JUDGEMENT : 1. Challenge in this petition is thrown to Order No. DMB/PSA/14 of 2019 dated 20.03.2019, passed by District Magistrate, Budgam – respondent no.2 herein (for short “detaining authority”), placing under preventive detention Shri Dr. Hameed Ganai @ Hameed Fayaz S/o Mohammad Yaseen Ganai R/o Wazir Bagh, Zabarwan Colony House No. 119, Budgam (for brevity the “detenu”) with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of security of State and has been lodged in District Jail, Kathua, J&K, Jammu. 2. The case set up by petitioner in the instant petition is that he has been arrested on 22.02.2019 at 4:00 A.M. from his residence and sent to the Police Station Humhama, where he remained for two days and thereafter sent to Central Jail, Srinagar. On 09.03.2019 upon production before Tehsildar, Budgam, the detenue was admitted to bail but re-arrested suddenly and escorted to Police Station, Humhama, wherefrom shifted to District Jail, Kathua on 24.03.2019 under the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act in connection with case FIR No. 42/2019 and subsequently placed under preventive detention in terms of impugned detention order. 3. The respondents have filed the counter affidavit, vehemently resisting and opposing the petition on hand. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and considered the matter. I have gone through the detention record produced by the learned counsel for the respondents. 5. Before giving heed to the case in hand, it would be apt to say that the right of the personal liberty is most precious right, guaranteed under the Constitution. It has been held to be inspirational, absolute and available to a person independent of the Constitution. A person is not to be deprived of his personal liberty, except in accordance with procedures established under law and the procedure as laid down in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978 AIR SC 597), is to be just and fair. The personal liberty may be curtailed, where a person faces a criminal charge or is convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment. Where a person is facing trial on a criminal charge and is temporarily deprived of his personal liberty owing to criminal charge framed against him, he has an opportunity to defend himself and to be acquitted of the charge in case prosecution fails to bring home his guilt. Where a person is facing trial on a criminal charge and is temporarily deprived of his personal liberty owing to criminal charge framed against him, he has an opportunity to defend himself and to be acquitted of the charge in case prosecution fails to bring home his guilt. Where such person is convicted of offence, he still has satisfaction of having been given adequate opportunity to contest the charge and also adduce evidence in his defence. However, framers of the Constitution have, by incorporating Article 22(5) in the Constitution, left room for detention of a person without a formal charge and trial and without such person held guilty of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment by a competent court. Its aim and object are to save society from activities that are likely to deprive a large number of people of their right to life and personal liberty. In such a case it would be dangerous for the people at large, to wait and watch as by the time ordinary law is set into motion, the person, having dangerous designs, would execute his plans, exposing general public to risk and causing colossal damage to life and property. It is, for that reason, necessary to take preventive measures and prevent a person bent upon to perpetrate mischief from translating his ideas into action. Article 22(5) Constitution of India, therefore, leaves scope for enactment of preventive detention law. 6. The essential concept of preventive detention is that detention of a person is not to punish him for something he has done, but to prevent him from doing it. The basis of detention is satisfaction of the executive of a reasonable probability of likelihood of detenu acting in a manner similar to his past acts and preventing him by detention from doing the same. The Supreme Court in Haradhan Saha v. State of W.B. (1975) 3 SCC 198 , points out that a criminal conviction, on the other hand, is for an act already done, which can only be possible by a trial and legal evidence. There is no parallel between prosecution in a Court of law and a detention order under the Act. One is a punitive action and the other is a preventive act. There is no parallel between prosecution in a Court of law and a detention order under the Act. One is a punitive action and the other is a preventive act. In one case, a person is punished to prove his guilt and the standard is proof, beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in preventive detention a man is prevented from doing something, which it is necessary for reasons mentioned in the Act, to prevent. 6.1. It is sometimes said in an uncivilised manner that law cannot bind individual actions which are perceived as flaws by the large body of people, but, the truth is and has to be that when the law withstands the test of the constitutional scrutiny in a democracy, the individual notions are to be ignored. At times certain activities, wrongdoings, assume more accent and gravity depending upon the nature and impact of such deleterious activities on the society. It is neither to be guided by a sense of sentimentality nor to be governed by prejudices. 6.2. Acts or activities of individual or a group of individuals, prejudicial to the security of the State, have magnitude of across-the-board disfigurement of societies. No court should tune out such activities, being swayed by passion of mercy. It is an obligation of the Court to constantly remind itself the right of society is never maltreated or marginalised by doings, an individual or set of individuals propagate and carry out. 7. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and Section 13 of the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, guarantee safeguard to detenu to be informed, as soon as may be, of grounds on which order of detention is made, which led to subjective satisfaction of detaining authority and also to be afforded earliest opportunity of making representation against order of detention. Detenu is to be furnished with sufficient particulars enabling him to make a representation, which on being considered, may obtain relief to him. 8. Detention record, produced by counsel for respondents, divulges that detention order was made on proper application of mind, to the facts of the case and detenu was delivered at the time of execution of detention order, the material and grounds of detention and also informed that he had a right to represent against his preventive detention. 8. Detention record, produced by counsel for respondents, divulges that detention order was made on proper application of mind, to the facts of the case and detenu was delivered at the time of execution of detention order, the material and grounds of detention and also informed that he had a right to represent against his preventive detention. It is mentioned in the counter affidavit that in compliance to District Magistrate, Budgam’s detention order, the warrant was executed through SI, Ab. Aziz No. 286/BD (EXK.811277) DPL Budgam P/S Budgam on 24.03.2019, who handed over the detenue to the Superintendent District Jail Kathua, J&K, Jammu, who took over the detenue against proper receipt and lodged him in the said Jail. Detention order also reveals that contents of detention warrant and grounds of detention had been read over and explained to detenu in Kashmiri/Urdu languages, which he fully understood and it was in lieu whereof that he subscribed his signatures on the Execution Report. It also divulges that detenu was informed that he can make representation to government as well as detaining authority. Detention record disclosed that all the material has been handed over to detenu. 9. It may not be out of place to mention here that grounds of detention are definite, proximate and free from any ambiguity. Detenu has been informed with sufficient clarity what actually weighed with Detaining Authority while passing detention order. Detaining Authority has narrated facts and figures that made it to exercise its powers under Section 8 of J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, and record subjective satisfaction that detenu was required to be placed under preventive detention in order to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. 10. Learned counsel for petitioner has stated that the allegations/grounds of detention are vague and the instances and cases mentioned in grounds of detention have no nexus with detenu and have been manoeuvred by police in order to justify its illegal action of detaining detenu. 11. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the Judgment reported as 2009 (2) JKJ 141 [HC], wherein it is held that even in a case where a person is in custody in a criminal case, he can be placed under detention and the order can validly be passed where the detaining authority feels it essential to detain him to prevent him from indulging in a prejudicial activity. In such a case, however, the authority passing the order must be aware of the fact that he is actually in custody. Learned counsel further relief upon the Judgment reported as 2017 (1) JKLT 1 (SC) as also on the Judgment passed by this Court in HCP No. 489/2018 titled Nisar Ahmad Qazi vs. State and Ors., wherein it is held that if detention order is based on more than one ground, independent of each other, then detention order will still survive even if one of grounds found t be unfounded or legally unsustainable. 12. It is not impertinent to mention here that the Supreme Court, in numerous decisions, has held that even one prejudicial act can be treated as sufficient for forming requisite satisfaction for detaining a person. 13. Brief look of detention record produced by respondents would reveal that detenu is affiliated with banned organization of Jamat-e-Islami and heads the said organisation as being its “Ameer”. Grounds of detention mention that the detenue is involved in the illegal acts against the State and do not come to fore and thereby avoids getting incriminated in the criminal cases. It is stated that detenue is operating in very clandestine manner to achieve the agenda of the separatists which being inimical to the security of the State and the detenue never remained a law abiding citizen, which can be gathered from the fact that even in 2009, the detenue sowed the seeds of hatred and disaffection against the Army in the town of Shopian for which FIR No. 328/2009 was registered under Section 13 ULA (P) Act in Police Station, Shopian. 14. Grounds of detention also make mention that the detenue has affiliation and active role in the banned organization of Jamat-e-Islami for carrying out antinational propaganda and campaigning against sovereignty and integrity of country, besides instigating and motivating general masses for antinational propaganda. 15. Grounds of detention also mention that the detenue is a hard-core motivator and supporter of terrorists and is quite long acting to further the activities of the terrorist organizations and acting to bring about secession of J&KState from the Union of India and to its consequent merger with Pakistan. 