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2019 DIGILAW 3422 (MAD)

A. Sheik Aaja v. Elangovan

2019-12-16

S.M.SUBRAMANIAM

body2019
JUDGMENT : (Prayer: First Appeal is filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 30.01.2015 made in O.S. No.6 of 2009 on the file of the learned District and Sessions Judge, Thiruvannamalai.) 1. The appeal suit is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.01.2015 passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Thiruvannamalai in O.S.No.6 of 2009. 2. The defendant is the appellant and the plaintiff is the respondent in the appeal suit. 3. The respondent/plaintiff instituted the civil suit for specific performance of contract to direct the appellant/defendant to execute the registered Sale Deed in respect of the suit schedule properties in favour of the respondent/plaintiff as per the Sale Agreement between the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/ defendant, after receiving the balance sale consideration amount of Rs.9,93,500/- from the respondent/plaintiff as per the Sale Agreement dated 14.01.2007 for a sum of Rs.12,44,500/-. 4. The respondent/plaintiff instituted the suit by stating that the appellant/defendant is the absolute owner of the suit properties. The appellant/defendant offered to convey the suit properties of 2.62 acres at Rs.4,750/- per cent. The respondent/plaintiff accepted the said offer. In pursuance of the offer and acceptance, a contract of sale between the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant were entered into on 14.01.2007. 5. As per the terms of Sale Agreement, the appellant/ defendant is willing to convey all the suit properties comprises for Rs.12,44,500/- to the respondent/plaintiff and the respondent/plaintiff agreed to purchase the said suit properties for the agreed price. The respondent/plaintiff paid an advance of Rs.51,000/- in cash to the appellant/defendant and the said amount was acknowledged in the agreement itself. 6. It is mutually agreed between the parties that the appellant/defendant has to measure the suit properties and be ready to convey the same. The time for execution of sale is recited as 60 days. It was specifically agreed that the time is not essence of contract. The appellant/defendant demand second installment as portion of sale price on 29.01.2007 and the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- to the appellant/defendant and the appellant/defendant endorsed the same in the Sale Agreement itself. When the respondent/ plaintiff was willing to pay the balance and get the sale deed executed in her favour and requested the appellant/defendant to perform his part of the contract on 26.03.2007. When the respondent/ plaintiff was willing to pay the balance and get the sale deed executed in her favour and requested the appellant/defendant to perform his part of the contract on 26.03.2007. The appellant/defendant had requested three months time to execute the sale deed and also demanded the respondent/plaintiff to pay the additional sum of Rs.50,000/-. Thus, in all, a sum of Rs.2,51,000/- had been paid by the respondent/plaintiff to the appellant/defendant. 7. The respondent/plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of contract and did inform the same to the appellant/ defendant on various occasions. Even at the time of receiving a sum of Rs.50,000/- on 26.03.2007 and making endorsement in the agreement for sale, the appellant/defendant had categorically recorded the said fact also. Despite the fact that the respondent/plaintiff made repeated demands, the appellant/defendant failed to comply with the terms of the Sale Agreement and was going on evading. Thus, the respondent/plaintiff caused a registered notice dated 04.07.2008 through her lawyer to the appellant/defendant, informing her readiness and willingness and requested the appellant/defendant to receive the balance sale consideration and insisted him to perform his part of contract. The appellant/defendant had chosen to cause a false reply and thereafter, the respondent/plaintiff was constrained to institute the civil suit for specific performance. 8. The appellant/defendant, in his written statement, denied the allegations set out in the plaint by stating that the suit itself is vexatious. The appellant/defendant states that the respondent/plaintiff accepted to purchase the suit properties at Rs.4,750/- per cent. Further, admitted the fact that the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant entered into Sale Agreement on 14.01.2007. The appellant/defendant denied the allegations that the time was not fixed as the essence of contract. The readiness and willingness as expressed by the respondent/plaintiff was denied by the appellant/defendant. The respondent/plaintiff is the resident of Thiruvarur District and the appellant/defendant is in Vandavasi Town. 9. One Mr.Elangovan from Chennai was the real estate agent, who approached the appellant/defendant for the purchase of the suit properties. It was agreed between Mr.Elangovan and the appellant/ defendant and the sale had to be concluded within 60 days. The time was clearly made as an essence of contract and it was clearly mentioned in the agreement itself. 