JUDGMENT : (1) The controversy in the instant appeal revolves around the scope for grant of interim assistance in terms of Section 9 of the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act (hereinafter for short referred to as the Act). It appears from the perusal of order dated 14.11.2018 (for short impugned order) that the learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar, after entertaining petition filed by respondent No.1 herein under Section 9 of the Act, has granted interim assistance in favour of respondent No.1 herein and against the appellants herein. (2) Earlier one round of litigation had been contested by respondent No.1 and the appellant herein which was commenced at the instance of “Tanveer Ahmad Parra & Ors. Vs. M/S Manoj Ji and Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors” and “Ghulam Mohammad Dar & Ors. Vs. M/S Manoj Ji and Co. Pvt. Ltd. & Ors”, who had been joined as party by the trial court, on two appeals filed by the said appellants. The said appeals registered as A.A. No.14/2018 and A.A. No.3/2019, were disposed of by this Court on 05.02.2019 with the following observations: “For what has been discussed above, no merit is found for interference by invoking appellate jurisdiction in terms of Section 37 of the Act and as a necessary corollary, the appeals are dismissed. Since limited question regarding right of appeal had been under consideration in the instant proceedings, the dismissal of the appeals shall not be construed as a bar in prosecuting any other remedy, if available, for ensuring supply of fertilizers to consumers or for enforcing the right if any the appellants may be possessing to associate themselves with any tendering process intended to be initiated by official respondents in this regard. (3) It may be proper herein to note that the order in the earlier appeals had been passed after the end of winter vacations of this Court. The appellants herein have challenged the order passed by learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar, after the arguments had been heard in the cases referred above and reserved for judgment. (4) It appears from the perusal of record that an agreement had been entered between respondent No.1 herein and the appellants, in terms whereof, the out agency of Udhampur was allotted to the respondent No.1. (4) It appears from the perusal of record that an agreement had been entered between respondent No.1 herein and the appellants, in terms whereof, the out agency of Udhampur was allotted to the respondent No.1. The relevant paras of the agreement dated 15.03.2015 executed between the parties, to appreciate the contentions raised in terms of the instant appeal, are quoted below: 1. The agreement shall be deemed to have come into force w.e.f 02.11.2015 to 01.11.2018 and shall, subject to the provision for earlier termination as herein provided, remain in force for a period of three years. 2. The Railway Administration may in its sole and unfetter discretion, renew the contract for such period as it may in its discretion fix, subject to such additions and alterations as the Railway Administration, may in its sole discretion deem necessary. 3. No change shall be binding on the Railway Administration unless and until the same is enclosed on this agreement. Except as otherwise provided, a verbal or written arrangement, abandoning, varying or supplementing this contract or any of the terms thereof shall be deemed conditional and shall not be binding on the Railway Administration. Unless and until the same is endorsed in this agreement or is 4. The Railway Administration shall have right and be entitled to withhold payment of dues of the contractor under this Agreement, in the event of a breach, in the opinion of the Railway Administration, of any of the terms and conditions of any agreement entered into by the contractor with the President of India through the General Manager, Chief Commercial Manager, Chief Commercial Manager/FM, Divisional Railway Manager, or any other authorized officer of any Railway belonging to the Government of India. 5. Dispute regarding meaning of any clause of agreement. 6. 5. Dispute regarding meaning of any clause of agreement. 6. In the event of any difference of opinion or dispute between the Railway Administration and the contractor as to the respective rights and obligations of the parties hereunder or as to the true intent and meaning of those presents or any articles of conditions thereof, such difference of opinion shall be referred to the sole arbitrator of an officer appointed by the General Manager, Northern Railway for the time being whose decision shall be final, conclusive and binding on the parties, the intention of the parties being that every matter in respect of this agreement must be decided by him as sole arbitrator and not taken to a Civil Court. (5) Precisely, to put forth, the appellants have projected the order passed by learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar, being bad on following counts: A. That the impugned order is against the facts and law and is therefore liable to be set aside. B. That the impugned order depicts gross non-application of judicial mind by learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar and therefore deserves to be set aside. C. That the pleadings as well as record of the petition filed before the Court below, failed to disclose as to who is Sh. Subash Balgotra filing the petition on behalf of “M/S Manoj Ji & Co. Pvt. Ltd.”, which is admittedly a Private Limited Company and as such a specific defence was taken before the Court below was taken that the petition is not filed by a competent person and the same requires to be dismissed and for the said principle. D. That the below has over stepped its jurisdiction u/s 9 of J&K Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1997 by in-fact re-writing and contract between the respondent no. 1 and the appellants/Railways, which was executed by the appellants on behalf of the President of India. E. That the impugned order and the relief sought for by the respondent No.1 in the petition cannot be granted, since the J&K Specific Relief Act, 1977, as amended, applies to application under section 9 of the J&K Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1997. 1 and the appellants/Railways, which was executed by the appellants on behalf of the President of India. E. That the impugned order and the relief sought for by the respondent No.1 in the petition cannot be granted, since the J&K Specific Relief Act, 1977, as amended, applies to application under section 9 of the J&K Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1997. F. That since the J&K Specific Relief Act, 1977, as amended, applies to the mater/controversy and the relief granted by the impugned order could not have been granted u/s 21 (1) (b) & (c) of the J&K Specific Relief Act, 1977, as amended upto date as the contract was of a nature that could not be found with reasonable certainty (or was of a determinable nature) and from its nature, its material terms could not be specifically enforced. G. That the learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar has under the cover of “interim measure” granted the final relief, a course not available under law inasmuch as with the grant of impugned order extending life of the contract and renewing the contract unlawfully usurping the powers of the appellants/railway administration and nothing remains for the appellants to contest and to get adjudication. H. That learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar has proceeded on an erroneous assumption that there was any assurance on part of the competent authority regarding extension of the contract; that learned judge in the impugned order has erroneously referred to communication dated 12.06.2017 as an assurance to extend the contract, but failed to appreciate that the communication dated 12.06.20107 relied upon was not issued by the authority competent to renew the contract in terms of para 11.2 of the contract nor from its contents and form, appearing as a certificate labeled as “To whom it May Concern” could be taken as an assurance by the authority competent to renew the contract and on top of it an assurance could not have been made one and half years before the expiry of the contract; that learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar did not notice that the communication dated 12.06.2017 was manipulated and would not warrant grant of impugned order; that the Learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar has erroneously referred to the orders dated 23.10.2018/24-10-2018 to assume that the contract had been extended by the said order, least realizing that the order dated 24.10.2018/25-10-2018 was issued in compliance of learned Judge’s own order dated 28.09.2018 followed by order dated 13.10.2018 and 20.10.2018, whereby the appellants and respondents No. 2& 3 were repeatedly asked /directed to in effect extend/renew the contract and allow the respondent no.1 to transport fertilizers from Udhampur Rake Point to Kashmir Division. I. That the learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar appears not to have even looked at the objections filed by the appellants herein to the petition under section 9 of the J&K Arbitration & Conciliation Act and in particular the averments that respondent no.1 during the period of contract had failed to smoothly and as per requirements, transport the fertilizers from Udhampur Rake Point to Kashmir Division and the respondent no. 1’s conduct while performing the contract had evoked/ given rise to complainants from the fertilizer companies such as IFFCO, IPL, CFCL and NFL, the farmers and fruit growers and that despite warnings the respondent no.1 had failed to mend his ways and that there were complaints of non-delivery (1024 MT), short delivery, lack of delivery and delivery of damaged