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2019 DIGILAW 338 (JHR)

Sakur Ansari son of Late Ganpat Ansari v. State of Jharkhand

2019-02-01

RATNAKER BHENGRA

body2019
JUDGMENT : Ratnaker Bhengra, J. 1. Heard the parties. 2. The appellant, above named, has been convicted by the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh on 20.03.2002 under Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code in S.T. No. 426 of 1996/36 of 2002 and the appellant has been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and at the same time, the appellant has been further sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years and has been liable to pay fine of Rs.5000/- and in default of payment of fine, he will further undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 3. The case of the prosecution, in brief, as per the fardbeyan of the informant Md. Hanif Ansari, PW-5 is that 6 years ago his daughter, the deceased Saiyeeda Khatoon was married with Mohiuddin Ansari at village Kargalo. Father of the victim deceased Saiyeeda Khatoon gave dowry also to the in-laws of the victim lady. In the marriage, the members of the in-laws of the deceased had demanded motorcycle, from the informant upon which the informant refused to fulfil that demand and from that time all the accused persons who happens to be the father-in-law, dewar Sakur Ansari, mother-in-law and Gotni of the victim deceased began torturing, assaulting and harassing the deceased for which panchayati was also held. On 07.02.1996, the father-in-law of the victim lady came to the informant and said regarding the ailing condition. The informant sent his son Hakim Ansari in the morning of 07.02.1996 to the place of his daughter at village Kargalo and on way to that village, the father-in-law disclosed that in the night the daughter of the informant Saiyeeda Khatoon has committed suicide. It is said that when the informant came to know the aforesaid message from his son, he along with others went to village Kargalo to see his daughter, and there her daughter Saiyeeda Khatoon was found dead and there was mark of rope on the neck of his daughter Saiyeeda Khatoon. The villagers disclosed that in the last night the informant’s daughter Saiyeeda Khatoon was assaulted by her dewar accused Sakur Ansari as a result of which Saiyeeda Khatoon committed suicide and died. 4. The villagers disclosed that in the last night the informant’s daughter Saiyeeda Khatoon was assaulted by her dewar accused Sakur Ansari as a result of which Saiyeeda Khatoon committed suicide and died. 4. On the basis of the fardbeyan of the informant Hanif Ansari, the FIR was registered as Bishungarh P.S. Case No. 11/96 against the four accused persons including the accused Sakur Ansari under Section 304B/498A/34 of the Indian Penal Code. After investigation, charge sheet was submitted by the Police against the father-in-law of the victim lady, Ganpat Ansari (since dead) and the accused appellant Sakur Ansari, dewar of the victim lady. The case was committed to the Court of Sessions. 5. Prosecution examined altogether 13 witnesses in support of its case, namely, PW-1 Majruh Ansari, PW-2 Gayani Mahto, PW-3 Hakim Ansari, PW-4 Sujan Ansari, PW-5 Hanif Ansari, PW-6 Kailash Mahto, PW-7 Dr. Nidhish Sharan, PW-8 Chamru Mistri, PW-9 Sukhdeo, PW-10 Budhan, PW-11 Moti, PW-12 Moti Roy and PW-13 Ashok Kumar. The defence examined two witnesses, namely, DW-1 Md. Ansari and DW-2 Jakir Ansari to show that the accused Sakur Mian was living separately with his brothers. At the conclusion of the trial, the sole appellant herein was convicted and sentenced as aforesaid. Hence, this appeal. 6. PW-5, Hanif Ansari, is the informant of the case and the father of the deceased-victim. He deposed that his daughter Saiyeeda Khatoon died around four years ago in her in-laws place. Five to six years before her death she was married to Mohiuddin Ansari of village Kargalo. After her marriage she used to live at her in-laws place where she was tortured and harassed. Her younger brother-in-law (dewar) and father-in-law complained about her in the context of dowry demands and that she was not working in the house. His son-in-law used to demand dowry. He had gone to Saudi Arab. Her mother-in-law, father-in-law, younger brother-in-law (dewar) and elder Gotni used to harass her. They demanded motorcycle from her. He was unable to give the motorcycle to her daughter. Ganpat Mian came to his house at around 12:00- 1:00 O’clock and informed that his daughter is possessed by witches and evil spirits and she is not recognizing any one. The next morning, he sent Hakim Ansari and Chaitya Yadav to the in-laws place of his daughter. He was unable to give the motorcycle to her daughter. Ganpat Mian came to his house at around 12:00- 1:00 O’clock and informed that his daughter is possessed by witches and evil spirits and she is not recognizing any one. The next morning, he sent Hakim Ansari and Chaitya Yadav to the in-laws place of his daughter. On the way they met Sakur Mian and they were informed that his daughter had hanged herself and died. In paragraph-2 of his cross-examination, he deposed that his daughter was married in May or June, 1989. That his daughter was not married on 2nd June, 1987. 