9. One Mr.Elangovan from Chennai was the real estate agent, who approached the appellant/defendant for the purchase of the suit properties. It was agreed between Mr.Elangovan and the appellant/ defendant and the sale had to be concluded within 60 days. The time was clearly made as an essence of contract and it was clearly mentioned in the agreement itself. The appellant/defendant was in need of money for his medical and family purposes and under those circumstances, he insisted upon Elangovan to pay the balance amount as soon as possible. 10. The respondent/plaintiff did not come to Vandavasi and no contract was entered into between the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant. It is further contended that the respondent/ plaintiff was never ready and willing to conclude the contract. The real motive of Mr.Elangovan was that he would take the agreement and sell the properties to other buyers for higher price. Since Mr.Elangovan was unable to find suitable buyers, he was postponing the contract by paying paltry amount to the appellant/defendant whenever the appellant/defendant demanded for the balance amount. The appellant/defendant states that the land cost has increased a lot, now one cent costs Rs.15,000/-. The respondent/plaintiff cannot purchase the land for a lesser value on account of the inordinate delay on the part of the respondent/plaintiff alone. 11. The Trial Court framed the following issues for consideration:- “(1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to obtain the relief of specific performance as per the Agreement of Sale dated 14.01.2007 as claimed in the plaint? (2) Whether the time is the essence of the Agreement of Sale? (3) To what relief, the plaintiff is entitled to?” 12. By way of an additional issue, the Trial Court framed whether the plaintiff is entitled to the alternate relief of advance amount? 13. The respondent/plaintiff in support of his case, PW-1 and PW-2 had been examined and Exs.A-1 to A-6 were marked as documents. On the side of the appellant/defendant, DW-1 was examined and Exs.B-1 and B-2 were marked as documents. 14. With reference to issue No.2, the Trial Court found that the appellant/defendant was the absolute owner of the suit property. The appellant/defendant offered to sell the suit property at the rate of Rs.4,750/- per cent and the respondent/plaintiff had agreed to purchase and accordingly entered into the Sale Agreement, which was marked as Ex.A-1. 14. With reference to issue No.2, the Trial Court found that the appellant/defendant was the absolute owner of the suit property. The appellant/defendant offered to sell the suit property at the rate of Rs.4,750/- per cent and the respondent/plaintiff had agreed to purchase and accordingly entered into the Sale Agreement, which was marked as Ex.A-1. As per the Sale Agreement, the respondent/plaintiff had paid an advance of Rs.51,000/- and agreed to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.11,93,500/-. Both the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant had signed the Sale Agreement in the presence of two witnesses, namely, Sheik Davud and S.H.Faridha Sheik. 15. As per the terms of Agreement, the respondent/ plaintiff had always ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration. On the other hand, due to the family dispute, the appellant/defendant could not come forward to execute the Sale Deed by receiving the balance sale consideration. The respondent/plaintiff had represented by the Power of Attorney Agent. The Power of Attorney deposed as PW-1, on 29.01.2007, the part sale consideration of Rs.1,50,000/- was paid by the respondent/plaintiff and the same was acknowledged by the appellant/defendant and an endorsement was made behind the sale Agreement itself and the same was marked as Ex.A-2. 16. On 26.02.2007, the appellant/defendant had received another sum of Rs.50,000/- and agreed to execute the Sale Deed on receipt of the balance sale consideration within three months from the date of endorsement, that is on 26.03.2007, which was marked as Ex.A-3. The defendant had not received the balance sale consideration and executed the Sale Deed as per the terms agreed between the parties. Thus, the respondent/plaintiff issued legal notice. The copy of the notice was marked as Ex.A-5 and the reply given by the appellant/ defendant was marked as Ex.A-6. 17. The Trial Court found that the suit was filed within the period of limitation as the subsequent advance payments were made by the respondent/plaintiff on various dates and the said payments were endorsed by the appellant/defendant in the Agreement itself. 18. On behalf of the appellant/defendant, it was contended that the respondent/plaintiff had not signed in Exs.A-1 and B-1. In this regard, the Trial Court found that the Agreement was only unilateral and would not bind the appellant/defendant, but there is no specific pleadings in the written statement. The respondent/plaintiff did not sign in the Agreement. 18. On behalf of the appellant/defendant, it was contended that the respondent/plaintiff had not signed in Exs.A-1 and B-1. In this regard, the Trial Court found that the Agreement was only unilateral and would not bind the appellant/defendant, but there is no specific pleadings in the written statement. The respondent/plaintiff did not sign in the Agreement. Repeatedly, the appellant/defendant contended that the respondent/plaintiff was only a moneylender and it was the benami transaction, only the Power of Attorney Agent, entered into the Agreement, by the name of the respondent/plaintiff. Since there is no specific pleadings that the respondent/plaintiff is not signed in the Ex.A-1, the appellant/defendant was not entitled to let in evidence and that the respondent/plaintiff had not signed in the Ex.A-1. 