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2019 DIGILAW 333 (GAU)

Markash Jajara v. State of Assam

2019-03-12

M.R.PATHAK, SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO

body2019
JUDGMENT : Songkhupchung Serto, J. 1. We have heard Mr. Azad Ahmed, learned Amicus Curiae for the accused appellant and Ms. Shamima Jahan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State of Assam. 2. This is a jail appeal directed against the judgment and order dated 03.10.2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Jorhat, in Sessions Case No. 188 (J-T)/2015, arising out of Titabar P.S. Case No. 65/2015, wherein the accused appellant was held guilty of having committed murder of a person, namely, late Markush Borja and sentenced to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- with stipulated imprisonment of 6 (six) months on default of payment of the fine amount. 3. Facts leading to the institution of the FIR case, which in turn, led to the registration of the Sessions Case, and the filing of this appeal, briefly stated are as follows; On 29.03.2015, an FIR being Titabar P.S. Case No. 65/2015, under Section 302 of the IPC was registered on receipt of an ejahar submitted by P.W. -8 on the same day at about 10 AM, which stated that at about 5 PM of 28.03.2015, he (the informant) received an information that his younger brother Markush Borja had been assaulted and killed by the accused-appellant with a bamboo stick, inside the later's house, and after receiving the information, he had gone to the house of the accused-appellant and actually found his brother there lying dead. It was also mentioned that his deceased brother was staying with the in-laws since the last 3/4 months. Following the registration of the FIR, one Sri Lileswar Gogoi, a Police Officer posted at Titabar Police Station at that time, was entrusted with the investigation of the case. Accordingly, the Police Officer investigated the case and after all the formalities were completed, the charge sheet under Section 302 of IPC was submitted against the accused-appellant, before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate (M), Titabar, who in turn, committed the same to the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Jorhat. The learned Sessions Judge, on receipt of the same framed the charge under section 302 of IPC. After the charge was framed, the same was read over and explained to the accused- appellant and the accused- appellant pleaded not guilty. Therefore, the trial was taken up by the learned Sessions Judge. The learned Sessions Judge, on receipt of the same framed the charge under section 302 of IPC. After the charge was framed, the same was read over and explained to the accused- appellant and the accused- appellant pleaded not guilty. Therefore, the trial was taken up by the learned Sessions Judge. The prosecution produced and examined as many as 9 (nine) witnesses including the doctor, who performed the autopsy over the dead body of the victim and the Investigation Officer, who investigated the case. Thereafter, the learned Sessions Judge heard the parties and came to the conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to hold the accused appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. Therefore, the accused appellant, was held guilty of the offence charged and sentenced him to the imprisonment and the fine as stated above. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order, the accused appellant has come before this Court through this jail appeal. 4. The case of the prosecution, as submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae, in brief, is that there was no eye witness to the commission of the crime and the prosecution has failed to prove through the circumstantial evidence, beyond reasonable doubt, because, the same lacks corroboration from other evidences. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge has erred in coming to the conclusion that the accused appellant had committed murder of the victim. In order to substantiate his submission, the learned Amicus Curiae took us through the evidence given by PW-8 and submitted that the informant was not an eye witness as per his deposition, therefore, the evidence given by him in no case proves the case of the prosecution. The learned counsel then led us through the deposition of PW-1 and submitted that as per his deposition the witness was not an eye witness to the occurrence of the incident, therefore, his evidence is only hear say and, as such, it cannot be relied upon. The learned counsel also submitted that PW-2 was also not an eye witness since he stated in his deposition that he was informed by the daughter of the accused (wife of the deceased). Therefore, his evidence also does not help the case of the prosecution. The learned counsel also submitted that PW-2 was also not an eye witness since he stated in his deposition that he was informed by the daughter of the accused (wife of the deceased). Therefore, his evidence also does not help the case of the prosecution. Thereafter, the learned counsel also referred to the evidence given by PW-3 and submitted that from the deposition of the witness, it is quite clear that he went to the place of occurrence only after he was informed by one of the villagers. Therefore, he is also not an eye witness and his deposition in anyway cannot help the case of the prosecution. The learned counsel, thereafter, referred to PW-4, the doctor who performed the post mortem over the deceased. However, it appears that the learned counsel has nothing to say on the evidence given by him since he has neither challenged his findings nor the method or the procedure he applied in arriving at the conclusions. In respect of the deposition of the PW-5, the learned counsel submitted that the witness is wife of the accused and mother in-law of the deceased, but, as per her deposition she was not present at the place of occurrence when the incident happened, and she came to know about the same through the mouth of some villagers only. Therefore, she was not an eye witness and her evidence in no way can be accepted as supportive of the case of the prosecution. The learned counsel also referred to the deposition of PW 6, who is none other than the wife of the deceased and submitted that the deceased came to know about the death of her husband only when she returned home at about 4 PM of the day the incident took place. Therefore, she was also not an eye witness. And, further, the fact that she stated in her deposition that her father confessed to her that he had committed the murder of her husband cannot be accepted as evidence since it was made in the presence of the police submitted the learned counsel. Regarding the PW-7 who is the I.O. of the investigation, the learned counsel has not submitted anything. 5. After having taken us through the depositions of the witnesses, the learned counsel further submitted that the seized weapon allegedly used for committing the murder was not proved to be the crime weapon. Regarding the PW-7 who is the I.O. of the investigation, the learned counsel has not submitted anything. 