7. PW-1 is Majruh Ansari. Deceased was her niece. He deposed that after marriage Saiyeeda Khatoon used to reside at her in-laws place. She used to come some times to her maternal home. When she used to come then she used to tell regarding some items which her father had been unable to give to her in-laws and because of that they were not behaving properly with her. In para-2, he said that the girl had complained 2 to 4 months before her death. Regarding this matter, no panchayati was conducted. 8. PW-2 is Gayani Mahto. He has deposed that Saiyeeda Khatoon died three years ago. He did not know how she had died. He had not given statement to the police. On hearing alarm, he had gone to her house. Then he had seen her hanging by her neck with rope. 9. PW-3 is Hakim Ansari. He is the brother of the deceased. He has deposed that his sister Saiyeeda Khatoon was married in Kargalo to Mohiuddin Ansari. Her father-in-law’s name was Ganpat Ansari and husband’s brother’s name was Sakur Ansari. About three years and nine months ago she died. Five to six years before she had been married. She used to compliant that money and motorcycle was demanded as dowry. She was assaulted by her younger brother-in-law (dewar), father-in-law, mother-in-law and gotni. Ten to fifteen days before the incident she had come home. Thereafter when he had gone to leave her then her mother-in-law, Gotni, father-in-law and Dewar started arguing with her. At night he was not given food. In the morning he returned back home. Four to five days later, father-in-law of the deceased came and informed that his sister is ill and she is not recognizing anyone. Thereafter when he had gone to leave her then her mother-in-law, Gotni, father-in-law and Dewar started arguing with her. At night he was not given food. In the morning he returned back home. Four to five days later, father-in-law of the deceased came and informed that his sister is ill and she is not recognizing anyone. Thereafter, he along with one Chaita went to meet her; however, on the way they met Sakur and he informed that his sister had died. Thereafter, he returned home and informed his father. In his cross examination, at para-2 he deposed that his sister had been married on 02.06.1987. 10. PW-4 is Sujan Ansari. He has deposed that Sayeeda Khatoon died three years from today. He deposed that in the month of Ramzan the girl had eaten and slept and died in the morning. When they had gone then they had seen her hanging and dead. Her father-in-law was there along with the mother-in-law in the house. When they reached the accused house then Sakur came running from the Mosque. 11. PW-7 is Dr. Nidhish Sharan. He conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of deceased Saida Khatoon. He found the following: “I External- Both eyes open, mouth partly open. Rigor Mortis present in both upper & lower limbs. Two parallel ligature marks all around neck. No mark of knot. II On dissection- The ligature under neath tissue found. Parchment light hyoid bone fractured. Tracheal wall congested. Neck muscles ocdemetius. Both lungs intact congested. Heart right chamber blood clot. Left empty. Stomach contained mico fluid about one og. Wall not congested spleen liver & kidney intact & pale. Urinary bladder emply uterus not pregnant. In my opinion the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation.” He proved the post-mortem report marked as Ext.2. 12. PW-6 Kailash Mahto, PW-8 Chamru Mistri and PW-9 Sukhdeo have been declared hostile. 13. PW-11 Moti has been tendered, PW-12 Moti Roy and PW-13 Ashok Kumar are formal witnesses, who have proved the FIR. Arguments of learned counsel for the appellant: 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to show some of the weakness of the evidences of the prosecution witnesses and highlighted those aspects from the evidence. 13. PW-11 Moti has been tendered, PW-12 Moti Roy and PW-13 Ashok Kumar are formal witnesses, who have proved the FIR. Arguments of learned counsel for the appellant: 14. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to show some of the weakness of the evidences of the prosecution witnesses and highlighted those aspects from the evidence. Referring to the evidence of PW-1 Majruh Ansari, counsel has pointed out paragraph-1 and submitted that from the date indicated therein regarding the time of marriage that some tampering was sought to be done. Counsel for the appellant says that this is to hide or alter the date of marriage so that it can come within the criterion of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. He also pointed out that as per PW-1 no prior complaint was made to the police regarding any dowry or harassment for the same nor was any complaint made earlier to the panchayat. Counsel also says that this witness is a hearsay witness because he had only heard that murder had taken place. Counsel then submits that PW-2 has been declared hostile. 