JUDGMENT : K. S. Mudagal, J. This plaintiff's second appeal arises out of the judgment and decree dated 03.08.2017 in R.A.No.58/2015 passed by the VII Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore. 2. By the impugned judgment and decree, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant/plaintiff and confirmed the judgment and decree dated 27.03.2015 passed in O.S.No.376/2008 by the Principle Senior Civil Judge, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, dismissing the suit of the appellant/plaintiff for partition and separate possession of her share in the suit schedule property and for permanent injunction. 3. Respondents were defendants-1 to 3 before the Trial Court. For the purpose of convenience, parties will be referred to hereafter with their ranks before the trial Court. 4. The subject-matter of the suit was agricultural land bearing Sy.No. 109 measuring 2 acres of Cheemasandra Village, Bidarahalli Hobli, Bangalore East Taluk. 5. Plaintiff and one Ramaiah and third defendant purchased 3 acres of land in Sy.No.109 under Ex.P. 10 registered sale deed dated 09.09.1993 jointly. They were not blood relatives. Suit schedule property is 2 acres out of the said land. Out of 3 acres, plaintiff and defendants sold 14 guntas to one N. Sadananda and 13 guntas each to one Gundappa and V.R.Anjanappa under sale deeds Exs.P. 1 to P.3 dated 20.01.2006 and 24.01.2006. Thus remaining land out of the said land namely 2 acres was the subject-matter of the suit. 6. Plaintiff contended that sale deeds under Exs.P. 1 to P.3 were jointly executed by her and other co-owners and after such sale she has 1/3rd share in the remaining 2 acres. She further contended that defendants are denying her share and though she is in joint possession, they are disturbing her possession. Thus, she sought for partition and separate possession. 7. Defendants 1 and 2 are the wife and son of D. Ramaiah, who was the co-purchaser with defendant No. 3. As he had died, defendants 1 and 2 were made parties to the suit. 8. Defendants admitted the joint purchase of the land and plaintiff had 1/3rd share out of the said 3 acres. But they contended that plaintiff for her financial needs sold her 1/3rd interest/share in the suit schedule property under Exs.P. 1 to P.3 to different purchasers and received the sale consideration and therefore she does not have any share in the remaining 2 acres. But they contended that plaintiff for her financial needs sold her 1/3rd interest/share in the suit schedule property under Exs.P. 1 to P.3 to different purchasers and received the sale consideration and therefore she does not have any share in the remaining 2 acres. They further contended that before such sale there was a partition between plaintiff, defendant No. 3 and D. Ramaiah under Ex.D.1 and thereafter plaintiff sold her share and received consideration. They further contended that plaintiff to make wrongful gain is setting up the claim. They contended that as the names of defendants were appearing in revenue records, at the instance of the purchasers, they formally joined in execution of Exs.P. 1 to P.3. 9. On the basis of such pleadings, the Trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that she and defendant Nos. 1 to 3 are the joint owners of the suit schedule property? 2. Whether the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 prove that the plaintiff had sold her share of land? 3. Whether the plaintiff further proves that she is entitled for /rd share by way of partition and separate possession in the suit schedule land? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the permanent injunction to restrain the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 from alienating the suit schedule land? 5. To what Decree or Order?" 10. To prove her case, the plaintiff got examined herself as P.W.1 and got marked Exs.P. 1 to P. 14. Defendant No. 2 got examined himself as D.W. 1, witnesses D.Ws.2 and 3 and got marked Exs.D.1 to D.9. 11. The Trial Court after hearing the parties dismissed the suit on the following grounds: (i) Though Exs.P. 1 to P.3 partition deeds cannot be received in evidence, in view of section 49 of the Registration Act, the other evidence on record shows that plaintiff got her share divided and sold her interest/share under Exs.P. 1 to P.3 to different persons and received the consideration. Therefore she cannot claim share in that suit property; (ii) The recitals in the Exs.P. 1 to P.3, Exs.D.2 and D.3 and admission of plaintiff herself substantiate the defence of the defendants that plaintiff has already received her share in the property and sold that; (iii) Exs.P. 1 to P.3 show that plaintiff has sold her share as per section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 12. 12. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, plaintiff filed R.A.No.58/2015 before the VII Additional District & Sessions Judge, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore. The First Appellate Court concurred with reasoning and findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 13. Sri. Aravind Neglur, learned counsel for the appellant submits that indisputably in the revenue records, the name of the plaintiff was also continued all along for the suit schedule property, therefore by virtue of Section 133 of Karnataka Land Revenue Act, she is the co-sharer of the property and that presumption was not properly appreciated by the Trial Court. He further submits that section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 enables sale of defendant's share and that recital was absent in Exs.P. 1 to P.3 and the interpretation of Section 133 of Karnataka Land Revenue Act and section 44 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and improper appreciation of the same by the Courts below become substantial questions of law. 14. Per contra, Sri. K. G. Sadashivaiah, learned Counsel for the respondents submits that both the courts on appreciation of the evidence have concurrently held that plaintiff has failed to prove her claim. Therefore, there are no grounds to admit the appeal. He further submits that the presumption under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 and section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 raised by the appellant's Counsel are not the substantial questions of law. 15. A regular second appeal under Section 100, C.P.C. can be admitted for hearing only if the appellant makes out substantial question of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by LRs. - AIR 2001 SC 965 has held that on the question of facts, the first appellate court is the last court unless the appreciation of evidence is shown to be perverse. It was further held that all questions of law are not the substantial questions of law and only the debatable questions of law, which have some bearing on the case and go to the root of the matter, are the substantial questions of law. 16. In this case, the parties purchased the property jointly and they were the tenants it common. 16. In this case, the parties purchased the property jointly and they were the tenants it common. According to the defendants, due to her financial needs, the plaintiff intended to sell her share, therefore, there was a partition under the partition deed Ex.D1 and thereafter she sold her share/interest to DWs-2 to 4 under the sale deeds Exs.P1 to P3 and received the consideration. They say they joined in the sale deed Exs.P1 to P3 only as formal parties at the insistence of the purchasers as the ii names were also appearing in the revenue records. 17. Ex.D2 is an agreement of sale dated 14.3.2005 executed by the plaintiff in favour of one Rathnamma agreeing to sell the property wherein plaintiff claimed that she is the absolute owner of the property intended to be sold. She alone executed said agreement of sale. Even under Ex.D3 the cancellation deed dated 21.1.2006, she alone got the said sale agreement under Ex.D2 cancelled. Those two documents were much before the suit was filed in 2008. 18. The recitals in Exs.P1 to P3 show that plaintiff stated therein that she has one acre share in the property and out of that, she is selling 13 guntas, etc. and she has received the sale consideration. PW-1 in her cross-examination unequivocally admitted all these facts. 19. Though Ex.D1 was not a registered document, the other documents i.e., Exs.P1 to P3, Exs.D2 and D3 are relevant evidence for the purpose of fact in issue and they show that plaintiff sold her share/interest in the property i.e., to the extent of one acre and has received the sale consideration. The purchasers defendant Nos. 2 to 4 also deposed that sale consideration was received by the plaintiff. There is no perversity in the appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence by the courts below. 20. Section 133 of the Land Revenue Act states that an entry in the records of rights and a certified entry in the Register of Mutations or in a Patta Book shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved. Therefore, the said presumption is rebut table presumption and not a conclusive proof. 21. section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act defines "shall presume" as presumption of a fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. Therefore, the said presumption is rebut table presumption and not a conclusive proof. 21. section 4 of the Indian Evidence Act defines "shall presume" as presumption of a fact as proved unless and until it is disproved. The term "disproved" is defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act as follows: "Disproved".- A fact is said to be disproved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes that it does not exist, or considers its nonexistence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist." Therefore, it is clear that if the other party is able to prove the non-existence or probability of such fact, under the circumstances of particular case, the fact stands disproved. These are the basic principles. 22. In this case, though initially the names of the plaintiff, defendant No. 3 and D. Ramaiah were jointly entered in the record of rights, by the other evidence namely recitals in sale deeds Exs.P1 to P3, agreement of sale and cancellation of agreement Exs.D2 and D3 and by the admissions of PW-1 herself, the presumption of entry in the record of rights, which was available under Section 133 of the Land Revenue Act stood rebutted. Thus, the question of presumption under Section 133 of the said Act is not a substantial question of law in this case. 23. So far section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, the said provision relates to the transfer of share of a co-owner, which reads as follows: "44. Transfer by one co-owner.-Where one of two or more co-owners of immoveable property legally competent in that behalf transfers his share of such property or any interest therein, the transferee acquires as to such share or interest, and so far as is necessary to give. effect to the transfer, the transferor's right to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the property, and to enforce a partition of the same, but subject to the conditions and liabilities affecting at the date of the transfer, the share or interest so transferred. Where the transferee of a share of a dwelling-house belonging to an undivided family is not a member of the family, nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle him to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the house." 24. Where the transferee of a share of a dwelling-house belonging to an undivided family is not a member of the family, nothing in this section shall be deemed to entitle him to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the house." 24. A perusal of section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, makes it clear that, the said Section is for the benefit of transferee, who purchases property from one of the several co-owners. In such case, if there is any ambiguity regarding the extent of the property transferred, it is deemed that the share of the transferor is sold to the purchaser. In this case, there is no dispute between the parties that plaintiff, defendant No. 3 and D.Ramaiah had /rd share each. The issue was whether plaintiff sold her /rd share/interest and received the sale consideration, but not whether the share transferred was /rd or not. Therefore, the issue under section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act also does not become a substantial question of law. 25. Under these circumstances, the case does not involve any substantial question of law to admit the appeal. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. 26. In view of disposal of the appeal, I.A.No. 1/2017 does not survive for consideration and disposed of accordingly.