JUDGMENT : 1. The Debts Recovery Tribunal, Ernakulam (hereinafter referred to as the DRT for brevity), has apparently taken a view, in the order impugned in this Original Petition, that a pending Securitisation Application (SA), filed under the provisions of Section 17 of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act (SARFAESI Act for convenience), cannot be amended by the applicant to incorporate a challenge against subsequent action/steps taken by a Bank or Financial Institution under the said Act, either because the earlier measures, assailed in the SA, had matured into the next stage pending lis or if it had not borne fruit, as was expected by them. 2. The DRT, Relying on the judgment of another learned Judge of this Court in Sidheek A.V v. Authorised Officer, Federal Bank, M.G.Road Branch (2017 [5] KHC 373), appears to have concluded that every subsequent measure/action taken by the Bank/Financial Institution gives rise to a new cause of action, amenable to an independent challenge through a fresh Securitisation Application; and axiomatically, therefore, that an amendment to the pending SA, to bring on record pleadings and reliefs consequent to such measure/action becomes unnecessary and impermissible. 3. The petitioners in this O.P calls into question the afore rationale of the DRT, as being erroneous and thus unsustainable in law. 4. It is the petitioners' singular contention that the conclusions of the DRT are on account of a bonafide misdirection since in Sidheek A.V (supra) this Court had made no declaration that it cannot allow amendments to a pending SA, to bring into its fold challenge to subsequent measures/steps or to bring on record developments pending such lis. 5. I will consider the forensic worth of these contentions after I notice the requisite facts. 6. The petitioners concede to be the borrowers of certain sums from the respondent -Bank and submits that when measures were taken by the said Bank, for recovery of certain amounts allegedly due from them, invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, they had filed SA No.498 of 2018 before the DRT assailing such action and in particular, the notice dated 23.11.2018, issued by the Bank for sale of the secured assets on 31.12.2018. They say that even though the DRT did not interdict the sale, there were no bidders on that day and consequently, that the Bank notified a second sale notice, dated 05.02.2019, scheduling such sale to 27.02.2019. 7. The petitioners submit that since the Bank obviously had issued the second sale notice pending the aforementioned SA and had also simultaneously approached the Competent Chief Judicial Magistrate for assistance under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, they were constrained to move Exhibit P4 interim application before the DRT, seeking to amend the SA, so as to bring the subsequent events to the notice of the Tribunal, along with additional prayers to have the subsequent sale notice and the proceedings initiated by the Bank under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, set aside. 8. The petitioners assert that this was the most logical thing for them to have done because, in the pending SA, the entire recovery action taken by the Bank under the SARFAESI Act, including its attempt to bring the secured assets to sale, had been challenged; and that it was only because the sale notified through the first notice, dated 23/11/2018, had not taken place that the Bank had chosen to issue the second sale notice, dated 05/02/2019. 9. The petitioners predicate that the amendments to the SA, sought through Exhibit P4, are nothing more than the continuation of the cause of action as was originally pleaded in the SA and therefore, that it ought to have been allowed. The petitioners allege that, however, the DRT dismissed the said application, solely being guided by the objections filed by the Bank against Exhibit P4 application, a copy of which has been appended to this OP as Exhibit P5, wherein they relied on the judgment of this Court in Sidheek A.V (supra), allegedly misinterpreting the declarations therein, by taking them in isolation away from the larger context, to contend that the subsequent sale notice is a new cause of action and therefore, that Exhibit P4 application for amendment is not maintainable. 10. 10. The petitioners allege that the impugned order of the DRT, namely Exhibit P6, has been issued merely accepting the afore objections of the Bank; but without entering into any detailed discussion on the merits of Exhibit P4 application for amendment, thus unwittingly promoting multiplicity of proceedings because if they are to file a fresh Securitisation Application, as per the conclusions in the impugned order, the earlier SA, which is still pending, will be rendered virtually redundant and superfluous. 11. The petitioners, on the afore legal and factual edifice, prays that Exhibit P6 order be set aside and that the DRT be directed to allow the amendments sought for through Exhibit P4 application. 