15. Referring to the evidence of PW-3 Hakim Ansari, who is brother of the deceased, counsel points out that the deceased used to say about torture and harassment for dowry against all the members of in-laws family rather than only this appellant. Counsel argued that when other members of the family against whom same allegations have been made have been acquitted or allowed to go scot free then the same benefit should also be allowed to this appellant. Counsel also referred to the evidence and pointed out that when she returned after marriage after six years then she complained. Counsel for the appellant argued that prior to this for six years she had not made any complaint. This is so because Saiyeeda Khatoon was living happily in her matrimonial house and there was no reason for any complaint and this witness, brother himself, has admitted that after six years when she had returned then she had complained. Counsel says that complaint made after six years is definitely not easy to believe as being genuine. This is so because Saiyeeda Khatoon was living happily in her matrimonial house and there was no reason for any complaint and this witness, brother himself, has admitted that after six years when she had returned then she had complained. Counsel says that complaint made after six years is definitely not easy to believe as being genuine. Counsel also pointed out paragraph-3 of the deposition and submitted that as per this part of the deposition it is indicated that his sister was married eight years before her death and that when she died the marriage had subsisted for more than seven years. Counsel for the appellant says that this information in paragraph-3 of the evidence of PW-3 is most crucial because technically death occurs after seven years of marriage and therefore, the offence cannot be within Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the evidence of PW-5, who is father of the deceased and also the informant and pointed out to paragraph-4 where it has been indicated that the girl died on 10.02.1996. Counsel for the appellant here points out that this is more than seven years ago. Counsel also referred to the cross-examination of this witness where he has referred that the marriage had taken place in May/June, 1989 and the assertion has been made by PW-5, the father that marriage had not taken place on 02.06.1987. Counsel for the appellant says that there is some doubt regarding the marriage because different witnesses seem to be beavering on it. Even in the cross examination here, he says the marriage is indicated in May or June, 1989, which means that he is not even clear regarding the month in which it had taken place, therefore benefit of such confusing dates must accrue to the appellant. Counsel for the appellant says that this witness also in his cross examination said that he does not know whether the girl had died by hanging or suicide. Counsel for the appellant therefore says that when the father himself had not said how his daughter died, it is not possible to convict the appellant for the same. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant then referred to the evidence of PW-6 Kailash Mahto and said that though he was declared hostile, in his cross examination, he has deposed that the marriage was of the year 1987. 17. Learned counsel for the appellant then referred to the evidence of PW-6 Kailash Mahto and said that though he was declared hostile, in his cross examination, he has deposed that the marriage was of the year 1987. Counsel for the appellant has then said that if this is so and the death had occurred in 1996 then the death of the deceased takes place after seven years of marriage and therefore, not within the ambit of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. This witness also, according to the counsel for the appellant, deposed that the appellant was found sleeping in the Masjid at the time of the incident. That Sakur had gone to his house only on alarm. Counsel for the appellant here submits that this aspect is also corroborated by PW-4, who had deposed that Sakur came running from Masjid. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that PW-8, PW-9 and PW-10 have been declared hostile. PW-11 has simply been tendered and PW-12 and PW-13 are simply formal witnesses. 19. Learned counsel for the appellant has then pointed out to the evidence of DW-1Noor Mohammad Ansari and DW-2 Jakir Ansari, who have, both, deposed that all the five brothers had been living separately. Therefore, counsel for the appellant says that in view of the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2, the appellant Sakur Ansari could not have been at the place of crime anyway and would not be responsible for the suicide or death of the deceased. 