DINESHBHAI MOHANBHAI KUVAD v. PURIBEN CHAKUBHAI KATARIA
2019-04-08
B.N.KARIA
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is pending for admission before this Court. As the concurrent findings were given by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Dhoraji in the Special Civil Suit No.68 of 2012 as well as by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Rajkot at Dhoraji in Regular Civil Appeal No.9 of 2017, this appeal is taken up for final hearing. 2. The present appellants, who were the original plaintiffs before the learned trial Court in Special Civil Suit No.68 of 2012 as well as appellants before the first appellate Court in Regular Civil Appeal No.9 of 2017, have challenged the impugned judgments and orders passed on 07.02.2017 and 15.12.2018 respectively. Learned advocate for the appellants has produced relevant documents relied upon by the plaintiffs before the Courts below. 3. The short facts of the present case are as under : 3.1 That, as per the averments made by the plaintiffs in the Suit, father of the plaintiffs namely Mohanbhai in his presence had purchased agriculture land of Survey No.61 of account No.241 from the deceased- Chakubhai Bhagabhai Katariya. That, they were relatives of each other and possession of the land was handed over to the father of the plaintiffs and since then, they are in possession of the land. The measurement of survey no.61 was shown as Acre 3-08 Guntha Hector 1-29-50. 3.2 As per the averments of the plaintiffs, they are in possession of the suit land since last 12 years. The defendants were cousin family members, and therefore, registered document was not executed by them. That, consideration of the land was paid to the father of the defendants, however, no registered document was executed by the defendants. That, on 22.09.2008, a fresh agreement was executed by the defendants with a promise to execute the registered sale deed. However, the same request was made by father of the plaintiffs to execute the sale deed, no response was given by the defendants about execution of registered sale deed of the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, father of the plaintiffs as well as defendants were expired. That, the suit land was transferred in the revenue record in favour of the defendants. That, on 19.09.2012, public notice was issued through advocate, and therefore, plaintiffs have approached through Mansukhbhai Chakubhai, but no satisfactory reply was received by the plaintiffs, and therefore, suit was filed.
Thereafter, father of the plaintiffs as well as defendants were expired. That, the suit land was transferred in the revenue record in favour of the defendants. That, on 19.09.2012, public notice was issued through advocate, and therefore, plaintiffs have approached through Mansukhbhai Chakubhai, but no satisfactory reply was received by the plaintiffs, and therefore, suit was filed. That, since the year 1990 till the execution of the sale deed, plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land and were cultivating the land. That, on account of increasing price of the land, defendants were trying to sale the suit land to the third party. That, it was requested by the plaintiffs to grant permanent injunction restraining the defendants to transfer, sale or assigning rights of the suit land to any other parties as well as to grant declaration to execute the registered sale deed of the said land in favour of the plaintiffs. 3.3. The suit was resisted by the defendants having written statement vide Exh.18 denying contents of the averments made by the plaintiffs in the suit. As per the contention raised by the defendants, the suit was clearly time bared. That, material facts were suppressed by the plaintiffs in the suit. It was denied that any agreement to sale was executed by the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai Katariya in favour of the father of the plaintiffs deceased-Mohanbhai of the suit land i.e. survey no.61 of account no.241 admeasuring Acre 3-08 Guntha Hector 1-29-50. That, deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai Katariya had never executed any agreement to sale to anyone. That, from the beginning possession of the suit land was lying with the defendants. That, the financial condition of the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai Katariya was weak from the beginning and by taking disadvantage of the weak financial condition of the deceased, in the year 1990, signature of the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai Katariya was received and agreement was fabricated in the year 1990. In fact, no agreement to sale was executed about the suit land by the deceased in favour of the deceased-Mohanbhai. That, no registered document was executed by the father of the plaintiffs nor any amount of consideration was paid to the deceased. That, thereafter in the year 2008, no fresh agreement was executed by the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai Katariya. That, in the alleged second agreement of the year 2008, signature of the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai Katariya was over writing.
