JUDGMENT : A.C. Rao, J. By way of the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner has prayed for appropriate writ, order and/or direction to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 05.09.2009 passed by the respondent No.1 (Annexure-A), order dated 06.01.2010 passed by the respondent No.2 (Annexure-B) and order dated Nil.05.2010 passed by the respondent No.3 (Annexure-C). 2. The short facts leading to the present petition are as under: 2.1 That, the petitioner was a Police Sub-Inspector at Kadi Police Station. On 14.12.2007, one FIR was filed by Shri Patel Pankajkumar Rameshbhai against one Dineshbhai Prabhubhai Khandelval for the offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. In this regard, it was alleged that petitioner had not made any investigation with regard to the complaint and he had not drawn proper attention of the court after the accused's remand was over and at the time when the accused had obtained bail order from the court. It is also alleged that he had not recorded statement of Himanshubhai Bansibhai Khamar and demanded money from him. 2.2 That, charge-sheet dated 28.03.2008 was served upon the petitioner on 29.03.2008. The Inquiry Officer had recorded a statement of the petitioner on 04.11.2008. The petitioner had appointed one Shri K.J. Vankar retired Constable, as his friend in the inquiry. On 23.01.2009, the petitioner submitted his last defence statement. The inquiry report was submitted by the Inquiry Officer on 25.06.2009. Thereafter, the show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 20.07.2009 to show cause as to why the punishment to stop one increment should not be imposed upon him. The show-cause notice was replied by the petitioner. Thereafter, he was punished with the stoppage of one increment on 05.09.2009. The said order was challenged by way of an Appeal to the respondent no.2. The Appeal was rejected by an order dated 06.01.2010 by confirming the order passed by the respondent no.1. The revision application was filed on 06.02.2010 to respondent no.3. The respondent no.3 has also confirmed the order passed by respondent no.2 and the revision application came to be rejected in the month of May, 2010. The Appeal was rejected by an order dated 06.01.2010 by confirming the order passed by the respondent no.1. The revision application was filed on 06.02.2010 to respondent no.3. The respondent no.3 has also confirmed the order passed by respondent no.2 and the revision application came to be rejected in the month of May, 2010. The petitioner has submitted that on 27.05.2011, he made an application under RTI, which was replied on 25.08.2011, wherein the petitioner was declared as innocent by the Inquiry Officer as the charges were not proved but, the respondent no.1 had written a letter to the Inquiry Officer, wherein he had directed the Inquiry Officer to submit a fresh report. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that once the Inquiry Officer had exonerated a delinquent employee, the disciplinary authority can impose punishment and differ with the Inquiry Officer after following the procedure laid down in Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. Rule No.10, of the said Rules reads as under: "10. Action on the Inquiry Report : (1) The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Inquiry Authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the Inquiry Authority for further inquiry and report and the Inquiry Authority shall there upon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 9, as far as may be. (2) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of the Inquiry Authority on any article of charge, record its reasons for such disagreement and record its own finding on such charge if the evidence on record is sufficient for the purpose. (3) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in items (1) to (3) of Rule 6 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall not withstanding anything contained in rule 11 make an order imposing such penalty: Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advice and such advice shall be taken into consideration before making any order imposing any penalty on the Government Servant. (4) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charge and on the basis of the evidence adduced during the inquiry is of that opinion that any of the penalties specified in items (4) to (8) of Rule 6 should be imposed on the Government servant, it shall make an order imposing such penalty it shall not be necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed to be imposed : Provided that in every case where it is necessary to consult the Commission, the record of the inquiry shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advice and the advice shall be taken into consideration before making an order imposing any such penalty as may be imposed on the Government Servant." 3. It is contended that in the case on hand, respondent No.1 had pressurized the Inquiry Officer and compelled him to change his report and submit another inquiry report. The order was passed on the basis of the second inquiry report, which is confirmed in Appeal and revision and the said report is unjust, illegal and arbitrary. 4. At the time of argument, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has relied on the judgment of this Court delivered in case of D.K. Dave Vs. Secretary, Government of Gujarat & 1 rendered in Special Civil Application No.2092 of 2002, wherein in paragraph 31 it is held as under : "31. The net result of the above discussion is that, due to the lack of tentative reasons being communicated to the petitioner, he is unable to make a representation addressing those specific reasons. The opportunity of hearing granted to the petitioner can hardly be called effective or adequate. It is more in the nature of an empty formality to show an outward compliance with the Rules and law. In effect, the principles of natural justice have clearly been violated and the petitioner has suffered prejudice and injustice due to such violation." With the above observation, the petition was allowed and the order of the disciplinary authority was quashed and set aside. 4.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank & Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra & Another reported in,1998 1 LLJ 199. 4.