20. In submission, counsel for the appellant has argued that the FIR was lodged against father-in-law, mother-in-law, dewar as well as Gotni and in the fardbeyan as well as the evidences, the allegations or evidences of demand as well as harassment are against all the persons. However, mother-in-law and Gotni were not charge sheeted and sent up for trial. Therefore, if the Gotni and mother-in-law have been discharged on the same evidence then the current accused or the appellant herein should also be allowed the benefit and conviction against him under Sections 304B as well as 498A of the Indian Penal Code cannot be sustained. Counsel for the appellant also submits that there is dispute in the records and the evidences regarding the marriage of the deceased with the appellant. Counsel for the appellant also submits that there is dispute in the records and the evidences regarding the marriage of the deceased with the appellant. At one instance it has come that marriage was of the year 1987 while it has also been indicated that it was of the year 1989. Counsel says that if it is of the year 1987 then the death which has taken place in 1996 will not bring the alleged offence within the ambit of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code wherein the period required is that the offence has to occur within seven years of marriage. Therefore, because of doubtful death, benefits of doubt again accrue to the appellant. 21. Learned counsel for the appellant also pointed out that apart from the allegations that have been made in the fardbeyan, later on in the evidence it is sought to be developed and given a more serious nature such as in the evidence it has come that the present appellant was interested in developing illicit relationship with the wife of his brother or the deceased. The appellant was harassing the deceased for such illicit relationship and she was avoiding his advances and due to this, death has occurred or she was done to death. Counsel for the appellant says that this is purely a concoction only made to aggravate the offence and make it appear in such a manner that it is not easy to acquit him of the allegations. 22. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that the independent witnesses, who have been declared hostile, have been done so because they deposed in favour of the appellant. In such situation, what these independent but hostile declared witnesses have deposed cannot be ignored. In fact, if their evidences are convincing then it may be used for acquitting the appellant. In the FIR, it is indicated that the informant had come to know from the villagers that his daughter had been done to death or murdered; however, none of these independent witnesses have been examined to support the prosecution case. 23. For clarification again, counsel for the appellant submitted that Hakim Ansari, brother of the deceased has said that the date of marriage is of 1987 or more specifically 2nd June, 1987. On the other hand, PW-5, who is the informant and the father, says that the date of marriage is of May/June, 1989. 23. For clarification again, counsel for the appellant submitted that Hakim Ansari, brother of the deceased has said that the date of marriage is of 1987 or more specifically 2nd June, 1987. On the other hand, PW-5, who is the informant and the father, says that the date of marriage is of May/June, 1989. Counsel for the appellant says that when there is variation in the date of marriage by PW-3 as against PW-5 and there is no documentary evidence to the same then the dates as submitted by PW-3 should be taken into account. Even if it is not taken into account since some doubt has been raised regarding this date then whatever benefit accrues it should accrue to the appellant. Counsel also points out that even the date mentioned by the father of the deceased is doubtful because he has not been able to pinpoint either the specific date of the marriage or even the month itself because he mentioned both May and June as being the months of marriage. Counsel further says that in the evidence of PW-1 if one looks at the date that has been indicated in the evidence it seems there is some interpolation and therefore, taking all these factors regarding dates, the appellant cannot be convicted. 24. Learned counsel refers to the evidence of PW-5 and points out that he had specifically stated that demand was made by the husband and therefore, allegations against the Dewar or Sakur Ansari is totally misdirected. Counsel for the appellant points out that PW-4 and PW-6 have both stated that when the incident occurred the appellant was not in his house and he reached his house on alarm. Therefore, the murder itself cannot be attributed to the appellant and he is in no way responsible for the hanging of the deceased. 25. Learned counsel also pointed out that there is no reference to when demand was made. It is also not indicated that the demand was made recently so the question of soon before the death has not been answered by the evidence or by the learned Court below. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that it cannot also be alleged that suicide was abetted by the appellant because the facts do not indicate so. It is also not indicated that the demand was made recently so the question of soon before the death has not been answered by the evidence or by the learned Court below. 26. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued that it cannot also be alleged that suicide was abetted by the appellant because the facts do not indicate so. Moreover, counsel says that even in the fardbeyan or FIR, suicide has not been alleged and therefore at a later stage and at this time of appeal whether it would be prudent to do so is also a major question. Learned counsel submits that at this stage this issue of abetment of suicide is simply not permissible. 