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2019 DIGILAW 33 (UTT)

Lord Mahadev Trust v. State of Uttarakhand

2019-01-08

ALOK SINGH, RAMESH RANGANATHAN

body2019
JUDGMENT : Ramesh Ranganathan, J. This appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1131 of 2007 dated 02.05.2012. The appellant herein filed the said writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the notification and declaration dated 20.05.2003 and 16.06.2003 respectively issued by the first respondent; and a writ of mandamus to direct the respondents to hand over possession of the property to them, and not to create any hindrance in their smooth and peaceful possession of the subject property. 2. Facts, to the extent necessary, are that the appellant-writ petitioner is a registered Trust created on 30.05.1997. It purchased House No. 23, Lakshmi Road, Dehradun which was mutated in its name vide order dated 01.12.1999. It is the appellant-writ petitioner’s case that, since they are engaged in providing and promoting educational activities, and were running the Rai University, they had purchased the subject property at Lakshmi Road, of an extent of 4061.33 Sq. Meters, on 01.04.1999 by way of a registered sale deed for Rs. 50.00 lakhs; they had paid Rs. 5.00 lakhs for registration of the said property; the subject land was purchased for running a software training institute, and for starting a new technical institution offering diploma or under graduate degree courses; the All India Council for Technical Education, by its proceedings dated 06.07.2000, rejected their request for grant of approval to run the aforesaid courses for the academic year 2000-01; they were informed that their application could be considered for the subsequent year 2001-02, and they should furnish the required information by 18.08.2000; while matters stood thus, the State of Uttaranchal was formed on 09.11.2000, pursuant to the U.P. Reorganisation Act, 2000, with Dehradun as the capital of the State; on the respondents requisitioning the subject property, the appellant-writ petitioner filed Writ Petition (M/B) 165 of 2002 challenging the said requisition; and this Court, by order dated 06.05.2003, directed the respondents either to hand over possession of the property to the appellant-writ petitioner within 10 days or to acquire the same under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the “1894 Act”). 3. 3. Pursuant to the directions of this Court, in Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002 dated 06.05.2003, a notification was issued on 20.05.2003 under Section 4 of the 1894 Act, and the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the said Act was invoked dispensing with the requirement of Section 5-A of the said Act. Thereafter a declaration was issued, under Section 6 of the 1894 Act, on 16.06.2003. It is these proceedings dated 20.05.2003 (whereby a notification under Section 4(1) read with Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act was issued), and the subsequent declaration issued under Section 6 of the 1894 Act dated 16.06.2003, which were subjected to challenge in Writ Petition (M/B) No. 607 of 2003 which was later renumbered as Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1131 of 2007. 4. In the counter affidavit filed before the learned Single Judge, the respondents contended that the department took possession of the building on 14.05.2001 after completing all legal formalities; several offices, under the control of the Finance Department, were running thereat; the subject property was previously requisitioned under Section 3 of the U.P. Accommodation and Requisition Act, 1947 ( the “1947 Act” for short); in view of the directions of this Court, in Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002 dated 06.05.2003, proceedings were initiated for acquisition of the subject land; a request for acquisition of the subject land was made by the Director, Treasury and Finance Services, Uttaranchal, Dehradun, by his letter dated 08.05.2003; the Special Land Acquisition Officer, Dehradun informed the Director, Treasury and Finance Service, Uttaranchal, Dehradun to deposit 10 per cent of the total estimated cost; Rs. 10.00 Lakhs was consequently deposited; thereafter the District Magistrate issued proceedings, under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the 1894 Act, as the acquisition was in public interest; the subject property was in a dilapidated condition, and was lying vacant and unused; hence a notice to this effect was issued, which was published in the newspaper, and was also notified in the Gazette; thereafter notices were issued under Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the 1894 Act, and were published in accordance with the rules made thereunder; use of the building, for the offices of the finance department, is in public interest; and, as there was an urgency to acquire the property, adopting the procedure under Section 17 (4) of the 1894 Act cannot be said to be illegal. 5. In reply thereto the appellant-writ petitioner, in its rejoinder affidavit, contended that, for the purpose of locating a public office, the authorities could have confined the acquisition only to the subject premises; it was not necessary to acquire the entire land; acquisition of the entire land by the State was illegal, and contrary to the provisions of the 1894 Act; and, in view of Section 3(f) of the 1894 Act, the legislature lacked power to acquire open land for locating a public office. 6. A supplementary affidavit was filed by the respondents stating that the land was acquired for the public purpose of establishing Government offices in view of the acute scarcity of accommodation, for Government offices and officers, at Dehradun. 7. 6. A supplementary affidavit was filed by the respondents stating that the land was acquired for the public purpose of establishing Government offices in view of the acute scarcity of accommodation, for Government offices and officers, at Dehradun. 7. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge, after referring to several judgments cited on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner and on behalf of the respondents, observed that the subject property was already in the use of the State Government ever since May, 2001; this fact was not disputed by the parties; the subject property was previously requisitioned under Section 3 of the 1947 Act; possession of the State Government, over the disputed property, was established; government offices were functioning in the subject building; after creation of the State of Uttaranchal, Dehradun was declared as the provisional capital of the State; the subject property was acquired for the use of offices under the control of the Finance Department, and these offices were functioning in the subject building; while it was contended by the appellant-writ petitioner that they intended to run educational institutions in the subject building, the contention urged on behalf of the respondent-State was that there were many educational institutions at Dehradun, and there was acute shortage of accommodation for creation of government offices for the State of Uttarakhand; and there was real urgency to acquire the subject land. 8. The learned Single Judge observed that requisition of the subject land was in public interest; while the appellant-writ petitioner had educational institutions at Delhi and at other places, and wanted to open a new technical institute at Dehradun, opening of public offices, after creation of the new State, had greater importance and was more beneficial to the public at large; the State Government had acquired the subject land to locate various offices functioning under the control of the Finance Department; and the acquisition was in public interest. 9. 9. On the question whether there was any urgency necessitating invocation of the provisions of Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act, or whether the urgency clause was invoked on non-existent facts or on non-application of mind or on the ground of malafides, the learned Single Judge observed that the State had taken possession of the disputed building in the year 2001; it was earlier requisitioned under the provisions of the 1947 Act; the appellant-writ petitioner had challenged the said requisition filing Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002; there was a threat, on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner, for possession of the State offices, located in the subject property, being taken; this Court had, by its order in Writ Petition (M/B) No.165 of 2002 dated 06.05.2003, directed the respondents either to hand over possession of the disputed property within 10 days or to acquire the same under the 1894 Act; in such circumstances, the State had issued a notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act, invoking the provisions of Section 17(4) thereof, dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act; it could not, therefore, be said that there was no real and genuine need to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act; and, in case the property in question was not acquired, the State was obligated to hand over its possession, to the appellant-writ petitioner, as per the directions of this Court in Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002. 