12. Sri. V.K. Peer Mohamed Khan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, commenced his submissions in consonance with the afore factual narration and submitted that the power of the DRT to allow amendments in pending Securitisation Applications is implicit from the provisions of the SARFAESI Act itself. He says that, as is clear from Section 17(2) of the said Act, the DRT is obligated to consider the validity of all the measures taken by the Bank under Section 13 (4) thereof and consequently, is enjoined to examine whether those measures/action are in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules thereunder. He vehemently asserts that even though, under the stipulations of Section 22 (1) of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial institutions Act, 1993, which is now renamed as Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the RDB Act), the DRT is not bound by the rigour of the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the CPC for short), it has been statutorily vested with all the powers of a Civil Court under the CPC, with respect to the various procedural requirements and aspects enumerated in the said section. He, thus contends that the DRT certainly has the power to invoke the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC and that it, therefore, ought to have allowed Exhibit P4 application for amendment of the pending SA. 13. He, thus contends that the DRT certainly has the power to invoke the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC and that it, therefore, ought to have allowed Exhibit P4 application for amendment of the pending SA. 13. After submitting as afore on the statutory provisions, Sri.V.K.Peer Mohamed Khan further contends that the judgment of this Court in Sidheek A.V (supra) has been misread by the DRT, because no interdiction has been made in the said judgment against it in allowing amendments to the pleadings in a pending SA, so as to bring the subsequent events on record and to seek apposite prayers based on such. Sri.V.K.Peer Mohamed Khan concludes by asserting that Exhibit P6 order of the DRT has been issued without proper application of mind and therefore, eminently deserving of being set aside by this Court. 14. Sri.C.K.Karunakaran, the learned Standing Counsel appearing for the respondent – Bank, submits that his client had preferred Exhibit P5 objections before the DRT, opposing Exhibit P4 application for amendment, ushered by the declaration of law in the judgment of this Court in Sidheek A.V (supra). He reads paragraph 2 of the said judgment to contend that the clear ratiocination therein is that a subsequent measure taken by the Bank can only be impugned by the borrower/guarantor through a separate Securitisation Application challenging such step; and that the Tribunal, therefore, cannot entertain an interlocutory application seeking reliefs against the said step in a pending Securitisation Application. The learned counsel, on such basis, argues that the DRT has acted without error in having issued Exhibit P6 order, which, according to him, only follows the declarations in Sidheek A.V (supra) as afore. 15. I have considered the above submissions made by the learned counsel quite intently. I am, however, of the view that Exhibit P6 order cannot find favour in law for the reasons that I will presently record. 16. The key to the resolution of the legal aspects involved in this case perhaps lies in exploring the true nature of the functions of the DRT and its jurisdiction. I am, however, of the view that Exhibit P6 order cannot find favour in law for the reasons that I will presently record. 16. The key to the resolution of the legal aspects involved in this case perhaps lies in exploring the true nature of the functions of the DRT and its jurisdiction. My path in this area is illuminated by the holdings of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Mardia Chemicals & others v. Union of India & others [ (2004)4 SCC 311 ], which is, arguably, the most emphatic forensic enunciation of the powers and competence of the DRT, while it acts under the SARFAESI Act. The binding declarations of the Hon'ble Court on the aspects relevant in this case is available in paragraph 59 of the judgment, which, in my view, compels a full reading; and I, therefore, deem it necessary to extract it as under: “We may like to observe that proceedings under Section 17 of the Act, in fact, are not appellate proceedings. It seems to be a misnomer. In fact it is the initial action which is brought before a forum as prescribed under the Act, raising grievance against the action or measures taken by one of the parties to the contract. It is the stage of initial proceeding like filing a suit in civil court. As a matter of fact proceedings under Section 17 of the Act are in lieu of a civil suit which remedy is ordinarily available but for the bar under Section 34 of the Act in the present case. We may refer to a decision of this Court in Ganga Bai v.Vijay Kumar where in respect of original and appellate proceedings a distinction has been drawn as follows: (SCC p.397, para 15) “There is a basic distinction between the right of suit and the right of appeal. There is an inherent right in every person to bring a suit of civil nature and unless the suit is barred by statute one may, at one's peril, bring a suit of one's choice. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous to claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is quite the opposite. It is no answer to a suit, howsoever frivolous to claim, that the law confers no such right to sue. A suit for its maintainability requires no authority of law and it is enough that no statute bars the suit. But the position in regard to appeals is quite the opposite. The right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law. That explains why the right of appeal is described as a creature of statute.” 