JUDGMENT Jitendra Chauhan, J. - This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 08.02.2003 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, (Adhoc), Jhajjar, vide which the accused/respondent was acquitted of the charge in FIR No. 440 dated 27.09.2000 registered under Section 376 IPC at Police Station Jhajjar, District Jhajjar. 2. The brief facts of the case as noticed in the judgment passed by the trial Court in paragraph No. 2 is reproduced as under:- "2. "Briefly stated that the facts of the case are that on 27.09.2000 Sat Narain ASI Police Station Jhajjar was present at Jahajgarh crossing accompanied by Mahender and Suresh Constables in connection with patrol duty and checking when Poonam daughter of Rattan Singh resident of Khatiwas appeared before him along with her brother Surender and brother's wife Kanta and reported the matter to him that she is the youngest child of his parents and that she studied upto 4th class. On 27.09.2000 at about 7 p.m. she had accompanied her Mausi Kamlesh upto her house and after leaving her at her house, she was returning to her house alone. When at about 7.30 p.m. she reached near the house of Shubh Ram her uncle in village relationship, the accused Rajesh son of Shubh Ram came out of his house and caught hold of her and gagged her mouth with his land and took her towards the cluster of kikkar trees by lifting her up and he laid he ron the ground under a Pipal tree. Then he opened the string of her salwar and gagged her mouth with her chunni and committed sexual intercourse with her forcible and against her wishes. She resisted a lot but as the accused was quite stout she could not do anything for getting herself released and as her mouth had been muzzled with her chunni she could not raise any alarm. After committing sexual intercourse with her he left her and ran away. So she returning to her house after opening the chunni from her mouth and she disclosed about the occurrence to her mother Murti Devi and to Kanta the wife of her brother Surender. Thus, Kanta and Surender were taking her to the Police Station for reporting the matter to the Police when Sat Narain. ASI met them at Jahajagarh crossing, Jhajjar and so the report was lodged with him and her statement Ex. PE was recorded. Thus, Kanta and Surender were taking her to the Police Station for reporting the matter to the Police when Sat Narain. ASI met them at Jahajagarh crossing, Jhajjar and so the report was lodged with him and her statement Ex. PE was recorded. It was read over to her and she put her signatures thereafter admitting the same as correct. The Police Officer made his endorsement Ex. PA/1 thereafter and sent the same to the Police Station on which formal FIR Ex. PH was registered by Om Parkash, ASI against the accused under Section 376 IPC." 3. After completion of investigation, challan/report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was presented in the Court. As the offence under Section 376 IPC is triable by Court of Session, the case was committed to the said Court. 4. Charge under Section 376 IPC was framed against the accused to which the accused did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 5. In order to prove its case, the prosecution had examined PW-1 Dharampal, PW-2 Constable Anil Kumar, PW-3 HC Mahender Singh, PW-4 Surender, PW-5 prosecutrix, PW-6 Satpal, PW-7 Kamlesh, PW-8 Dr. Kumud Sharma, PW-9 Kanta Devi, PW-10 ASI Sat Narain, PW-11 Dr. Gulshan Arora, PW-12 Constable Shish Ram and closed the evidence. 6. The statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded in which all the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence were put to the accused to which the accused denied and pleaded false implication. 7. In defence evidence, Mahender Singh, SDO Irrigation Department was examined as DW-1 and Manpal was examined as DW-2. 8. After appraisal of evidence, the learned trial court vide impugned judgment acquitted the accused/respondent of the charges framed against him. 9. Feeling dissatisfied with the impugned judgment, the present appeal has been filed by the State of Haryana. 10. The name of the prosecutrix is being withheld. She will be referred to as "the prosecutrix". 11. It is contended by the learned State counsel that the prosecutrix was less than 16 years of age at the time of occurrence and her consent, if any, would be immaterial. Even otherwise, the case of the prosecution stands fully proved from the statements of the prosecutrix while she appeared in the witness box as PW-5 and PW-6 Satpal that the respondent/accused forcibly committed rape on the prosecutrix. Even otherwise, the case of the prosecution stands fully proved from the statements of the prosecutrix while she appeared in the witness box as PW-5 and PW-6 Satpal that the respondent/accused forcibly committed rape on the prosecutrix. He further points out that human semen was also detected on the swabs, salwar and underwear of the accused/respondent. There was no delay in lodging the FIR. He further submits that the trial Court fell in grave error while acquitting the accused by giving the benefit of doubt. 12. We have heard the learned State counsel and have gone through the case file and record very carefully. 13. Though, the prosecution claims the age of the prosecutrix to be less than 16 years but from the birth certificates Ex. DC and Ex. DD issued by the office of Additional District Registrar, Births and Deaths, proves that the prosecutrix was 16 years and 3 months of age at the time of the occurrence. 