JUDGMENT : Subramonium Prasad, J. 1. The writ petitioner is the appellant. The writ petition challenges the award dated 04.07.2006 passed by the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, Chennai in Industrial Dispute I.D. No. 57 of 2005, by which, the Labour Court refused to interfere with the punishment of removal from service imposed against the appellant petitioner by the Authorities. 2. The charge against the appellant petitioner is of unauthorized absence from duty for 286 days from February 2000 to 14.02.2001 without obtaining prior sanction of leave by the appropriate Authority. During the enquiry proceedings, the appellant petitioner accepted the charge. The Enquiry Officer also looked into the exhibits marked by the Department and came to a conclusion that the appellant petitioner had absented unauthorizedly, without any prior sanction by the appropriate Authority. The Disciplinary Authority accepted the finding of the Enquiry Officer and gave a punishment of removal from service. 3. On appeal, the Appellate Authority found that the appellant petitioner was unauthorizedly absented from duty from 01.01.1996 to 29.07.1996. The Appellate Authority held that the petitioner was granted extraordinary leave of 313 days from 01.01.1996 to 31.12.1996. Again, the appellant petitioner has been unauthorizedly absent from 16.02.2000 to the date of discharge i.e. 16.09.2002. The Appellate Authority, came to a conclusion that the appellant petitioner has been continuously absent for more than two years and has not mended himself, even after sufficient opportunities was given to him. 4. The order of the Appellate Authority was challenged before the Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court in I.D. No. 57 of 2005. The Labour Court found that the appellant petitioner had wilfully abstained from attending office. The Labour Court refused to accept the reasons given by the appellant petitioner that he was suffering from ailments. The Labour Court, after considering all the arguments, came to a conclusion that the charge against the petitioner is proved and the punishment of discharge from service does not require any interference. It is this order, which was challenged in the writ petition. 5. The learned Single Judge, after going through all the materials, upheld the findings of the Labour Court. The appellant petitioner has assailed the order of the learned Single Judge in the instant Writ Appeal. 6. It is this order, which was challenged in the writ petition. 5. The learned Single Judge, after going through all the materials, upheld the findings of the Labour Court. The appellant petitioner has assailed the order of the learned Single Judge in the instant Writ Appeal. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant petitioner vehemently contended that there has been no independent assessment by the Enquiry Officer and the appellant petitioner has been found guilty of the charges levelled against him only on the basis of his admission. Learned counsel vehemently contended that the appellant petitioner was suffering from various ailments and he had informed the Department that he was suffering from ailments and therefore, he was not able to attend the office. He would also contend that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the misconduct. 7. The contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant petitioner cannot be accepted. 8. A perusal of the order of the Appellate Authority and the order of the Tribunal discloses that they have meticulously gone into the facts and evidence and have reached a conclusion that the appellant petitioner has been unauthorisedly absent. The finding of the Tribunal that the reason given by appellant petitioner that he was suffering from ailments, is only a ruse and that the absence of the appellant petitioner was deliberate and he was wilfully abstaining from attending the office. The finding of the Tribunal, that merely by informing the Authorities, that he was suffering from ailments is not sufficient. In the absence of any sanction of leave, the petitioner was guilty of unauthorized absence. Finding on facts by the Courts/authorities below would show that the charge against the appellant petitioner has been proved. It is well settled that once guilt is proved, then Writ Courts must not interfere with the punishment. 9. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India reported in 1995 (6) SCC 749 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that once the Authority has come to the conclusion that the employee is guilty and was imposed a punishment, then, the Courts and Tribunals would be slow in imposing a punishment. In Paragraph Nos. 17 and 18, the Hon'ble Supreme has held as under: "17. The next question is whether the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa Ors. In Paragraph Nos. 17 and 18, the Hon'ble Supreme has held as under: "17. The next question is whether the Tribunal was justified in interfering with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of Orissa Ors. v. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra [ AIR 1963 SC 779 ] held that having regard to the gravity of the established misconduct, the punishing authority had the power and jurisdiction to impose punishment. The penalty was not open to review by the High Court under Article 226. If the High Court reached a finding that there was some evidence to reach the conclusion, it became unassessable. The order of the Governor who had jurisdiction and unrestricted power to determine the appropriate punishment was final. The High Court had no jurisdiction to direct the Governor to review the penalty. It was further held that if the order was supported on any finding as to substantial misconduct for which punishment "can lawfully be imposed", it was not for the Court to consider whether that ground alone would have weighed with the authority in dismissing the public servant. The court had no jurisdiction, if the findings prima facie made out a case of misconduct, to direct the Governor to reconsider the order of penalty. This view was reiterated in Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [ (1972) 2 SCR 218 ]. It is true that in Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. [ AIR 1983 SC 454 ], a Bench of two Judges of this Court, while holding that the High Court did not function as a court of appeal, concluded that when the finding was utterly perverse, the High Court could always interfere with the same. In that case, the finding was that the appellant was to supervise felling of the trees which were not hammer marked. The Government had recovered from the contractor the loss caused to it by illicit felling of trees. Under those circumstances, this Court held that the finding of guilt was perverse and unsupported by evidence. The ratio, therefore, is not an authority to conclude that in every case the Court/Tribunal is empowered to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. Under those circumstances, this Court held that the finding of guilt was perverse and unsupported by evidence. The ratio, therefore, is not an authority to conclude that in every case the Court/Tribunal is empowered to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. In Rangaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu [ AIR 1989 SC 1137 ], a Bench of three Judges of this Court, while considering the power to interfere with the order of punishment, held that this Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitutions, is empowered to alter or interfere with the penalty; and the Tribunal had no power to substitute its own discretion for that of the authority. It would be seen that this Court did not appear to have intended to lay down that in no case, the High Court/Tribunal has the power to alter the penalty imposed by the disciplinary or the appellate authority. The controversy was again canvassed in State Bank of India's case (supra), where the court elaborately reviewed the case law on the scope of judicial review and powers of the Tribunal in disciplinary matters and nature of punishment. On the facts in that case, since the appellate authority had not adverted to the relevant facts, it was remitted to the appellate authority to impose appropriate punishment. 18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. It the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof." 10. The said dictum has been followed in several other judgments. This Court does not find that the punishment of removal from service, is not shockingly disproportionate in the facts of the present case. The said dictum has been followed in several other judgments. This Court does not find that the punishment of removal from service, is not shockingly disproportionate in the facts of the present case. The appellant petitioner has not been able to substantiate his case that his absence from work was due to circumstances completely beyond his control. 11. In the result, the Writ Appeal fails and the same is, accordingly, dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.