15. Grounds of detention also mention that the detenue is a hard-core motivator and supporter of terrorists and is quite long acting to further the activities of the terrorist organizations and acting to bring about secession of J&KState from the Union of India and to its consequent merger with Pakistan. It is further stated that the detenue’s aim is to ensure that such objectives are accomplished and from this end is resorting to activities which has the effect of causing widespread disturbance and instability and also posing threat to the security of the State. In such circumstances, suffice it is to say that there had been material before detaining authority to come to conclusion and hence, it cannot be said that subjective satisfaction of detaining authority was wrongly arrived at or grounds of detention are self-contradictory or vague. The role of detenu has been specifically described. 16. Even otherwise it is settled law that this Court in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution has limited scope to scrutinizing whether detention order has been passed on material placed before it, it cannot go further and examine sufficiency of material. This Court does not sit in appeal over decision of detaining authority and cannot substitute its own opinion over that of detaining authority when grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, and relevant. This Court can only examine grounds disclosed by the Government in order to see whether they are relevant to the object which the legislation has in view, that is, to prevent detenu from engaging in activities prejudicial to security of the State or maintenance of public order. In this regard I am fortified by law laid down by the by the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Adam Kasam Bhaya (1981) 4 SCC 216 . 17. Submission of learned counsel for petitioner is that detenu has not been provided the material relied upon by detaining authority while passing impugned detention order. Given submission made by learned counsel for petitioner, it has become unavoidable to have glimpse of detention record produced by learned counsel for respondents. Glance of detention record reveals that all the relevant documents have been handed over to detenu at the time of execution of detention order. Given submission made by learned counsel for petitioner, it has become unavoidable to have glimpse of detention record produced by learned counsel for respondents. Glance of detention record reveals that all the relevant documents have been handed over to detenu at the time of execution of detention order. In such circumstances, submission of learned counsel for petitioner that material, relied upon by detaining authority, has not been furnished to detenu, flies in the face of detention record and therefore baseless. 18. Learned counsel for petitioner has also averred that detaining authority has made basis a lonely event in grounds of detention for slapping preventive detention upon detenu and that could not have been made use of for slapping detention on detenu. It may not be out of place to mention here that the Supreme Court, in several decisions, has held that even one prejudicial act can be treated as sufficient for forming requisite satisfaction for detaining a person. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be, made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention and an order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. Discharge or acquittal of a person will not preclude detaining authority from issuing a detention order. In this regard the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Haradhan Saha’s case (supra), while considering various facets concerning preventive detention, has observed: “32. The power of preventive detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. The power of preventive detention is a precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be, made before or during prosecution. It may or may not relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may be, made before or during prosecution. An order of preventive detention may be made with or without prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal. The pendency of prosecution is no bar to an order of preventive detention. An order of preventive detention is also not a bar to prosecution. 33. Article 14 is inapplicable because preventive detention and prosecution are not synonymous. The purposes are different. The authorities are different. The nature of proceedings is different. In a prosecution an accused is sought to be punished for a past act. In preventive detention, the past act is merely the material for inference about the future course of probable conduct on the part of the detenu. 34. The recent decisions of this Court on this subject are many. The decisions in Borjahan Gorey v. State of W.B., Ashim Kumar Ray v. State of W.B.; Abdul Aziz v. District Magistrate, Burdwan and Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. correctly lay down the principles to be followed as to whether a detention order is valid or not. The decision in Biram Chand v. State of U. P., (1974) 4 SCC 573 , which is a Division Bench decision of two learned Judges is contrary to the other Bench decisions consisting in each case of three learned Judges. The principles which can be broadly stated are these. First, merely because a detenu is liable to be tried in a criminal court for the commission of a criminal offence or to be proceeded against for preventing him from committing offences dealt with in Chapter VIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure would not by itself debar the Government from taking action for his detention under the Act. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Second, the fact that the Police arrests a person and later on enlarges him on bail and initiates steps to prosecute him under the Code of Criminal Procedure and even lodges a first information report may be no bar against the District Magistrate issuing an order under the preventive detention. Third, where the concerned person is actually in jail custody at the time when an order of detention is passed against him and is not likely to be released for a fair length of time, it may be possible to contend that there could be no satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority as to the likelihood of such a person indulging in activities which would jeopardise the security of the State or the public order. Fourth, the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during the pendency of the prosecution will not violate the order. Fifth, the order of detention is a precautionary measure. It is based on a reasonable prognosis of the future behaviour of a person based on his past conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances.” 19. Personal liberty is one of the most cherished freedoms, perhaps more important than the other freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution. It was for this reason that the Founding Fathers enacted the safeguards in Article 22 in the Constitution so as to limit the power of the State to detain a person without trial, which may otherwise pass the test of Article 21, by humanising the harsh authority over individual liberty. In a democracy governed by the rule of law, the drastic power to detain a person without trial for security of the State and/or maintenance of public order, must be strictly construed. However, where individual liberty comes into conflict with an interest of the security of the State or public order, then the liberty of the individual must give way to the larger interest of the nation. These observations have been made by the Supreme Court in The Secretary to Government, Public (Law and Order-F) and another v. Nabila and another (2015) 12 SCC 127 . 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. (1974) 4 SCC 135 , has said that while ordinarily-speaking one act may not be sufficient to form requisite satisfaction, there is no such invariable rule and that in a given case “one act may suffice”. 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Debu Mahato v. State of W.B. (1974) 4 SCC 135 , has said that while ordinarily-speaking one act may not be sufficient to form requisite satisfaction, there is no such invariable rule and that in a given case “one act may suffice”. That was a case of wagon-breaking and given the nature of the Act, it was held therein that “one act is sufficient”. The same principle was reiterated in the case of Anil Dely v. State of W.B. (1974) 4 SCC 514 . It was only a case of theft of railway signal material. Here too “one act was held to be sufficient”. Similarly, in Israil S K v. District Magistrate of West Dinajpur (1975) 3 SCC 292 and Dharua Kanu v. State of W.B. (1975) 3 SCC 527 , single act of theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal of railway fish-plates respectively, was held sufficient to sustain the order of detention. In Saraswathi Seshagiri v. State of Kerala (1982) 2 SCC 310 , a case arising under a single act, viz. attempt to export a huge amount of Indian currency was held sufficient. In short, the principle appears to be this: “Though ordinarily one act may not be held sufficient to sustain an order of detention, one act may sustain an order of detention if the act is of such a nature as to indicate that it is an organised act or a manifestation of organised activity.” The gravity and nature of the act is also relevant. The test is whether the act is such that it gives rise to an inference that the person would continue to indulge in similar prejudicial activity. That is the reason why single acts of wagon-breaking, theft of signal material, theft of telegraph copper wires in huge quantity and removal of railway fish-plates were held sufficient by the Supreme Court. Similarly, where the person tried to export huge amount of Indian currency to a foreign country in a planned and premeditated manner, as in the present case detenu has been apprehended with arms and ammunition, it was held that such single act warrants an inference that he will repeat his activity in future and, therefore, his detention is necessary to prevent him from indulging in such prejudicial activity. 21. 21. Here detenu has been caught in the act, which are prejudicial to the security of the State. He has been, what is discernible from grounds of detention, instigating and motivating youth to indulge in breach of law and, thereby create enmity and disharmony among general masses. Grounds of detention also depict that despite facing criminal investigation, detenu indulged in unlawful activities repeatedly. If that be so, it is not possible to say that order of detention was passed by detaining authority with a view to subverting, or substituting the criminal law of the land. The order of detention was plainly and undoubtedly with a view to preventing detenu from continuing the activities which are prejudicial to the security of the State. 22. It is apt to mention here that if one looks at the acts, the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978, is designed for, is to prevent, they are all these acts that are prejudicial to security of the State or maintenance of public order. The acts, indulged in by persons, who act in concert with other persons and quite often such activity has national level consequences. These acts are preceded by a good amount of planning and organisation by the set of people fascinated in tumultuousness. They are not like ordinary law and order crimes. If, however, in any given case a single act is found to be not sufficient to sustain the order of detention that may well be quashed, but it cannot be stated as a principle that one single act cannot constitute the basis for detention. On the contrary, it does. In other words, it is not necessary that there should be multiplicity of grounds for making or sustaining an order of detention. The said views and principles have been reiterated by the Supreme Court in Gautam Jain v. Union of India another AIR 2017 SC 230 . 