19. On the other hand, the respondent/plaintiff examined the attesting witnesses as PW-2 and categorically deposed that both the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant had signed in the Ex.A-1. The appellant/defendant had not specifically pleaded that the respondent/plaintiff had not signed in the Ex.A-1. Thus, the appellant/ defendant cannot plead before the Court that the Agreement is unilateral. Even in case, the respondent/plaintiff had not signed the Agreement when it was signed by the Power of Attorney Holder with the knowledge of the appellant/defendant and the appellant/defendant agreed to the terms and conditions of the Sale Agreement, then the appellant/defendant cannot take the defence that the respondent/ plaintiff had not signed the Agreement at all. 20. The entire contract between the parties are admitted. While-so, in the absence of any specific pleading regarding the signature and its validity, the appellant/defendant had agreed to the terms of the contract and further the agreement was signed on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff by the Power of Attorney Holder. On behalf of the appellant/defendant, a further point is raised that the time is the essence of contract. As in the Sale Agreement, it was stated that the sale had to be completed within a period of 60 days and the respondent/plaintiff had to pay the balance sale consideration and therefore, the respondent/plaintiff was not entitled for the relief in support of his contention. 21. In support of the said contention, the appellant/ defendant relied on certain judgments and the Trial Court considered the ground whether the time is essential for contract. In the present suit with reference to the facts and circumstances as well as the evidences and the documents. 21. In support of the said contention, the appellant/ defendant relied on certain judgments and the Trial Court considered the ground whether the time is essential for contract. In the present suit with reference to the facts and circumstances as well as the evidences and the documents. The Power of Attorney Agent of the respondent/ plaintiff alone deposed as PW-1. At the time of presentation of the plaint, an application in I.A.No.108 of 2010 was filed and sought permission to represent the suit by the Power of Attorney Agent on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff and the same was allowed on 24.09.2010. The appellant/defendant did not prefer any revision against the said order passed in the said I.A.No.108 of 2010. Thus, the appellant/defendant cannot take advantage of non-examination of the respondent/plaintiff before the Court. Further, the respondent/plaintiff is none other than the sister-in-law of PW-1. Therefore, the contention of the appellant/defendant that the respondent/plaintiff did not enter into Sale Agreement and the respondent/plaintiff was only the moneylender., cannot be accepted as the Interlocutory Application filed by the respondent/plaintiff was allowed and accordingly, PW-1 deposed before the Trial Court about the agreement and its terms and under these circumstances on the very ground raised in untenable. 22. All related grounds raised in this regard was adjudicated by the Trial Court and ultimately, this Court is of an opinion that once the suit is instituted by the respondent/plaintiff and the PW-1, who was a Power Holder, was permitted to depose before the Trial Court and such an order passed in Interlocutory Application became final, there is no reason for the appellant/defendant to raise this ground and therefore, the Trial Court had rightly proceeded in this regard by rejecting the defence taken by the appellant/defendant. 23. The Trial Court examined the endorsements made in Exs.A-2 to A-4 behind the Sale Agreement. The Trial Court categorically found that for the first time, during the course of cross- examination, the appellant/defendant deposed inconsistent plea. The inconsistency deposed before the Trial Court was that as per Ex.A-3 dated 26.03.2007, the signature was admitted by the appellant/ defendant. However, the appellant/defendant deposed that the wordings were written by the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/ defendant had denied that he had signed only after writing the contents in the above endorsement. The appellant/defendant made a defence that he signed in a blank paper. However, the appellant/defendant deposed that the wordings were written by the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/ defendant had denied that he had signed only after writing the contents in the above endorsement. The appellant/defendant made a defence that he signed in a blank paper. However, the appellant/ defendant specifically not denied about Ex.A-4 endorsement either in the written statement or in the reply notice. 