5. After having taken us through the depositions of the witnesses, the learned counsel further submitted that the seized weapon allegedly used for committing the murder was not proved to be the crime weapon. In the absence of such proof, the benefit of doubt would go to the appellant. In support of his submissions, the learned counsel referred to paragraph Nos. 18, 22 and 24 of the judgment passed by this High Court in the case of Anil Nath Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2018 (1) GLT 579. The contents of the paragraph are reproduced below:- "18. Reiterating the law laid down in the case of Kanhaiya Lal (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anjan Kumar Sarma Vs. State of Assam, Crl App 560/2014, dated 23.05.2017, held that in a case where the other links have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the guilt of the accused, the circumstance of last seen together and absence of explanation would provide an additional link which completes the chain. In the absence of proof of other circumstances, the only circumstance of last seen together and absence of satisfactory explanation cannot be made the basis of conviction. 22. Secondly, there is no evidence that the blood stains found in the seized spear matched with the blood samples in the body of the deceased. The mere recovery of spear is not by itself any incriminating circumstance establishing a link between the accused appellant and the cause of death of the deceased because the spear, as alleged, was smeared in blood and yet no forensic examination of the spear and the blood stains has been conducted to ascertain whether the blood stains matched the blood stains of the deceased. In the absence of any proof that blood stains in the spear matched with the blood sample of the deceased it would be unsafe to rely on the proposition that the spear seized from the residence of the accused appellant was used in the killing of the deceased. There is also no evidence that the injury was caused by the said seized spear. ...... 24. The prosecution's burden to establish all the facts by independent proof cannot be relieved because of non-explanation of any particular circumstance by the accused. There is also no evidence that the injury was caused by the said seized spear. ...... 24. The prosecution's burden to establish all the facts by independent proof cannot be relieved because of non-explanation of any particular circumstance by the accused. As laid down in the case of Anjan Kumar Sarma (supra), it is only in a case where the other links have been satisfactorily made out and the circumstances point to the guilt of the accused, the circumstance of last seen together and absence of explanation would provide an additional link which completes the chain. In the absence of proof of other circumstances, the only circumstance of last seen together and absence of satisfactory explanation cannot be made the basis of conviction." 6. The learned counsel further submitted that in a case where the prosecution is relying on circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that motive of the crime is proved. However, in this case, none of the witnesses have revealed the reason or motive behind the killing of the victim. Therefore, the prosecution case is not only weak but without any evidential foundation. In support of his submission, the learned counsel cited the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Sakharam Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (1992) 2 SCC 153 . The contents of the relevant paragraph No. 9 are reproduced below:- "9. There is absolutely no motive on the part of the appellant to murder the deceased. Absence of motive may not be relevant in a case where the evidence is overwhelming but it is a plus-point for the accused in a case where the evidence against him is only circumstantial." 7. The learned counsel also submitted that without eye witness and strong circumstantial evidence, the case of the prosecution in this case at best is of suspicion and suspicion however strong it may be cannot be the basis of conviction in a criminal case. The learned counsel referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Kanhaiya Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 4 SCC 715 in support of his submission. The contents of the relevant paragraph Nos. 8 and 12 are reproduced below:- "8. The prosecution case is that the appellant/accused Kanhaiya Lal committed the murder of Kala by strangulation and threw the body in the well. State of Rajasthan reported in (2014) 4 SCC 715 in support of his submission. The contents of the relevant paragraph Nos. 8 and 12 are reproduced below:- "8. The prosecution case is that the appellant/accused Kanhaiya Lal committed the murder of Kala by strangulation and threw the body in the well. Nobody witnessed the occurrence and the case rests on circumstantial evidence. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances... ...... 12. The circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who committed the crime. There must be something more establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime. Mere non-explanation on the part of the appellant, in our considered opinion, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against the appellant." 8. The learned counsel lastly submitted that in order to qualify as a reliable evidence, extra judicial confession must be proved by the witness with the words exactly or nearly exactly as stated by the one who made the confession. However, in this case, the words of the accused have not been proved by the witnesses, particularly his daughter PW-6. Therefore, the evidence of PW-6 that her father, the accused appellant had confessed to her about the incident cannot be relied upon. The learned counsel, in support of his contention, referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of C.K. Raveendran Vs. State of Kerala reported in (2000) 1 SCC 225 . The contents of the relevant paragraph 4.d.e.f. are reproduced below:- "4.d.e.f. ....There is not an iota of material from which the High Court could have jumped to the aforesaid conclusion and we, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that the conclusion of the High Court that Yeshoda met a homicidal death is wholly erroneous. The contents of the relevant paragraph 4.d.e.f. are reproduced below:- "4.d.e.f. ....There is not an iota of material from which the High Court could have jumped to the aforesaid conclusion and we, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that the conclusion of the High Court that Yeshoda met a homicidal death is wholly erroneous. The extra-judicial confession as deposed by P.W. 15 has not been relied upon by the learned Sessions Judge and High Court also came to the conclusion that it is difficult to rely upon the same, as the exact words or even the words as nearly as possible have not been reproduced by P.W. 15. That apart, as has been stated earlier, even the evidence; of P.W. 15 indicates that Raveendran and he went to arrack shop and consumed liquor, where-after Raveendran disclosed the entire incident and therefore, such statement cannot be said to be a voluntary and truthful one and on the other hand it is the outcome of the consumption of liquor, both by the witness as well as the accused, if at all he can be said to have made the statement. In this view of the matter, the so-called extra- judicial confession has to be excluded from the purview of consideration for bringing home the charge" 9. Against the submission of the learned Amicus Curie, the learned Additional Public prosecutor submitted that though there was no eye witness, the case of the prosecution is strongly supported by the circumstantial evidence, which are linked by unbroken chain of facts and the extra judicial confession made by the accused to his daughter, PW-6. It is also submitted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor that the murder was committed in the house of the accused himself when no one was present and during the time when the victim with his wife were staying with the accused. It is further submitted that all the witnesses including the wife of the accused-appellant had stated that no one except the accused was present at the place of occurrence when they reached the place of occurrence on receiving the information, as such, and, since the accused has not given any explanation as to how the deceased was murdered inside his own house the only conclusion that can be drawn is, no one but the accused had committed the murder of the deceased. The learned PP also submitted that the wife of the deceased had stated in her deposition that her father (the accused- appellant), had confessed before her that he had killed her husband but the witness did not mention about the presence of police at that time. Therefore, this extra judicial confession can be relied upon. She further submitted that PW-1 had also stated that the accused appellant had confessed before the villagers and he also did not mention about the presence of the police when the confession was made, therefore, the evidence given by PW-1 also shows that the extra judicial confession was voluntarily made by the accused appellant. In view of the nature of the confession and the fact that it was made in the absence of police personnel makes the same reliable evidence submitted the learned Addl. PP. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor, in support of her submission, referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Sahadevan and another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (2012) 6 SCC 403 . The contents of the relevant paragraph No. 16 are reproduced below:- "16. Upon a proper analysis of the above-referred judgments of this Court, it will be appropriate to state the principles which would make an extra- judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused. These precepts would guide the judicial mind while dealing with the veracity of cases where the prosecution heavily relies upon an extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused: (i) The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution. (ii) It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful. (iii) It should inspire confidence. (iv) An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence. (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law." 10. (v) For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. (vi) Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law." 10. Now, we shall discuss the evidence given by the PWs; (i) First, coming to the evidence of PW-1, the witness stated that while he was at home, he came to know from the people of the tea estate that the accused had murdered his son-in-law at his residence, and on hearing the same, he went to the house of the accused (place of occurrence) and when he reached, he saw the accused, and the police was informed accordingly and only after the police came, he saw the dead body with injuries over his head. The witness also stated that no one except the accused was present in his house at the time of the occurrence of the crime and he did not come out of fear. The witness further stated that the accused confessed in front of the villagers that he had committed the murder of his son-in-law with a bamboo stick. In his cross-examination, the witness stated that he was not present when the incident took place but only the accused was present inside the house. From the evidence given by this witness, what one can conclude is that he was not present at the place of occurrence of the crime at the time of the commission of the crime, but, he went there on coming to know from the people of the tea estate about the same and, when he reached the place of occurrence, he found only the accused person. Further, it can also be concluded that he heard the accused confessing before the villagers. From the facts and circumstances stated by the witness, it can be concluded that the police were not yet present at the place of occurrence when the confession before the villagers was made by the accused, because when he and the villagers were at the place of occurrence the police have not reached the same. (ii) PW-2 is the garden Sardar of the tea estate where the incident took place. (ii) PW-2 is the garden Sardar of the tea estate where the incident took place. This witness stated that he was at home on that day when the incident took place and the daughter of the accused, i.e., the wife of the victim (PW-6), came to his house and disclosed to him that her husband has been murdered by her own father with a piece of bamboo stick. The witness also stated that on receiving the information, he informed the VDP President and Secretary, who in turn informed the police thereafter. The witness also stated that after giving the information to the two persons, he along with the daughter of the accused went to the house of the accused and found him there (the accused) with the deceased. The witness further stated that thereafter, the police arrived and in his presence, the accused disclosed to police that he had committed the crime and showed the weapon which he used for committing the crime and the same was seized in his presence. He exhibited his signature as Exhibit 1.1. He also identified the bamboo stick (Exhibit 1), which was alleged to have been used by the accused in the commission of the offence. In his cross examination, the witness stated that the deceased married the daughter of the accused, 5 (five) years ago and the deceased and his wife used to reside in the house of the accused. He also stated that the accused used to consume alcohol but he was not sure whether he use to threaten his wife or not. The witness also stated that his house is located just about 55 ft. away from the house of the accused and he immediately came to the place of occurrence with the wife of the deceased after she informed him about the incident. He also stated that thereafter, he informed the VDP President and Secretary who informed the police. The evidence given by this witness corroborates the evidence of PW-1 that the accused was the only person present at the place of occurrence. From his evidence, it can also be inferred that it was only after he was informed about the incident by the wife of the deceased that he informed the VDP President and Secretary, who, in turn, informed the police. From his evidence, it can also be inferred that it was only after he was informed about the incident by the wife of the deceased that he informed the VDP President and Secretary, who, in turn, informed the police. Further it can also be inferred that he and the wife of the deceased were the first to reach the place of occurrence and met the accused before anybody including the police reached the same. (iii) PW-3, the witness stated that his house was situated at a distance of about 2 KM away from the place of occurrence but he knew the deceased and the accused both. The witness also stated that on the day of the incident, he was at home and while he was there, he was informed by one of the villagers that the accused committed murder of the deceased. And on received of the information, he went to the place of occurrence and, when he reached the accused was present there and he also found the dead body lying on the floor of the house. The witness, thereafter stated that it was then that, he informed the Police Officer of Titabar Police Station about the incident. And, it was only thereafter that the police arrived at the place of occurrence. He also stated that the accused was questioned and he disclosed to the police in his presence that he had committed the murder of his son-in-law with a piece of bamboo. The witness also stated that the accused showed the weapon of offence to the police and the same was seized. He exhibited his signature on the Exhibit 1, the material exhibit - the bamboo stick used in the commission of the