27. Learned counsel also submitted that IO has not been examined and therefore, he has been greatly prejudiced. He has been greatly prejudiced because if the IO had been examined then he was the only person who could have authoritatively deposed regarding the date of marriage, whether it had taken place in 1987 or 1989. Since he has not been examined, the appellant is greatly prejudiced and therefore, he should be acquitted of the allegation of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code, because if the offence as alleged falls outside the seven years period then he simply will not be convicted for this offence. 28. Lastly, counsel for the appellant has said that presumption of dowry death also cannot be made out because presumption has to be made only if offence occurs within seven years of marriage but in this case, allegation against the appellant is not within seven years of marriage and because of the differing dates that have been brought on record regarding the marriage, if any benefit of doubt has to accrue, it has to be given to the appellant. Arguments of learned counsel for the State: 29. Learned counsel for the State has argued that there is no doubt that there was demand of dowry accompanying harassment for the same leading to both physical and mental harassment. Arguments of learned counsel for the State: 29. Learned counsel for the State has argued that there is no doubt that there was demand of dowry accompanying harassment for the same leading to both physical and mental harassment. He has pointed out that there is evidence given that the demand was made for motorcycle as well as for money and that this was made even before the marriage as well as after the marriage and there is reference to assault or marpit and any way this would have resulted in tremendous mental torture and anguish for the deceased bringing it very much within the ambit of both Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code. Even prior to the date of occurrence, deceased was subjected to cruelty and this has been indicated so by the evidence of PW-3, who is brother of the deceased and it can be found that in paragraph-4, PW-3 has said that she had come home fifteen days before her death and complained again regarding harassment and torture, but, he had not filed the case. 30. Learned counsel for the State refers to the evidence of PW-5, who is father of the informant and points out that in paragraph-1 informant had pointed out that the father-in-law used to complain about the dowry and that the deceased did not work at home. That the father-in-law, mother-in-law, elder Gotni used to harass her and that even there is reference to demand made by Dewar and father-in-law. 31. Learned counsel for the State pointed out that even more serious element was that along with the element of demanding dowry items and harassing the deceased, the appellant, who is brother-in-law of the deceased was desperately trying to develop illicit sexual relationship with the deceased and this was objected to by the deceased. Counsel for the State also stated that any way such attempts to develop illicit relationship and harassing her would also bring it within the ambit of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 32. Learned counsel for the State then points out to the evidence of PW-7 Dr. Nidhish Sharan and says that Doctor has given his opinion that cause of death is asphyxia due to strangulation. Counsel for the State submitted that the Doctor has in clear cut terms indicated that death was not due to any accident but rather it was due to strangulation. Nidhish Sharan and says that Doctor has given his opinion that cause of death is asphyxia due to strangulation. Counsel for the State submitted that the Doctor has in clear cut terms indicated that death was not due to any accident but rather it was due to strangulation. Counsel therefore says that from the evidence regarding dowry demands and the harassment, it must be held that the offence, as alleged, under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code is totally made out. The offence under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code is also made out. 33. Learned counsel for the State said that the ingredients of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code is totally made out because first and foremost death had occurred within seven years of marriage and soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty of demand of dowry, which is also apparent from the evidence. The occurrence took place in the matrimonial home and at the time of death, mother-in-law, father-in-law and dewar were present at the matrimonial home and the deceased was seen hanging by rope from the neck. Further the testimony of Doctor is that death is not suicidal but homicidal in nature. 