JUDGMENT B. AMIT STHALEKAR, J. 1. Heard Shri A.K. Upadhyay, learned counsel for the petitioners and Shri Rajendra Babu Gaur, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. The petitioner, in the writ petition, prays that the order of the District Judge, Hathras dated 15.12.2018 rejecting the petitioners' transfer application No. 309 of 2018 (Dinesh Kumar and others vs. Durvijay Singh) may be set aside. 3. Contention of the petitioners is that the Civil Judge (Senior Division) has no pecuniary jurisdiction' to hear the matter since after the amendment in the C.P.C. all pecuniary jurisdiction upto Rs. 5,00,000/- is vested in the Civil Judge (Junior Division). The District Judge, however, in appeal has held: (i) that there was a direction of the High Court to decide the suit expeditiously, and therefore, transferring the matter to the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) would unnecessarily delay the hearing of the suit, (ii) The Court below has held that an objection to territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not go to the root of the matter, and therefore, would not render the final decree as void. (3) Reference has been made to the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in the Case of M/s Pankaj Hotel and another vs. Bal Mukund (Deceased) through his legal representatives and others, (2018) 126 AllLR 334 , wherein has held:- "The Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between law of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make the decree passed by that court to be one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void." 4. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Subhash Mahadevasa Habib vs. Nemasa Ambasa Dharmadas (dead) by legal representatives and others, (2007) 13 SCC 650 , wherein the Supreme Court has held in para 33 as under:- "What is relevant in this context is the legal effect of the so-called finding in OS No. 4 of 1972 that the decree in OS No. 61 of 1971 was passed by a court which had no pecuniary jurisdiction to pass that decree. The Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. The Code of Civil Procedure has made a distinction between lack of inherent jurisdiction and objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas an inherent lack of jurisdiction may make a decree passed by that court one without jurisdiction or void in law, a decree passed by a court lacking territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not automatically become void. At best it is voidable in the sense that it could be challenged in appeal therefrom provided the conditions of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied." 5. In the recent judgment in the case of Sneh Lata Goel vs. Pushplata and others; civil appeal No. 116 of 2019 decided on 7th of January, 2019 the Supreme Court has taken the same view that an objection to territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction does not go to the root of the subject matter of the suit and would not render a final decree as void. Paragraphs 17 to 26 of the same reads as under:- '17. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has placed a considerable degree of reliance on the judgment of four Judges of this Court in Kiran Singh (supra). In that case, there was a dispute in regard to the valuation of the suit. The issue would ultimately determine the forum to which the appeal from the judgment of the trial court would lie. If the valuation of the suit as set out in the plaint was to be accepted, the appeal would lie to the district court. On the other hand, if the valuation as determined by the High Court was to be accepted, the appeal would lie before the High Court and not the District Court. It was in this background that this Court held that as a fundamental principle, a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its validity could be set up wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution in a collateral proceeding. Moreover, it was held that a defect of jurisdiction, whether pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass the decree and cannot be cured even by the consent of the parties. 18. Moreover, it was held that a defect of jurisdiction, whether pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass the decree and cannot be cured even by the consent of the parties. 18. The Court then proceeded to examine the effect of Section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act 1887 on this fundamental principle. This Court held thus: "7. Section 11 enacts that notwithstanding anything in Section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure, an objection that a court which had no jurisdiction over a suit or appeal had exercised it by reason of overvaluation or undervaluation, should not be entertained by an appellate court, except as provided in the section...a decree passed by a court, which would have had no jurisdiction to hear a suit or appeal but for overvaluation or undervaluation, is not to be treated as, what it would be but for the section, null and void, and that an objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation, should be dealt with under that section and not otherwise. The reference to Section 578, now Section 99 CPC, in the opening words of the section is significant. That section, while providing that no decree shall be reversed or varied in appeal on account of the defects mentioned therein when they do not affect the merits of the case, excepts from its operation defects of jurisdiction. Section 99 therefore gives no protection to decrees passed on merits, when the courts which passed them lacked jurisdiction as a result of overvaluation or undervaluation. It is with a view to avoid this result that Section 11 was enacted. It provides that objections to the jurisdiction of a court based on overvaluation or undervaluation shall not be entertained by an appellate court except in the manner and to the extent mentioned in the section. It is a self-contained provision complete in itself, and no objection to jurisdiction based on overvaluation or undervaluation can be raised otherwise than in accordance with it. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or Revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. With reference to objections relating to territorial jurisdiction, Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code enacts that no objection to the place of suing should be allowed by an appellate or Revisional Court, unless there was a consequent failure of justice. It is the same principle that has been adopted in Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act with reference to pecuniary jurisdiction. The policy underlying Sections 21 and 99 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is the same, namely, that when a case had been tried by a court on the merits and judgment rendered, it should not be liable to be reversed purely on technical grounds, unless it had resulted in failure of justice, and the policy of the legislature has been to treat objections to jurisdiction both territorial and pecuniary as technical and not open to consideration by an appellate court, unless there has been a prejudice on the merits." (Emphasis supplied) 19. Dealing with the question of whether a decree passed on appeal by a court which had jurisdiction to entertain it only by reason of undervaluation or overvaluation can be set aside on the ground that on a true valuation that court was not competent to entertain the appeal, the Court held that a mere change of forum is not 'prejudice' within Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. This Court held thus: "12. it is impossible on the language of the section to come to a different conclusion. If the fact of an appeal being heard by a Subordinate Court or District Court where the appeal would have lain to the High Court if the correct valuation had been given is itself a matter of prejudice, then the decree passed by the Subordinate Court or the District Court must, without more, be liable to be set aside, and the words "unless the overvaluation or undervaluation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on its merits" would become wholly useless. These words clearly show that the decrees passed in such cases are liable to be interfered with in an appellate court, not in all cases and as a matter of course, but only if prejudice such as is mentioned in the section results. And the prejudice envisaged by that section therefore must be something other than the appeal being heard in a different forum. And the prejudice envisaged by that section therefore must be something other than the appeal being heard in a different forum. A contrary conclusion will lead to the surprising result that the section was enacted with the object of curing defects of jurisdiction arising by reason of overvaluation or undervaluation, but that, in fact, this object has not been achieved. We are therefore clearly of opinion that the prejudice contemplated by the section is something different from the fact of the appeal having been heard in a forum which would not have been competent to hear it on a correct valuation of the suit as ultimately determined."(Emphasis supplied) 20. The Court disallowed the objection to jurisdiction on the ground that no objection was raised at the first instance and that the party filing the suit was precluded from raising an objection to jurisdiction of that court at the appellate stage. This Court concluded thus: "16. If the law were that the decree of a court which would have had no jurisdiction over the suit or appeal but for the overvaluation or undervaluation should be treated as a nullity, then of course, they would not be stopped from setting up want of jurisdiction in the court by the fact of their having themselves invoked it. That, however, is not the position under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act." 21. Thus, where the defect in jurisdiction is of kind which falls within Section 21 of the CPC or Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act 1887, an objection to jurisdiction cannot be raised except in the manner and subject to the conditions mentioned thereunder. Far from helping the case of the respondent, the judgment in Kiran Singh (supra) holds that an objection to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction is different from an objection to jurisdiction over the subject matter. An objection to the want of territorial jurisdiction does not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit. 22. In Hiralal v Kalinath, a person filed a suit on the original side of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay for recovering commission due to him. The matter was referred to arbitration and it resulted in an award in favour of the Plaintiff. 22. In Hiralal v Kalinath, a person filed a suit on the original side of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay for recovering commission due to him. The matter was referred to arbitration and it resulted in an award in favour of the Plaintiff. A decree was passed in terms of the award and was eventually incorporated in a decree of the High Court. In execution proceedings, the judgment-debtor resisted it on the ground that no part of the cause of action had arisen in Bombay, and therefore, the High Court had no jurisdiction to try the cause and that all proceedings following thereon where wholly without jurisdiction and thus a nullity. Rejecting this contention, a four judge Bench of this Court held thus: "The objection to its [Bombay High Court] territorial jurisdiction is one which does not go to the competence of the court and can, therefore, be waived. In the instant case, when the plaintiff obtained the leave of the Bombay High Court on the original side, under clause 12 of the Letters Patent, the correctness of the procedure or of the order granting the leave could be questioned by the defendant or the objection could be waived by him. When he agreed to refer the matter to arbitration through court, he would be deemed to have waived his objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the court, raised by him in his written statement. It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure." (Emphasis supplied) 23. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v DLF Universal Ltd., this Court held that an objection to territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. If it is not raised at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. This Court held thus: "30. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v DLF Universal Ltd., this Court held that an objection to territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. If it is not raised at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. This Court held thus: "30. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be aken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity." 24. In Hasham Abbas Sayyad v Usman Abbas Sayyad, a two judge Bench of this Court held thus: "24. We may, however, hasten to add that a distinction must be made between a decree passed by a court which has no territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction in the light of Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and a decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction in regard to the subject-matter of the suit. Whereas in the former case, the appellate court may not interfere with the decree unless prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of the cases would be interfered with." 25. Similarly, in Mantoo Sarkar v Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd, a two judge Bench of this Court held thus: "20. A distinction, however, must be made between a jurisdiction with regard to the subject-matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the former category the judgment would be a nullity, in the latter it would not be. Ltd, a two judge Bench of this Court held thus: "20. A distinction, however, must be made between a jurisdiction with regard to the subject-matter of the suit and that of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the former category the judgment would be a nullity, in the latter it would not be. It is not a case where the Tribunal had no jurisdiction in relation to the subject-matter of claim in our opinion, the court should not have, in the absence of any finding of sufferance of any prejudice on the part of the first respondent, entertained the appeal. 26. The objection which was raised in execution in the present case did not relate to the subject matter of the suit. It was an objection to territorial jurisdiction which does not travel to the root of or to the inherent lack of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain the suit. An executing court cannot go behind the decree and must execute the decree as it stands. In Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, the Petitioner filed a suit in the Court of Small Causes, Ahmedabad for ejecting the Defendant-tenant. The suit was eventually decreed in his favour by this Court. During execution proceedings, the defendant-tenant raised an objection that the Court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and its decree was a nullity. The court executing the decree and the Court of Small Causes rejected the contention. The High Court reversed the order of the Court of Small Causes and dismissed the petition for execution. On appeal to this Court, a three judge Bench of this Court, reversed the judgment of the High Court and held thus: "6. A court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 8. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 8. If the decree is on the face of the record without jurisdiction and the question does not relate to the territorial jurisdiction or under Section 11 of the Suits Valuation Act, objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to make the decree may be raised; where it is necessary to investigate facts in order to determine whether the Court which had passed the decree had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit, the objection cannot be raised in the execution proceeding." 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that there is no finding recorded by the District Judge that the plea of pecuniary jurisdiction has not been taken by the petitioner at the first instance in his written statement. Learned counsel submits that at the time when the suit was filed, the court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) had jurisdiction, but after the amendment in the C.P.C. in 2018, the jurisdiction upto Rs. 5,00,000/- has now vested in the Civil Judge (Junior Division), and therefore, the objection to pecuniary jurisdiction was not taken by him in his written statement, but becomes available to him only now when the amendment has been made to the C.P.C., and therefore, his interest may be protected in any further appeal against the decree, if any objection is taken with reference to Section 21 C.P.C. that the plea regarding the pecuniary jurisdiction had not been taken by the petitioner in the first instance. 7. Considering the facts of the case and in light of the judgment of this Court as well as the Supreme Court in the case of M/s Pankaj Hotel and another; Subhash Mahadevasa Habib; Sneh Lata Goel (Supra) and the fact that the transfer application was moved only after the amendment in C.P.C. in 2018, it cannot be said that the petitioner would be divested of his rights to raise his objection against the final decree before the appropriate appellate forum, if at all he has any grievance at that stage. 8. With the aforesaid observations, this petition is disposed of.