That, no registered document was executed by the father of the plaintiffs nor any amount of consideration was paid to the deceased. That, thereafter in the year 2008, no fresh agreement was executed by the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai Katariya. That, in the alleged second agreement of the year 2008, signature of the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai Katariya was over writing. That, the signatures of the witnesses were of the same witnesses in the agreement executed in the year 1990. That, no decree of specific performance is granted in favour of the plaintiffs. That, in the revenue record suit land was transferred in favour of the defendants. That, no objection was taken by the plaintiffs in respect of the entry made in the revenue record. That, no request was made by the plaintiffs to execute the sale deed of the suit land in their favour. That, there was no discussion for execution of the sale deed with the plaintiffs. That, to establish the possession of the suit land, plaintiff – Dineshbhai has approached the Court Commissioner to take in writing that he was cultivating the suit land. That, the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest in the suit land. That, no prayer under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act was sought by the plaintiffs. That, no public notice was issued by the defendants to sale the suit land. Hence, ultimately it was requested by the defendants to dismiss the suit as well as interim injunction application filed by the plaintiffs. 3.4 Learned trial Court after framing issues and recording the oral as well as documentary evidences produced by the other side, was pleased to dismiss the suit of the plaintiffs by its judgment and order dated 07.02.2017. The original – plaintiffs, being aggrieved with the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned trial Court, approached the Court of learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Rajkot at Dhoraji by filing Regular Civil Appeal No.9 of 2017. After hearing learned advocates for the respective parties, learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Rajkot at Dhoraji was pleased to dismiss the appeal vide judgment and order dated 15.12.2018. Hence, the plaintiffs have approached this Court by preferring this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4.
After hearing learned advocates for the respective parties, learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Rajkot at Dhoraji was pleased to dismiss the appeal vide judgment and order dated 15.12.2018. Hence, the plaintiffs have approached this Court by preferring this second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 4. Following substantial questions of law are framed for determination of this appeal : A. Whether both the learned courts below have erred in not granting the decree of specific performance to the appellants considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case? B. Whether both the learned courts below have erred in holding that the suit of the appellants is time barred? C. Whether both the learned courts below have erred in not considering the fact that the appellants were always ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement? Question No. D at page – I did not found material question. Learned advocate for the appellants has also requested to consider additional substantial questions of law : 1. Whether the Learned Trial Court as well as the Learned First Appellate Court has committed a substantial error of law in invoking Section 73 of the Evidence Act, 1872 comparing signatures of documents? 2. Whether the Learned First Appellate Court has committed a substantial error of law in failing to frame proper points for determination under Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908? 3. Whether the Learned Trial Court as well as the Learned First Appellate Court has committed a substantial error of law in failing to appreciate that time was not of the essence of the contract and therefore the suit could not be held to be barred by the law of limitation? 5. Heard learned advocate for the appellants. 6. Learned advocate for the appellants has submitted that the impugned judgments and orders passed by both the Courts below are completely contrary to the facts and evidence on record as well as provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. That, both the Courts have not framed proper issues for consideration and determination. That, the original plaintiffs/appellants are always ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement as they are in possession of the land in question. That, the plaintiffs have performed their part of the agreement.
That, both the Courts have not framed proper issues for consideration and determination. That, the original plaintiffs/appellants are always ready and willing to perform their part of the agreement as they are in possession of the land in question. That, the plaintiffs have performed their part of the agreement. That, after execution of the first agreement in the year 1990, there were two fresh agreements operating first agreement at Exh.33. That, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was in time however, both the Courts have committed grave error in not considering the facts of the case. That, the comparison of the signature under Section 73 of the Evidence Act, 1872 was wrongly considered by both the Courts below. That, ignoring provision of Section 73 of the Evidence Act, both the courts have contrary compared the signature. That, under Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no issues were framed by the Courts below for determination of the issue and both the Courts have committed error while passing the impugned judgments and decrees. That, both the Courts should allow the suit as well as appeal for specific performance of contract and hence, it was requested by the learned advocate for the appellants to quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the lower Courts. In support of his arguments, learned advocate for the appellants has relied upon AIR 1922 Calcutta 12, (2006) 5 SCC 340 , (2015) 5 SCC 223 . (2013) 1 GLH 217 , (2010) 2 GLH 551 and (2007) 10 SCC 296 . 7. Having perused the record of the trial Court produced by the appellants arguments advanced by the learned advocate for the appellants, it transpires that in the plaint, paragraph no.2, no date was shown by the plaintiffs when the agreement to sale was executed of survey no.61 of account no.241 admeasuring Acre 3-08 Guntha Hector 1-29-50 in favour of the deceased-Mohanbhai, father of the plaintiffs or possession of the suit land was handed over to the plaintiffs. It is vaguely averred that since last ten years, possession of the suit land was with the plaintiffs and no registered document was executed, as the defendants were retreated to their family. That, the plaintiffs have claimed based on second agreement dated 22.09.2008.