offence. In his cross-examination, the witness stated that he does not know under what circumstances the incident took place but, he was only informed about the incident. From the deposition of this witness, two pertinent facts can be determined. First is that he was the one who informed the police, and second that the accused was present at the place of occurrence. From the deposition of this witness, two pertinent facts can be determined. First is that he was the one who informed the police, and second that the accused was present at the place of occurrence. The evidence of this witness, corroborates the evidence given by PW-1 and PW-2 that the accused was present at the place of occurrence that is his own house and he was the one who informed the police about the incident and it was only after his information that the police came to the place of occurrence. (iv) PW-4 is the Medical Officer, who conducted the post-mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased victim. The witness stated that on 29.03.2015, as per the requisition of the police, he conducted the post mortem examination over the dead body of the victim and on examination of the same, he found the following:- "1. Laceration of size 7 cm x 1 cm x muscle deep is present over right forehead, 3 cm from mid-line and 2.5 cm above eyebrow. 2. Laceration of size 2 cm x 1 cm x muscle deep is present deep is present over left mastoid region. 3. Laceration of size 2 cm x 1 cm x muscle deep is present is just below the chin and placed obliquely. No ligature mark is detected around the neck. On dissection underlying neck tissues are found to be health. Scalp, skull and vertebrae - Scalp on dissection, contusion of size 12 cm x 8 cm is present over the right of fronto - parietal region. Another contusion of size 14 cm x 8 cm is present over left parieto -occipital region. Skull- A tissue fracture of length 6 cm is present on left parietal bone posteriorly. Another tissued fracture of length 8 cm is present on right occipital bone. Vertebrae is healthy. In my opinion, the cause of death was due to coma as a result of injury sustained over the head as described. All the injuries were ante-mortem caused by blunt force impact. Time since death is approximately 12 to 24 hours. The injury sustained over the head by the deceased is fatal to cause instantaneous death. Vertebrae is healthy. In my opinion, the cause of death was due to coma as a result of injury sustained over the head as described. All the injuries were ante-mortem caused by blunt force impact. Time since death is approximately 12 to 24 hours. The injury sustained over the head by the deceased is fatal to cause instantaneous death. The injury may also be caused due to fall on hard substance." In his cross-examination, the witness stated that the time of the death was about 24 hours before and the injury sustained was due to fall of hard substance. From the evidence given by the witness, what one can make out is that the deceased sustained injuries over his head and there were contusions on two places, one was of the size 12 cm x 8 cm over the right of fronto-parietal region, and the other was of the size 14 cm x 8 cm over left parieto-occipital region. Further, one can also make out that on his skull, there was a tissue fracture of the length of 6 cm on the left parietal bone posteriorly and another tissue fracture of the length of 8 cm on the right occipital bone. It appears from the injuries that they were caused by blunt and heavy weapon and death of the victim was caused by the same. And this goes to show that the prosecution's case that the deceased was killed by the accused-appellant with a bamboo stick is true and not a mere concoction (v) PW-5 is the wife of the accused. The witness stated that when she was informed about the incident, she was at the office of the tea estate to get the family ration. She also stated that she was informed that the accused had committed the murder of her son-in-law and when she came back to the house, she could not enter inside the house due to fear but entered only after the police arrived. The witness further stated that she did not see the dead body of her son-in-law, who was taken by the police for post-mortem examination. From the deposition of the witness, it appears that she was not an eye witness to the incident but was present at the place of occurrence only when she came back from the tea estate office and, entered her house only after police arrived. From the deposition of the witness, it appears that she was not an eye witness to the incident but was present at the place of occurrence only when she came back from the tea estate office and, entered her house only after police arrived. The only evidence that can be drawn from this deposition of the PW-5 is that the deceased was at the residence of the accused and his dead body was taken by the police for post-mortem examination from there. (vi) PW-6 is the daughter of the accused and wife of the deceased. The witness testified that she and her husband were staying in the house of her parents at that time as their parents were not physically well. The witness further testified that on the date of the incident, she was at her work place but when she returned home at about 4 PM, she came to know that her husband has been murdered by her own father. She also stated that she entered the house when the police arrived and noticed the dead body of her husband lying on the floor of the house. The witness also stated that she questioned her father about the incident and he confessed to her that he had murdered her husband. In her cross-examination, she stated that she did not know anything about the incident and she was not present at that time. She also stated that her husband was an alcoholic and prior to the date of the incident, he use to quarrel with her as well as her father after consuming alcohol. She also affirmed in her cross-examination that her father killed her husband with a piece of bamboo. From the evidence of this witness, what can be concluded is that she came back to her house at about 4 PM when she came to know about the death of her husband and when she was at the place of occurrence she asked her father about the incident and her father confessed to her that he had committed the murder. This evidence of the witness is trustworthy, firstly because though the accused-appellant is her own father she had testified as she deed. If it were not true she would not have testified against her own father. This evidence of the witness is trustworthy, firstly because though the accused-appellant is her own father she had testified as she deed. If it were not true she would not have testified against her own father. Under the facts and circumstances one can safely assumed that the witness had given the evidence against her own father as compelled by the truth itself and pressed down by the weight of moral responsibility. Further, taking note of the evidence given by this witness along with the evidence given by PW-2 and PW-3, one can come to the conclusion that this witness was the first person to arrive at the place of occurrence and after she came to know about the facts regarding the murder of her husband by her own father from her father himself she went to the house of PW-2 and informed him about it and the later came along with her to the place of occurrence and, it was only thereafter that he informed PW-1, the President and Secretary of the VDP, who in turn, informed the police. Moreover, it can also be concluded that the police came only thereafter. This fact is also supported by the evidence of PW-7, the I.O. of the case, who stated that he made the G.D entry at 6.30 