10. The learned Single Judge, thereafter, noted the submission of the learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State that, after acquiring the subject property, the State has spent Rs. 1,51,79,000/-for construction of office buildings of the Director, Treasury and Finance Services; a further sum of Rs. 53,35,000/-was spent for the construction of offices of the Director, Accounts & Entitlement; and a sum of Rs. 4,23,63,000/-was spent for the Commercial Tax Department. 11. 1,51,79,000/-for construction of office buildings of the Director, Treasury and Finance Services; a further sum of Rs. 53,35,000/-was spent for the construction of offices of the Director, Accounts & Entitlement; and a sum of Rs. 4,23,63,000/-was spent for the Commercial Tax Department. 11. After relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anand Singh and another V/s State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2010) 11 SCC 242 , the learned Single Judge observed that the facts of the case on hand were almost identical to the case in Anand Singh (2010) 11 SCC 242 ; an award had been made, and the State has spent a sum in excess of Rs. 6.00 crores for construction of government offices; and, the appellant-writ petitioner was, therefore, not entitled to any relief even if it was presumed that dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A was not justified. 12. 6.00 crores for construction of government offices; and, the appellant-writ petitioner was, therefore, not entitled to any relief even if it was presumed that dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A was not justified. 12. The learned Single Judge, thereafter, opined that existence, and the extent, of urgency was a matter in the subjective satisfaction of the Government; it was not open to courts to examine the propriety or correctness of the satisfaction by scrutinizing the same as an appellate court; the power of the Court was confined only to grounds that the decision was taken on non-existent facts or because of non-application of mind or that it was vitiated by malafides; the present case was not a case of non-existent facts or non-application of mind or malafide intention; the contention, urged on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner, was that the acquisition was made on the dictates of the Director, Koshagar Evam Vitta Sevayen Uttaranchal; the said letter dated 08.05.2003 shows that the Director had requested the Collector to acquire the subject property looking at the real and genuine urgency of the need for a building to locate the public offices under his control; the request of the Director could not be said to be a dictate to the Collector, as the Collector was the acquiring authority of the District on behalf of the State; the subject building was in a dilapidated condition, and when the State Government took possession it was in a vacant state; the State had to acquire the subject land on the directions of the Court, and as urgency was felt for acquiring the subject property; the decision to invoke the urgency clause, and to dispense with the Section 5-A enquiry, was taken on proper material and in an objective manner; the urgency was to open offices, for the newly formed State, on the subject property; it could not be said that the opinion was based on no facts or on irrelevant facts; and it was evident that there was proper application of mind. 13. 13. On the appellant-writ petitioner’s contention that the subject land could not be acquired, in view of Section 3(f) of the 1894 Act, the learned Single Judge observed that clause (viii) of Section 3(f) could not be read in isolation, but should be read along with Section 3(a) of the 1894 Act which defines ‘land’; the expression “land” includes benefits arising out of land, and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth; land can be acquired, along with a dwelling house standing on it, in terms of Section 3(a) of the 1894 Act; the State had acquired the disputed property in the interest of the public at large; and there was real and substantive urgency warranting invocation of the urgency clause, and dispensing with an enquiry under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act. 14. The learned Single Judge further observed that since this Court had, in its order in Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002, directed the State to hand over possession of the property within 10 days or to acquire the same, the urgency clause was, therefore, invoked in view of the fact that, if the land was not acquired within 10 days, the State would be liable to be evicted from its possession of the property; the appellant-writ petitioner’s contention that, since the State was in possession, there was no need to invoke the urgency clause, and to dispense with the enquiry, could not be accepted; the appellant-writ petitioner had failed to establish non-existence of facts or non-application of mind or that acquisition of the subject property was vitiated by malafides; and the appellant-writ petitioner was not entitled for the relief sought for in the writ petition. The writ petition was, accordingly, dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal. 15. The writ petition was, accordingly, dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal. 15. Before us Sri Avtar Singh Rawat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner, would submit that the right of a land owner to file his objections, in an enquiry under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act, is a substantive right; it is open to a land owner to raise objections in the Section 5-A enquiry to the acquisition made pursuant to the notifications issued under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act; as invocation of the urgency clause, under Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act, deprives a land owner of his/her valuable right of filing objections under Section 5-A, it is only in exceptional circumstances and in cases of genuine urgency, could the urgency clause, under Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act, have been invoked depriving the appellant-writ petitioner of its right to submit objections in an enquiry under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act; in the present case, it is not in dispute that possession of the subject land was already taken by the State on 14.05.2001; as the respondents were in possession of the subject land, even before a notification was issued under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act on 20.05.2003, there was no need for them to invoke Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act, and avoid an enquiry under Section 5-A thereof; the order of this Court in Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002 dated 06.05.2003 only required the respondents to acquire the land within ten days; acquisition of land would only mean issuance of a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act; as the appellant-writ petitioner could only have sought for delivery of the subject land, by filing a suit before the competent civil court, there was no need for the respondents to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the Act, or to dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act; since the appellant-writ petitioner has a substantive right to file its objections under Section 5-A, and as it is evident that dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A by invoking the urgency clause under Section 17 (4) is illegal, the declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act dated 16.06.2003 should be set aside, and the respondent-State should be directed to conduct a Section 5-A enquiry in accordance with law; the respondents failed to notice that the directions issued by the Court, in Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002 dated 06.05.2003, were to either hand over possession of the subject land to the appellant-writ petitioner or to proceed with the acquisition under the 1894 Act; this only meant that a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was required to be issued within ten days of the order, and not to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the said Act; the fact that, despite lack of urgency, the enquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with, would disclose non-application of mind on the part of the respondents; this would suffice to set aside the declaration under Section 6 of the 1894 Act; and the learned Single Judge had erred in not considering these facts, and in rejecting the appellant-writ petitioner’s request for the Section 6 declaration to be set aside. 