fertilizers by the Farmers Unions like All India Kisan Sabha and that there was no dispute at all between the parties referable to Arbitration, let alone make an objective perusal of the objections filed; that the learned Additional District Judge by passing the impugned order has in effect allowed the respondent no.1 to handle sensitive matter i.e. transportation of fertilizers to Kashmir Division, notwithstanding grave complaints of mismanagement, mishandling and misappropriation and rewarded the respondent no.1 for all that was alleged against him not only by the fertilizer companies. J. That the learned Additional District Judge Srinagar has even transgress the jurisdiction vested in it u/s 9 of the Act and has assumed in it, the powers of section 11 of the Act by ordering the appointment of Arbitrator under Clause 16 of eth Contract Agreement entered into between the appellants and the respondent no.1 and on this score also the order impugned is required to be set aside. K. That it is a settled law that extent and scope of relief u/s 9 of the Act cannot extend so as the Court directs a party to specifically perform the contract, so that the party approaching the court has not to go to the arbitrator for breach of contract. Section 9 does not envisages a situation where the order of the court u/s 9 itself settles the disputes between the parties. Neither by the instrumentalities of Section 9, the Court can put the party back into pre-dispute situation and ask the party to comply with the contract. Even under order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC which is referred to as akin to section 9 of the Act, an interim relief cannot be granted which is same as the relief sought in the suit, and which amounts to disposal of the suit itself. Even under order 39 Rules 1 & 2 CPC which is referred to as akin to section 9 of the Act, an interim relief cannot be granted which is same as the relief sought in the suit, and which amounts to disposal of the suit itself. If the court could direct specific performance of the contract u/s 9 of the Act, and could place the parties in the position prior to rising of dispute, no dispute would ever go to the arbitrator and by an interim relief itself, the Court would be finally disposing of all the disputes between the contracting parties by just directing specific performance of the contract, irrespective of the breach on the part of one or the order. L. That it is settled law that before a contract can be ordered to be enforced, it has to be held that compensation in money is not the adequate relief, it cannot be disputed that where a contract which cannot be enforced by a decree for specific performance, the same cannot be negatively enforced by issue of an injunction. (6) In the petition presented under Section 9 of the Act, the points raised for making interim arrangement by respondent No.1 herein had been: (I) That the petitioner company is operating rail way out agency at Srinagar for the transportation of fertilizers for KashmirValley. The out agency/notional rank point of Srinagar is served (linked) through Udhampur railway station; (II) The out agency of Udhampur was allotted through tender system. Being successful tenderer, the out agency was allotted to the petitioner. The contract of the out agency was allotted for an initial period of three years w.e.f. 02.11.2015 with an extension clause; (III) The goods shed at Udhampur railway station is having low level platform and no proper covered space is available. The area of goods shed is located in the terrain of mountain and due to sudden rain, it has the access for rain water and even when the high winds with rain is blowing the fertilizer bags are pruned to absorb moisture from the atmosphere. Despite various representations no action was taken to improve the infrastructure at Udhampur railway station. The area of goods shed is located in the terrain of mountain and due to sudden rain, it has the access for rain water and even when the high winds with rain is blowing the fertilizer bags are pruned to absorb moisture from the atmosphere. Despite various representations no action was taken to improve the infrastructure at Udhampur railway station. The petitioner, in order to overcome from this problem had to produce a number of tarpaulins to ensure that the fertilizers bags are properly covered to avoid any damage to the commodity; (IV) During May, 2017, Senior Divisional Commercial Manager, Firozpur, during a meeting advised the petitioner to procure sufficient number of tarpaulins which should be sufficient to keep the fertilizer bags of 5 to 6 rakes as it may take considerable period for the Railway to provide any proper infrastructure facilities at the railway station. On the basis of formal and written extension of the contract, the petitioner further made huge investments in developing the infrastructure at the request of the respondents therein. The petitioner not only procured more