24. For the first time, the DW-1/appellant/defendant, made a statement before the Trial Court, denying the endorsement of Ex.A-4 and therefore, the Trial Court had rightly rejected the said defence. In the absence of any specific pleading either in the reply notice or in the written statement. Regarding the principle whether the time is the essence of contract is to be decided based on the nature of the terms agreed in the contract along with the conduct of the parties. In Ex.A-1, 60 days time was fixed for execution of the sale deed on payment of balance sale consideration. As per Ex.A-1, 60 days time expired on 15.03.2007, but on 29.01.2007, the appellant/defendant received a part sale consideration of Rs.1,50,000/- without any murmur and again received another sum of Rs.50,000/- on 26.03.2007 and made Ex.A-3 endorsement and again the said sum of Rs.50,000/- was received by the appellant/defendant without any objections. 25. In Ex.A-4 endorsement, the appellant/defendant admitted the signature, but he took defence that he had signed only in the blank paper. However, Ex.A-4 endorsement was made behind the Sale Agreement, Ex.A-1 and his wife S.H.Faritha Sheik had signed as witness for Ex.A-2 and Ex.A-3 endorsements. To disprove that his wife did not sign in Ex.A-2 and Ex.A-3, the appellant/defendant failed to examine his wife. 26. The appellant/defendant had not specifically denied the said endorsements made in Exs.A-2 and A-3 in his written statement as well as in his proof affidavit, there is no specific denial. But only for the first time, during the cross-examination, he submitted that whether the respondent/plaintiff had obtained signatures in a blank paper and filled the endorsements. In view of such contradictions in depositions as well as in the written statement and the proof affidavit, the Trial Court arrived a conclusion that there is no truth behind the statement made for the first time during cross-examination by the appellant/defendant. 27. In view of such contradictions in depositions as well as in the written statement and the proof affidavit, the Trial Court arrived a conclusion that there is no truth behind the statement made for the first time during cross-examination by the appellant/defendant. 27. It is pertinent to consider the findings of the Trial Court in paragraph-16 of its judgment, wherein the respondent/plaintiff specifically pleaded in the plaint at paragraph No.5 that he was always willing and ready to perform his part of the contract and also issued a legal notice, which was marked as Ex.A-5. The Trial Court found that the respondent/plaintiff established that he was always willing and ready to perform his part of contract. 28. The appellant/defendant admitted the same till the receipt of pre-suit notice, which is marked as Ex.A-5. The appellant/defendant had not taken any steps against the respondent/plaintiff to cancel the Agreement at any point of time. Therefore, the Trial Court arrived a conclusion that the decisions cited on behalf of the appellant/defendant were not applicable as the facts and circumstances established in the suit by the respondent/plaintiff were not similar and therefore, the judgments cited are of no avail to the appellant/defendant. Considering all these factors, the Trial Court arrived a conclusion that the respondent/plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance. 29. With reference to issue Nos.1 and 2, which were framed as an additional issue, the appellant/defendant had admitted execution of the Sale Agreement and also agreed the receipt of advance and part payments under Exs.A-2 and A-3 and not registered or cancelled the Sale Agreement. In view of the above findings, the Trial Court arrived a conclusion that the respondent/plaintiff is entitled for the discretionary relief and as such Ex.A-1 is enforceable under law. Consequently, the suit was decreed as prayed for with costs. 30. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/ defendant relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Manjunath Anandappa vs. Tammanasa [ (2003) 10 SCC 390 ], wherein, in paragraph-26, the Supreme Court made the following observations:- “In Pushparani S.Sundaram vs. Pauline Manomani James [ (2002) 9 SCC 582 ] it is stated: (SCC p. 584, paras 5-6) “5. …So far there being a plea that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the contract is there in the pleading, we have no hesitation to conclude, that this by itself is not sufficient to hold that the appellants were ready and willing in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act. This requires not only such plea but also proof of the same. Now examining the first of the two circumstances, how could mere filing of this suit, after exemption was granted be a circumstance about willingness or readiness of the plaintiff. This at the most could be the desire of the plaintiff to have this property. It may be for such a desire this suit was filed raising such a plea. But Section 16(c) of the said Act makes it clear that mere plea is not sufficient, it has to be proved. 6. Next and the only other circumstance relied upon is about the tendering of Rs 5000, which was made on 2-3-1982 which was even prior to the grant of the exemption. Such small feeder to the vendor is quite often made to keep a vendor in good spirit. In this case the only other payment made by the plaintiff was Rs 5000 at the time of execution of the agreement of sale. Thus, the total amount paid was insignificantly short of the balance amount for the execution of the sale deed. Thus in our considered opinion the said two circumstances taken together, is too weak a filament to stand even to build an image of readiness and willingness. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act requires that not only there be a plea of readiness and willingness but it has to be proved so. It is not in dispute that except for a plea there is no other evidence on record to prove the same except the two circumstances. It is true that mere absence of a plaintiff coming in the witness box by itself may not be a factor to conclude that he was not ready and willing in a given case as erroneously concluded by the High Court.” (emphasis supplied)” 31. It is true that mere absence of a plaintiff coming in the witness box by itself may not be a factor to conclude that he was not ready and willing in a given case as erroneously concluded by the High Court.” (emphasis supplied)” 31. Relying on the said judgment, the learned counsel made an attempt to convince this Court by stating that a meager amount of advance was paid at the time of entering into an agreement and an inference is to be drawn in this regard. When the purchaser made a small amount and pleading before the Court that he is ready and willing to perform the terms of contract, cannot be accepted by the Trial Court. Thus, the Trial Court has failed to consider the fact that the very meager amount of Rs.2,50,000/- had been paid by the purchaser out of sale consideration of Rs.12,44,500/-. 32. The learned counsel for the appellant cited the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Saradamani Kandappan vs. S.Rajalakshmi and others [ (2011) 12 SCC 18 ], the learned counsel relied on the certain paragraphs to emphasis that the Courts cannot ignore the significance of time/period, wherever time/period is prescribed by parties for taking certain steps or for completion of transaction. ‘Ready’ and ‘Willing’ are the concept to be considered by the Courts while deciding the suit for specific performance. The Hon’ble Supreme Court laid down certain general principles, which is relied upon. 33. This Court is of the considered opinion that as far as the facts and circumstances of the lis on hand is concerned, undoubtedly, the advance amount of Rs.51,000/- was paid at the time of entering into an agreement between the parties. The period of time for execution of the sale was fixed at 60 days. However, the appellant/ defendant had accepted the further advance amount of Rs.1,50,000/- and thereafter, Rs.50,000/- on a subsequent date. 34. Considering the conduct of the parties in respect of the receipt of further advance amount from the purchaser, this Court is of an opinion that they have extended the time for execution of sale as a factual inference is to be drawn that the acceptance of further advance is an understanding between the parties, so as to execute the sale on a subsequent date. 35. 35. In this context, it is to be considered whether the respondent/plaintiff was ready and willing to execute the terms of contract. However, the plaintiff in an unambiguous terms established before the Trial Court that he was always insisting for the execution of sale and it is the appellant/defendant, he who postponed execution on certain flimsy grounds. When such facts are established/proved before the Trial Court, there is no other reason whatsoever for drawing an adverse factual inference against the respondent/plaintiff as far as the grant of relief of specific performance is concerned. Thus, the above judgments cited by the learned counsel for the appellant/defendant are of no avail with reference to the facts and circumstances of the lis on hand is concerned. Thus, the defence in this regard deserves no merit consideration. 36. In this context, it is useful to consider the findings of the Trial Court, more specifically, in paragraph-15 of the judgment of the Trial Court, which reads as under:- “If really the defendant had concerned about Ex.A-2 and Ex.A-3 he ought to have specifically denie in the written statement and his proof affidavit. But only for the first time during the cross-examination, he submitted that whether the plaintiff has obtained a signature and filled the endorsements. Therefore, based on the evidence of PW-1 and the admission of the defendant, the signatures found on Ex.A-2 to Ex.A-4 and also admission in the cross examination”. XXX XXX Amounts of admission and waiver of terms of agreement. It is pertinent incorporated the endorsements made by the defendant behind the suit agreement Ex.A-1 vide Ex.A-2 and Ex.A-3. XXX XXX During the cross-examination, the defendant admitted that Sheik Ibrahim, Sheik Hussain and Sheik Sikkandar are his brothers and also admitted Sheik Haja and Sheik Hussain filed a suit against their brother Sheik Sikkanthar in O.S.No.74 of 2007 on the file of District Munsif Court, Vandavasi. Therefore, the endorsement Ex.A-4 was proved by the plaintiff that since there is a dispute between the brothers of the defendant and litigations is pending, and defendant has made an endorsement that after solving the problem with Sheik Sikkandar who is come forward to execute the Sale Deed. Therefore, the endorsement Ex.A-4 was proved by the plaintiff that since there is a dispute between the brothers of the defendant and litigations is pending, and defendant has made an endorsement that after solving the problem with Sheik Sikkandar who is come forward to execute the Sale Deed. Therefore, on receipt of part payments i.e., Ex.A-2 and Ex.A-3, and based on the endorsement made in Ex.A-4, this Court comes to the conclusion that defendant waived the clause, that within 60 days, the transaction have to be concluded, and that the defendant on his own will, received the part sale consideration under Ex.A-2 and Ex.A-3, and also execute Ex.A-4. Therefore, this Court comes to the conclusion that the time is not essence of the contract.” 