It is vaguely averred that since last ten years, possession of the suit land was with the plaintiffs and no registered document was executed, as the defendants were retreated to their family. That, the plaintiffs have claimed based on second agreement dated 22.09.2008. It is nowhere averred in the plaint that they were ready and willing to perform their part by executing sale deed after first agreement(no date was mentioned). They have not stated about predate in their plaint that for what reason registered sale deed was not executed by the defendants. In the written statement filed by the defendants at Exh.18, defendants have denied execution of agreement to sale in the year 1990 contending that the signature of the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai was obtained on account of his weak financial condition and it was concocted. That, no agreement to sale of the suit land was executed by the deceased-Chakubhai with the deceased-Mohanbhai. That, bogus and concocted contract was created by the plaintiffs. It was also denied that the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit land since last 12 years and registered sale deed was not executed because they were relatives of the plaintiffs. They have clearly denied acceptance of any consideration of the suit land by their father. They also denied about execution of any agreement to sale in the year 2008. That, the suit was time barred. That, names of the defendants were entered in the revenue records and no objections were raised by the plaintiffs, in fact, they are in possession of the suit land. They also denied of issuing any public notice in the news paper. As per their contentions false interpretation of notice was made by the plaintiffs. Ultimately, it was requested by the defendants to dismiss the suit. 8. If we refer documents produced before the trial Court, it appears that first agreement was executed under the signature of Shri Chakubhai Bhagabhai in favour of the Ahir Mohanbhai B. Kuvad. This agreement to sale was produced vide Exh.33. For the first time in the deposition, plaintiff no.1 – Dineshbhai Mohanbhai Kuvad vide Exh.26 has stated that on 25.09.1990 agreement to sale of the suit land was executed by the deceased Ahir Chakubhai Bhagabhai for consideration of Rs.40,000/- in favour of his father late Mohanbhai Bhimabhai Kuvad.
This agreement to sale was produced vide Exh.33. For the first time in the deposition, plaintiff no.1 – Dineshbhai Mohanbhai Kuvad vide Exh.26 has stated that on 25.09.1990 agreement to sale of the suit land was executed by the deceased Ahir Chakubhai Bhagabhai for consideration of Rs.40,000/- in favour of his father late Mohanbhai Bhimabhai Kuvad. That, on account of family relation, fresh agreement to sale of the suit land was executed in the year 1998 and thereafter in the year 2008. This witness has further stated that the amount of consideration was accepted by the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai and possession was handed over to the plaintiffs and only the registration of the document was pending. 9. If we refer agreement to sale (Exh.33), there was no signature of the purchaser late Mohanbhai Bhimabhai. No record was produced by the plaintiffs that father of the plaintiffs had requested to execute the registered sale deed after and later from the date of execution of document at Exh.33. In fact, it appears that no document was executed by the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai. Thereafter, no notice was issued by the father of the plaintiffs showing his readiness and willingness to execute the registered sale deed by the defendants. That, another document was produced vide Exh.34 allegedly executed in the year 1998. No signature of the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai was found in the agreement to sale at Exh.34, but only signature of deceased Mohanbhai Bhimabhai was available on the said document. That, in both the documents vide Exh.33 and Exh.34, amount of consideration was shown as Rs.40,000/-, wherein document (Exh.35), amount of consideration for purchasing the suit land was shown as Rs.60,000/-. That, the plaintiff has also admitted that at the time of execution of the agreement to sale (Exh.35), a request was made to execute the sale deed before 8 to 10 days and after execution of the sale deed a request was made within one or two months, however, no registered sale deed was executed. Thereafter, no notice was issued to the defendants for executing the registered sale deed. This witness has also admitted that the signature of deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai in the documents at Exh.33 and 35 were different. This witness has no idea about amount of consideration for purchase of the suit land. No draft of sale deed was prepared by this witness.
Thereafter, no notice was issued to the defendants for executing the registered sale deed. This witness has also admitted that the signature of deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai in the documents at Exh.33 and 35 were different. This witness has no idea about amount of consideration for purchase of the suit land. No draft of sale deed was prepared by this witness. This witness has stated that specific performance was sought by him on the basis of the agreement to sale executed in the year 1990. There is contrary deposition of this witness in respect of the consideration amount paid to the defendants from document at Exh.33. There was no clear evidence produced by the plaintiff that any amount of consideration was paid by the father of the plaintiffs to the father of the defendants. In the subsequent document at Exh.34, which was relied upon by the plaintiffs, there was no signature of the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai. Without any signature of the seller of land, this document cannot be treated as valid contract or binding to the defendants. That, the witness Hasmukhbhai Nathabhai examined by the plaintiffs has tried to support the case of the plaintiffs of executing the agreement to sale and witness in the document as well as amount paid by the family of the deceased-Mohanbhai Bhimabhai accepting the possession of the suit land. It appears that the deceased-Mohanbhai Bhimabhai was cousin uncle of this witness and plaintiff Dineshbhai Mohanbhai is his cousin brother. That, father of this witness and deceased Mohanbhai Bhimabhai were real brothers. He has also admitted that there was no signature of the deceased Mohanbhai Bhimabhai. This witness has stated that in the year of 1986, when other land was sold by him, at that time, deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai had received consideration amount of Rs.30,000/-. There was no disclosure of this fact in the document at Exh.33. There was no proof of paying Rs.30,000/- available with this witness. He has also admitted that the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai had frequently requested to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. After passing of eight years, subsequent contracts were executed. That, in the document at Exh.34, only signature of Hasmukhbhai Nathabhai, Mohanbhai Bhimabhai and Ram Jina were available. In document at Exh.35, this witness has admitted that name of deceased Chakubhai Bhagabhai was over writing in three pages.
After passing of eight years, subsequent contracts were executed. That, in the document at Exh.34, only signature of Hasmukhbhai Nathabhai, Mohanbhai Bhimabhai and Ram Jina were available. In document at Exh.35, this witness has admitted that name of deceased Chakubhai Bhagabhai was over writing in three pages. There was no written document that the plaintiff Dineshbhai Mohanbhai was cultivating the land. This witness had said that transaction of purchasing suit land was fixed for consideration of Rs.70,000/- however, in the document at Exh.33, amount of consideration was shown at Rs.40,000/- only. There was no evidence available with the plaintiffs that any amount of consideration of suit land was paid to the father of the defendants. This witness has stated that in this procedure, by two installments, amount of Rs.60,000/- was paid to the father of the defendants. It was further stated that amount of Rs.30,000/- was paid to the father of the defendants when the other land was sold in the year 1996. There was contradiction in the deposition of this witness and the document at Exh.33. As per the document at Exh.33, registered sale deed was to be executed on or before Vaishakh Sud Bij of Savant 2047 as and when the purchaser asked at the office of the Sub-Registrar at Dhoraji. 10. The defendant in his deposition at Exh.88, denied about execution of any agreement to sale deed by his father in favour of the deceased-Mohanbhai Bhimabhai in the year of 1990 or accepting any amount of consideration. Exh.33, 34 and 35 were also denied by this witness. Signature of the deceased – Chakubhai Bhagabhai in the document vide Exh.33 was also denied by this witness. The witness Jayantibhai Nathabhai Kataria in his cross examination at Exh.56 has also admitted that the suit land was cultivated by the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai and after his death, the possession was lying with his legal heirs. The possession of the suit land was never handed over to the plaintiffs, which transpires from the evidence produced before the trial Court. For execution of the sale deed of the suit land, no readiness or willingness was shown by the plaintiffs within limitation of time. There was no evidence produced on record by the plaintiffs that they are ready and willing to execute the sale deed except bare words before the Court.
For execution of the sale deed of the suit land, no readiness or willingness was shown by the plaintiffs within limitation of time. There was no evidence produced on record by the plaintiffs that they are ready and willing to execute the sale deed except bare words before the Court. The public notice issued by the defendants of selling suit land was denied by the defendants. It was issued through an advocate under the instructions of the defendants and it was never proved. This notice was published and the witness advocate was not examined by the plaintiffs. From the deposition of the plaintiff and his witnesses, the suit was not filed within the limitation as prescribed under the Limitation Act. 11. If we believe that period of limitation would start from the year 2008, the suit was not filed within three years. Article 54 of the Limitation Act prescribes the limitation of filing the suit for specific performance in case when the time was essence. Learned advocate for the appellant has relied upon the judgment reported in AIR 1922 Calcutta 12 in case of Sarojini Dasi Versus Haridas Ghose wherein Hon’ble High Court has observed as under : “In this connection, reference may be made to the exposition of the methods of proving handwriting given by Jenkins, C. J., in the case of Barindra Rumar v. Emperor (1), which was followed in Pulin Behari v. King-Emperor (2). The ordinary methods of proving handwritings are (i) by calling as a witness a person who wrote the document or saw it written, or who is qualified to express an opinion as to the handwriting by virtue of Section 47 of the Evidence Act; (ii) by a comparison of hand writing as provided in Section 73 of the Evidence Act; and (iii) by the admission of the person against whom the document is tendered, A document does not prove itself, nor is an unproved signature proof of its having been written by the person whose signature it purports to bear. In applying the provisions of Section 73 of the Evidence Act it is important not to lose sight of its exact terms.
In applying the provisions of Section 73 of the Evidence Act it is important not to lose sight of its exact terms. It does not sanction the comparison of any two documents, but requires that the writing with which the comparison is to be made, or the standard writing as it may be sailed, shall he admitted or proved to have been written by the person to whom it is attributed, and next the writing to be compared with the standard or, in other words, the disputed writing, must purport to have been written by the same person, that is to say, the writing itself must state or indicate that it was written by that person. The Section does not specifically state by whom the comparison may be made, though the second paragraph of the Section dealing with a related subject expressly provides by way of contrast that in that particular connection the Court may make the comparison. A comparison of hand writing is at all times as a mode of proof hazardous and inconclusive, and especially when it is made by one not conversant with the subject and without such guidance as might be derived from the arguments of Counsel and the evidence of experts.” 12. In another judgment relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellants reported in (2007) 10 SCC 296 in case of Gannmani Anasuya Versus Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhry wherein it was held in para 29 as under : “29. It was for the High Court to frame appropriate points for its determination in the light of the submissions made on behalf of the Appellants in terms of Or.41 R.31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High Court failed to address itself on the said issue. Thus, apart from Issues Nos.2 and 4, other points which for its consideration including the extent of the share of Plaintiffs and Defendant No.1 were required to be specifically gone into particularly in view of the fact that such a contention had been considered by the learned Trial Judge. Issue Nos.2 and 4, in our opinion, therefore, require fresh consideration at the hands of the High Court.” 13. The judgment reported in (2010) 2 GLH 551 in case of Prajapati Ambaram Nagarbhai and Anr. Versus Prajapati Harjibhai and Ors., this Court has taken view in para 9 which reads as under : “9.
Issue Nos.2 and 4, in our opinion, therefore, require fresh consideration at the hands of the High Court.” 13. The judgment reported in (2010) 2 GLH 551 in case of Prajapati Ambaram Nagarbhai and Anr. Versus Prajapati Harjibhai and Ors., this Court has taken view in para 9 which reads as under : “9. In view of the above and considering the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned appellate Court, it appears that the learned appellate Court has not strictly followed Order 41 Rule 31 of the CPC. The impugned judgment and order passed by the learned appellate Court is absolutely non-reasoned order and even the learned appellate Court has not properly framed the points for determination. To frame the point for determination to the effect that whether the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is illegal, perverse or against the principle of law and is liable to be set aside. It cannot be said that the learned appellate Court has properly framed the points for determination. The learned appellate Court was required to frame the points for determination considering the issues involved in the matter which were dealt with and considered by the learned trial Court. Thus, the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned appellate Court cannot be sustained.” 14. The judgment reported in (2013) 1 GLH 217 in case of Budhabhai Bhikhabhai Parmanand Anr. Versus Shantaben Wd/o. Bhalabhai Becharbhai, this Court in para 4.2 relying upon the judgment reported in (2011) 2 GLR 1429 , has taken a view as under : “The said provisions provide guidelines for the appellate court as to how the court has to proceed and decide the case. The provisions should be read in such a way as to require that the various particulars mentioned therein should be taken into consideration. Thus, it must be evident from the judgment of the appellate court that the court has properly appreciated the facts/evidence, applied its mind and decided the case considering the material on record. It would amount to substantial compliance of the said provisions if the appellate court's judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all important aspect of the matter and the findings of the appellate court are well founded and quite convincing.
