JUDGMENT 01. Petitioner, a constable in Border Security Force, has questioned order No.ESTT/44 BN/Dismissal/SS/2001 dated 05.01.2002 vide which he was dismissed from service. A direction is also sought for setting aside the same and also for his reinstatement on the post of Constable treating the period from the date of his dismissal till the date of joining as on duty. 02. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was posted in F-Coy of 44 Bn BSF and deployed at BOP Amudia where it is alleged that he committed offences under Sections 20(a), 20(b) and 25 of BSF Act. Since he pleaded not guilty to the charges, therefore, Summary Security Force Court trial was fixed on 05.01.2002. Summary Security Force Court found him guilty of all the charges and he was sentenced to be dismissed from service vide order dated 06.02.2002. 03. Respondents in their preliminary objections have stated that the present petition cannot be entertained on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, as no cause of action has accrued to the petitioner within the jurisdiction of this Court. It is submitted that the petitioner was tried in West Bengal at 44 Bn BSF HQ Digberia and promulgation of sentence was also done there, as such, it is only the Court at West Bengal which has jurisdiction to entertain this petition. 04. Petitioner, after almost sixteen years, has now moved an application seeking permission to amend the writ petition. Mr. Sandeep Gupta, learned CGSC, has vehemently opposed the same, on the ground, that since petition is not maintainable as no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, therefore, application for amendment cannot be considered without first considering the preliminary objections of jurisdiction. Admittedly, the petitioner as per the given address in the petition is resident of Bikhi, District Mansa, Punjab, and was posted at 44 Bn BSF Digberia (West Bengal). He was tried and convicted by the Summary Security Force Court in West Bengal, the impugned order of dismissal assailed by him, was also passed at West Bengal, but the same has been filed in this Court. 05. Mrs. He was tried and convicted by the Summary Security Force Court in West Bengal, the impugned order of dismissal assailed by him, was also passed at West Bengal, but the same has been filed in this Court. 05. Mrs. S. Kour, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has vehemently argued that statutory appeal filed against the order of dismissal was rejected vide order dated 30.10.2002 and the same was communicated to the petitioner in Jammu, therefore, the part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, as such, this petition is maintainable. 06. Per contra, respondents submits that since no cause of action has arisen in Jammu and mere communication of order of dismissing the statutory appeal communicated to the petitioner in Jammu would not change the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. He has placed reliance on “Dharam Pal versus Secretary Home Department & ors.”, “SWP No.2002/2012” and “Atal Bihari Vs. Union of India reported’ as “ 2008 (1) JKJ 53 ’, and in “Aligarh Muslim University vs. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd.’, ‘ (1994) 4 SCC 710 ’ wherein it has been held as under:- “We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried out at Aligarh,, even the contracts provided that in the event of dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the High Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning. We are constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of Jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court. It clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable.” 07. Mrs. It clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High Court was thoroughly unsustainable.” 07. Mrs. Surinder Kour, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court rendered in the case of Union of India v. Narinder Singh Mehta, 1996 KLJ 470, perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench would show that it was not a case of mere receipt of communication in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The officer was posted in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Moreover, he was convicted by Court Martial at Alwar in Rajasthan. He filed post confirmation appeal under Section 164 of the Army Act. That appeal came to be rejected. He had already been promoted and posted as Dy. GOC, 10 Infantry Division Akhnoor and the order rejecting his appeal was communicated to him the State of Jammu and Kashmir where he was posted. It was in the aforesaid facts and circumstances that a part of cause of action had arisen to him in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and his writ petition was held to be maintainable in this Court, therefore, the same is applicable to the facts of the present appeal. Thus, mere communication of the rejection of his statutory appeal would not render any cause of action to the petitioner. 08. This Court in “Gian Chand vs Union of India & Ors.’ “1988 KLJ 394, has held as under:- “In the instant case all the respondents reside and have their seat of offices outside the jurisdiction of this court, the impugned orders adversely affecting the service career of the petitioner were passed by the authorities outside the jurisdiction of this court when the petitioner was serving in Pune. The petitioner is alleged to have submitted a statutory appeal against the adverse remarks in his ACRs pertaining to the year, 1985 to the respondent No.2 who vide his order dated 25.11.1986 rejected the same. The order annexure p-1 was passed by Headquarters Puna sub-area Puna on 07.01.1987. It is submitted that as the impugned order annexure p-1 was received by the petitioner on 2.2.1987 within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, therefore, he was entitled to file the petition in this court for the redress of his grievances. The order annexure p-1 was passed by Headquarters Puna sub-area Puna on 07.01.1987. It is submitted that as the impugned order annexure p-1 was received by the petitioner on 2.2.1987 within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, therefore, he was entitled to file the petition in this court for the redress of his grievances. It is submitted that as the order of his statutory appeal was passed in Puna was conveyed to him when he stood transferred within the territory of this court, therefore, this court has got the jurisdiction to grant the relief under Art. 226. The contention of the petitioner is miss-conceived and cannot be accepted on the facts and circumstances of the case. No part of cause of action has accrued to the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of this court. The territorial jurisdiction of the court would not change with the change of place of posting of the concerned person. No orders passed by the respondent adversely affected the petitioner within the jurisdiction of this court. 