16. Learned Senior Counsel would rely on Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (2012) 11 SCC 370 ; Radhy Shyam and others Vs.State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2011) 5 SCC 553 ; and Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of Haryana and others (2012) 1 SCC 792 . 17. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (2012) 11 SCC 370 ; Radhy Shyam and others Vs.State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2011) 5 SCC 553 ; and Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of Haryana and others (2012) 1 SCC 792 . 17. On the other hand Sri J.P. Joshi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State of Uttarakhand, would seek to justify the action of the respondents, and would submit that possession of the subject land was taken under the 1947 Act on 14.05.2001, long before an order was passed by this Court in Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002 dated 06.05.2003; the order of this Court dated 06.05.2003 required the respondents to proceed with acquisition of the subject land; buildings had already been constructed on the subject land by the respondents by then; their existed the possibility of this Court directing delivery of possession, since Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002 was still pending, and was disposed of later by order dated 08.07.2003; the respondents, therefore, had no choice but to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act to take possession of the subject land; an award was passed on 17.02.2004 more than 8 years before the order under appeal was passed by the learned Single Judge; the appellant-writ petitioner was also offered compensation in terms of the award; nothing prevented the appellant-writ petitioner, if they were so aggrieved, from seeking a reference under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, and in approaching the reference court seeking enhancement of compensation; as they failed to do so, it would be wholly inappropriate at this distance of time, (since nearly 15 years have elapsed since the award was passed on 17.02.2004), to interfere with the acquisition proceedings; the appellant-writ petitioner has not even chosen to challenge the validity of the award either by way of a subsequent writ petition, or by seeking amendment of the prayers sought for in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1131 of 2007; and it would be wholly inequitable for this Court to now accede to the appellant-writ petitioner’s request for the Section 6 declaration to be set aside, more than 15 years after it was issued on 16.06.2003, as its consequence would be that the award would then be required to be set aside, the acquisition proceedings under Section 4(1) would lapse (in view of Section 11A of the 1894 Act), and the respondents would now be required to initiate proceedings afresh under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the “2013 Act” for short). 18. As noted hereinabove, the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction of this Court, filing Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1131 of 2007, seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the Section 4(1) notification dated 20.05.2003 and the Section 6 declaration dated 16.06.2003, among others, on the ground that the urgency clause in Section 17(4) ought not to have been invoked, and the enquiry under Section 5-A ought not to have been dispensed with. Section 4 of the 1894 Act enabled the appropriate Government or the Collector, whenever it appeared to them that land in any locality was needed for any public purpose, to issue a notification to that effect, and to cause it to be published in the official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one should be in the regional language; and, except in the case of any land to which, by virtue of a direction of the State Government under Section 17 (4), the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at a convenient place in such locality. 19. Section 5-A of the 1894 Act relates to hearing of objections and, under sub-section (1) thereof, any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4 (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose, may, within thirty days from the date of publication of the notification, object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in that locality, as the case may be. Section 5-A (2) of the 1894 Act stipulated that every objection under Section 5-A (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector an opportunity of being heard (in person or by any person authorized by him in this behalf or by pleader) and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any as he thinks necessary, make a report in respect of the land which has been notified under Section 4(1) to the appropriate Government, containing his recommendations on the objections, together with the record of the proceedings held by him, for the decision of that Government. Section 6 of the 1894 Act related to a declaration that the land is required for a public purpose and, subsection (1) thereof, stipulated that, subject to the provision of Part VII of the Act, when the appropriate Government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or some officer duly authorized to certify such orders. 20. The power of eminent domain is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate property belonging to citizens for public use. To put it differently, the sovereign is entitled to reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the State including private property without its owner’s consent, provided that such assertion is on account of public exigency and for public good. (Prabhawati and (2014)13 SCC 721 others Vs. State of Bihar and others; Dev Sharan v. State of U.P. (2011) 4 SCC 769 ; Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P. (2011) 5 SCC 553 ; Devender Kumar Tyagi and others v. State of U.P. and others (2011) 9 SCC 164 ; Dwarkadas Shrinivas Vs. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd. AIR (1954) SC 119; Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri Vs. Union of India AIR (1951) SC 41; and Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar Vs. State of Gujarat (1995) Supp. (1) SCC 596). Though, in exercise of the power of eminent domain, the Government can acquire private property for a public purpose, it must be remembered that compulsory taking of one’s property is a serious matter. (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Dev Sharan Vs. State of U.P. (2011) 4 SCC 769 ; Radhy Shyam Vs. State of U.P. (2011) 5 SCC 553 , and Devender Kumar Tyagi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, (2011) 9 SCC 164 ). Legislations, which provide for compulsory acquisition of private property by the State, fall in the category of expropriatory legislation and must be construed strictly (DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust Vs. State of Haryana (2003) 5 SCC 622 ; State of Maharashtra Vs. B.E. Billimoria, (2003) 7 SCC 336 ; Prabhawati and others Vs. Legislations, which provide for compulsory acquisition of private property by the State, fall in the category of expropriatory legislation and must be construed strictly (DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust Vs. State of Haryana (2003) 5 SCC 622 ; State of Maharashtra Vs. B.E. Billimoria, (2003) 7 SCC 336 ; Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Dev Sharan v. State of U.P. (2011) 4 SCC 769 ; Radhy Shyam v. State of U.P. (2011) 5 SCC 553 , and Devender Kumar Tyagi and others v. State of U.P. and others (2011) 9 SCC 164 . 