34. Regarding the confusion about date of marriage, counsel for the State points out that PW-3 had deposed that he was rustic and illiterate person, hence, if he had said 1987 it had to be taken with some concern because he has himself deposed that he did not know how to read and write and therefore, he may not have given the correct date of marriage initially. Therefore, the date of marriage has to be taken from the entire evidence on record. 35. Finally, learned counsel for the State has submitted that the offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code is also fully made out because given the evidence that have come the presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act is fully made out and therefore, appellant is guilty for the offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. FINDING 36. This is a case in which this Court note that the conviction has been done for both Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. When this Court examined the Sections, I see that the element of cruelty is common to both the Sections. FINDING 36. This is a case in which this Court note that the conviction has been done for both Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. When this Court examined the Sections, I see that the element of cruelty is common to both the Sections. However, in 304B of the Indian Penal Code cruelty must be done in relation to any demand for dowry and it should be also soon before her death and victim must be subjected to such cruelty and death must have occurred within seven years of marriage. So while Section 498 of the Indian Penal Code essentially deals with cruelty meted out to a wife by her husband or relative of the husband who subject her to cruelty, to bring the offence within Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code requires certain more criteria. In some ways, Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code could be considered more technical. In the fact of the case, it does appear from the evidences that there was some cruelty meted out to the deceased. However, the question then can be asked whether that cruelty was of such a nature that brings this cruelty or extends this cruelty to the extent that Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code comes into operation. 37. There are number of arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant which if listed broadly fall into a questioning of the date of marriage, that on the same piece of evidence certain other accused were acquitted that the accused or the appellant was not there at the place of occurrence when the hanging or the suicide took place and also another reason for his absence is that he was living separately, then no independent witnesses have supported the allegation. All they have turned hostile and finally, there was no prior complaint regarding such cruelty or harassment which resulting finally in the offence of 304B of the Indian Penal Code. 38. First this Court takes the arguments that on the same piece of evidence other accused have been acquitted. It is found that in the fardbeyan it is alleged that the members of the in-laws of the deceased had demanded motorcycle from the informant. 38. First this Court takes the arguments that on the same piece of evidence other accused have been acquitted. It is found that in the fardbeyan it is alleged that the members of the in-laws of the deceased had demanded motorcycle from the informant. When Hanif Ansari, father of the victim-lady was unable to fulfil the demand, then from time to time all the accused persons, who happen to be father-in-law, dewar or the remaining appellant the mother-in-law and the Gotni of the deceased-victim all began torturing, assaulting and harassing the deceased. Regarding her death, it is said in the fardbeyan that when the father of the girl and others had gone to the village Kargalo to see his daughter then she was found dead and there was marks of rope on the neck of his daughter. The villagers had disclosed that in the last night the informant’s daughter was assaulted by her dewar Sakur Ansari and Gotni as a result of which she committed suicide and died. From the evidence of PW-5 Hanif Ansari, PW-1 Majruh Ansari and PW-3 Hakim Ansari, it appears that there is reference to element of cruelty committed by the in-laws, which would include the current appellant, however, conviction has only been of this appellant while the others were acquitted. Therefore, the appellant has raised the question other accused being acquitted on the same piece of evidence while he has been convicted. He has argued that if others were acquitted on the same piece of evidence he also should be acquitted. 