17. The view of the Hon'ble Court is thus limpid that when the DRT performs its functions under the SARFAESI Act, it acts as a Civil Court and therefore, that the adjudicatory processes undertaken by it ought to answer the same basic requirements of the processes of a Civil Court while it considers a civil suit. 18. This being beyond doubt now, the next glance ought to be on the statutory fabric, woven by the applicable statutes, with regard to the procedure to be followed by the DRT while it acts. These provisions are ingrained in Section 22(1) of the RDB Act, which reads as under: “Procedure and Powers of the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal- (1) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall not be bound by the procedure laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), but shall be guided by the principles of natural justice and, subject to the other provisions of this Act and of any rules, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have powers to regulate their own procedure including the places at which they shall have their sittings. (2) The Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal shall have, for the purposes of discharging their functions under this Act, the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely:- (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavits; (d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents; (e) reviewing its decisions; (f) dismissing an application for default or deciding it ex parte; (g) setting aside any order of dismissal of any application for default or any order passed by it ex parte; (h) any other matter which may be prescribed. (3) Any proceeding before the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and 228, and for the purposes of Section 196, of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)” 19. It is thus indubitable that when the DRT acts under the provisions of either the SARFAESI Act or the RDB Act, it certainly is not bound by the procedural rigour of the CPC, as has been unequivocally affirmed through the afore extracted Section, but that is not to mean that it cannot invoke the provisions of the CPC, as and when it is necessary, to effectuate the purposes under the SARFAESI Act or the RDB Act. This becomes more pronounced when the said statutes are silent on a matter of procedural requirement, as is the case here, since they admittedly do not provide for the manner or method of making amendments to pleadings; and therefore, even by the prescriptions of the above extracted Section 22(1) of the RDB Act, the Tribunal will obtain competence, in its obligation to act as a Civil Court, to draw power from the CPC, unless it is specifically prohibited. 20. 20. In the case at hand, what has been attempted by the petitioners is to bring on record a subsequent event and to impel a consequential prayer against further measures taken by the Bank, which were taken by them solely because the sale proposed through the first sale notice did not fructify for want of bidders. The second sale notice was resultantly issued by the Bank as a consequential action and it is therefore, incontestable that the challenge to this measure is merely an extension of the original cause of action of the petitioners. Pertinently, all the steps and action taken by the Bank under the SARFAESI Act, which included the first sale notice, had been challenged by the petitioners in SA 498/2018 and therefore, should said SA finally succeed, then the subsequent action taken by the Bank may also fail. 21. Obviously, therefore, the filing of a fresh Securitisation Application, challenging the second sale notice or the further action taken by the Bank under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, would serve only to proliferate litigation and unnecessarily add to docket numbers because the alleged infirmities in the recovery action, being pursued by the Bank, had already been brought to the notice of the Tribunal in the pending Securitisation Application, which cannot be construed to have become infructuous merely because additional / fresh steps have been taken by the Bank, pending it. 22. From the above angle, when one examines the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the CPC, it becomes without doubt that the power to allow an amendment is vested in a Court to ensure that the real questions in controversy between the parties are appositely determined. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, in various judgments, cemented this principle beyond any requirement for restatement, two among them being Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and another (2002 [7] SCC 559) and Abdul Rehman and another v. Mohd. Ruldu and others (2012 [11] SCC 341). In both these judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has strongly driven home the edict that all amendments made and allowed to the pleadings are intended to determine the real point of controversy between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of litigations. 23. Ruldu and others (2012 [11] SCC 341). In both these judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has strongly driven home the edict that all amendments made and allowed to the pleadings are intended to determine the real point of controversy between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of litigations. 23. Resultantly, the imperatively fundamental prescript that must inexorably guide Courts, while deciding whether an application for amendment is to be allowed or otherwise, is to find out whether the cause of action is altered by such amendment or whether it is supplemental. In the former case, certainly the Courts will be much more circumspect in allowing the proposed amendments; while in the latter scenario, Courts will generally be relaxed and liberal in its consideration because any pleadings or circumstances, that are intended to supplement the original pleadings or cause of action, should be welcomed, since that will surely help in determining the real issue between the parties. 