PM, and only thereafter, went to the place of incident. Exhibit 3 shows that G.D. entry was made at 6.30 PM. This would further mean that the police arrived at the place of occurrence at about 7 PM only. This conclusion about the arrival time of the police to the place of occurrence is further supported by the time that is most likely to be taken for covering the distance between the place of occurrence and the Police station which is stated to be about 15 Kms taking into account our road conditions. All these taken together, particularly, the time gap between the time the PW-6 arrived at the place of occurrence and the time the police arrived at the same place shows that the extra judicial confession was made by the accused appellant to his daughter, PW-6, before the arrival of the police at the place of occurrence. In fact, the GD Entry (Exhibit 3) shows that the information was received at 6.30 in the evening. In fact, the GD Entry (Exhibit 3) shows that the information was received at 6.30 in the evening. These only shows that the extra judicial confession was made to the PW-6 by her father before the police arrived at the place of occurrence. One more important fact that is revealed by the deposition of this witness is that her husband was alcoholic or in the habit of drinking and whenever he does so he was used to quarrelling with her and even with her father. From this, one can also conclude that the motive or the reason for the murder was to keep away the deceased forever. (vii) PW-7, this witness is the Investigation officer, who conducted the investigation of the case. As stated, the witness deposed that at about 5 PM of 28.03.2015, through a telephone call one Mohon Goala (PW-1) informed him that the accused has murdered his son-in-law with the help of a bamboo lathi. The witness also stated that on receipt of the information, he made G.D. Entry No. 733/15 dated 28.03.2015, which was exhibited as Exhibit 3. He also stated that after the G.D. entry was made, the Officer-in-Charge of the police station entrusted him with the investigation and accordingly, he went to the place of occurrence and found the body of the deceased in the courtyard of the accused. He further stated that he found the accused sitting near the dead body of the deceased. The witness also stated that he recorded the statement of the witnesses, held inquest over the dead body of the deceased and thereafter took the dead body for post mortem examination. The witness exhibited the inquest report as Exhibit 4(1). He further deposed that he seized the bamboo piece as shown by the accused and exhibited the same as Exhibit 1 and his signature as Exhibit 1(2). The witness further testified that he prepared the sketch map of the place of occurrence and exhibited the same as Exhibit 5. Lastly, the witness stated that he submitted the charge sheet after the investigation was completed. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he found no eye witness to the incident. From the deposition of the witness what can be made out is that the information was received at about 5 PM of the day the incident took place and the G.D. entry was made at 6.30. In his cross-examination, he admitted that he found no eye witness to the incident. From the deposition of the witness what can be made out is that the information was received at about 5 PM of the day the incident took place and the G.D. entry was made at 6.30. It can also be concluded that the I.O. went to the place of occurrence only thereafter and reached the same at around 7 PM. Further, what can be made out from the deposition of the witness is that he conducted the inquest over the dead body and the post mortem examination was conducted on his requisition and the charge sheet was submitted along with all the relevant documents. (viii) PW-8 is the brother of the deceased victim. The witness stated that the place of occurrence is the house of the accused and the incident took place when his younger brother, i.e., the deceased, was staying in the house of the accused. The witness also stated that he was not present when the incident took place. He also stated that he heard about the news at about 2 PM and on hearing, he went to the house of the accused and, on reaching the place, he was told by people, who were present there that his younger brother was assaulted with a piece of bamboo by the accused. The witness further stated that on reaching the place of the occurrence, he saw his younger brother lying on the floor and the accused and his family members present there. The witness further stated that only the accused and the deceased were present at the place of the occurrence at the time of the incident. He also stated that he informed the police regarding the incident and, thereafter, the police came and took the dead body for post mortem examination. He also identified the piece of bamboo, which was exhibited as Exhibit 1 as the weapon by which his brother was assaulted. In his cross-examination, the witness stated that the ejahar was written as per his statement. He also stated that he was not an eye witness to the incident. The witness also stated that the deceased was not in the habit of raising commotion under influence of liquor. In his cross-examination, the witness stated that the ejahar was written as per his statement. He also stated that he was not an eye witness to the incident. The witness also stated that the deceased was not in the habit of raising commotion under influence of liquor. He denied the suggestion put to him that his younger brother, the deceased victim, was not at the house of the accused at the time of the incident and the accused did not call him to stay with him. What can be concluded from the deposition of this witness is that he was not an eye witness to the incident but, went to the place of occurrence on receiving the information from his co-villagers and, after gathering the information, he lodged the ejahar. One more thing that can be considered from the deposition of the witness is that the deceased was in the house of the accused during the relevant time on the invitation of the later who was not well. (ix) PW-9 is the person who reduced in writing the ejahar based on the facts and circumstances stated by the informant. He stated that he wrote the ejahar on the facts and circumstances narrated by Well Borja, who is the informant. He also stated that after having written the ejahar he read over the same to the informant and the informant put his signature on the same in his presence. The witness identified his signature as Exhibit 6(1) and the ejahar (Exhibit 6). The witness further stated that he did not know the accused. The PW was not cross-examined. As per the statement of this witness, the conclusion that can be drawn is that the ejahar of the case was lodged by the informant after this witness reduced in writing the narration of the informant about the incident and the machinery of the criminal law started moving only thereafter. 11. In recapitulation, the facts which have been established by the evidence given by the witnesses are as follows:- (i) That on the day and at the time the occurrence took place, the deceased victim and his wife, PW-6, were staying together with the accused and his wife, PW-5 in their house, and when the incident occurred only the accused and the deceased victim were present at the place of occurrence, i.e. the house of the accused. Secondly, that the wife of the deceased victim was at her work place when the incident took place and she came to know about the incident only when she returned home around 4 PM and, the fact that her father, the accused had murdered her husband was disclosed to her by her father himself. Further, the fact that the accused made the disclosure to his daughter, i.e. PW-6, before the police came to the place of occurrence can also be inferred from the following facts:- (a) She was the first to reach the place of the occurrence at 4 PM when nobody was there at that time except her father, as her mother was away from the house to purchase ration at the tea estate office. This is supported by the evidence of PW-2, who stated that PW-6 came to his house and informed him that her husband had been murdered by her father with a piece of bamboo lathi and accordingly, he informed the VDP President and Secretary who informed the police. From the evidence of this witness, it is also evident that he and PW-6 went to the place of occurrence as soon as he was informed. (b) The Exhibit 3 shows that after the information was received by the police G.D. entry was made at 6.30 PM on 28.03.2015 and it was thereafter only that the police went to the place of occurrence. Further from the First Information Report, it can be seen that the distance between the police station and the place of occurrence is 15 kms; as such, it will take at least 20 to 30 minutes to reach the place of occurrence by vehicle. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the confession made to his daughter by the accused appellant was before the arrival of the police. Taking note of human nature, in all probabilities, wife of the victim would have naturally asked her father, who was the only person present at the place of occurrence, as to what had happened to her husband and how the incident had taken place at the very beginning of their meeting at the place of occurrence. Therefore, we have no doubt on the veracity of the evidence of PW-6 that her father had confessed to her that he had killed her husband. Therefore, we have no doubt on the veracity of the evidence of PW-6 that her father had confessed to her that he had killed her husband. (c) Furthermore, the fact that the accused confessed before the villagers that he had committed the murder of his son-in-law with the help of bamboo lathi as testified by PW-1 is also supported by the facts we have indicated above because by the time, PW-6, PW-2, PW-3 and the other witness' arrived at the place of occurrence, the other villagers would have also surely arrived on hearing about the incident taking into account the fact that the place of occurrence is in a village/tea estate area, and when they arrived, the police would not have arrived as yet as there was a lot of time gap between the time the PWs reached the PO and the police reached the same as stated above. Because of the reasons stated above we have no reason to doubt on the truthfulness of the evidence given by PW-6 and PW-1. 12. It is true that none of the witnesses are eye witness to the incident. However, the fact that the accused appellant had confessed to his own daughter, i.e., PW-6, about the incident and to the villagers which is well supported by evidence as already discussed and, the fact that only the accused-appellant and the victim were there at the place of occurrence at the time of the incident which is also well supported by evidence, we are of the view that the murder could not have been committed by any other person than the accused-appellant. In a case like this where the crime took place in the secret of the house of the accused himself, it would be unreasonable to expect the prosecution to prove its case with mathematical precision. The duty of prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of doing so having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. When sufficient evidence has been given to the extent it is possible on the circumstances of the case, it is for the accused in whose knowledge the incident had happened to prove that it was not he who committed the offence. If it is not done Presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would be against him. When sufficient evidence has been given to the extent it is possible on the circumstances of the case, it is for the accused in whose knowledge the incident had happened to prove that it was not he who committed the offence. If it is not done Presumption under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would be against him. In this case, the accused appellant was given the opportunity to explain under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. However, he offered no explanation. Therefore, taking together all the circumstances, which are supported by the evidence of the witnesses, we are of the considered view that the accused appellant's appeal has no merit. The Courts in criminal trial does not sit merely to see that no innocent man is punished but also to see that a guilty man does not escape and both are public duties. To make our points clearer we may re-produce all the relevant portions of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of Trimukh Maroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court had discussed several decisions rendered by the Court in cases decided earlier. The relevant paragraphs are at paragraph Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21 and 22. The contents of the relevant paragraph are as follows:- "14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution 1944 AC 315 quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution 1944 AC 315 quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab v. Karnail Singh The law does not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision and it reads: "(b) A is charged with traveling on a railway without ticket. The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him. 15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation. 16. A somewhat similar question was examined by this Court in connection with Section 167 and 178-A of the Sea Customs Act in Collector of Customs, Madras & Ors. v. D. Bhoormull and it will be apt to reproduce paras 30 to 32 of the reports which are as under: "30. It cannot be disputed that in proceedings for imposing penalties under Clause (8) of Section 167 to which Section 178-A does not apply, the burden of proving that the goods are smuggled goods, is on the Department. v. D. Bhoormull and it will be apt to reproduce paras 30 to 32 of the reports which are as under: "30. It cannot be disputed that in proceedings for imposing penalties under Clause (8) of Section 167 to which Section 178-A does not apply, the burden of proving that the goods are smuggled goods, is on the Department. This is a fundamental rule relating to proof in all criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings, where there is no statutory provision to the contrary. But in appreciating its scope and the nature of the onus cast by it, we must pay due regard to other kindred principles, no less fundamental, of universal application. One of them is that the prosecution or the Department is not required to prove its case with mathematical precision to a demonstrable degree; for, in all human affairs absolute certainty is a myth, and as Prof. Brett felicitously puts it - ''all exactness is a fake". El Dorado of absolute proof being unattainable, the law, accepts for it, probability as a working substitute in this work-a-day world. The law does not require the prosecution to prove the impossible. All that it requires is the establishment of such a degree of probability that a prudent man may, on its basis, believe in the existence of the fact in issue. Thus, legal proof is not necessarily perfect proof; often it is nothing more than a prudent man's estimate as to the probabilities of the case. 31. The other cardinal principle having an important bearing on the incidence of burden of proof is that sufficiency and weight of the evidence is to be considered - to use the words of Lord Mansfield in Blatch v. Archer (1774) 1 Cowp. 63 at p. 65 "according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to prove, and in the power of the other to have contradicted". Since it is exceedingly difficult, if not absolutely impossible for the prosecution to prove facts which are especially within the knowledge of the opponent or the accused, it is not obliged to prove them as part of its primary burden. 