21. The property of a citizen cannot be acquired by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities without complying with the mandate of Sections 4, 5-A and 6 of the Act. A public purpose, however laudable it may be, does not entitle the State to invoke the urgency provisions as it has the effect of depriving the owner of his right to the property without being heard. Only in case of real urgency can the State invoke the urgency provisions and dispense with the requirement of hearing the land owner or other interested persons. (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Dev Sharan Vs. State of U.P. (2011) 4 SCC 769 ; Radhy Shyam Vs. State of U.P. (2011) 5 SCC 553 , and Devender Kumar Tyagi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others (2011) 9 SCC 164 . 22. Section 5-A confers a valuable right on the land owner. When the Government proceeds for compulsory acquisition of a particular property for a public purpose, the only right that the owner, or the person interested in the property, has, is to submit his objections within the prescribed time under Section 5-A of the Act, and persuade the State authorities to drop acquisition of that particular land by setting forth the reasons such as the unsuitability of the land for the stated public purpose, the grave hardship that may be caused to him by such expropriation, availability of alternative land for achieving the public purpose etc. Moreover the right conferred on the owner, or the person interested to file objections to the proposed acquisition is not only an important and valuable right, but also makes the provision for compulsory acquisition just and in conformity with the fundamental principles of natural justice. Moreover the right conferred on the owner, or the person interested to file objections to the proposed acquisition is not only an important and valuable right, but also makes the provision for compulsory acquisition just and in conformity with the fundamental principles of natural justice. (Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (2012) 11 SCC 370 ; Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2010) 11 SCC 242 ; Raja Anand Brahma Shah Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1967 SC 1081 ; Jage Ram Vs. State of Haryana (1971) 3 SCR 871 ; Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 1 SCC 133 ; State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 ; Deepak Pahwa Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1984) 4 SCC 308 ; State of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi (1986) 4 SCC 251 ; Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. Shri Kishan (1993) 2 SCC 84 ; Chameli Singh Vs. State of U.P. (1996) 2 SCC 549 ; Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satbir Singh (1996) 11 SCC 462 ; Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (1998) 6 SCC 1 ; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627 ; Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi Vs. State of Karnataka (2008) 12 SCC 418 ; Babu Ram Vs. State of Haryana (2009) 10 SCC 115 and; Tika Ram Vs. State of U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689 ). 23. The rules of natural justice have been ingrained in the scheme of Section 5-A with a view to ensure that, before any person is deprived of his land by way of compulsory acquisition, he must get an opportunity to oppose the decision of the State Government and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to acquire the particular parcel of land. At the hearing, the objector can make an effort to convince the Land Acquisition Collector to make his recommendations against the acquisition of his land. He can also point out that the land, proposed to be acquired, is not suitable for the purpose specified in the notification issued under Section 4(1). Not only this, he can produce evidence to show that another piece of land is available, and the same can be utilised for execution of the particular project or scheme. (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. Not only this, he can produce evidence to show that another piece of land is available, and the same can be utilised for execution of the particular project or scheme. (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792 ; Munshi Singh Vs. Union of India (1973) 2 SCC 337 ; State of Punjab Vs. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 ; Shyam Nandan Prasad Vs. State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255 ; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans (2004) 8 SCC 14 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627 and Anand Singh Vs. State of U.P. (2010) 11 SCC 242 ). 24. The Collector should give a fair opportunity of hearing to the objector, and objectively consider his plea against the acquisition of land. Only, thereafter, should he make recommendations, supported by brief reasons, as to why the particular piece of land should or should not be acquired, and whether or not the plea put forward by the objector merits acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made by the Collector must reflect objective application of mind to the objections filed by the land owners and other interested persons. (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Raghbir Singh Sehrawat Vs. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792 ; Munshi Singh Vs. Union of India (1973) 2 SCC 337 ; State of Punjab Vs. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 ; Shyam Nandan Prasad Vs. State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255 ; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans (2004) 8 SCC 14 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627 and Anand Singh Vs. State of U.P. (2010) 11 SCC 242 ). 25. Use of the power of invoking the urgency clause, and dispensation of enquiry under Section 5-A by the Government, in a routine manner and thereby depriving the owner or person interested of a very valuable right under Section 5-A may not meet the statutory test nor can it be readily sustained. (Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (2012) 11 SCC 370 ; Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2010) 11 SCC 242 ; Raja Anand Brahma Shah Vs. (Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (2012) 11 SCC 370 ; Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2010) 11 SCC 242 ; Raja Anand Brahma Shah Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1967 SC 1081 ; Jage Ram Vs. State of Haryana (1971) 3 SCR 871 ; Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 1 SCC 133 ; State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 ; Deepak Pahwa Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1984) 4 SCC 308 ; State of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi (1986) 4 SCC 251 ; Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. Shri Kishan (1993) 2 SCC 84 ; Chameli Singh Vs. State of U.P. (1996) 2 SCC 549 ; Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satbir Singh (1996) 11 SCC 462 ; Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (1998) 6 SCC 1 ; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans (2004) 8 SCC 14 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627 ; Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi Vs. State of Karnataka (2008) 12 SCC 418 ; Babu Ram Vs. State of Haryana (2009) 10 SCC 115 and Tika Ram Vs. State of U.P. (2009)10SCC689). 26. As the right conferred on the land owner, to file his objections under Section 5-A, is a valuable right, and since exercise of power under Section 17(4) would result in deprivation of such a right, it is only in rare cases, where the acquisition cannot brook any delay, should such a power be exercised. Exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) does not necessarily result in exclusion of Section 5-A of the Act in terms of which any person interested in land can file objection and is entitled to be heard in support of his objections. The use of word "may" in sub-section (4) of Section 17 makes it clear that it merely enables the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5-A would not apply to the cases covered under sub-section (1) or (2) of Section 17. In other words, invocation of Section 17(4) is not a necessary concomitant of the exercise of power under Section 17(1). (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Dev Sharan Vs. State of U.P. (2011) 4 SCC 769 ; Radhy Shyam Vs. In other words, invocation of Section 17(4) is not a necessary concomitant of the exercise of power under Section 17(1). (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Dev Sharan Vs. State of U.P. (2011) 4 SCC 769 ; Radhy Shyam Vs. State of U.P. (2011) 5 SCC 553 and Devender Kumar Tyagi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others (2011) 9 SCC 164 ). 