23. In the above background, it would be apt to refer to the observations made by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya AIR 1951 SC 157 . The paragraph 5 of the judgement lays law on the point, which is profitable to be reproduced infra: “5. It has to be borne in mind that the legislation in question is not an emergency legislation. The paragraph 5 of the judgement lays law on the point, which is profitable to be reproduced infra: “5. It has to be borne in mind that the legislation in question is not an emergency legislation. The powers of preventive detention under this Act of 1950 are in addition to those contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, where preventive detention is followed by an inquiry or trial. By its very nature, preventive detention is aimed at preventing the commission of an offence or preventing the detained person from achieving a certain end. The authority making the order therefore cannot always be in possession of full detailed information when it passes the order and the information in its possession may fall far short of legal proof of any specific offence, although it may be indicative of a strong probability of the impending commission of a prejudicial act. Section a of the Preventive Detention Act therefore requires that the Central Government or the State Government must be satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to (1) the defence of India, the relations of India with foreign powers, or the security of India, or (2) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, or (8) the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community ......... it is necessary So to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. According to the wording of section 3, therefore, before the Government can pass an order of preventive detention it must be satisfied with respect to the individual person that his activities are directed against one or other of the three objects mentioned in the section, and that the detaining authority was satisfied that it was necessary to prevent him from acting in such a manner. The wording of the section thus clearly shows that it is the satisfaction of the Central Government or the State Government on the point which alone is necessary to be established. It is significant that while the objects intended to be defeated are mentioned, the different methods, acts or omissions by which that can be done are not mentioned, as it is not humanly possible to give such an exhaustive list. The satisfaction of the Government however must be based on some grounds. It is significant that while the objects intended to be defeated are mentioned, the different methods, acts or omissions by which that can be done are not mentioned, as it is not humanly possible to give such an exhaustive list. The satisfaction of the Government however must be based on some grounds. There can be no satisfaction if there are no grounds for the same. There may be a divergence of opinion as to whether certain grounds are sufficient to bring about the satisfaction required by the section. One person may think one way, another the other way. If, therefore, the grounds on which it is stated that the Central Government or the State Government was satisfied are such as a rational human being can consider connected in some manner with the objects which were to be prevented from being attained, the question of satisfaction except on the ground of mala fides cannot be challenged in a court. Whether in a particular case the grounds are sufficient or not, according to the opinion of any person or body other than the Central Government or the State Government, is ruled out by the wording of the section. It is not for the court to sit in the place of the Central Government or the State Government and try to deter- mine if it would have come to the same conclusion as the Central or the State Government. As has been generally observed, this is a matter for the subjective decision of the Government and that cannot be substituted by an objective test in a court of law. Such detention orders are passed on information and materials which may not be strictly admissible as evidence under the Evidence Act in a court, but which the law, taking into consideration the needs and exigencies of administration, has allowed to be considered sufficient for the subjective decision of the Government.” 24. In the light of the aforesaid position of law settled by the Six-Judge Constitution Bench, way back in the year 1951, the scope of looking into the manner in which the subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the detaining authority, is limited. In the light of the aforesaid position of law settled by the Six-Judge Constitution Bench, way back in the year 1951, the scope of looking into the manner in which the subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the detaining authority, is limited. This Court, while examining the material, which is made basis of subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, would not act as a court of appeal and find fault with the satisfaction on the ground that on the basis of the material before detaining authority another view was possible. 25. For the foregoing discussion, the petition without any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. 26. Detention record be returned to learned counsel for respondents.