32. Smuggling is clandestine conveying of goods to avoid legal duties. Secrecy and stealth being its covering guards, it is impossible for the Preventive Department to unravel every link of the process. 32. Smuggling is clandestine conveying of goods to avoid legal duties. Secrecy and stealth being its covering guards, it is impossible for the Preventive Department to unravel every link of the process. Many facts relating to this illicit business remain in the special or peculiar knowledge of the person concerned in it. On the principle underlying Section 106, Evidence Act, the burden to establish those facts is cast on the person concerned; and if he falls to establish or explain those facts, an adverse inference of facts may arise against him, which coupled with the presumptive evidence adduced by the prosecution or the Department would rebut the initial presumption of innocence in favour of that person, and in the result prove him guilty. As pointed out by Best in 'Law of Evidence', (12th Edn. Article 320, page 291), the "presumption of innocence is, no doubt, presumptio juris; but every day's practice shows that it may be successfully encountered by the presumption of guilt arising from the recent (unexplained) possession of stolen property", though the latter is only a presumption of fact. Thus the burden on the prosecution or the Department may be considerably lightened even by such presumption of fact arising in their favour. However, this does not mean that the special or peculiar knowledge of the person proceeded against will relieve the prosecution or the Department altogether of the burden of producing some evidence in respect of that fact in issue. It will only alleviate that burden to discharge which very slight evidence may suffice. 17. The aforesaid principle has been approved and followed in Balram Prasad Agrawal v. State of Bihar and Ors. where a married woman had committed suicide on account of ill-treatment meted out to her by her husband and in-laws on account of demand of dowry and being issueless. 18. The question of burden of proof where some facts are within the personal knowledge of the accused was examined in State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar and Ors. In this case the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased Mahesh from the house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the accused and took him away at about 2.30 in the night. Next day in the morning his mangled body was found lying in the hospital. In this case the assailants forcibly dragged the deceased Mahesh from the house where he was taking shelter on account of the fear of the accused and took him away at about 2.30 in the night. Next day in the morning his mangled body was found lying in the hospital. The trial Court convicted the accused under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC and sentenced them to 10 years RI. The accused preferred an appeal against their conviction before the High Court and the State also filed an appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for murder charge. The accused had not given any explanation as to what happened to Mahesh after he was abducted by them. The learned Sessions Judge after referring to the law on circumstantial evidence had observed that there was a missing link in the chain of evidence after the deceased was last seen together with the accused persons and the discovery of the dead body in the hospital and had concluded that the prosecution had failed to establish the charge of murder against the accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt. This Court took note of the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and laid down the following principle in paras 31 to 34 of the reports: "31. The pristine rule that the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused should not be taken as a fossilised doctrine as though it admits no process of intelligent reasoning. The doctrine of presumption is not alien to the above rule, nor would it impair the temper of the rule. On the other hand, if the traditional rule relating to burden of proof of the prosecution is allowed to be wrapped in pedantic coverage, the offenders in serious offences would be the major beneficiaries and the society would be the casualty. 32. In this case, when the prosecution succeeded in establishing the afore-narrated circumstances, the court has to presume the existence of certain facts. Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption is a course recognised by the law for the court to rely on in conditions such as this. 33. Presumption of fact is an inference as to the existence of one fact from the existence of some other facts, unless the truth of such inference is disproved. Presumption of fact is a rule in law of evidence that a fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as the most probable position. The above principle has gained legislative recognition in India when Section 114 is incorporated in the Evidence Act. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process the court shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct etc. in relation to the facts of the case. 34. When it is proved to the satisfaction of the court that Mahesh was abducted by the accused and they took him out of that area, the accused alone knew what happened to him until he was with them. If he was found murdered within a short time after the abduction the permitted reasoning process would enable the court to draw the presumption that the accused have murdered him. Such inference can be disrupted if the accused would tell the court what else happened to Mahesh at least until he was in their custody. 19. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court while maintaining the conviction under Section 364 read with Section 34 IPC reversed the order of acquittal under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and convicted the accused under the said provision and sentenced them to imprisonment for life. 21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence where no eye- witness account is available, there is another principle of law which must be kept in mind. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. The principle is that when an incriminating circumstance is put to the accused and the said accused either offers no explanation or offers an explanation which is found to be untrue, then the same becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances to make it complete. This view has been taken in a catena of decisions of this Court. [See State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 (para 6); State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 (para 40); State of Maharashtra v. Suresh (2000) 1 SCC 471 (para 27); Ganesh Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 731 (para 15) and Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. (1995) 3 SCC 574 (para 4)]. 