39. Taken along with this, another aspect has been that the he has argued that the offence should come within seven years of the marriage and it has been argued that this is not the case. Counsel for the appellant has referred to the evidence of PW-5, who is the father of the deceased and pointed out that it is indicated that in the cross-examination of this witness that marriage had taken place in May or June, 1989. However, counsel for the appellant also says that PW-3 brother of the deceased has said that marriage had taken place on 02.06.1987. Counsel also says that informant PW-5 is not even clear regarding the month in which the marriage had taken place in 1989 whether it is May or June. However, counsel for the appellant also says that PW-3 brother of the deceased has said that marriage had taken place on 02.06.1987. Counsel also says that informant PW-5 is not even clear regarding the month in which the marriage had taken place in 1989 whether it is May or June. Counsel says that this is important particularly in the light of the evidence of PW-1 Majruh Ansari. Counsel had pointed out that in the evidence of PW-1 Majruh Ansari, if we look at the original, it seems that there was some tampering sought to be done with the date of the marriage so that it could be so tampered so that the accusations could come within the ambit of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. Counsel says this is crucial because if she was married in the year 1987 then the offence has taken place or the girl has died on 08.02.1996, then the death would not have occurred within seven years of marriage and therefore, no offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code would be made out. Since Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code has certain criteria attached to it and one of there being seven years framework, then taken along with the other grounds that the appellant has raised this technical aspect of the date of marriage being suspicious and doubtful cannot be ignored. Another vital piece of information that has been tendered by PW-6 Kailash Mahto that the appellant was sleeping in the Masjid at the time of the incident and this is corroborated by PW-4 Sujan Ansari who has deposed that on information regarding the incident he had come running from the Masjid. So as per the evidence these two witnesses PW-6 and PW-4, it can be said that he was not at the place of occurrence when the hanging took place and which may have been committed by some other persons or even by the deceased herself. Along with this the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 who has deposed that all five brothers were already living separately. Therefore, there is some doubt as to whether the appellant is directly responsible for the hanging. Along with this the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 who has deposed that all five brothers were already living separately. Therefore, there is some doubt as to whether the appellant is directly responsible for the hanging. Again which brings this Court to the question that if the others on the same piece of evidence have been acquitted for the offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code including 498A of the Indian Penal Code then whether this appellant who is not said to be there at least by the evidence of PW-6 and PW-4 at the précised moment of having hanging then whether he can be accused for the offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. 40. This Court see that other prosecution witnesses, who have been declared hostile, have been done so because they have deposed in favour of the appellant. Prosecution witnesses deposing in favour of the appellant taken with other grounds aforesaid indicated also go towards weakening the case against the appellant. 41. It has also been indicated that there was no prior complaint or allegations of this kind made much earlier to this occasion. Even if it is taken that the marriage was done in 1989 then why was not any complaint about cruelty against the in-laws including this appellant made earlier on to the police. There is no record of such complaint and it seems only after the incident that the issue of cruelty is raised. 42. So looking into the facts and circumstances of the case and the aforesaid reasoning, we are on the same piece of evidence and others have been acquitted on the technical nature of within seven years, the appellant may be able to escape the offence of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and that he himself was not there in the précised moment and if others are given the benefit of doubt then he should be allowed the extended benefit of doubt. I see no reason why he should be convicted for the offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code including Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, particularly because no complaints regarding cruelty or harassment have been made to the police or have been brought on record till long period of marriage except prior to the incident. I see no reason why he should be convicted for the offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code including Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, particularly because no complaints regarding cruelty or harassment have been made to the police or have been brought on record till long period of marriage except prior to the incident. Accordingly, appellant is acquitted of the conviction under Sections 304-B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code. 43. Hence, judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20.03.2002, passed by the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Hazaribagh in S.T. No. 426 of 1996/36 of 2002 is set aside. Appellant is discharged from the liability of the bail bond. 44. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed.