the Opp. Party No. 1. (iv). The letter dt. 11.5.2016 (not memo) of the Secretary 1/c was written to petitioner as per written instruction dt. 11.5.2016 (copy enclosed) of the commission. Since the petitioner wrote a representation dt. 16.05.2016 (in reply to the Secretary I/c letter dt. 11.5.2016), though no explanation was called for, the petitioner was intimated vide Secy, I/c letter dt. 17.8.2016 about the actual position. He was advised to improve performance and gain the confidence of the Commission. 11.5.2016 (copy enclosed) of the commission. Since the petitioner wrote a representation dt. 16.05.2016 (in reply to the Secretary I/c letter dt. 11.5.2016), though no explanation was called for, the petitioner was intimated vide Secy, I/c letter dt. 17.8.2016 about the actual position. He was advised to improve performance and gain the confidence of the Commission. As regards the annoyance of almost all the staffs with the petitioner, he had verbally admitted before the Secretary I/c that he-was not able to meet the official requirement of the office and hence almost all the officers/staff were annoyed with him. Without actually showing physical improvement of performance, the petitioner vide letter dt. 23.5.2016 wrote back that he had improved with an example that he had instructed the A.C. agency vide letter dt. 12.5.2016 to complete the job by 14.5.2016. Incidentally the same work was not complete even on 23.05.2016. This shows his perfunctory attitude." In reply to the above allegations, the petitioner submitted his representation, but the same was not considered. Thereafter, on 11.05.2016 communication was made by the Secretary I/c to the following effect: "It is observed that the arrangement in the room of Member (D) is poor due to your poor monitoring and supervision of the new building, depicting your insincerity and lack of interest to work, I am directed to intimate you that the above shall be recorded in your performance report." The petitioner also replied by way of representation In Annexure-6 dated 16.05.2016, but the Secretary I/c on 17.05.2016 in Annexure-7 communicated to the petitioner to the following effect: "In your representation, you have stated that the undersigned and Member(D) are not happy relating to room arrangement of Member(D). In this connection, 1 am to say the letter under reference (1) was issued under the instruction of the Commission. You have also admitted verbally that most of the officers and staffs are annoyed with your performance. Hence instead of making representation, it shall be better if you improve your performance and gain the confidence of the Commission." 7. The cumulative effect of findings referred to above clearly indicates that during probation period the opposite parties, having not satisfied with the performance of the petitioner, took action on 07.06.2016, vide Annexure-10-A, by passing order to the following effect: "Sri Ashok Kumar Nayak was appointed as Dy Director (P & A), OERC vide OERC No. 884 dt. 24.07.2015. The cumulative effect of findings referred to above clearly indicates that during probation period the opposite parties, having not satisfied with the performance of the petitioner, took action on 07.06.2016, vide Annexure-10-A, by passing order to the following effect: "Sri Ashok Kumar Nayak was appointed as Dy Director (P & A), OERC vide OERC No. 884 dt. 24.07.2015. He joined OERC on 27.07.2015. The term of appointment was that he shall remain on probation for a period of one year from the date of joining and the appointment is purely temporary and terminable at any time with a month's notice without any compensation. The Commission has reviewed his overall performance till date with the Commission and is of the considered view that his performance is not satisfactory and does not warrant any further continuation in the organization in public interest. Therefore as per the terms of the order of the appointment and Regulation 17(d) of the OERC (Method of Recruitment and Conditions of Services of Officers and Staff) Regulations (1997) appointment of Sri Ashok Kumar Nayak as Dy. Director (P & A) stands terminated with immediate effect. In lieu of the one month notice period, he is granted one month's salary. He is directed to hand over charge of Sri P.K. Tripathy, Accounts Officer with immediate effect." 8. The aforementioned order dated 07.06.2016 under Annexure-10-A was not communicated to the petitioner. The reason for termination assigned in such order indicates that the Commission had reviewed his overall performance and was of the considered view that his performance was not satisfactory and did not warrant any further continuation in the organization in public interest. But it has not been indicated what public interest was involved in the performance of the petitioner, nor has any opportunity been given to the petitioner to improve his performance. Furthermore, in terms of the appointment, the petitioner has to remain on probation for a period of one year from the date of joining and his appointment is purely temporary and terminable at any time with a month's notice "without any compensation. But the authority, while issuing the order impugned dated 07.06.2016 as per the