37. The Trial Court in unambiguous terms arrived a conclusion that the facts and circumstances as well as the evidences adduced have established the appellant/defendant himself with reference to the clause regarding the fixation of time limit for execution of sale in the suit sale agreement. Therefore, now after institution of the suit by the respondent/plaintiff, he cannot take such a plea during the cross-examination at the first time. The Trial Court rightly arrived a conclusion that by considering these facts and circumstances in a cogent manner. 38. Therefore, the judgment cited in this regard, regarding the importance of time as per the terms of the agreement is of no support to the case of the appellant in this appeal suit. 39. Specific performance is equitable relief given by the court to enforce against a defendant, the duty of doing what he agreed by contract to do. Thus, the remedy of specific performance is in contrast with the remedy by way of damages for breach of contract, which gives pecuniary compensation for failure to carry out the terms of the Agreement. 40. The plaintiff seeking this remedy must first satisfy the Court that the normal remedy of damages is inadequate, the presumption being that in cases of contracts for transfer of immovable properties, damages will not be adequate. Even in these cases specific performance is not always granted, as it is a discretionary remedy. 41. As far as the suit for specific performance is concerned, it is to be construed whether a valid and concluded contract exists between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property? Even in these cases specific performance is not always granted, as it is a discretionary remedy. 41. As far as the suit for specific performance is concerned, it is to be construed whether a valid and concluded contract exists between the parties for sale/purchase of the suit property? As far as the case on hand is concerned, the respondent/plaintiff unambiguously established before the Trial Court that there was a valid contract existed between the respondent/plaintiff and the appellant/defendant at the time of institution of the suit and even the contract between the parties were admitted by them in their depositions. 42. Secondly, whether the plaintiff had been ready and willing to perform their part of contract and whether they were still ready and willing to perform their part as mentioned in the contract? had been complied with or not. In this regard, the pre-suit notice, the respondent/plaintiff categorically stated that he was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. To prove the bona fide, the respondent/plaintiff had deposited the entire sale consideration before the Trial Court. Thus, the readiness was established by the respondent/plaintiff and the willingness was also established as the respondent/plaintiff was making periodical advance payments, which were endorsed by the appellant/defendant behind the suit Sale Agreement itself. Therefore, the respondent/plaintiff, in fact, performed his part of the contract as per the terms and there was no lapse or violations. 43. The performance of the respondent/plaintiff was in conformity with the terms of the contract. Therefore, the equitable relief of specific performance is to be considered. This Court has to consider whether any hardship would be caused to the appellant/defendant, in the present case, as the agreed amount of Rs.4,750/- per cent was fixed. The escalation of land cost and the payable damages are not established by the appellant/defendant before the Trial Court and a meager amount of escalation or otherwise during the pendency of the suit, cannot be a ground to deny the relief of specific performance to the respondent/plaintiff. 44. The escalation of land cost and the payable damages are not established by the appellant/defendant before the Trial Court and a meager amount of escalation or otherwise during the pendency of the suit, cannot be a ground to deny the relief of specific performance to the respondent/plaintiff. 44. Considering all the facts and circumstances as well as the findings of the Trial Court, this Court is of an undoubted opinion that the respondent/plaintiff established his case before the Trial Court in conformity with the terms of the contract and contrarily, the appellant/defendant failed to prove his case and under those circumstances, the Trial Court had rightly granted the relief of specific performance in favour of the respondent/plaintiff. 45. This being the factum established by the parties before the Trial Court, through documents and evidences and the Trial Court also rightly interpreted the facts and circumstances, based on the documents and the evidences, there is no perversity or infirmity, as such, in the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. 46. Accordingly, the judgment and decree dated 30.01.2015 passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Thiruvannamalai in O.S.No.6 of 2009 stands confirmed and consequently, the appeal suit stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.