24. Viewed from the afore perspective and testing these principles against the conceded facts of the case at hand, it becomes irrefragable that what was sought by the petitioners, through Exhibit P4 application, was to bring on record the subsequent action, taken by the Bank pending the SA, which is merely the corollary progression of the earlier steps taken by them, which had already been projected and challenged by the petitioner in the pending Securitisation Application and to challenge the same through supplemental prayers. I therefore, fail to comprehend why the DRT should have thought such an amendment to be not permissible, particularly when they have been admittedly made well within the period of limitation, within which time the subsequent steps/action could have been independently challenged through a fresh Securitisation Application. 25. That said, however, I am certainly cognizant that the particular reason, cited by the DRT in Exhibit P6 order, in not allowing the amendments sought for by the petitioners, is that the declarations in Sidheek A.V(supra) inhibits it. 25. That said, however, I am certainly cognizant that the particular reason, cited by the DRT in Exhibit P6 order, in not allowing the amendments sought for by the petitioners, is that the declarations in Sidheek A.V(supra) inhibits it. I am afraid that the DRT has completely misread the conclusions in Sidheek A.V(supra), since even a cursory reading of the facts and circumstances noticed by this Court in the said case would clearly indicate that the forensic exposition therein was made in the context of a person attempting to challenge a subsequent action taken by the Bank merely by filing an interlocutory application assailing it but without seeking amendment of the pleadings or prayers in the pending Securitisation Application; and this Court rightly held that such a challenge could not have been carried through an interlocutory application in the pending lis, but only through a fresh Securitisation Application, because every action taken by the Bank under the SARFAESI Act gives rise to a fresh cause of action. Pertinently, however, nowhere in Sidheek A.V(supra) has the law been enounced that amendments to an SA cannot be made, so as to bring on record the subsequent measures / steps taken by the Bank, pending it and to seek supplemental reliefs. 26. I, therefore, am compelled to hold that the interpretation of the DRT and the manner in which it has understood Sidheek A.V(supra) is completely untenable and cannot obtain the imprimatur of this Court. 27. Interestingly, I am told by the learned counsel for the petitioners that another bench of the DRT, Ernakulam has, in fact, allowed applications for amendments similar to Exhibit P4, in various cases before it, including in Hope Constructions, Kolenchery & others v. Federal Bank Ltd (SA No.252/2015) and that such amendments were thus carried and the Securitisation Applications thereafter, finally considered on such basis. I, therefore, find no justifiable explication from the impugned order, as to why the DRT has now issued Exhibit P6 order, particularly when there is no express or implied proscription in Sidheek A.V (supra) against it in allowing eligible amendments to pending Securitisation Applications. 28. I, therefore, find no justifiable explication from the impugned order, as to why the DRT has now issued Exhibit P6 order, particularly when there is no express or implied proscription in Sidheek A.V (supra) against it in allowing eligible amendments to pending Securitisation Applications. 28. In summation, I am of the certain opinion that since neither the SARFAESI Act or the RDB Act prohibits amendments to pleadings, the DRT is well within its powers to consider applications for such purpose, on the basis of the procedural guidelines available from Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC, and to consider if such amendments be allowed or otherwise. However, while doing so, the DRT must exercise requisite circumspection and be careful not to allow amendments carrying challenge to the subsequent measures/steps taken by a Bank/Financial Institution, if they have been made beyond the period of limitation for making such challenge through a fresh Securitisation Application; though amendments to the pleadings, without a prayer against it, to bring on record subsequent events/steps, may be possible. 29. Further, it is needless to say specifically that merely because the Bank or the Financial Institution takes additional or fresh steps/measures pending an SA, it may not always be rendered infructuous and this will depend on the prayers originally made and will be upto the DRT to decide this on a case to case basis, adverting to all relevant and germane facts, circumstances and inputs. In the afore circumstances, I set aside Exhibit P6 order and direct the DRT to reconsider Exhibit P4 application of the petitioner in terms of law, after affording necessary opportunities to all sides; and to thereafter issue an appropriate order thereon, as expeditiously as is possible, but not later than one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Needless to say, until such time as the afore exercise is completed, all further action being pursued by the Bank under the SARFAESI Act shall stand deferred.