terms of the order of the appointment and Regulation 17(d) of the Regulations, 1997, terminated the services of the petitioner with immediate effect and in lieu of one month notice period is granted one month's salary. But the authority, while issuing the order impugned dated 07.06.2016 as per the terms of the order of the appointment and Regulation 17(d) of the Regulations, 1997, terminated the services of the petitioner with immediate effect and in lieu of one month notice period is granted one month's salary. In one hand the impugned office order indicates that reliance has been placed on the terms and conditions of the appointment order issued in favour of the petitioner, but on the other hand the appointment order clearly indicates that he shall remain on probation for a period of one year from the date of joining and also the appointment is purely temporary and terminable at any time with a month's notice and without any compensation. But notice of one month has not been given to the petitioner, rather his service has been terminated by granting one month salary in lieu of one month notice period, which is contrary to the terms of the appointment issued in favour of the petitioner. The sequence of events clearly indicates that the authorities are after the petitioner for some reason and other and the termination itself during probation period is construed to be a punitive one which casts stigma than that of termination simpliciter. 9. The contention raised that one month notice pay, having been transmitted to the accounts of the petitioner and he having acknowledged the same, he is estopped to challenge such termination, cannot have any justification, in view of the fact that if in terms of engagement, which clearly indicates that the petitioner is entitled to get one month notice during probation period, without paying any compensation and transmitting the same to the accounts of the petitioner, cannot cure the terms of appointment issued in favour of the petitioner, therefore terms and conditions cannot be modified taking recourse to the Regulation 17(d) of the Regulations, 1997. In lieu of one month notice period, one month salary has been granted as compensation. Mere reference to Regulation 17(d) In the impugned office order cannot satisfy the requirement rather, it shall be construed to be contrary to the said regulation by which one month salary has been transmitted to the petitioner's account. 10. For better appreciation, the provisions contained in Regulation 17 of Regulations, 1997, which deal with probation, are reproduced hereunder: "17(a). Mere reference to Regulation 17(d) In the impugned office order cannot satisfy the requirement rather, it shall be construed to be contrary to the said regulation by which one month salary has been transmitted to the petitioner's account. 10. For better appreciation, the provisions contained in Regulation 17 of Regulations, 1997, which deal with probation, are reproduced hereunder: "17(a). All the direct recruits shall be on probation for a period of one year from the date of their joining. 17(b). The period of probation shall not include the following: (i) the period spent on Earned Leave, Extraordinary Leave and the Medical Leave availed during the period of Probation; and (ii) the period of unauthorised absence and the period held not to be on duty by the Commission. 17(c). The Commission may extend the period of probation for a maximum period of one year in one or more instalments if in the opinion of the Commission on the performance of the probationer has not been found up to its satisfaction. 17(d). The commission may dispense with the services of a probationer after giving him/her a month's notice and the probationer shall not be entitled to any compensation for the termination. 17(e). If a person is serving in the Government of Orissa or the Public Sector Undertakings of Government of Orissa and is selected for appointment in the Commission, he/she shall be allowed to keep his/her lien over the post in the Government/Public Sector Undertakings till his confirmation in the Commission." A perusal of aforementioned provisions of Regulation 17(d) of Regulations, 1997 would clearly reveal that the Commission may dispense with the services of a probationer, after giving him/her a month's notice, and the probationer shall not be entitled to any compensation for the termination. Therefore, the terms and conditions prescribed in the appointment letter is in consonance with Regulation 17(d) of Regulations, 1997. But by misconstruing the provisions contained in Regulation 17(d) of Regulations, 1997, one month's, salary has been transmitted to the account of the petitioner and it is contended that since the petitioner has accepted such compensation amount he is estopped to raise such contention, which IS absolutely misconceived and cannot be accepted. 11. Very often an appointment is initially made on probation. 