22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission of crime they were seen together or the offence takes placed in the dwelling home where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 2077 it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with 'khokhri' and the fact that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of Maharashtra (1992) 3 SCC 106 the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The mere denial of the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation were held to be inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. In State of U.P. v. Dr. In State of U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 the medical evidence disclosed that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that time. The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that the husband ill-treated her and their relations were strained and further the evidence showed that both of them were in one room in the night. It was held that the chain of circumstances was complete and it was the husband who committed the murder of his wife by strangulation and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court acquitting the accused and convicted him under Section 302 IPC. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 the wife was found dead in a hut which had caught fire. The evidence showed that the accused and his wife were seen together in the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the roof when the hut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case of accidental fire which resulted in the death of his wife and a daughter. The medical evidence showed that the wife died due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of burn injuries. It was held that there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion that it was the accused (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime." 13. Though the above given paragraphs of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made sufficiently clear that in a case like the present one, where no eye witness was there but the dead body was found in the precinct of the house of the accused himself and no one but accused alone was present and no explanation convincing enough on the facts and circumstances of the case is given by the accused, presumption has to be drawn against him, we may also add another judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of State of A.P. Vs. Gangula Satya Murthy reported in (1997) 1 SCC 272 . The contents of the relevant paragraph No. 21 are reproduced below:- "21. Gangula Satya Murthy reported in (1997) 1 SCC 272 . The contents of the relevant paragraph No. 21 are reproduced below:- "21. The fact that body of (Satya Vani) was found on the cot inside the house of the respondent is a very telling circumstance against him. Respondent owed a duty to explain as to how a dead body which was resultant of a homicide happened to be in his house. In the absence of any such explanation from him the implication of the said circumstance is definitely adverse to the respondent." 14. In view of the facts and circumstances, which are well supported by the witnesses, we disagree with the submission of the learned Amicus Curiae that the conviction of the accused appellant was based on suspicion only. We also disagree with the submission of the learned counsel that the word of the "confession" has to be recorded in the exact words of the accused specifically when it is extra judicial confession. At para 8 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court passed in the case of Ajay Sing Vs State of Maharashtra reported in (2007) 12 SCC 341 , it has been stated that thought it is not necessary that the witness should speak the exact words, but there cannot be vital and material difference. This very sentence shows that it is not necessary that the witness should give the exact words spoken by the accused who confessed but it would be sufficient if the material and vital parts of the confession has been stated by the witness. In this case, under the facts and circumstances, the fact that the PW-6 has stated in her deposition that her father confessed to her that he had murdered her husband when she questioned him is sufficient enough as the same is clear, specific, unambiguous and trustworthy. 15. Another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was delivered by a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges in the case of Mulk Raj Vs State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1959 SC 902 , stated at para 11 as follows:- "An extra judicial confession, if voluntarily made, can be relied upon by the Court, along with the other evidence in convicting the accused. The confession will have to be proved just like any other fact. The confession will have to be proved just like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to the confession just like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it is made. It is true that the Court requires the witness to give the actual words used by the accused as merely as possible, but is not an invariable Rule that the Court should not accept the evidence, if not the actual words, but the substance were given. It is for the Court having regard to the credibility of the witness, his capacity to understand the language in which the accused made the confession, to accept the evidence." 16. In the present case, it is the daughter of the accused-appellant himself who testified that the accused-appellant had confessed to her that he had killed her husband. In normal human circumstances it is not likely that one's own daughter would testify against her own father. The fact that it has been done in this case shows that nothing but the truth has been stated by the witness(the daughter). Therefore, we find is no reason to suspect the veracity of the witness. 17. Further, the PW-6 (daughter of the accused) stated that "I questioned my father about the incident and he confessed before me that he had murdered my husband" and PW-1 has stated that "the accused confessed before the villagers that he had committed the murder of his son-in-law with the help of bamboo lathi. The statements of the two witnesses are simple, clear and unambiguous and they clearly conveyed that the accused appellant had confessed that he had committed the murder of the victim deceased. It is true that the exact words of the accused appellant were not stated by the two witnesses but the material substance of the fact stated by the accused have been conveyed. Moreover, the defence did not question the two witnesses on the same and not even tried to either controvert or discredit their statement. Thus, we find no reason not to believe the statement of the witnesses. Moreover, the defence did not question the two witnesses on the same and not even tried to either controvert or discredit their statement. Thus, we find no reason not to believe the statement of the witnesses. Further, the confessional statement of the accused as stated by the two witnesses is well supported by the circumstantial evidence that the incident took place in the precinct of the house of the accused- appellant himself and, the accused-appellant was alone with the death body of the victim at the time of the incident. 18. In view of the above discussion, we find no reason to interfere with the decision of the learned Trial Court. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 19. Send back the case records to the Trial Court along with a copy of this judgment. A copy of this judgment also be forwarded to the Superintendent of Central Jail, Jorhat for his onward communication to the appellant. 20. Before parting with the judgment, we express our appreciation to the assistance rendered by Mr. Azad Ahmed, learned Amicus Curiae and we direct the Gauhati High Court Legal Service Committee to pay him a sum of Rs. 7,500/- towards his professional fees.