14. From the evidence on record, it transpires that it was a clear case of consent. Admittedly, the alleged occurrence had taken place near cluster of kikkar trees and there were houses nearby. As per the case of the prosecution, the prosecutrix was caught hold of by the accused, who gagged her with mouth with one hand and took her towards the cluster of kikkar tree by lifting her up. Thereafter, he opened the string of her salwar and committed sexual intercourse with her forcibly and against her wishes. There was no mark of injury on the person of the prosecutrix, as is evident from the testimony of PW-8 Dr. Kumud Sharma. The medical evidence on record rules out the fact that there was any violence over any part of the body. Besides even local examination and examination of the private parts, did not show any injury on the person of the prosecutrix. Concededly, the prosecutrix was more than 16 years of age at the time of occurrence and it is very difficult for any person to rape single handed a grown up girl without meeting stiffest possible resistance from her. Besides even local examination and examination of the private parts, did not show any injury on the person of the prosecutrix. Concededly, the prosecutrix was more than 16 years of age at the time of occurrence and it is very difficult for any person to rape single handed a grown up girl without meeting stiffest possible resistance from her. Reliance in this regard can be placed on Partap Misra vs. State of Uddisha AIR 1997 SC 1307 wherein it was held by Hon'ble the Supreme Court that the medical evidence which indicates that there was no injury on the person of the prosecutrix in a case of this type militates against the theory/allegation of rape. Their lordships relied upon the following observations made by Taylor in "Principles and Practice of Medical Jurisprudence" Vol. II, which is as under:- "Unless under the influence of drink or drugs or asleep or ill, a fully grown girl or adult woman should be able to resist a sex assault. We should expect to find evidence of a struggle to avoid sexual contact or penetration, and may well feel uncertainly about the real nature of an alleged assault in its absence. A false accusation of rape may sometimes be exposed by marks of violence being wholly inadequate or absent. Bruises upon the arms or the neck may be considered to constitute some evidence of a struggle; and impressions of finger nails are also significant. Bruises or scratches about the inner side of the thighs and knees may be inflicted during attempts to abduct the legs forcibly, and care must also be taken to examine the back, for the victim may have been pinned against the wall or floor. It is important to record these in detail, and to say, if possible, how fresh they are. The ageing of bruises, is, as was indicated in Volume I, a matter of some uncertainly in the absence of microscopy. Strong corroborative evidence of a struggle might be obtained from an examination of the accused, for similar marks of bruises or scratches about the arms or face, and possibly evidence about his penis, though this is less likely. Though injury is most unlikely to the penis, a man may have had his face scratched or have been bitten during a sex assault. Though injury is most unlikely to the penis, a man may have had his face scratched or have been bitten during a sex assault. The clothing may bear some contract traces of the woman-hairs, vaginal secretion or blood, and, though of less significance, seminal stains." 15. The mere presence of human semen on the swab, salwar and underwear of the accused does not connect the accused with the commission of the alleged offence. Prompt lodging of FIR is also not an unmistakable guarantee of the prosecution version. 16. PW-6 is admittedly not an eyewitness to the occurrence. He had only seen the accused/respondent running from the place of occurrence. His testimony would not be of much help to the prosecution and cannot be even taken as relevant being res gestae under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act. 17. The prosecution case hinges on the testimony of PW-5, the prosecutrix which does not inspire confidence of the Court. Learned State counsel has failed to refer to the facts which have not been appreciated by the learned trial Court or convince us as to how the impugned judgment is illegal or perverse in the given set of facts. 18. It is a settled law as has been held in C. Antony vs. K.G. Raghavan Nair, 2002(4) RCR (Criminal) 750 that even if a second view on appreciation of evidence is possible, the Court will not interfere in the acquittal of the accused unless the judgment suffers from any perversity. In the cases of acquittal, there is double presumption in his favour; first the presumption of innocence, and secondly the accused having secured an acquittal, the Court will not interfere until it is shown conclusively that the inference of guilt is irresistible. 19. In Anil Kumar Gupta vs. State of U.P. 2001(2) RCR (Criminal) 292 SC it was held as under:- "This Court held that "the mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the trial Court can be legitimately arrived at by the appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence, cannot constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere an order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that the entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in judgment over an acquittal, the appellate Court is first required to seek an answer to the question whether the findings of the trial Court are pal ably wrote, manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If the appellate Court answers the above question in the negative, the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed. Conversely, if the appellate Court holds, for reasons to be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can then-and then only-reappraise the evidence to arrive at its own conclusions". (emphasis supplied) 11. This Court following the decision in Ramesh Babulal Doshi, further observed that 'there cannot be any denial of the factum that the power and authority to appraise the evidence in an appeal, either against acquittal or conviction stands out to be very comprehensive and wide, but if two views are reasonably possible, on the state of evidence: one supporting the acquittal and the other indicating conviction, then and in that event, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with an order of acquittal, merely because it feels that it, sitting as a trial court, would have taken the other view. While reappreciating the evidence, the rule of prudence requires that the High Court should give proper weight and consideration to the views of the trial Judge. But if the judgment of the Sessions Judge was absolutely perverse, legally erroneous and based on a wrong appreciation of the evidence, then it would be just and proper for the High Court to reverse the judgment of acquittal, recorded by the Sessions Judge, as otherwise, there would be gross miscarriage of justice". 20. In the instant case, the findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based on correct appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any infirmity and perversity much less illegality. 21. The present appeal lacks merit and is hereby dismissed.