than 1000 tarpaulins but also procured about 50 trucks of 20 tonnes capacity to reduce dependency of the outsiders; (V) Now a decision has been taken by the railways not to have the system of out agency which should be dispensed with. The said decision has been taken under the pressure of some vested interests though the farmers of Kashmir valley were benefited by operation of the out agency coupled with the fact that out agency provided employment to almost 200 locals besides at the time of unloading rake at Udhampur and Srinagar, almost 400 labourers are engaged; (VI) The respondents at the behest of business rivals of the petitioner, intend to take a U turn illegally and for extraneous considerations are in the process to give up with the operation of the out-agency at Srinagar which is against the settled principles of law and if allowed serious prejudice will be caused to the petitioner therein, besides that great financial loss will be caused; (VII) Finally, the respondents issued the communication dated 18.09.2018 whereby the contract allotted to the respondent No.1 (petitioner therein) was cancelled. Endorsement vide communication dated 24.09.2018 was also issued regarding termination of the contract of the respondent No.1(petitioner therein). Endorsement vide communication dated 24.09.2018 was also issued regarding termination of the contract of the respondent No.1(petitioner therein). The dispute as to whether the official respondents after having formally extended the contract and after directing the petitioner therein to make huge investments could take U turn and order cancellation of the contract requires to be resolved by the nominated arbitrator. But till reference is made to the arbitrator the rights and interests of the petitioner therein are to be protected for the time being till the matter is adjudicated upon by the arbitrator; (7) Heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. (8) Learned ASGI, as noted in the earlier round of litigation, submitted that he has instructions on behalf of Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers, Department of Fertilizers, Government of India, to inform the Court that the arrangement which was existing for transportation of fertilizers etc. to Kashmir and in terms of which respondent No.1 had a role to play, does not subsist as the Ministry, in its wisdom, has thought it proper to exclude the role of the Railways and its out agency to avoid any kind of disruption of supply of fertilizers. He has placed a copy of communication dated 11 December, 2018, on file, which sounds that that the Department of Fertilizers has decided to supply all fertilizers to KashmirValley through fertilizer companies directly so as to avoid any kind of disruption of supplies in the larger interests of farming community. (9) Learned counsel for the appellants while being heard reiterated the grounds taken in the appeal and submitted that the order impugned is bad and is required to be set aside. He further submitted that the impugned order depicts gross non-application of judicial mind by court below. The pleadings filed before the court below failed to disclose as to who is Sh. Subash Balgotra filing the petition on behalf of “M/S Manoj Ji & Co. Pvt. Ltd” which, according to him, is, admittedly, a Private Limited Company and in this regard, a specific defence was taken before the Court below that the petition is not filed by a competent person. Reliance in this behalf, has been taken on the judgments in “M/S Schmenger Gmbh and Company Vs. Pvt. Ltd” which, according to him, is, admittedly, a Private Limited Company and in this regard, a specific defence was taken before the Court below that the petition is not filed by a competent person. Reliance in this behalf, has been taken on the judgments in “M/S Schmenger Gmbh and Company Vs. M/S Saddler Shoes Private Limited” decided on 29.10.2018 (Madras High Court), “State Bank of Travancore vs. M/S Kingston Computers (I) Private Limited” decided on 22.02.2011, and “Nayagam Lourd Prakash Vs. Standard Chartered Bank (Andhra Pradesh High Court). He further contended that the court below has over stepped its jurisdiction under Section 9 of the act by, re-writing the contract between the respondent No.1 and appellants. Further, according to him, since the J&K Specific Relief Act, 1977, applies to the applications under Section 9 of the Act, the relief sought for by the respondent No.1 in the petition could not have been granted. Reliance, in this regard, has been placed on the judgments in “Adhunik Steel Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Limited” reported in (2007) 7 SCC 125 and “Arvind Constructions Co. (P) Ltd. Vs. Kalinga Mining Corporation and others” reported in (2007) 6 SCC 798 . (10) Explaining the same, it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that since in terms of amended provisions of Section 21(1)(b)(c) of J&K Specific Relief Act, 1977, the assistance has not to