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Punjab National Bank & Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra & Another reported in,1998 1 LLJ 199. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the said judgement read as under : "18. Under Regulation - 6 the inquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an inquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the inquiry is conducted by the inquiry officer his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the inquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an inquiry an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary authority differs with the view of the inquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the inquiry officer they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the inquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the Disciplinary Authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of inquiry as explained in Karunakar's case (supra). 19. The result of the aforesaid discussion would be that the principles of natural justice have to be read into Regulation 7(2). As a result thereof whenever the disciplinary authority disagrees with the inquiry authority on any article of charge then before it records its own findings on such charge, it must record its tentative reasons for such disagreement and give to the delinquent officer an opportunity to represent before it records its findings. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favorable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The report of the inquiry officer containing its findings will have to be conveyed and the delinquent officer will have an opportunity to persuade the disciplinary authority to accept the favorable conclusion of the inquiry officer. The principles of natural justice, as we have already observed, require the authority, which has to take a final decision and can impose a penalty, to give an opportunity to the officer charged of misconduct to file a representation before the disciplinary authority records its findings on the charges framed against the officer." 5. On the other hand, learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Venugopal Patel has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Mithilesh Singh Vs. Union of India And Others reported in, (2003) 3 SCC 309 , wherein it is held in paragraph 9 as under : "9. The only other plea is regarding punishment awarded. As has been observed in a series of cases, the scope of interference with punishment awarded by a disciplinary authority is very limited and unless the punishment appears to be shockingly disproportionate, the Court cannot interfere with the same. Reference may be made to a few of them. (See: B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors., State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Singh, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Union of India V. J.R. Dhiman and Om Kumar v. Union of India)." The same view is taken by the Apex court in case of Apparel Export Promotion Council Vs. A.K. Chopra reported in, (1999) 1 SCC 759 . 5.1 Learned AGP has also relied on the judgment of the State of Rajasthan Vs. M.C. Saxena reported in, (1998) 3 SCC 385 , wherein it is held as under : "If the Disciplinary Authority gives reasons for disagreeing with the findings of enquiring officer then the Court cannot interfere with those findings unless it comes to the conclusion that no reasonable man can come to the said finding. In this view of the matter, the disciplinary authority was well within his powers to award punishment on the findings arrived at by him." 5.2 Learned AGP has vehemently submitted that, if the other view is possible, in such case also, Court cannot interfere with the findings of the departmental inquiry and the same principle is held by the Apex Court in case of Dr. Anil Kapoor Vs. Anil Kapoor Vs. Union of India And Another reported in, (1998) 9 SCC 47 . It is contended by the learned AGP that even though we believe the case of the petitioner that the disciplinary authority had wrongly remitted back the inquiry report for re-writing his inquiry report, then it is merely irregularity and not illegality, and therefore, the order does not require any interference. To substantiate his arguments, the learned AGP has relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of B.N. Nagarajan Vs. State of Karnataka reported in, (1979) AIR SC 1676, wherein, it is held as under : "In Nanjundappa's case also the question of regularisation of an appointment arose and this Court dealt with it thus : ...Counsel on behalf of the respondent contended that regularisation would mean conferring the quality of permanence on the appointment whereas counsel on behalf of the State contended that regularisation did not mean permanence but that it was a case of regularisation of the rules under Article 309. Both the contentions are fallacious. It the appointment itself is in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution illegality cannot be regularised. Ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of setting at naught the rules." 5.3 The learned AGP has also relied on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Radhakishan reported in, (1998) AIR SC 1833, wherein, in paragraphs 17, 19 and 20 it is held as under : "17. One of the grounds on which the Tribunal quashed memo dated July 31, 1995, issued under 1991 Rules, was that without cancelling the earlier memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987, issued under 1963 Rules, the latter memo could not be issued. We have seen that under Rule 45 of 1991 Rules the inquiry proceedings initiated under 1963 Rules could be continued even after coming into force of 1991 Rules. We have seen that under Rule 45 of 1991 Rules the inquiry proceedings initiated under 1963 Rules could be continued even after coming into force of 1991 Rules. It is correct that inquiry proceedings did progress after issuance of memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987 to the extent that an inquiry officer was appointed and should have been concluded under 1963 Rules. If memo of charge has been served for the first time before 1991 there would have been no difficulty. However, in the present case it could be only an irregularity and not an illegality vitiating the inquiry proceedings inasmuch as after the Inquiry Officer was appointed under memo No. 1412 dated December 22, 1987, there had not been any progress. If a fresh memo is issued on the same charges against the delinquent officer it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to him. He can always challenge the second memo and rather even the first one on the ground of delay which he did. 19. It is not possible to lay down any pre-determined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant factors and to balance and weight them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the Court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take its course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the Court is to balance these two diverse consideration. 