27. The circumstances in which the power of emergency can be invoked are specified in Section 17(2), but circumstances necessitating invocation of urgency under Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) are not stated in the provisions themselves. As an important and valuable right of the person interested in the land is being taken away, and with some effort enquiry can always be completed expeditiously, the urgency provision should be invoked sparingly. (Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (2012) 11 SCC 370 ; Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2010) 11 SCC 242 ; Raja Anand Brahma Shah Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1967 SC 1081 ; Jage Ram Vs. State of Haryana (1971) 3 SCR 871 ; Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 1 SCC 133 ; State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 ; Deepak Pahwa Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1984) 4 SCC 308 ; State of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi (1986) 4 SCC 251 ; Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. Shri Kishan (1993) 2 SCC 84 ; Chameli Singh Vs. State of U.P. (1996) 2 SCC 549 ; Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satbir Singh (1996) 11 SCC 462 ; Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (1998) 6 SCC 1 ; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans (2004) 8 SCC 14 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627 ; Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi Vs. State of Karnataka (2008) 12 SCC 418 ; Babu Ram Vs. State of Haryana (2009) 10 SCC 115 and Tika Ram Vs. State of U.P. (2009)10 SCC 689 ). 28. The exceptional and extra-ordinary power of doing away with an enquiry under Section 5-A in a case where possession of the land is required urgently, or in an unforeseen emergency, is provided in Section 17 of the Act. State of Haryana (2009) 10 SCC 115 and Tika Ram Vs. State of U.P. (2009)10 SCC 689 ). 28. The exceptional and extra-ordinary power of doing away with an enquiry under Section 5-A in a case where possession of the land is required urgently, or in an unforeseen emergency, is provided in Section 17 of the Act. Such power is not a routine power and, save circumstances warranting immediate possession, it should not be lightly invoked. The guideline is inbuilt in Section 17 itself for exercise of the exceptional power in dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Exceptional the power, the more circumspect the Government must be in its exercise. The Government should, therefore, apply its mind, before it dispenses with the enquiry under Section 5-A, on the aspect whether the urgency is of such a nature that justifies elimination of the summary enquiry under Section 5-A. (Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (2012) 11 SCC 370 ; Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2010) 11 SCC 242 ; Raja Anand Brahma Shah Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1967 SC 1081 ; Jage Ram Vs. State of Haryana (1971) 3 SCR 871 ; Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 1 SCC 133 ; State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 ; Deepak Pahwa Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1984) 4 SCC 308 ; State of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi (1986) 4 SCC 251 ; Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. Shri Kishan (1993) 2 SCC 84 ; Chameli Singh Vs. State of U.P. (1996) 2 SCC 549 ; Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satbir Singh (1996) 11 SCC 462 ; Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (1998) 6 SCC 1 ; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans (2004) 8 SCC 14 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627 ; Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi Vs. State of Karnataka (2008) 12 SCC 418 ; Babu Ram Vs. State of Haryana (2009) 10 SCC 115 and Tika Ram Vs. State of U.P. (2009)10 SCC 689 ). 29. While Section 17(4) confers power on the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, exercise of such a power is subject to formation of the opinion regarding urgency in acquisition of the land. State of Haryana (2009) 10 SCC 115 and Tika Ram Vs. State of U.P. (2009)10 SCC 689 ). 29. While Section 17(4) confers power on the Government to direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply, exercise of such a power is subject to formation of the opinion regarding urgency in acquisition of the land. Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary powers on the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook delay of even a few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding application of Section 5-A, the concerned authority must be fully satisfied that a time of a few weeks or months, which is likely to be taken in conducting the inquiry under Section 5-A, will, in all probability, frustrate the public purpose for which the land is proposed to be acquired. (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (2014)13 SCC 721 ; Dev Sharan Vs. State of U.P. (2011) 4 SCC 769 ; Radhy Shyam Vs. State of U.P. (2011) 5 SCC 553 ; Devender Kumar Tyagi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others (2011) 9 SCC 164 ). 30. The question of urgency of an acquisition, under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act, is a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Government and, ordinarily, it is not open to the Court to scrutinize the propriety of that satisfaction on an objective appraisal of facts. In this view of the matter when the Government takes a decision, taking all relevant considerations into account and is satisfied that there exists an emergency for invoking powers under Section 17(1) and (4) of the Act, and issues a Notification accordingly, the same should not be interfered with unless the Court comes to the conclusion that the appropriate authority has not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that the decision has been taken by the appropriate authority malafide. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency, even if it is not conclusive, is entitled to great weight. (First Land Acquisition Collector & others vs. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli & another (2002) 4 SCC 160 ). 31. The conclusion of the Government that there was urgency, even if it is not conclusive, is entitled to great weight. (First Land Acquisition Collector & others vs. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli & another (2002) 4 SCC 160 ). 31. The Government should apply its mind on whether the urgency is of such a nature that necessitates dispensation of the enquiry under Section 5-A. (Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (2012) 11 SCC 370 ; Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2010) 11 SCC 242 ; Raja Anand Brahma Shah Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1967 SC 1081 ; Jage Ram Vs. State of Haryana (1971) 3 SCR 871 ; Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 1 SCC 133 ; State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 ; Deepak Pahwa Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1984) 4 SCC 308 ; State of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi (1986) 4 SCC 251 ; Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. Shri Kishan (1993) 2 SCC 84 ; Chameli Singh Vs. State of U.P. (1996) 2 SCC 549 ; Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satbir Singh (1996) 11 SCC 462 ; Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (1998) 6 SCC 1 ; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans (2004) 8 SCC 14 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur ChenaiV; Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi Vs. State of Karnataka (2008) 12 SCC 418 ; Babu Ram Vs. State of Haryana (2009) 10 SCC 115 and Tika Ram Vs. State of U.P. (2009)10SCC689). While the satisfaction of the Government, on the issue of urgency, is subjective, it is, however, a condition precedent to the exercise of power under Section 17(1), and the same can be challenged on the ground that the purpose for which the private property is sought to be acquired is not a public purpose at all or that the exercise of power is vitiated due to malafides or that the concerned authorities did not apply their mind to the relevant factors and the records. (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others, (supra); Dev Sharan Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Radhy Shyam Vs. State of U.P., (supra) and Devender Kumar Tyagi and others Vs. State of U.P. (supra)). 32. (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others, (supra); Dev Sharan Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Radhy Shyam Vs. State of U.P., (supra) and Devender Kumar Tyagi and others Vs. State of U.P. (supra)). 32. A repetition of the statutory phrase in the notification, that the State Government is satisfied that the land specified in the notification is urgently needed and the provision contained in Section 5-A shall not apply, though may initially raise a presumption in favour of the Government that the prerequisite conditions for exercise of such power have been satisfied, but such presumption may be displaced by the circumstances themselves having no reasonable nexus with the purpose for which the power has been exercised. Upon a challenge being made to the exercise of the power under Section 17, the Government must produce appropriate material before the Court that the opinion, for dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A, has been formed by the Government after due application of mind on the material placed before it. (Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (supra),; Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra),; Raja Anand Brahma Shah Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Jage Ram Vs. State of Haryana (supra),; Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra),; State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (supra),; Deepak Pahwa Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (supra),; State of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi (supra),; Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. Shri Kishan (supra),; Chameli Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satbir Singh (supra),; Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans (supra),; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai (supra),; Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi Vs. State of Karnataka (supra),; Babu Ram Vs. State of Haryana (supra), and Tika Ram Vs. State of U.P. (supra)). 33. In examining whether the Government was justified, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, in invoking the urgency clause and in dispensing with the Section 5-A inquiry, it must be borne in mind that, whenever the government seeks to invoke its power of urgency, it has to first form the opinion that the land, for the stated public purpose, is urgently needed. Such an opinion has to be founded on the need for immediate possession of the land for carrying out the purpose for which land is sought to be compulsorily acquired. If the government intends to eliminate the enquiry, it has to then apply its mind on the aspect that the urgency is of such a nature that necessitates elimination of such an enquiry. The satisfaction of the government on the twin aspects viz; (i) need for immediate possession of the land for carrying out the stated purpose and (ii) urgency is such that necessitates dispensation of enquiry is a must, and permits no departure for a valid exercise of power under Section 17(1) and (4). (Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (supra)). 34. If an order invoking power under Section 17(4) is assailed, the Courts may enquire whether the appropriate authority had all the relevant material before it or whether the order has been passed without application of mind. The opinion of the State Government can be challenged in a Court of law if it can be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter, or that action of the State Government is malafide. Though the satisfaction under Section 17(4) is subjective and is not open to challenge before a Court of law, except on limited grounds, the satisfaction must be of the Appropriate Government, and the satisfaction must be regarding the existence of urgency. (First Land Acquisition Collector & others vs. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli & another (supra),; Jage Ram and others vs. The State of Haryana and Others (supra)). But in a case where the opinion is formed, regarding the urgency, based on considerations not germane to the purpose, judicial review of such administrative decision may become necessary. (Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (supra),; Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra),; Raja Anand Brahma Shah Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Jage Ram Vs. State of Haryana (supra),; Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra),; State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (supra),; Deepak Pahwa Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (supra),; State of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi (supra),; Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. Shri Kishan (supra),; Chameli Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satbir Singh (supra),; Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Union of India Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra),; State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (supra),; Deepak Pahwa Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (supra),; State of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi (supra),; Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. Shri Kishan (supra),; Chameli Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satbir Singh (supra),; Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans (supra),; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai (supra),; Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi Vs. State of Karnataka (supra),; Babu Ram Vs. State of Haryana (supra), and Tika Ram Vs. State of U.P. (supra)). 35. It is evident, from the counter affidavit filed by the respondents, that possession of the subject building was taken over by them under the 1947 Act on 14.05.2001, and they continued to remain in possession ever since. On the petitioner invoking the jurisdiction of this Court, by filing Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002 challenging the requisition on 14.05.2001 under the 1947 Act, this Court passed an interim order on 06.05.2003 directing the respondents either to hand over possession of the property to the appellant-writ petitioner within 10 days or to acquire the same under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The interim order of this Court, in Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002 dated 06.05.2003 to acquire the land, merely required the respondents to issue a notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act within 10 days. While the notification, under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, was issued on 20.05.2003 in compliance with the aforesaid interim order of this Court, exercise of the power to invoke the urgency clause by the Government was, evidently, not because of the interim order passed by this Court, as this Court did not direct the respondents to either invoke the urgency clause or to dispense with the Section 5-A inquiry. 36. 36. The respondents herein had contended before the learned Single Judge, when Writ Petition (M/S) No.1131 of 2007 was being heard, that the interim order of this Court dated 06.05.2003 required the respondents to proceed with acquisition of the subject land; buildings had already been constructed thereupon; and, since there existed the possibility of this Court directing delivery of possession since Writ Petition (M/B) No. 165 of 2002 was still pending and was disposed of later by order dated 08.07.2003, the respondents had no choice but to invoke the urgency clause under Section 17(4) to take possession of the subject land. The fact, however, remains that the possibility of such an order being passed by this Court later was merely a conjecture on the respondents part, and did not, by itself and without anything more, justify the land owner (appellant-writ petitioner) being deprived of its valuable right to file objections under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 37. In any event, it is only on the basis of the material placed before it, could the authorities concerned have formed the opinion of the need to invoke the urgency clause. Though the respondents were directed to produce the records to show whether there was any material based on which the respondents had formed such an opinion, Mr. J.P. Joshi, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State of Uttarakhand, informed us that there was no such record available with the Government. It is evident, therefore, that formation of the opinion to invoke the urgency clause was not based on any material placed before the Government. As noted hereinabove, mere use of the word “urgency” would not justify a land owner being deprived of his right to file objections under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act as it is only in cases of genuine urgency can the power, to dispense within the enquiry under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act, be exercised. 38. While Mr. J.P. Joshi, learned Additional Advocate General, is justified in his submission that acquisition of land, for institutional purposes, is acquisition for public purposes within the meaning of Section 4, but that, by itself, does not justify exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(1) and/or 17(4). (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (supra),; Dev Sharan Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Radhy Shyam Vs. (Prabhawati and others Vs. State of Bihar and others (supra),; Dev Sharan Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Radhy Shyam Vs. State of U.P. (supra), and Devender Kumar Tyagi and others Vs. State of U.P. and others (supra)). The submission that continuous possession of the subject property ever since 14.05.2001, both in terms of the 1947 Act and thereafter, necessitated invoking the urgency clause under Section 17(4) when the Section 4(1) notification was issued on 20.05.2003, does not merit acceptance. A pre-notification or a post-notification delay has no material bearing on the question of invocation of the urgency power, particularly in a situation where no material has been placed by the appropriate Government before the Court to show that the urgency was of such a nature that necessitated elimination of the enquiry under Section 5-A. (Ram Dhari Jindal Memorial Trust Vs. Union of India and others (supra),; Anand Singh and another Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra),; Raja Anand Brahma Shah Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Jage Ram Vs. State of Haryana (supra),; Narayan Govind Gavate Vs. State of Maharashtra (supra),; State of Punjab vs. Gurdial Singh (supra),; Deepak Pahwa Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi (supra),; State of U.P. Vs. Pista Devi (supra),; Rajasthan Housing Board Vs. Shri Kishan (supra),; Chameli Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Meerut Development Authority Vs. Satbir Singh (supra),; Om Prakash Vs. State of U.P. (supra),; Union of India Vs. Mukesh Hans (supra),; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai (supra),; Mahadevappa Lachappa Kinagi Vs. State of Karnataka (supra),; Babu Ram Vs. State of Haryana (supra), and Tika Ram Vs. State of U.P. (supra)). As noted hereinabove, the interim order of this Court required the State to initiate acquisition proceedings which only meant that a notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was required to be issued. In the absence of any order of the Court, permitting the respondents to either dispense with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act or to invoke the urgency clause, the mere fact that this Court had directed the subject land to be acquired under the 1894 Act would not justify the respondents, exercising their powers under Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act, to dispense with the 5-A enquiry. 39. The submission of Mr. 39. The submission of Mr. J.P. Joshi, learned Additional Advocate General, that, since the respondents had taken possession of the subject land under the 1947 Act and as the period stipulated therein had expired, there was an urgent need to invoke the urgency clause to make the earlier illegal possession legal, is also not tenable. As noted hereinabove, the respondents had taken possession of the subject land under the 1947 Act as early as on 14.05.2001 more than two years before the notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was issued on 20.05.2003. As the respondents continue to retain possession of the building ever since 14.05.2001, the only manner in which the appellant-writ petitioner could have dispossessed the respondents therefrom was by availing their common law remedy of filing a suit before the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Having retained possession of the subject land, under the 1947 Act and thereafter, for a period of more than two years, the respondents cannot take advantage of their own illegal act, in retaining illegal possession of the subject land, to contend that they were justified thereby in invoking Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act to legalise their possession. 40. In First Land Acquisition Collector & others vs. Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli & another (supra), on which reliance is placed by Sri J.P. Joshi, learned Additional Advocate General, the contention urged on behalf of the respondents was that, as the premises in question continued to be under the possession of the Calcutta Medical College, invocation of the special powers under Section 17 was vitiated and a valuable right of the land owners to file objections under Section 5-A could not have been taken away; the power under Section 17, dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A, can be invoked where there exists urgency to take immediate possession of the land, but where possession is with the acquiring authority, there cannot exist any urgency; and, therefore, exercise of that power is patently erroneous. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs. M.D. Bhagwat and Ors. AIR 1975 SC 1767 . 41. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on Balwant Narayan Bhagde vs. M.D. Bhagwat and Ors. AIR 1975 SC 1767 . 41. It is in this factual matrix that the Supreme Court, in Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli & another (supra), held that the subject premises had been requisitioned under the provisions of the Requisition Act, and stood released from requisition, by operation of Section 10B of the said Act, since 1993; even though the premises stood occupied by the students of the medical college, but such occupation was neither as the owner nor was it lawful in the eye of law; to effectuate lawful possession, and as the purpose was a public purpose, the State Government had been attempting ever-since December, 1982, and each of its attempt had failed on account of the Court's intervention; it is in this context that the legality of the exercise of power under Section 17, of the notification dated 29.11.94, was required to be adjudicated upon; and, having regard to these facts and circumstances, exercise of power under Section 17, by the State Government, could not be held to be illegal or malafide. 42. The observations of the Supreme Court, in Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli & another (supra), were made in the context of the repeated intervention by the Court thwarting the efforts made by the authorities to acquire the subject land for a public purpose. The Supreme Court has specifically observed that the legality of exercise of powers under Section 17 was required to be examined in the context of the State Government having attempted ever since December, 1982 to acquire the land and each of its attempts having failed on account of the Court’s intervention. In the present case the notification issued by the respondents, under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act, has not been interdicted by this Court. In any event, in the absence of any material having been placed before the Government for the exercise of power under Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act, exercise of such a power suffered from non-application of mind and stood vitiated. 43. The notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was issued on 20.05.2003 and the declaration under Section 6 was issued on 16.06.2003. 43. The notification under Section 4(1) of the 1894 Act was issued on 20.05.2003 and the declaration under Section 6 was issued on 16.06.2003. The appellant-writ petitioner questioned both the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration by way of Writ Petition (M/B) No. 607 of 2003 on 04.07.2003 before an award was passed on 17.02.2004. Writ Petition (M/B) No. 607 of 2003 was later renumbered as Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1131 of 2007. While we are satisfied that the respondents could have waited for a few months for an enquiry to be caused under Section 5-A of the 1894 Act, and the appellant-writ petitioner ought to have been given the opportunity of submitting their objections to the acquisition, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the respondents had passed an award on 17.02.2004, and the appellant-writ petitioner has neither questioned the validity of the award nor have they sought a reference to the Court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. 44. The submission of Shri A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-writ petitioner, that the appellant-writ petitioner had challenged the validity of the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration on the ground that the Section 5-A enquiry was not conducted, and once the Court holds that failure to conduct a Section 5-A enquiry is illegal, then all proceedings, including the subsequent award, would be rendered a nullity, cannot be said to be without merit. It must, however, be borne in mind that the respondents have after taking possession of the land, and both before and after an award was passed, spent a sum in excess of Rs. 6.00 crore for construction of Government offices on the subject land, and it would be wholly inequitable, at this length of time (nearly 15 years after the award was passed on 17.02.2004), to declare the award a nullity even in the absence of a challenge thereto. 45. In New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Vs. Harkishan (Dead) through LRs. And others AIR 2017 SC 854 , on which reliance is placed by Mr. 45. In New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Vs. Harkishan (Dead) through LRs. And others AIR 2017 SC 854 , on which reliance is placed by Mr. J.P. Joshi, learned Additional Advocate General, the Supreme Court observed that, in the second round of writ petitions preferred by the respondents, they chose to challenge only the Office Order dated December 03, 1999 by which their representation under Section 48 of the Act had been rejected; and it never dawned on them to challenge the validity of the award on the ground that the same was not passed within the prescribed period of limitation; in the second round of litigation also, the respondents had failed in their attempt in as much as the Supreme Court had put its imprimatur to the rejection order dated December 03, 1999 vide its judgment dated March 12, 2003; at that time, possession of land had also been taken; if the respondents wanted to challenge the validity of the award, on the ground that it was passed beyond the period of limitation, they should have done so immediately; and, in any case, in the second round of writ petitions filed by them; filing a fresh writ petition, challenging the validity of the award for the first time in the year 2004, was not only barred by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, but would also be barred on the doctrine of laches and delay as well; the land was acquired by invoking the urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act, and dispensing with the requirement of filing the objections under Section 5-A of the Act; this action, on the part of the Government, was upheld by the Supreme Court in the first round of litigation; once possession is taken under Section 17(1) of the Act, Section 11A is not attracted; acquisition proceedings would not lapse on failure to make the award within the period prescribed therein; and this was so held in Satendra Prasad Jain & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 1993 (4) SCC 369 ; and Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. 1995 (6) SCC 31 46. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 1993 (4) SCC 369 ; and Awadh Bihari Yadav & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. 1995 (6) SCC 31 46. The aforesaid judgment has also no application, to the facts and circumstances of the case on hand, since, in the present case, the award was passed only during the pendency of the writ petition before this Court wherein the validity of the Section 4(1) notification and the Section 6 declaration were under challenge on the ground that failure to conduct a Section 5-A enquiry was fatal. 47. What then should be the relief which the appellant-writ petitioner must be granted as a result of our holding that invocation of the urgency clause by the respondents suffered from non-application of mind, and they had acted illegally in dispensing with a Section 5-A enquiry? In answering this question, the illegality in exercising the powers under Section 17(4) of the 1894 Act by the respondents, must be weighed with the appellant-writ petitioner’s failure to question the award, passed during the pendency of the writ petition, on 17.02.2004 for the past nearly 15 years. 48. In this context, it must be borne in mind that, in acquisition of lands, there may be omission on the part of the claimants to adopt extra vigilance; but the same need not be used as a ground to depict them with negligence or want of bona fides. Equities can be balanced by denying the appellants’ interest for the period for which they did not approach the Court. The substantive rights of the appellants should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking a hyper-technical view of self-imposed limitations. In the matter of compensation for land acquisition, the approach of the Court has to be pragmatic and not pedantic. (K. Subbarayudu and others Vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) (2017) 12 SCC 840 ; Dhiraj Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives And others Vs. State of Haryana and others, (2014) 14 SCC 127 ). Both, in Dhiraj Singh (supra), and K. Subbarayudu (supra), the Supreme Court denied the appellants therein interest for the period of delay in preferring an appeal against the award passed by the reference court. 49. State of Haryana and others, (2014) 14 SCC 127 ). Both, in Dhiraj Singh (supra), and K. Subbarayudu (supra), the Supreme Court denied the appellants therein interest for the period of delay in preferring an appeal against the award passed by the reference court. 49. Setting aside the award, for the failure of the respondents to conduct a Section 5-A enquiry and to give the appellant-writ petitioner the opportunity to file their objections, would not be justified as it would result in the respondents having to initiate land acquisition proceedings afresh under the Right To Fair Compensation And Transparency In Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation And Resettlement Act, 2013. In such circumstances, it would be wholly inequitable to set aside the award, more so as it has not even been subjected to challenge in these writ proceedings. We are satisfied, however, that, on our holding that the exercise of power by the Government under Section 17(4) is illegal, the least that the appellant-writ petitioner is entitled to is to be permitted to seek enhancement of the compensation under the 1894 Act, as it does appear that the appellant-writ petitioner did not seek a reference, under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, only because of the pendency of their writ petition before this Court, and lest the validity of their challenge to the Section 6 declaration, on the ground that the respondents had failed to conduct a Section 5-A enquiry, is rejected on this ground. Ends of justice would be met if the appellant-writ petitioner is permitted to make an application under Section 18 of the 1894 Act to the competent authority seeking a reference to the Civil Court. In case any such application is made within four weeks from today, the competent authority shall, without taking into account the delay which has occurred because of the pendency of the writ petition and the special appeal before this Court, refer the matter to the competent Civil Court which shall then adjudicate on the appellant-writ petitioner’s claim for enhancement of compensation under the 1894 Act. As the appellant-writ petitioner has also been amiss in not questioning the award, or in seeking a reference under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, we direct, following the law declared by the Supreme Court in Dhiraj Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives And others Vs. State of Haryana and others (supra), and K. Subbarayudu and others Vs. As the appellant-writ petitioner has also been amiss in not questioning the award, or in seeking a reference under Section 18 of the 1894 Act, we direct, following the law declared by the Supreme Court in Dhiraj Singh (Dead) Through Legal Representatives And others Vs. State of Haryana and others (supra), and K. Subbarayudu and others Vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition)(supra), that the Reference Court shall not award them interest from the date of the award till the date on which the appellant-writ petitioner makes an application under Section 18 of the 1894 Act to the Collector, even if it is satisfied that the compensation paid, to the appellant-writ petitioner earlier, necessitates enhancement. 50. The order under appeal is modified accordingly, and the Special Appeal is disposed of. However, in the circumstances, without costs.