09. In “Oil & Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu & ors.”, “ (1994) 4 SCC 711 ”, while considering the issue has held:- “11. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in the State of Rajasthan case by the learned counsel for ONGC. The facts of that case reveal that the respondent-company having its registered office at Calcutta owned a large chunk of land on the outskirts of Jaipur. The Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur, at the instance of the Improvement Trust, Jaipur issued a notice intimating that the State Government proposed to acquire a large part of the said parcel of land for a public purpose, namely, implementation of a development scheme. The said notice was duly served on the respondents at their Calcutta office. The respondents thereafter participated in the inquiry and contended that they proposed to use the land for constructing a three star hotel. The Special Officer, however, felt that the alleged need of the respondents was just a pretence and the land was not needed bona fide by them, but the real object was to get the land released from acquisition. Consequently, the requisite final notification for the acquisition of the land was issued. The Special Officer, however, felt that the alleged need of the respondents was just a pretence and the land was not needed bona fide by them, but the real object was to get the land released from acquisition. Consequently, the requisite final notification for the acquisition of the land was issued. Thereafter an attempt was made to seek exemption in regard to the notified land under Section 20 of the Urban Lands (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, but in vain. Having failed to get the 1-and released from acquisition, the respondents filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Calcutta challenging the acquisition wherein rule nisi was issued and an ad interim ex parte prohibitory order was granted restraining taking of possession of the acquired land, etc. The question which arose for consideration in the backdrop of the said facts was whether the High Court of Calcutta had jurisdiction to entertain the petition and grant ex parte ad interim relief. This Court observed that upon the said facts, the cause of action neither wholly nor in part arose within the territorial limits of the Calcutta High Court and therefore the learned Judge had no jurisdiction to issue rule nisi or to grant the ad interim ex parte prohibitory order. After extracting the definition of the expression “cause of action” from Mulla’s Code of Civil Procedure, this Court observed as under:- “The mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Act on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta i.e. within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e. within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court at the Jaipur Bench. 10. Mrs. Surinder Kour, learned senior counsel in support of her contentions has placed reliance on “Abdul Rashid Makroo Vs. Chairman/MD UII & ors.’ reported as ‘2016 (II) SLJ (HC) 890” and “Nawal Kishore Sharma v Union of India & ors.’ reported as “ 2014 (5) Supreme 689 ’. 10. Mrs. Surinder Kour, learned senior counsel in support of her contentions has placed reliance on “Abdul Rashid Makroo Vs. Chairman/MD UII & ors.’ reported as ‘2016 (II) SLJ (HC) 890” and “Nawal Kishore Sharma v Union of India & ors.’ reported as “ 2014 (5) Supreme 689 ’. However, in the said case, memorandum of charge-sheet was served to the petitioner while he was in Srinagar, as such, the facts of the case being different from the present one and the same are not applicable to this case. 11. In “Om Parkash Srivastava vs. Union of India and anr.’ ‘ 2006 (6) SCC 207 ’, answering a similar question this Court observed that on a plain reading of Clause(2) of Article 226 it is manifestly clear that the High Court can exercise power to issue direction, order or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose if the cause of action in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is within the said territory. In para 7 this Court observed:- “7. The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court”s jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or threat thereof.” 12. Similarly in “Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India (UOI)’, “ 2014 (5) Supreme 689 ’ while considering in Para 22, it was observed as under:— “22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated hereinbefore including the interim order passed by the High Court, in our considered opinion, the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. Union of India (UOI)’, “ 2014 (5) Supreme 689 ’ while considering in Para 22, it was observed as under:— “22. Considering the entire facts of the case narrated hereinbefore including the interim order passed by the High Court, in our considered opinion, the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. As noticed above, at the time when the writ petition was heard for the purpose of grant of interim relief, the respondents instead of raising any objection with regard to territorial jurisdiction opposed the prayer on the ground that the writ petitioner-appellant was offered an amount of Rs.2.75 lakhs, but he refused to accept the same and challenged the order granting severance compensation by filing the writ petition. The impugned order, therefore, cannot be sustained in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case.” 13. The same being issued in different facts & circumstances are not applicable to the present case. 14. Thus, mere communication of order of dismissal of statutory appeal to the petitioner at Jammu, would not entitle him to maintain this petition as no part of cause of action has accrued to the petitioner within the jurisdiction of this Court. 15. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the present writ petition, therefore, this petition is dismissed alongwith connected IA(s).