It would amount to substantial compliance of the said provisions if the appellate court's judgment is based on the independent assessment of the relevant evidence on all important aspect of the matter and the findings of the appellate court are well founded and quite convincing. It is mandatory for the appellate court to independently assess the evidence of the parties and consider the relevant points which arise for adjudication and the bearing of the evidence on those points. Being the final court of fact, the first appellate court must not record mere general expression of concurrence with the trial court judgment rather it must give reasons for its decision on each point independently to that of the trial court. Thus, the entire evidence must be considered and discussed in detail. Such exercise should be done after formulating the points for consideration in terms of the said provisions and the court must proceed in adherence to the requirements of the said statutory provisions.” 15. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in (2018) 11 SCC 77 in case of Aftaruddin (dead) represented through legal representatives Versus Ramkrishna Datta @ Babul Datta and Others has held that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the High Court cannot exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the concurrent findings of the fact without any question of law much less a substantial question of law arising in the second appeal. The judgment of the High Court was set aside and the judgment of the trial Court was restored. 16. In another case reported in (2018) 11 SCC 554 in case of Dharmabiri Rana Versus Pramod Kumar Sharma and Another, the Appellate Court, after recording the findings confirmed the dismissal of the suit. The High Court also dismissed the Regular Second Appeal holding that it does not contain any substantial questions of law. Hon’ble Apex Court has held that dismissal of the second appeal in absence of substantial questions of law involved therein was proper. 17. In another case reported in (2018) 11 SCC 564 in case of Narendra and Others Versus Ajabrao s/o Narayan Katarre (dead) through legal representatives, it was observed that the High Court in second appeal again appreciated the entire oral evidence and reversed the findings of fact of the First Appellate Court under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In another case reported in (2018) 11 SCC 564 in case of Narendra and Others Versus Ajabrao s/o Narayan Katarre (dead) through legal representatives, it was observed that the High Court in second appeal again appreciated the entire oral evidence and reversed the findings of fact of the First Appellate Court under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Interference in second appeal with finding of fact is permissible where such finding is found to be wholly perverse to the extent that no judicial person could ever record such finding or where that finding is found to be against the settled principle of law or pleadings or evidence. The findings of not proving documents Exh.33, Exh.34 and Exh.35 executed by the father of the defendants and possession of the suit land was lying with the defendants, no consideration was paid to the father of the defendants, comparing signature of the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai in the documents, accepting the possession of the suit land with the defendants by witness of the plaintiff, not proving readiness and willingness of the registered sale deed after 1990, frequent request made to the deceased-Chakubhai Bhagabhai after 1990, no action was taken by the plaintiffs for execution of the registered sale deed are binding to this Court in Second appeal as they are not found perverse. The suit was also clearly barred under Article 54 of the Limitation Act as rightly held by the Court below. 18. As per the view of this Court, the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court were right in not accepting the case of the plaintiffs. The appeal does not involved any substantial questions of law and what is involved is the question of fact and hence, the findings recorded by the trial Court as well as First Appellate Court does not warrant any interference by this Court. Even otherwise, on examining the case of the plaintiffs independently, this Court do not find that they have any case at all. Learned advocate for the appellants however, took this Court through pleadings and the evidences adduced by the parties with a view to show that findings of the fact are not legal and sustainable.
Even otherwise, on examining the case of the plaintiffs independently, this Court do not find that they have any case at all. Learned advocate for the appellants however, took this Court through pleadings and the evidences adduced by the parties with a view to show that findings of the fact are not legal and sustainable. As per view of this Court, it could not be entertained in view of the submissions made by the learned advocate for the appellants in appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 nor can appreciate any oral evidence denovo in this appeal as his submissions were on facts/evidence. It does not permissible under law to crop the evidence at this stage. Moreover, in light of what this Court has held above, this appeal has no merits. In view of the aforegoing discussion, this Court found no merits in this appeal and accordingly, hereby dismissed.