11. Very often an appointment is initially made on probation. In Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 494 , the reason as to why a period of probation is prescribed has been elaborately discussed by the Supreme Court. The apex Court explained that the concept of probation acquired importance in the developing master servant relation in public service where it became difficult for the employer to dispense with the services of an employee without following certain procedural safeguards like natural justice etc. The apex Court held as follows: "To guard against errors of human judgment in selecting suitable personnel for service, the new recruit was put on test for a period before he is absorbed in service or gets a right to take post. Period of probation gave a sort of locus poenitentiae to the employer to observe the work, ability, efficient sincerity and competence of the servant and if he is found not suitable for the post, the master reserved a right to dispense with his service without anything more during or at the end of the prescribed period which is styled as period or probation." In Purshotam Lal Dingra (supra), the concept of probation has been enunciated as follows: "An appointment to a permanent post in Government Service on probation means, as in the case of a personnel appointed by a private employer, that the servant so appointed is taken on trial." In Ajit Singh (supra) it is well settled that generally a probationer does not acquire any substantive right to the post and cannot complain if his service is terminated at any time during the probationary period i.e. before confirmation. Similar view has also been taken in State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691 and in State of Punjab v. Sukhwinder Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 569 : AIR 2005 SC 2960 . It has also been clarified in Purshotam. Lal Dingra (supra) that a probationary appointment is, by its very nature, of a transitory character and in the absence of any special contract or special rule regulating the condition of service, the implied term of such appointment is that it is terminable at any time. In Union of India v. Raj Kumar Gupta, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 607, the apex Court held that a probationer right to continue will arise only on confirmation. 12. In Union of India v. Raj Kumar Gupta, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 607, the apex Court held that a probationer right to continue will arise only on confirmation. 12. In Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1977) 1 LLJ 1 (SC), the apex Court held that 'Probation' means 'trial' and a probationer is an employee' who has been provisionally employed to fill a permanent vacancy and whose probation, i.e. fitness for the post, has not been confirmed or declared. The concept of 'fitness' for the post includes three main ingredients, viz., performance or productivity, discipline or conduct and attendance. Therefore, 'Probation' means testing of a person's capacity, conduct or character especially before he is admitted to regular employment or full membership or some organization. 13. In State of Orissa v. Narayan, AIR 1961 SC 177 , the apex Court held that a probationer comes under the class of Government servants who have been appointed on trial and who have no right to hold the post, unless they are confirmed. 14. In Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1711 , the apex Court held that a servant appointed on probation continues to hold that status, unless he is discharged or confirmed. Similar view has also been taken in Ranendra v. Union of India, AIR 1963 SC 1552 . 15. Keeping in view the law discussed above it has also been seen that the transitory character of probationary appointment carried with it by necessary implication the consequence that it is terminable at any time. The law laid down by the apex Court in Purshotam Lal Dingra (supra) which was subsequently followed in catena of judgments, wherein. It has been held that a probationer whose services have been terminated for unsuitability for the job cannot complain about such termination and such a termination has been judicially labeled as simpliciter termination. 16. The law laid down by the apex Court in Purshotam Lal Dingra (supra) which was subsequently followed in catena of judgments, wherein. It has been held that a probationer whose services have been terminated for unsuitability for the job cannot complain about such termination and such a termination has been judicially labeled as simpliciter termination. 16. In Kunwar Arun Kumar v. U.P. Hill Electronics Corporation Ltd. 1997 (1) SLR 136 (SC) the apex Court held that during the period of probation, the authorities are entitled to assess the suitability of a candidate and if it is found that the candidates is not suitability to remain in service they, are entitled to record a finding of unsatisfactory performance of the work and duties during the period of probation and, for this purpose, the performance of the probationer has to be looked into and if the findings is that the performance has been unsatisfactory then the employer would be entitled to terminate the services of the probationer without conducting any enquiry. As such, no opportunity of hearing is required to be given to probationer for dismissal during probationary period and therefore, question of violation of natural justice does not arise in view of the law laid down by the apex Court in Om Prakash Mann v. Director of Education (Basic) (2006) 5 SCC 89. Reference made to the judgment of the apex Court in Jagdish Mitter, Samsher Singh, A. Janardhan. Chandra Prakash Sahahi and Registrar General, High Court of Gujarat mentioned supra have been decided on their own facts and circumstances, which have no application to the present context. 17. In Anoop jaiswal (supra), the apex Court held that termination of probationer can be scrutinized by the Court by doing behind the formal order of discharge to find the real cause of action and the simple order of discharge of probationer on ground of unsuitability passed before completion of his probation period, which is actually based upon report/recommendation of the concerned authority indicating commission of alleged misconduct by the probationer being 3 punitive one, which the Court should come to a conclusion it is in violation of Article 311 of Constitution of India. But the said question does not arise in view of the fact that the petitioner's performance was not satisfactory on various grounds and on eight months of continuance of the probationer, the performance has been observed. But the said question does not arise in view of the fact that the petitioner's performance was not satisfactory on various grounds and on eight months of continuance of the probationer, the performance has been observed. Accordingly, the authority having not satisfied with the performance passed the impugned order. 18. In Diptiprakash Banerjee (Supra) termination of service of a probationer has been taken in consideration on the basis of the allegation made against him, where the apex Court held whether 'foundation' or 'motive' for such termination is to be examined and if the allegation against the probationer held, the foundation and not mere motive for his termination/no enquiry conducted, therefore, the apex Court held that termination is held to be bad. Thus, on the basis of the facts mentioned above, it is to be examined the foundation and motive behind the order of termination issued in favour of the petitioner. This Court, after lifting the veil, found that the order of termination cannot sustain in the eye of law. 19. In V.P. Ahuja (supra), the apex Court held that probationer is like a temporary servant and is entitled to certain protection. As such, his services cannot be terminated arbitrarily or punitively 'without complying with the principles of natural justice. The petitioner's service has been terminated during probation period invoking terms and conditions of his appointment 'which provided one month's notice, but without complying with the same by paying one month's notice pay, he has been terminated from service. More so, termination order itself indicates that his performance was not satisfactory and did not warrant further continuance in the organization in the public interest, but what public interest is required to be safeguard has not been indicated. Therefore, the said office order dated 07.06.2016 can be termed as stigmatic and punitive one. 20. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra), the apex Court held that the statements made in counter affidavit of the employer could not be invoked to invalidate a valid order of termination of service. Essentially the office order has to be adjudged on its face and determined the termination. 20. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma (supra), the apex Court held that the statements made in counter affidavit of the employer could not be invoked to invalidate a valid order of termination of service. Essentially the office order has to be adjudged on its face and determined the termination. As it appears, the impugned office order dated 07.06.2016 in Annexure-10-A does not speak anything except that the Commission reviewed his overall performance and was of the considered view that his performance was not satisfactory and did not warrant any further continuance in the organization in public interest, which they have explained in the counter affidavit, which is not permissible. Therefore, the order dated 07.06.2016 in Annexure-10-A terminating the services of the petitioner, who was on probation, cannot be allowed to stand. 21. In view of the facts and circumstances as well as the law discussed above, this Court is of the considered view that the office order dated 07.06.2016 in Annexure-10-A, basing upon which notice dated 17.06.2016 was published in Odia daily "The Samaj" on 18.06.2016 In Annexure-10, terminating the services of the petitioner, while he was on probation, cannot sustain, in view of the fact that the same had been issued in violation of the terms of appointment and also Regulation 17(d) of the Regulations, 1997, and otherwise also the law laid down by the apex Court, as discussed above, to the extent of lifting the veil and examining the foundation and motive behind such order. Accordingly, the same are liable to be quashed and are hereby quashed. Consequentially, the petitioner shall be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits, as admissible to him in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of communication of this judgment 22. The writ application is thus allowed. No order to costs.