be granted by the Court as the contract was of a nature that could not be found with reasonable certainty (or was of a determinable nature) and from its nature, its material terms could not be specifically enforced. Reliance has been taken on the judgment of the Delhi High Court in “Rajasthan Breweries v. Stroh Brewery Company Limited” reported in AIR 2000 Delhi 450, and on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Indian Oil Corporation v. Amritsar Gas Service” reported in (1991) 1 SCC 533 ”. (11) It is also contended that where a contract which cannot be enforced by a decree for specific performance, same cannot be enforced by issue of an injunction. According to learned counsel for the appellants, even if there is wrongful termination of the contract, the appropriate remedy is an action for damages for breach of contract, if any. (11) It is also contended that where a contract which cannot be enforced by a decree for specific performance, same cannot be enforced by issue of an injunction. According to learned counsel for the appellants, even if there is wrongful termination of the contract, the appropriate remedy is an action for damages for breach of contract, if any. He has taken reliance in this regard on the judgments reported in AIR 2000 Delhi 450, 2005 (118) DLT 591 , 2010 (3) R.A.J. 332, 2010 (3) R. A. J. 350, 1991 (1) SCC 533 and 2011 (5) MLJ 231. (12) Further, according to him, the court below while passing the impugned order has transgressed all the provisions of law governing the Law of Contracts, Specific Relief Act, Arbitration act etc. The above pleas are further substantiated by the fact of lodging of FIR No.RC 1232019A001 dated 17.01.2019 by CBI under Section 120-B read with Section 409 and 420 RPC and Sections 5(2) and 5(1)(c) & (d) of J&K PC Act against the respondent No.1 herein on prima facie establishment of case of misappropriation of thousand metric tons of subsidized fertilizers. (13) On the other hand, Mr. Makhdoomi, learned counsel for the respondent No.1, submitted that the grounds taken in the appeal have been considered and taken due care by the subordinate court. the court below has applied its mind while passing impugned order. The appellants have miserably failed to show and demonstrate any bit of perversity in the impugned order, is being also submitted. The court below has based its findings on each and every limb of the issue by giving sound reasons in support of the issues before it. The out agency (respondent No.1) has submitted ample proof by way of documents before the court below and before this Court in earlier two appeals in which it was pointed out that the performance of Out Agency has been appreciated and applauded both by the State Departments including the then Chief Minister of the State as well as the Railway officials besides the fertilizer companies, is being also canvassed. (14) Mr. Makhdoomi also submitted that the railway agency at one point of time asked the Out Agency to raise the security deposit from Rs.1.00/ to Rs.30.00/ lacs which the Out Agency obliged. (14) Mr. Makhdoomi also submitted that the railway agency at one point of time asked the Out Agency to raise the security deposit from Rs.1.00/ to Rs.30.00/ lacs which the Out Agency obliged. According to him, the moot question arises that why would Railways ask the Out Agency to enhance its security deposit if at all they were not incline to continue with the contract. The demand for enhancement in security deposit from the Out Agency falls exactly in line with the established principles adopted by various departments while considering the extension of contract to the agency/ies. (15) According to Mr. Makhdoomi, what will be the consequence and effect of dismissal of earlier two appeals on the instant appeal, is to be seen at the very inception. In those two appeals, the appellants herein were respondents. The counsel for the appellants herein was also heard in those two appeals and he raised all those grounds and arguments which now he has tried to reiterate in the memo of appeal. The appellants herein have chosen to file the appeal independent of those two appeals and did not opt to file the cross objections as per the mandate of Civil Procedure Code, which, according to him, was the only remedy available to the respondents, if aggrieved of impugned order. According to him, it was only when this Court dismissed the earlier two appeals, the Railway authorities woke up from deep slumber and filed the instant appeal. The pleas not taken have been considered by the Court in earlier set of litigation and a party cannot be permitted to reiterate and re-agitate those grounds, which were considered by the Court at one point of time. The principal of waiver would apply to the conduct of the appellants, which, according to him shows that the present appeal is a camouflaged one, filed at the behest of those persons, who are business competitors of the Out Agency and have succeeded in persuading some railway officials including the appellant No.1, who, in fact has issued communication in favour of the Out Agency for extension of contract by extending promise to make investment, which the Out Agency has made. The appellants cannot be permitted in law to resile and back out from the promise. The Out Agency would be subjected to disadvantage if the position is unilaterally altered. The appellants cannot be permitted in law to resile and back out from the promise. The Out Agency would be subjected to disadvantage if the position is unilaterally altered. The rule of estoppel/acquiescence will also operate the conduct of appellants. (16) Mr. Makhdoomi also contented that the questions which also crops up for consideration of this Court is whether a person who has made commitment with other side and the other side has acted upon such commitment by making huge investments, can be permitted to call in question, the order passed by the court below, in the capacity as appellant, when the Out Agency has laid claim on the express promise made to them by the said appellant i.e. Senior Commercial Divisional Manager. (17) Further it is projected that the argument of the appellants that the court below had no power to extend the contract, was absolutely not the case of the Out Agency before the court below. Out agency had called in question two communications issued by none other than the appellant Senior Commercial Divisional Manager, whereby the contract of the respondent No.1 has been terminated as is obvious from the subject of those two communications. The termination and expiry of contract has two different implications as per the agreement. The appellants are confused as to whether the contract has expired by the efflux of time or the contract has been terminated. They have not been able to come out of that confusion as was quite discernible during the course of arguments. (18) According to Mr. Makhdoomi, the FIR registered by CBI against unknown officials of Railways and the Out Agency is the outcome of some malicious and sponsored design intended to defame the Out Agency unnecessarily. There are four fertilizer manufacturing companies and IFFCO is one amongst them. Had there been any shortfall and/or non-delivery of any consignment of fertilizers during all these years, of any company, would have been brought to the notice of the respondents and/or railways and if no action would have been taken on any such grievance, then the matter ought to have been reported to criminal investigating agency. No such grievance/compliant has ever been raised by any such company except IFFCO which is an afterthought, as the alleged occurrence dates back to the year 2016-17. No such grievance/compliant has ever been raised by any such company except IFFCO which is an afterthought, as the alleged occurrence dates back to the year 2016-17. Subsequent to the alleged shortfall of the consignment as per FIR, same company has further dispatched its fertilizers through railways, which too was transported by the Out Agency to Nowgam, Srinagar destination, which goes to show that the alleged occurrence reported by some unknown source to CBI is intended to browbeat, humiliate and intimidate the agency, which is being operated through Directors, who have high repute in the society. Besides, the FIR is under investigation, the alleged shortfall of fertilizers is very much lying in godown. The communication of IFFCO with Railways and Out Agency and vice versa for reconciliation of stocks bear testimony to the fact that said consignment was substandard as reported by State Agriculture Department after taking same for testing. According to him the efficacy of the said consignment of the product got deteriorated due to inaction of both Railways and IFFCO company. (19) Finally, Mr. Makhdoomi, contended that the argument of the appellants that the application under Section 9 of the Act has been filed by Subash Balgotra, who had no authorization from the company, is absurd in the sense that the application under Section 9 has been filed by the company, namely, “Manoj Ji & Co” which is a private limited company. The company under law is a legal entity that can sue and can be sued and still Mr. Subash Balgotra has an authorization letter of the company. Mr. Makhdoomi, in support of his arguments, placed reliance on the following judgments: (1) The Workmen of CochinPort Trust v. The Board of Trustees of the CochinPort Trust and another ( AIR 1978 SC 1283 ); (2) Newton Hickie and another v. Official Trustee of West Bengal (AIR 1954 Calcutta 506); (3) Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai (Dead by L. Rs. and others v. Mohd. Hanifa (Dead) by L. Rs. and others ( AIR 1976 SC 1569 ); (4) Lal Chand (Dead) by L.Rs and others v. Radha Kishan ( AIR 1977 SC 789 ); (5) M/S NKG Infrastructure v. GRANCO Industries and another. (2018 (5) JKLT 473 (J&K); and (6) Banarsi and others v. Ram Phal ( AIR 2003 SC 1989 ). Hanifa (Dead) by L. Rs. and others ( AIR 1976 SC 1569 ); (4) Lal Chand (Dead) by L.Rs and others v. Radha Kishan ( AIR 1977 SC 789 ); (5) M/S NKG Infrastructure v. GRANCO Industries and another. (2018 (5) JKLT 473 (J&K); and (6) Banarsi and others v. Ram Phal ( AIR 2003 SC 1989 ). (20) In rebuttal, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the contentions raised on behalf of respondent No.1 are without any merit. It is being submitted that the principle of res judicata, on which reliance is placed, would not be applicable to the instant case as the merits in earlier round of litigation were not determined by this Court. It is also his submission that the plea regarding submission of cross objection and not an independent appeal, as raised, is also fallacious as the cross objections may have to be filed by the part interested in case aggrieved of any order if the appeal itself is competent. In this regard, learned counsel for the appellants has taken reliance on the judgment of Supreme Court in “Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors. Vs. Intnl. Security & Intelligence Agency Ltd” (2003 AIR SC 1515). (21) Considered the rival arguments. The judgment earlier passed in AA No.14/2018 c/w AA No.3/2019, in my opinion would not operate as res judicata in the instant case mainly for the reason that no adjudication has taken place on the merits of the controversy between the parties. As noted hereinabove, earlier appeals have failed because of technical reasons. The appellants, in strict sense, could not be termed to be persons aggrieved in terms of Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and so merits were not touched. The plea raised on behalf of respondent No.1, in this regard, requires to be, as such, turned down. Judgement of this in “Syed Jalal-ud-din vs. Sidiq Dar & Anr” (1985 KLJ 497), may be noted in this regard, wherein it has been held that “the basic order of transfer passed by Munsiff was without jurisdiction, therefore, that order would not operate as res judicata”. (22) Similarly, the plea raised by Mr. Judgement of this in “Syed Jalal-ud-din vs. Sidiq Dar & Anr” (1985 KLJ 497), may be noted in this regard, wherein it has been held that “the basic order of transfer passed by Munsiff was without jurisdiction, therefore, that order would not operate as res judicata”. (22) Similarly, the plea raised by Mr. Makhdoomi that because of omission on the part of Railways to file cross objections in the earlier round of litigation in case they had any grievance against the order passed by learned Additional District Judge, is also required to be treated without any substance. The cross objections could be filed only in an appeal which was worth consideration on merits and in which merits of the case had been considered by the Court and the finding returned thereon. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court, as referred by learned counsel for the appellants, in Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors. Vs. Intnl. Security & Intelligence Agency Ltd” (2003 AIRSC 1515), wherein it has been held that the cross objections are maintainable in a valid and validly filed appeal. (23) There is much force in the plea raised on behalf of the appellants that the case as projected before the trial court, if assumed, was worth to be entertained and dispute if any had arisen for settlement in terms of Section 11, the respondent No.1 could be properly compensated at the time finally Arbitral Tribunal returned its finding. It is notable that the agreement entered into between the parties was determinable in nature and so no being enforceable contract at law, the compensation in terms of the Specific Relief Act had been an adequate remedy. This single grounds knocks at the bottom of the contention raised by learned counsel for respondent No.1 and makes the impugned order unsustainable. The interim assistance as granted by learned Additional District Judge, Srinagar, subject to orders to be passed by Arbitral Tribunal was, as such, inapt in the facts and circumstances. The respondent No.1 could adequately be compensated and so the interim arrangement as directed in terms of the impugned order ought not to have been granted. Furthermore, the direction passed by the court below in terms of the impugned order does overreach the main relief and so is not within the parameters of law. The respondent No.1 could adequately be compensated and so the interim arrangement as directed in terms of the impugned order ought not to have been granted. Furthermore, the direction passed by the court below in terms of the impugned order does overreach the main relief and so is not within the parameters of law. Viewed thus, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. The action, if any taken by the appellants, shall, however, remain subject to outcome of final orders to be passed by the Arbitral Tribunal. (24) A copy of this order be sent the court below for information.