20. In the present case we find that without any reference to records merely on the report of the Director General, AntiCorruption Bureau, charges were framed against the respondent and ten others, all in verbatim and without particularizing the role played by each of the officers charged. There were four charges against the respondent. With three of them he was not concerned. He offered explanation regarding the fourth charge but the disciplinary authority did not examine the same nor did it choose to appoint any inquiry officer even assuming that action was validly being initiated under 1991 Rules. There is no explanation whatsoever for delay in concluding the inquiry proceedings all these years. The case depended on records of the Department only and Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau had pointed out that no witnesses had been examined before he gave his report. The Inquiry Officers, who had been appointed one after the other, had just to examine the records to see if the alleged deviations and constructions were illegal and unauthorised and then as to who was responsible for condoning or approving the same against the bye- laws. It is nobody's case that respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the State as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. It is nobody's case that respondent at any stage tried to obstruct or delay the inquiry proceedings. The Tribunal rightly did not accept the explanations of the State as to why delay occurred. In fact there was hardly any explanation worth consideration. In the circumstances the Tribunal was justified in quashing the charge memo dated July 31, 1995 and directing the State to promote the respondent as per recommendation of the DPC ignoring memos dated October 27, 1995 and June 1, 1996. the Tribunal rightly did not quash these two later memos." 5.4 Lastly, the learned AGP has relied on the judgment of this Court rendered in case of Jiteshkumar V. Chotai Vs. District Judge reported in, (2006) 13 GHJ 237 . In the said reported case, the petitioner was sick and the adjournment was not granted, so order was challenged and it was prayed that the order of Inquiry Officer be quashed and set aside, which was not accepted by the Court and it was held that it was not necessary to hold full-fledged inquiry for imposing minor penalty. 6. After considering the rival submissions and after considering the facts of the case, it appears that in the case in hand, the petitioner is imposed a minor punishment. The case of the petitioner is that, the Inquiry Officer does not have any power to remit back the inquiry report and direct him to rewrite the report, the disciplinary authority has not followed the procedure as laid down in Rule 10 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline And Appeal) Rules, 1971. Disciplinary Authority has pointed out the reason why he had not agreed with the inquiry report and directed the Inquiry Officer to rewrite the inquiry report. After receipt of the inquiry report, he had issued the show-cause notice and the petitioner was given opportunity to meet with the second show-cause notice. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority had taken a decision and imposed a minor penalty. The said order is also upheld by the Appellate authority and by respondent no.2 and respondent no.3 in revision application. 7. Thus, there is a concurrent findings about the guilt of the petitioner. There is some irregularity in the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority but the petitioner is not able to point out any prejudice to him when the petitioner is implicated a minor penalty. 7. Thus, there is a concurrent findings about the guilt of the petitioner. There is some irregularity in the procedure adopted by the disciplinary authority but the petitioner is not able to point out any prejudice to him when the petitioner is implicated a minor penalty. As per the decision of this Court in case of Jiteshkumar (Supra), the full-fledged inquiry is not required, if minor punishment is imposed. Under the circumstances, I am of the view that there is some irregularity in the procedure, but it cannot be a ground to vitiate the impugned orders. With regard to the scope of interference by the High Court in jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of U.P. Vs. Rajkishore Yadav reported in, (2006) 5 SCC 673 , has held that: "........ It is a settled law that High Court has limited scope of interference in the administrative action of the State in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and therefore, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and the consequent order of punishment of dismissal from service should not be disturbed..." 8. In the facts of the case, reference may also be made to the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Chairman M.D.V.S.P. Vs. Goparaju Shri Prabhakara Hari Babu reported in, (2008) 5 SCC 569 , wherein the Apex Court has in Paragraph 17 and 17.1 observed as under : "17. Once it is found that all the procedural requirements have been complied with, the Courts would not ordinarily interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed upon a delinquent employee. The Supreme Courts only in some cases may invoke the doctrine of proportionality. If the decision of an employer is found to be within the legal parameters, the jurisdiction would ordinarily not be invoked when the misconduct stands proved." 9. For the foregoing reasons, this petition fails and is accordingly, dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs.