JUDGMENT : P.N. Prakash, J. 1. Since these criminal appeals emanate from the same judgment and FIR, they are considered and decided by this common judgment. 2. The facts distilled from the evidence on record are crystallised as under: 2.1 Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14), Inspector of Police, B3, Kattur Police Station was oh rounds with his subordinates in the afternoon of 25.06.1999 in the Gandhipuram area. In the junction of Gandhipuram IV Street and 100 ft. road, there is a mosque. Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14) and his team observed two persons outside the mosque displaying some printed materials to the worshipers coming out of the mosque. When the police party neared them, the duo tried to slip out. They were apprehended and when questioned, they disclosed their name as Shah Jahan (A.6) and Abu Tahir (A.7). 2.2. On verifying the hand outs in their possession, the police found them to be prima facie offending the State and therefore, in the presence of one Balasubramaniam (P.W. 1) and Ravindran (not examined), Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14) seized from Shah Jahan (A.6), the following items: a. 10 copies of the June 1999 issue of Students Islamic Movement (for brevity "SIM") newsletter (Ex. P.25); b. a letter addressed to Shah Jahan (A.6) from SIM (Ex. P.27); c. An unposted letter from Shah Jahan (A.6) addressed to Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2) relating to SIM (Ex. P.28); and d. 10 copies of the May 1999 issue of SIM newsletter (Ex. P.43) found along with 10 copies of the June 1999 issue of SIM newsletter (Ex. P.25). 2.3. Similarly, Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14) seized from Abu Tahir (A.7), the following items: a. 7 copies of the June 1999 issue of SIM newsletter (Ex. P.26); b. 7 copies of the May 1999 issue of SIM newsletter (Ex. P.44) found along with 7 copies of the June 1999 issue of SIM newsletter (Ex. P.26), The above seizures were effected under the cover of mahazar (Ex. P.1). 2.4. After the seizure, Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14) arrested Shah Jahan (A.6) and Abu Tahir (A.7) and brought them to the police station. He registered a case in Cr. P.44) found along with 7 copies of the June 1999 issue of SIM newsletter (Ex. P.26), The above seizures were effected under the cover of mahazar (Ex. P.1). 2.4. After the seizure, Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14) arrested Shah Jahan (A.6) and Abu Tahir (A.7) and brought them to the police station. He registered a case in Cr. No. 722 of 1999 on the same day, i.e., 25.06.1999, under Section 124-A IPC, based on the names disclosed in the newsletters, against S.H.M. Mohideen (A.1), author of the articles, Samimul Islam (A.2), Editor of SIM newsletter, Syed Abdur Rahman (A.3), Editor in-charge, Syed Mohammed (A.4), Administrator, Khader Babha (A.5), Layout Designer, Shah Jahan (A.6) and Abu Tahir (A.7) and prepared the printed FIR (Ex. P.13). 2.5. Thereafter, Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14) searched the house of Abu Tahir (A.7) between 6.15 p.m. and 7.15 p.m. on the same day and did not recover any incriminating material vide search list (Ex. P.14). He also searched the house of Shah Jahan (A.6) between 7.30 p.m. and 8.00 p.m. and did not recover any incriminating material vide search list (Ex. P.15). Thereafter, Shah Jahan (A.6) and Abu Tahir (A.7) were produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate who sent them to judicial custody. 2.6. After reading the articles in the SIM newsletters, Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14) altered the penal provision in the FIR by including Section 153-B vide alteration report (Ex. P16). On 14.07.1999, Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14) obtained a search warrant and searched the premises of SIM at No. 81, Angappa Street, Chennai 600 001, Mannadi in the presence of witnesses Upendra Babu (P.W. 5) and Abdul Wadood (not examined). 2.7. From the office of SIM, the following items were seized under search list (Ex. P.3): a. 5 copies of the May 1999 issue of SIM newsletter (Ex. P.45); b. 5 copies of the June 1999 issue of SIM newsletter (Ex. P.46); c. 1 copy each of the January and February 1999 editions of A1 Haznath of Sri Lanka Jamath (Ex. P.47); d. Photocopy of the back cover of Ex. P.47 (Ex. P.48); e. Tamil manuscript of the article titled 11 pages (Ex. P.49); f. Resignation letter dated 10.04.1999 of Shah Jahan (A.6) from SIM (Ex. P.50); g. A book in Urdu titled "Maulana Mufti Mohammed Kapoor Rai Haan Sahib" (Ex. P.51); and h. Essay containing the Tamil translation of Ex. P.51 (Ex. P.52) 2.8. P.47 (Ex. P.48); e. Tamil manuscript of the article titled 11 pages (Ex. P.49); f. Resignation letter dated 10.04.1999 of Shah Jahan (A.6) from SIM (Ex. P.50); g. A book in Urdu titled "Maulana Mufti Mohammed Kapoor Rai Haan Sahib" (Ex. P.51); and h. Essay containing the Tamil translation of Ex. P.51 (Ex. P.52) 2.8. In the office of SIM, Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14) arrested S.H.M. Mohideen (A.1), Syed Abdur Rahman (A.3) and Khadar Babha (A.5). On 15.07.1999, the said three accused were produced before the jurisdictional Court for remand. 2.9. The investigation in this case was transferred from the file of Kattur Police Station to the CB-CID vide Ex. P.22 dated 23.07.1999, pursuant to which, the investigation of the case was taken over by Sampath Kumar (P.W. 16), Inspector of Police, CB-CID. 2.10. In the impugned articles on Kashmir found in the SIM newsletters, since there is a reference to certain articles that appeared in The Hindu and The New Indian Express, Sampath Kumar (P.W. 16) collected the 23.03.1999 issue of "The Hindu" from the office of the said daily and the article on Kashmir titled "Kashmir could go the Kosovo way" published in that issue was marked as Ex. P.19. Likewise, he collected the 26.03.1999 issue of the New Indian Express (Ex. P.20) and the news items titled "NATO intensifies raids on defiant Yogoslavia" and "India sheds passive voice, turns active critic" which appeared in that issue were marked as Ex. P.21. 2.11. Sampath Kumar (P.W. 16) identified that the SIM newsletters were being printed in Asia Graphics and Offset Printers at No. 2, Kummalamman Koil Street, Tondiarpet, Chennai by Mohammed Shah Jahan (P.W. 10) and therefore, he recorded the statement of Mohammed Shah Jahan (P.W. 10) and from the office of Asia Graphics and Offset Printers, took custody of a 1996 diary containing the orders placed for printing and the payments received from various customers, under the cover of mahazar (Ex. P.2) in the presence of witnesses Vadivelu (P.W. 3) along with Shabir Mohammed (not examined). The said diary was marked as Ex. P.42 and in that diary, three entries relating to this case were marked as Exs. P.9 to P.11. Ex. P.9 is the entry dated 09.04.1999 which refers to printing of 1,500 copies of SIM newsletter at Rs. 2,350/-. In Ex. The said diary was marked as Ex. P.42 and in that diary, three entries relating to this case were marked as Exs. P.9 to P.11. Ex. P.9 is the entry dated 09.04.1999 which refers to printing of 1,500 copies of SIM newsletter at Rs. 2,350/-. In Ex. P.10 is the entry dated 07.05.1999 which refers to printing of 1,300 copies of SIM newsletter for Rs. 2,185/- and in the said entry, there is a reference to the name of Syed Mohammed (A.4). Ex. P.11 is the entry dated 07.06.1999 for printing 1,200 copies of SIM newsletter for Rs. 2,100/- and in the said entry also, there is a reference to the name of Syed Mohammed (A.4). 2.12. On the request of the police, the State Government accorded sanction vide G.O.Ms. No. 211, Public (Law & Order-E) Department dated 04.02.2000 (Ex. P.7) under Sections 196(1)(a) and 196(1-A)(a) Cr.P.C. 1973. M.F. Farooqui, Secretary to Government, Public Department, was examined as P.W. 15 to prove the sanction order. 2.13. After completing the investigation, Sampath Kumar (P.W. 16) filed a final report on 19.02.2001 before the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Coimbatore against 7 accused. Since Abu Tahir (A.7) was a juvenile, the case against him was split up. Since Samimul Islam (A.2) and Syed Mohammed (A.4) in the FIR were in abscondence, they were shown in the final report as "absconding accused". Sivasubramaniam (P.W. 17), Inspector of Police, obtained non-bailable warrant from the Judicial Magistrate Court No. II, Coimbatore, for apprehending them. Samimul Islam (A.2) was arrested on 01.05.2001 by Paranthaman (P.W. 13), Inspector of Police, CB-CID, in Chennai. 2.14. After obtaining permission for further investigation, pursuant to the arrest of Samimul Islam (A.2), Panneerselvam (P.W. 12), Inspector of Police, CB-CID, once again searched the office of SIM at No. 81, Angappa Street, Chennai on 05.05.2001 and recovered the following items under the search list (Ex. P.8) in the presence of witnesses Jayaraman (P.W. 9) and Syed Bukari (not examined). a. Special Correspondent identity card of Samimul Islam (A.2) (Ex. P.34); b. Visiting Card of Samimul Islam (A.2) (Ex. P.35); c. Stickers with the photo of Babri Masjid bearing the words "The Revenge is Due" (Ex. P.36 series); d. Stickers with the photo of Babri Masjid and Jerusalem with the words "Ayodhya to Jerusalem - Jihad will go on" (Ex. P.37 series); e. Letters written to Samimul Islam (A.2) (Exs. P.34); b. Visiting Card of Samimul Islam (A.2) (Ex. P.35); c. Stickers with the photo of Babri Masjid bearing the words "The Revenge is Due" (Ex. P.36 series); d. Stickers with the photo of Babri Masjid and Jerusalem with the words "Ayodhya to Jerusalem - Jihad will go on" (Ex. P.37 series); e. Letters written to Samimul Islam (A.2) (Exs. P.38 to P.40); and f. Air mail covers of letters written by various persons from Sri Lanka addressed to Samimul Islam (A.2)(Ex. P.41 series). 2.15. Paranthaman (P.W. 13) searched the house of Samimul Islam (A.2) at No. 20, Jones Street, Mannadi, Chennai on 05.05.2001 in the presence of Malliga (P.W. 6), Firka Revenue Inspector and A.K.H. Hameed Sultan (not examined) and seized the following items under search list (Ex. P.5). a. Old and new Indian passports of Samimul Islam (A.2) (Ex. P.29 series); b. Identity Card of Samimul Islam (A.2) issued by Ansar Rejuvenation Camp (Ex. P.30); c. Voter ID card of Samimul Islam (A.2) (Ex. P.31); d. Volunteer ID card of Samimul Islam (A.2) issued by SIM (Ex. P.32); e. Colombo Camp Certificate issued to Samimul Islam (A.2) (Ex. P.33); and f. Two floppy discs (M.O.I. series). 2.16. Syed Mohammed (A.4) surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Coimbatore on 03.05.2001. While so, S.H.M. Mohideen (A.1) died on 29.08.2001. Therefore, the array of accused got changed in the trial Court. 2.17. The case was committed to the Court of Session in S.C. No. 459 of 2001 and was made over to the Additional District and Sessions Court, Coimbatore, for trial. The array of accused in the trial Court after the death of S.H.M. Mohideen (A.1) and the split up of the case as against Abu Tahir (A.7-juvenile accused) is as under: - Samimul Islam (A.1); - Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2); - Syed Mohammed (A.3); - Khader Babha (A.4); and - Shah Jahan (A.5). 2.18. Hitherto, the accused were referred to as per their rank in the FIR and from this point onwards, for the sake of clarity, they will be referred to as per their rank before the trial Court aftermath the death of S.H.M. Mohideen and the split up of the case as against Abu Tahir, as set out in paragraph 2.17 above. 2.19. The trial Court framed charges under Sections 124-A, 153-A and 153-B IPC against A.1 to A.5. When questioned, A.1 to A.5 pleaded not guilty. 2.19. The trial Court framed charges under Sections 124-A, 153-A and 153-B IPC against A.1 to A.5. When questioned, A.1 to A.5 pleaded not guilty. 2.20. To prove the case, the prosecution examined 17 witnesses and marked certain exhibits and material objects. 2.21. After considering the evidence on record and hearing either side, the trial Court, by judgment and order dated 05.01.2004 convicted A.1 to A.5 of all the charges framed against them and sentenced them to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment under each charge which were ordered to run concurrently. 2.22. Calling into question the legality and validity of the said judgment of conviction and sentence, A.1 to A.5 preferred Crl.A. No. 231 of 2004 before this Court. This Court found that some documents should not have been marked as material objects, but, should have been marked as exhibits and therefore, by judgment and order dated 08.03.2011 in Crl.A. No. 231 of 2004, set aside the trial Court's judgment and order and remanded the matter to the trial Court for marking the material objects as exhibits. After the matter came back to the trial Court, the prosecution once again recalled and examined Balasubramaniam (P.W. 1), Malliga (P.W. 6), Jayaraman (P.W. 9), Mohammed Shah Jahan (P.W. 10), Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14), Farooqui (P.W. 15) and Sivasubramanian (P.W. 17) and marked some of the material objects as exhibits. 2.23. In the above narration, as well hereinafter, of the facts by this Court, the reference to exhibit numbers and material object numbers refer to those assigned by the trial Court after the matter was remanded and re-heard by the trial Court. 2.24. The first round of the examination of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was on 08.08.2003 and the second round of their examination under the said provision, after the case was remanded by the High Court to the trial Court, was on 25.08.2010. In the first round of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., Samimul Islam (A.1) and Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2) have generally denied the questions put to them, but, had given a joint written statement, wherein, they have admitted the publication of the impugned articles in the May and June 1999 issues of SIM newsletter, but, have justified them as fair comments. In the first round of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., Samimul Islam (A.1) and Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2) have generally denied the questions put to them, but, had given a joint written statement, wherein, they have admitted the publication of the impugned articles in the May and June 1999 issues of SIM newsletter, but, have justified them as fair comments. In the second round of their examination after the case was remanded to the trial Court, while Samimul Islam (A.1) has stated that what he had written in the newsletters were correct and that a false case has been registered against him, Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2) has merely denied the allegations. 2.25. Syed Mohammed (A.3), in the first round of his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., has denied the allegations and has stated that while he was taken into police custody, a statement was extracted from him. When he was examined for the second time, he has merely denied the allegations. 2.26. Khadar Bhaba (A.4), in the first round of his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., has denied the allegations. When he was examined for the second time, he denied the allegation, but, added that the present case has been foisted on him since he is a Muslim. 2.27. Shah Jahan (A.5), in his first round of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as well in the second round of examination, has generally denied the allegations. 2.28. After the second round of examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. on 25.08.2010 aftermath the remand of the case, the defence examined one Marx, a retired Professor of Physics and Member of People's Union for Human Rights as D.W.1. Marx (D.W. 1) in his evidence, has stated that he has conducted research on Kashmir and has noted the oppression and human rights violation by the Armed Forces on Kashmir Muslims. He marked the books and articles written by him on Kashmir as Exs. D.1 to D.4. He opined that the two impugned articles on which the prosecution cases stand predicated, are not seditious nor capable of inciting communal violence. 2.29. He marked the books and articles written by him on Kashmir as Exs. D.1 to D.4. He opined that the two impugned articles on which the prosecution cases stand predicated, are not seditious nor capable of inciting communal violence. 2.29. After considering the evidence on record and hearing either side, the trial Court, by judgment and order dated 29.02.2012 in S.C. No. 459 of 2001, acquitted A.1 to A.5 of the offence under Section 153-A IPC, but, convicted and sentenced them of the offences under Sections 124-A and 153-B as under: Provisions under which convicted Sentence S. 124-A Three years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/- each, in default to undergo three months simple imprisonment S. 153-B Three years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/- each, in default to undergo three months simple imprisonment 2.30. Challenging the aforesaid conviction and sentences, while Samimul Islam (A.1) and Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2) have preferred Crl.A. No. 306 of 2012, Syed Mohammed (A.3), Khader Babha (A.4) and Shah Jahan (A.5) have preferred Crl.A. No. 392 of 2012. 3. Heard Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, learned counsel for the appellants in Crl.A. No. 306 of 2012, Mr. D. Ashok Kumar, learned counsel for the appellants in Crl.A. No. 392 of 2012 and Mrs. P. Kritika Kamal, learned Government Advocate (Crl. Side) appearing for the respondent police in both the appeals. Mr. D. Ashok Kumar adopted the arguments of Mr. R. Sankarasubbu. 4. The matter was listed for final hearing on 20.11.2019 and on that day, this Court passed the following order: "Heard Mr. R. Sankarasubbu, learned counsel for the appellants. 2. Mr. R. Sankarasubbu submitted that many of the documents have not been typed in the typed set of papers and therefore, he is handicapped. It is true that some of the voluminous documents have not been typed and kept in the typed set of papers. 3. Therefore, this Court grants permission to Mr. R. Sankarasubbu to peruse the originals, which are available in the Court records for the purpose of his arguments. 4. The Registry is directed to permit Mr. R. Sankarasubbu and Mr. Vijayakumar, learned counsels to peruse the original documents and take notes thereon for their defence. Part heard. Post on 27.11.2019." 5. On 27.11.2019, Mr. Sankarasubbu submitted that he has filed an application in Crl.M.P. Sr. 4. The Registry is directed to permit Mr. R. Sankarasubbu and Mr. Vijayakumar, learned counsels to peruse the original documents and take notes thereon for their defence. Part heard. Post on 27.11.2019." 5. On 27.11.2019, Mr. Sankarasubbu submitted that he has filed an application in Crl.M.P. Sr. No. 59449 of 2019 on 25.11.2019 with the following prayer: "Hence, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to translate the original document of Ex. P.49 to English and both the Urdu and English translation be placed before the Court in the above Crl. Appeal No. 306 of 2012 on the file of this Hon'ble Court and thus render justice." 6. Pertinent it is to point out that the issue before the trial Court and this Court is whether the two articles that were written in the May 1999 and June 1999 issues of the SIM newsletter would mulct the accused with criminal liability under Sections 124-A, 153-A and 153-B IPC. 7. During the course of search, some Urdu books were recovered from the office of SIM and from the house of Samimul Islam (A.1). These documents were marked as material objects during the first round of trial and later, they were marked as exhibits in the second round of trial. At that time, the accused did not ask for the translated copies of these exhibits, because, the accused themselves knew that Ex. P.49 was not the subject matter of the charge against them. The two SIM newsletters which contain the offending articles are in Tamil language, which is the language of the subordinate Courts in Tamil Nadu. The accused understood clearly the accusation against them and properly defended themselves. They have also put forth their stand unequivocally when they were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They also examined Marx as D.W. 1 to say that those articles will not attract the said penal provisions. Therefore, the present request for the English translated copy of the Urdu book, in the opinion of this Court, is only a dilatory tactic adopted by the accused. In such view of the matter, Crl.M.P. Sr. No. 59449 of 2019 is dismissed at the threshold itself. 8. Therefore, the present request for the English translated copy of the Urdu book, in the opinion of this Court, is only a dilatory tactic adopted by the accused. In such view of the matter, Crl.M.P. Sr. No. 59449 of 2019 is dismissed at the threshold itself. 8. As alluded to above, Samimul Islam (A.1), Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2) and Shah Jahan (A.5) have not denied the printing and circulation of the May and June 1999 issues of SIM newsletters and hence, the scope of enquiry in these appeals can be narrowed down to find out if the articles in question would attract Sections 124-A and 153-B IPC, for which, it is imperative that the free English translation of the offending portions of the two impugned articles are set out: May 1999 issue of SIM newsletter: Kosovo's lessons to Indian Muslims Indian Muslims are continuously being persecuted by consecutive Governments. After division, ethnic-cleansing of Muslims is being carried out on a small scale, in various parts of India. Indian Muslims who are financially weak, socially backward, discriminated in education are being controlled by political preponderance; in spite of these multifarious problems, nonchalant Indian Muslims have not involved themselves in the formative task of fortifying themselves. The important lesson to the Indian Muslims from Kosovo is that unless and until they unite and embark on the task of defending themselves, their destruction cannot be prevented. Therefore, they should perceive the secret plans of their enemies and accordingly, prepare their field of action. "Further, augment the strength and prepare the war horses to fight them! This would frighten your enemies and the antagonists of Allah! You may know them, but Allah (fully) recognises them! Allah would give you full remuneration for whatever you spend to foster His path. Allah will never disappoint you....." (A1-Quor-an 8:60) June 1999 issue of SIM newsletter: Kashmir - India's Kosovo The daily deafening sounds of ammunition and the fight for independence by Kashmiris, has sent chill and fear down the spines India. Even though Pakistan and India avowed in the Lahore declaration not to interfere in the internal affairs of one another, there was no mention about the Kashmiris' "right to self-determination"; this evidently shows that a repeat of Kosovo looms large on India. Even though Pakistan and India avowed in the Lahore declaration not to interfere in the internal affairs of one another, there was no mention about the Kashmiris' "right to self-determination"; this evidently shows that a repeat of Kosovo looms large on India. Likewise, Indian Government has also been propagating that Kashmir is part and parcel of India : numerous strategies were adopted by India to keep Kashmir under its control; those advocating Hindutva philosophy have heightened their pitch and thundering Kashmir is part and parcel of "outstretched India." SECOND SIMILARITY : In the name of ethnic-cleansing, Serbian Army have been brutally killing Kosovo Muslims, setting their houses ablaze, usurping and destroying their properties. Similarly, Indian Army has been indulging in heinous acts of killing Muslims. Journalist Bernard Levin wrote in 1991, in the "Times London", published from London, as follows: "As the Indian security forces had set ablaze a house in Dayalgam village, Anantanag District, Kashmir, on June 26, those residing in the house - Mohammad Sultan Butt, his three sons, pregnant daughter-in-law and her sister were burnt at stake." The strategy of the Indian Army in Kashmir includes complete elimination of Kashmiri youths; even women and children could not escape from the terror and violence let loose by the Indian Army; by such acts, the Indian Army does fantastic service and aims to easily succeed in its game plan to crush Islamic uprising in Kashmir. In the year 1992, Indian Government in the name of "operation Tiger" had let loose atrocity - those who were suspected were hunted and killed; Muslim village were raided at midnights and women were sexually assaulted, after forcing the men to stand outside. In the name of "Operation Shiva" new strategies were adopted - at the beginning of the rainy season violent attacks were resorted to, shops and houses were set ablaze and adjoining villages were also destroyed. Serbian Army has been using sexual assault as a weapon in the war they had waged. It is not surprising that Indian Army too had practised this method. They are using this abhorrent war strategy to crush the upsurge of Islamic people. For the first time in history, recently the Indian Army had used Helicopter to kill Indian Muslims. On March 25, in Kupwara district located at the northern tip, "deafening sounds were heard". It is not surprising that Indian Army too had practised this method. They are using this abhorrent war strategy to crush the upsurge of Islamic people. For the first time in history, recently the Indian Army had used Helicopter to kill Indian Muslims. On March 25, in Kupwara district located at the northern tip, "deafening sounds were heard". These northern ends comprising dense forests, have provided natural cover to the Mujahideen, who are waging a war against 7 lakh Indian Army. In this way, during the last 10 years, as many as 70,000 Muslims have been killed, 3,000 women have been subjected to sexual violence and thousands are missing. Notwithstanding the innumerable similarities found between the Indian army in Kashmir and the Serbian army in Kosovo, one dissimilarity is found. That is, the brutal blood bath perpetrated by the Serbian army is being depicted by the press and electronic media for the whole world to see, whereas the brutality perpetrated by the Indian Army in Kashmir has been blacked-out by the press and the electronic media and hence the world is denied an opportunity to see things in black and white. Therefore, the history of a country, enmeshed in blood bath, has been concealed from the public; at the same time, by screening its horrifying face, India has been proclaiming that it is a messiah of peace." 9. This Court is aware that the above free English translation of the offending portions alone of the two impugned articles published in SIM newsletters, if read in isolation, may not appear to satisfy the ingredients required for sustaining a charge under Sections 124-A and 153-B. Nevertheless, it would be burdensome to give the free English translation of the two impugned articles in their entirety, which run to more than seven pages in print. However, this Court carefully examined both the articles in their original Tamil version. 10. The first contention of Mr. Sankarasubbu is that the evidence on record does not show that the SIM newsletters were circulated to the worshipers coming out of the mosque and therefore, in the absence of communication, there is no basis for sustaining the charge under Section 124-A IPC. In this regard, he placed reliance on the judgments arising under the preventive detention laws and submitted that communication is a sine qua non for sustaining a conviction under Section 124-A IPC 11. In reply, Mrs. In this regard, he placed reliance on the judgments arising under the preventive detention laws and submitted that communication is a sine qua non for sustaining a conviction under Section 124-A IPC 11. In reply, Mrs. Kritika Kamal submitted that the law relating to preventive detention, where, the grounds of detention should be intelligible to the detenu, cannot be imported into a punitive law jurisdiction. On facts, she submitted that the evidence of Vijay (P.W. 2) clears the cloud, if any. 12. Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14), Inspector of Police, in his evidence, has stated that while he was on rounds on 25.06.1999 around 3.30 p.m., he saw two persons displaying printed materials to worshipers who were coming out of the mosque and on seeing the police party, they attempted to slip away. Vijay (P.W. 2), in his evidence, has stated that he is residing in No. 21, Raja Naidu Layout, Gandhipuram, where, the mosque is located and on 25.06.1999, while he was returning home from work, he saw two persons standing near the mosque, displaying some newspapers and exhorting the worshipers coming out of, the mosque by saying "every Muslim with self-respect should read this"; after about 10 minutes, he saw the police party coming and intercepting them. 13. Thus, from the evidence of Vijay (P.W. 2) and Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14), one can infer that Shah Jahan (A.5) and Abu Tahir (juvenile accused) had started distributing the newsletters and midway, they were apprehended. That apart, for fastening criminal liability under Section 124-A IPC or Section 153-B IPC, communication as required under the preventive detention law is not a pre-requisite. 14. Secondly, Mr. Sankarasubbu placed reliance on the judgment in Commissioner of Police and others vs. Sandeep Kumar, (2011-4-L.W. 138 - (2011) 4 SCC 644 ) wherein, the Supreme Court has referred to the observations of Lord Denning in Morris vs. Crown Office, (1970) 3 All ER 1079 (CA) and submitted that the acts of Shah Jahan (A.5) and Abu Tahir (juvenile accused) in distributing newsletters should be dismissed as youthful pranks. 15. In Sandeep Kumar (supra), the issue was whether the non-disclosure of the criminal case against the applicant for a job would be fatal to deny him employment. 15. In Sandeep Kumar (supra), the issue was whether the non-disclosure of the criminal case against the applicant for a job would be fatal to deny him employment. The applicant therein was involved in an offence under Section 325 read with Section 34 IPC when he was a youth and that was put against him when he was selected for police service. In that context, the Supreme Court had referred to the words of Lord Denning in Morris (supra). Hence, the judgment in Sandeep Kumar (supra) will be of no avail to the appellants. 16. Mr. Sankarasubbu's third contention is that the SIM newsletter was not registered under the Press & Registration of Books Act, 1867, and therefore, the appellants cannot be mulcted with criminal liability with the aid of Section 7, ibid., especially when S.H.M. Mohideen, the author of the articles, is no more. In the SIM newsletters, the name and designation of Samimul Islam (A.1), Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2), Syed Mohammed (A.3) and Khadar Babha (A.4) are printed. The fact that SIM newsletter was not registered under the Press and Registration of Books Act is itself an incriminating circumstance to show that it was intended to be disseminated clandestinely. That apart, the SIM newsletter clearly says that it is for private circulation. Section 7 of the Press and Registration of Books Act will apply to a newspaper registered under the said Act, however, non-registration of a newspaper under the said Act will not absolve the accused from criminal liability. 17. Mr. Sankarasubbu's fourth contention is that there is no evidence to show that violence had resulted pursuant to the publication of the impugned articles and therefore, the conviction of the appellants under Sections 124-A and 153-B IPC is unsustainable. 18. Per contra, Mrs. Kritika Kamal submitted that neither Section 124-A IPC nor Section 153-B IPC contemplates actual outbreak of violence as a condition precedent for completion of the offence 19. Be it noted that the said provisions are intended to protect the State and the society before anything grievous happens. To say that a person can be prosecuted only after a seditious act had resulted in violence, would be amounting to locking the stable after the horses have bolted. Be it noted that the said provisions are intended to protect the State and the society before anything grievous happens. To say that a person can be prosecuted only after a seditious act had resulted in violence, would be amounting to locking the stable after the horses have bolted. Under Section 21 of the Tamil Nadu District Police Act, 1859 and Section 149 Cr.P.C., the police have got a statutory duty to prevent all crimes, offences and public nuisances. At this juncture, it is worth quoting F.T. Giles (See, Chapter 27 of The Criminal Law - A Short Introduction (Penguin Books - 1954)), who has has traced the law of treason in England and observed thus: "..... The section has spelt the liquidation of the leading spirits of all rebellions whose object has been to depose a reigning monarch or overthrow his government; that is, of course, when they have failed. Revolts which succeed at once shed their treasonable character." 20. Mr. Sankarasubbu's fifth contention is that the first charge is very vague since it describes the deceased S.H.M. Mohideen as writer and editor and also Samimul Islam (A.1) as the editor of the SIM newsletter. A reading of charge No. 1 Which is in simple Tamil language gives no room whatsoever for any vagueness. S.H.M. Mohideen has been referred to as the writer and author, whereas, Samimul Islam (A.1) has been shown as the editor of the newsletter, but, the Tamil word "IMAGE" would mean the author and editor, depending upon the context. That apart, the accused had understood the charges framed against them very well, set up a spirited defence and some of them have also justified their action when they were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. On facts, this Court finds that there is no vagueness in charge No. 1 and even if had there been one, Section 465 Cr.P.C. states that no finding or sentence can be reversed on this score unless a failure of justice has, in fact, occasioned thereby. 21. His sixth contention is that while arresting the accused, the police had failed to follow the guidelines enumerated in D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal, 1997 Writ L.R. 821 : (1997) 1 SCC 416 and therefore, the entire prosecution stands vitiated. 21. His sixth contention is that while arresting the accused, the police had failed to follow the guidelines enumerated in D.K. Basu vs. State of West Bengal, 1997 Writ L.R. 821 : (1997) 1 SCC 416 and therefore, the entire prosecution stands vitiated. In support of this contention, he placed strong reliance on the judgment in K.A. Kotrappa Reddy and another vs. Rayara Manjunatha Reddy, (2016) 14 SCC 729. Kotrappa Reddy (supra) was a case under Sections 302 and 147 IPC in which the accused were acquitted by the High Court and the aggrieved challenged their acquittal in the Supreme Court. While discussing the evidence and upholding the acquittal, the Supreme Court observed that there was no material placed to suggest that the guidelines in D.K. Basu (supra) while effecting the arrest, were followed. Thus, Kotrappa Reddy (supra) is not the authority for the proposition that failure to follow the guidelines set out in D.K. Basu (supra) will vitiate the entire prosecution. 22. After having answered the tertiary arguments of Mr. Sankarasubbu, this Court has to now give a finding as to whether the impugned articles are seditious in nature. 23. What then are treason and sedition? 24. The ancient Indian law givers were also conscious of the threats that would be posed to the sovereign from various quarters. Kautilya, in Chapter V of Arthasastra, says as follows: (2) The various kinds of dangers are: that which is of external origin and of internal abetment; that which is of internal origin and of external abetment; that which is of external origin and of external abetment; and that which is of internal origin and of internal abetment. 25. The English common law classifies an offence against the State into "treason" and "sedition". 26. In Chapter 27 of the book "The Criminal Law - A Short Introduction" (supra), the term "treason" and "sedition" have been defined as under: Treason: The atrocious crime of endeavouring to subvert by violence those institutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace and happiness of society. 26. In Chapter 27 of the book "The Criminal Law - A Short Introduction" (supra), the term "treason" and "sedition" have been defined as under: Treason: The atrocious crime of endeavouring to subvert by violence those institutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace and happiness of society. Sedition: Sedition includes all those practices whether by word, deed, or writing which fall short of high treason but tend to excite discontent and dissatisfaction; to excite ill-will between different classes of the King's subjects; to create public disturbances and bring into hatred and contempt the sovereign or the Government and the laws and constitution of the realm; to incite people to unlawful associations, breaches of the peace, or to use any form of physical force in any public matter connected with the State. 27. The distinction between treason and sedition is that treason envisages an attack on the monarch, his family members and other institutions, whereas, sedition is an attack on the Government of the day. That is why, Oliver Cromwell, who served as Lord Protector of the Commonwealth of England, Scotland and Ireland and who spearheaded the execution of Charles I in 1648, was unceremoniously disinterred from his grave in Westminster Abbey and punished for treason posthumously. His dead body was hung for the charge of treason, by Charles II, son of Charles I. In India, treason has no relevance, because, we have cut the umbilical cord from the British and have given to ourselves, a republican form of government. 28. When Macaulay was entrusted with the task of preparing the Penal Code at the time when the East India Company was in charge of the political affairs, he included a separate chapter - Chapter V - "Of offences against the State" comprising Sections 109 to 115 in his draft penal code of 1937. The State, in Chapter V of his draft Code, referred to the East India Company and not to the British Crown. He consciously excluded any attack on the British Crown, because, he doubted the powers of the Governor-General in Council to legislate for the Crown. The State, in Chapter V of his draft Code, referred to the East India Company and not to the British Crown. He consciously excluded any attack on the British Crown, because, he doubted the powers of the Governor-General in Council to legislate for the Crown. In Note "C" to the draft of the Indian Penal Code, Macaulay has stated thus (See, A Penal Code prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners; Pelham Richardson, Cornhill, 1838, Page 87) "His Lordship in Council will perceive that in this Chapter we have provided only for offences against the Government of India, and that we have made no mention of offences against the General Government of the British Empire. We have done so because it appears to us doubtful to what extent his Lordship in Council is competent to legislate respecting such offences. The Act of Parliament which defines the legislative power of the Council of India especially prohibits that body from making any law "which shall in "any way affect any prerogative of the Crown, or the authority of Parliament, or any "part of the unwritten laws, or constitution of the United Kingdom of Great Britain "and Ireland, whereon may depend, in any degree, the allegiance of any person to the "Crown of the United Kingdom, or the Sovereignty, or Dominion of the said Crown over "any part of the said territories." 29. The draft Penal Code was submitted by Macaulay and the Law Commissioners to the Government in 1838 and it was in hibernation for over two decades. After the mutiny in 1857, the British Crown assumed sovereignty of the administration of India and at that juncture, Macaulay's draft Code was resurrected from the archives and given to Sir Barnes Peacock, the last Chief Justice of the then Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort Williams. The revised Penal Code was made ready in 1861, but, for want of a Code of Criminal Procedure, it was kept in abeyance. After a Code of Criminal Procedure was made ready in 1861, the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure were gazetted and were brought into force from 01.01.1862. Surprisingly, the chapter relating to offences against the State that was there in Macaulay's draft did not find place in the Indian Penal Code. After a Code of Criminal Procedure was made ready in 1861, the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure were gazetted and were brought into force from 01.01.1862. Surprisingly, the chapter relating to offences against the State that was there in Macaulay's draft did not find place in the Indian Penal Code. This anomaly was noticed by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen who was called to India to be a Law Member of the Governor-General in Council. Sir James Stephen noticed a letter written by Sir Barnes Peacock, the first Chief Justice of the High Court at Calcutta, addressed to Mr. Maine, his predecessor, where the learned Chief Justice makes an interesting observation which reads as under (See, A treatise on the Law of Sedition and Cognate Offences in British India - Penal and Preventive, by Walter Russel Donough, M.A., Page 2): "I have looked to my notes and I think the omission of a section in lieu of section 113 of the original Penal Code must have occurred through mistake, though I have no distinct recollection of it. After the original Code had been carefully revised, the original Code and the revised Code were printed in double columns. I send herewith a copy of the section proposed in the revised Code to be substituted for section 113." He concluded his letter with the remark: "I am sorry that I cannot throw any further light upon the matter, as I have no note as to the adoption or rejection of that clause. I feel, however, that it was an oversight on the part of the Committee not to substitute some section for section 113." Section 113 in Macaulay's draft Code was the precursor of Section 124-A IPC. 30. On the basis of the aforesaid letter, Sir James Stephen was convinced that the section was omitted by mistake, and set about fixing this legislative slip. The offence of sedition was formally enacted into law, as Section 124-A, vide Act XXVII of 1870, on 25.11.1870. The section, as originally enacted, was in line with the Treason Felony Act, 1848 in the United Kingdom which punished seditious intentions. Section 3 of the Treason Felony Act, 1848 punished any person who conceived in his heart, such seditious intentions, and "who showed that intention either by any act or writing". 31. The section, as originally enacted, was in line with the Treason Felony Act, 1848 in the United Kingdom which punished seditious intentions. Section 3 of the Treason Felony Act, 1848 punished any person who conceived in his heart, such seditious intentions, and "who showed that intention either by any act or writing". 31. Section 124-A IPC as it originally stood in 1870, reads as under: "Whoever by words, either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs, or by visible representation or otherwise, excites or attempts to excite feelings of disaffection to the Government established by law in British India, shall be punished with transportation for life or for any term, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine. Explanation.- Such a disapprobation of the measures, of the Government as is compatible with a disposition to render obedience to the lawful authority of the Government and to support the lawful authority of the Government against unlawful attempts to subvert or resist that authority, is not disaffection. Therefore, the making of comments on the measures of the Government, with the intention of exciting only this species of disapprobation, is not an offence within this clause." 32. It may be of interest to note that as originally conceived, Section 124-A IPC did not contemplate an appeal to violence as an essential ingredient of the offence. Making a reference to the corresponding provision in Article 96 of his Digest on the English Criminal Law, Sir James Stephen observes: "There is nothing in that article, and there is nothing in the almost identical article framed by the Criminal Code Commission to suggest that an appeal to violence is a necessary factor in the offence. I take it that the offence is complete, both in India and England, if it be proved that the offender has attempted to excite disaffection towards the Government. It is not necessary that he should himself appeal to force. What he does is to excite or attempt to excite feelings of discontent which make people ready for mischief should the opportunity arise." 33. It is not necessary that he should himself appeal to force. What he does is to excite or attempt to excite feelings of discontent which make people ready for mischief should the opportunity arise." 33. Section 124-A remained in virtual hibernation till 1891 when the first State Trial for sedition was held before the Calcutta High Court, in its original criminal jurisdiction, in the Queen Empress vs. Jogendra Chunder Bose, ILR 19 Cal 35 (popularly known as the Bangobasi case). In his charge to the jury, Sir W. Comer Petheram, CJ summed up the substance of the offence in an admirable passage which runs thus: "Mr. Jackson contended that the words "disaffection" and "disapprobation" wore synonymous words, and had one and the same meaning. If that reasoning were sound, it would be impossible for any person to be convicted under the section, as every class of writing would be within the explanation. But you, gentlemen of the Jury, are thoroughly acquainted with the English language, and must know that there is a very wide difference between the meaning of the two words disaffection and disapprobation. Whenever the prefix 'dis' is added to a word, the word formed conveys an idea the opposite to that conveyed by the word without the prefix. Disaffection means a feeling contrary to affection; in other words, dislike or hatred. Disapprobation means simply disapproval. It is quite possible to disapprove of a man's sentiments or action and yet to like him. The meaning of the two words is so distinct that I feel it hardly necessary to tell you that the contention of Mr. Jackson cannot be sustained. If a person uses either spoken or written words calculated to create in the minds of the persons to whom they are addressed a disposition not to obey the lawful authority of the Government, or to subvert or resist that authority, if and when occasion should arise, and if he does so with the intention of creating such a disposition in his hearers or readers, he will be guilty of the offence of attempting to excite disaffection within the meaning of the section, though no disturbance is brought about by his words or any feeling of disaffection, in fact, produced by them. It is sufficient for the purposes of the section that the words used are calculated to excite feelings of ill-will against the Government and to hold it up to the hatred and contempt of the people, and that they were used with the intention to create such feeling. The second question for you, gentlemen of the Jury, then, will be whether, upon the evidence before you, you think that the articles circulated by the prisoners were calculated to create such feelings in the minds of their readers, and if so, whether they intended to create such feeling by their circulation." 34. Fortunately for the accused and most unfortunately for legal pundits, the accused issued an apology and the matter ended before the jury went to trial. A few years later, the revolutionary nationalist Bal Gangadhar Tilak was charged with spreading seditious libel through his journal "Kesari". The trial came up before Mr. Justice Strachey, sitting single, in the High Court at Bombay in Queen Empress vs. Bal Gangadhar Tilak ((1897) 22 Bom. 112) (for brevity "the First Tilak trial"). Rejecting the suggestion that an appeal to force was an ingredient of the offence, Strachey J. summed up the charge to the jury in the following words: "The offence consists in exciting or attempting to excite in others certain bad feelings towards the Government. It is not the exciting or attempting to excite mutiny or rebellion, or any sort of actual disturbance, great or small. Whether any disturbance or outbreak was caused by these articles, is absolutely immaterial. If the accused intended by the articles to excite rebelling or disturbance, his act would doubtless fall within S. 124-A, and would probably fall within other sections of the Penal Code. But even if he neither excited nor intended to excite any rebellion or outbreak or forcible resistance to the authority of the Government still if he tried to excite feelings of enmity to the Government, that is sufficient to make him guilty under the section. I am aware that some distinguished persons have thought that there can be no offence against the section unless the accused either counsels or suggests rebellion or forcible resistance to the Government. I am aware that some distinguished persons have thought that there can be no offence against the section unless the accused either counsels or suggests rebellion or forcible resistance to the Government. In my opinion, that view is absolutely opposed to the express words of the section itself, which as plainly as possible makes the exciting or attempting to excite certain feelings, and not the inducing or attempting to induce to any course of action such as rebellion or forcible resistance, the test of guilt. I can only account for such a view by attributing it to a complete misreading of the explanation attached to the section and to a misapplication of the "explanation beyond its true scope", (emphasis supplied) 35. It is common knowledge that Bal Gangadhar Tilak was found guilty, and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. In the backdrop of the Tilak case, the legislature contemplated an amendment to state the law in clearer terms, finding, as one law member put it, that the law had been enacted in 1870 in the backdrop of the Wahabi conspiracy to "meet the exigency." The amendment proposed by the Select Committee in 1898 sought to repeal Section 124-A IPC and re-enact the same in the following terms: "Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards Her Majesty or the Government, (or promotes or attempts to promote feelings of enmity or ill-will between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects) shall be punished with transportation for life or any shorter term, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, to which fine may be added, or with fine. Explanation 1.-- The expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity (or ill-will). (emphasis supplied) Explanation 2.-- Comments on the measures of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection do not constitute an offence." The words within the brackets, supra, were ultimately omitted and the provision relating to class hatred was enacted as a cognate offence in Section 153-A of the IPC by Act IV of 1898. It may be apropos to extract Section 124-A and 153-A IPC as amended by Act IV of 1898. "124A. It may be apropos to extract Section 124-A and 153-A IPC as amended by Act IV of 1898. "124A. Sedition - Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India, shall be punished with transportation for life or any shorter term, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine. Explanation 1. - The expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. Explanation 2. - Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the Government with a view to obtain then-alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section. Explanation 3. - Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section." (emphasis supplied) The sentence of transportation for life or any other shorter term in the 1898 provision was amended and replaced with the punishment of imprisonment for life vide Section 117 of Central Act 26 of 1955. Section 153-A IPC, as introduced by Act IV of 1898, read as under: "153-A Promoting enmity between classes: Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes, or attempts to promote, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Explanation.-- It does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this section to point out, without malicious intention, and with an honest view to their removal, matters which are producing or have a tendency to produce, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects." 36. Quite obviously, the law, as then enacted, was tailored to suit the necessities of the then political masters. The air was filled with nationalist sentiments. Quite obviously, the law, as then enacted, was tailored to suit the necessities of the then political masters. The air was filled with nationalist sentiments. The British Government lost no opportunity in freely taking the aid of this provision to convict political rivals like Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Mahatma Gandhi, Gopala Krishna Gokhale, Veer Savarkar, V.O. Chidambaram Pillai, Subramaniam Siva, Neelakanta Brahmachari and other nationalists. 37. In the cusp of the Second World War and the Indian Freedom Movement, the Federal Court of India was called upon to examine the law on sedition. In Niharendu Dutt Majumdar vs. King Emperor, (1942) 55 L.W. 344 : AIR 1942 FC 22, Sir Maurice Gwyer, CJ, (for himself and S. Varadachariar and Sir Shah Sulaiman, JJ) specifically overruled the statement of law laid down by Strachey, J in the First Tilak Trial (supra). In an oft-quoted passage, Gwyer, C.J. laid down the test in the following words: "The first and most fundamental duty of every Government is the preservation of order, since order is the condition precedent to all civilization and the advance of human happiness. This duty has no doubt been sometimes performed in such a way as to make the remedy worse than the disease; but it does not cease to be a matter of obligation because some on whom the duty rests have performed it ill. It is to this aspect of the functions of government that in our opinion the offence of sedition stands related. It is the answer of the State to those who, for the purpose of attacking or subverting it, seek (to borrow from the passage cited above) to disturb its tranquillity, to create public disturbance and to promote disorder, or who incite others to do so. Words, deeds or writings constitute sedition, if they have this intention or this tendency; and it is easy to see why they may also constitute sedition, if they seek as the phrase is, to bring Government into contempt. This is not made an offence in order to minister to the wounded vanity of Governments, but because where Government and the law cease to be obeyed because no respect is felt any longer for them, only anarchy can follow. Public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation or likelihood of public disorder, is thus the gist of the offence. This is not made an offence in order to minister to the wounded vanity of Governments, but because where Government and the law cease to be obeyed because no respect is felt any longer for them, only anarchy can follow. Public disorder, or the reasonable anticipation or likelihood of public disorder, is thus the gist of the offence. The acts or words complained of must, either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency." (emphasis supplied) 38. From the aforesaid passage, it is discernible that an appeal to violence, which had been rejected by Strachey, J, was held to be an essential concomitant of the offence. This is clear from the test which requires that the seditious acts must" incite to disorder" or must have the tendency or intention of inciting disorder. 39. The judgment of the Federal Court Niharendu Dutt Majumdar (supra) was, however, overruled by the Privy Council in King Emperor vs. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, (1947) 60 L.W. 462 : 1947 PC 82. The Board observed that the Federal Court had misconstrued Section 124-A IPC by importing the principles found in the English common law, instead of adopting a plain and literal construction of the section which had held the field since the First Tilak Trial (supra). The Privy Council observed as under: "Their Lordships are unable to find anything in the language of either S. 124A or the Rule which could suggest that "the acts or words complained of must either incite to disorder or must be such as to satisfy reasonable men that that is their intention or tendency". The first explanation to S. 124A provides, "The expression 'disaffection' includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity". This is quite inconsistent with any suggestion that "excites or attempts to excite disaffection" involves not only excitation of feelings or disaffection, but also exciting disorder. Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the decision of the Federal Court in Niharendu's case, [(1942) F.C.R. 38.] proceeded on a wrong construction of S. 124A of the Penal Code and of sub-para, (e) of rule 34, sub-r. (6) of the Defence of India Rules." 40. Their Lordships are therefore of opinion that the decision of the Federal Court in Niharendu's case, [(1942) F.C.R. 38.] proceeded on a wrong construction of S. 124A of the Penal Code and of sub-para, (e) of rule 34, sub-r. (6) of the Defence of India Rules." 40. After the advent of the Constitution in 1950, and the constitutional recognition of a fundamental right of free speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a), the chilling effect of the plain and literal interpretation of Article(Section) 124-A IPC on the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) was plainly obvious. Section 124-A was further amended in 1955 and the amended version holds good as of today and the same reads as under: "124A. Sedition - Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine. Explanation 1. - The expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity. Explanation 2. - Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section. Explanation 3. - Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section." 41. The constitutional validity of Section 124-A IPC vis-a-vis Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Singh vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 . The Supreme Court approved the law laid down by the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar (supra) and stated that the qualified meaning given by the Federal Court was the only way that Section 124-A IPC could be construed in order to fall within constitutionally permissible limits under Article 19(2). The Supreme Court opined that in order to trigger the section, the activity complained of must be intended or must have a tendency to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resorting to violence. The Supreme Court opined that in order to trigger the section, the activity complained of must be intended or must have a tendency to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resorting to violence. The test was laid down Sinha, CJ in the following words: "The provisions of the sections read as a whole, along with the explanations, make it reasonably clear that the sections aim at rendering penal only such activities as would be intended, or have a tendency, to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence. As already pointed out, the explanations appended to the main body of the section make it clear that criticism of public measures or comment on Government action, however strongly worded, would be within reasonable limits and would be consistent with the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. It is only when the words, written or spoken, etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such activities in the interest of public order." 42. In order to judge an act as having a pernicious tendency to affect public order by resort to violence, the Courts have, very often, fallen back on the classic test of "clear and present danger" propounded by Oliver Wendell Holmes, JR. in Schenck vs. United States (39 S.C.T. 247), where, the test has been set out in the following words: "6.........The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced......." (emphasis supplied) 43. It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced......." (emphasis supplied) 43. Three years later, in Abrams v. United States (1919 SCC Online US SC 213), Justice Holmes, in a classic dissent, emphasized on the proximity of the act complained of and its tendency to trigger the offence of sedition, in the following words: "41. I am aware of course that the word 'intent' as vaguely used in ordinary legal discussion means no more than knowledge at the time of the act that the consequences said to be intended will ensue. Even less than that will satisfy the general principle of civil and criminal liability. A man may have to pay damages, may be sent to prison, at common law might be hanged, if at the time of his act he knew facts from which common experience showed that the consequences would follow, whether he individually could foresee them or not. But, when words are used exactly, a deed is not done with intent to produce a consequence unless that consequence is the aim of the deed. It may be obvious, and obvious to the actor, that the consequence will follow, and he may be liable for it even if he regrets it, but he does not do the act with intent to produce it unless the aim to produce it is the proximate motive of the specific act, although there may be some deeper motive behind." The test of "clear and present danger" propounded in Schenck (supra) has been quoted with approval in Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 . In paragraph 43 of the said judgment, the ratio of Kedar Nath Singh (supra) was set out in the following terms: "43. Similarly, in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, [1962 Supp (2) SCR 769 : AIR 1962 SC 955 : (1962) 2 Cri LJ 103], Section 124-A of the Penal Code, 1860 was upheld by construing it narrowly and stating that the offence would only be complete if the words complained of have a tendency of creating public disorder by violence. It was added that merely creating disaffection or creating feelings of enmity in certain people was not good enough or else it would violate the fundamental right of free speech under Article 19(1)(a)....." 44. It was added that merely creating disaffection or creating feelings of enmity in certain people was not good enough or else it would violate the fundamental right of free speech under Article 19(1)(a)....." 44. It may also be noticed that the decision in Kedar Nath Singh (supra) was delivered on 20.01.1962. By the Constitution (Sixteenth) Amendment Act, 1963, Article 19(2) was amended and the words "sovereignty and integrity of India" were inserted into Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Thus, Section 124-A IPC could now be held constitutional on an additional ground, i.e., "sovereignty and integrity of India" which was not available when Kedar Nath Singh (supra) was decided. In any event, as the Supreme Court, in Shreya Singhal (supra), has taken note of the test in Kedar Nath Singh (supra), this Court is constitutionally enjoined to apply it in view of the edict set out in Article 141 of the Constitution. 45. Mr. Sankarasubbu placed reliance on the aforesaid test propounded by the Supreme Court and submitted that the act of the accused in comparing the events that were happening in Kosovo with the ones in Kashmir did not pass muster the clear and present danger test prescribed by the Supreme Court for sustaining the charge of sedition. 46. Controverting the aforesaid contention, Mrs. Kritika Kamal submitted that the impugned articles should not be appraised in today's context, but, should be seen in the backdrop of the circumstances that were obtaining in Coimbatore district at the relevant point of time. She brought to the notice of this Court that on 14.02.1998, a bomb blast occurred in the city of Coimbatore resulting in huge damage to lives and properties causing communal unrest. She contended that bombs were timed to coincide with the visit of Mr. L.K. Advani, BJP leader, to Coimbatore; prosecutions were launched and several people were convicted in those cases; in the aftermath of the bomb blast, the impugned articles have been written, published and circulated outside the mosque in question which would have had a deleterious effect on the even tempo of life, especially when the city was returning to normalcy. 47. Mr. Sankarasubbu contended that the author of the articles S.H.M. Mohideen has passed away and the other accused cannot be held vicariously liable for his acts. 48. As contended by Mrs. 47. Mr. Sankarasubbu contended that the author of the articles S.H.M. Mohideen has passed away and the other accused cannot be held vicariously liable for his acts. 48. As contended by Mrs. Kritika Kamal, this Court cannot view the articles in the present climate nor can this Court import the happenings in Jammu and Kashmir today, pursuant to the abolition of its special status, while testing the impugned articles. It is no doubt true that the impugned articles do contain obnoxious averments which may tend to excite passions, but, their propensity to incite violence against the State was not imminent. Exciting passions and hatred between two groups is distinguishable from inciting disaffection or ill-will or other adjectives employed in Section 124-A IPC against the State. We will discuss in the later part of this judgment as to how, the two impugned articles would attract Section 153-B(c) IPC. 49. The next contention of Mr. Sankarasubbu is that the trial Court had not appreciated the evidence of Marx (D.W. 1) in the right perspective. In this regard, he placed reliance on the article written by M/s. Vaigai and Anna Mathew titled "Kashmir's children grow up traumatised by conflict and live in perpetual fear of being picked up by the State." 50. As a riposte, Mrs. Kritika Kamal contended that the impugned articles refer to the following passage in the Holy Quran for exhorting all the believers of Islam to take up arms against others: "Prepare any strength you can muster against them, and any cavalry with which you can overawe God's enemy and your own enemy as well, and others besides them whom you do not know, but who are known to God. Anything you spend in the way of God will be repaid to you in full. You will not be wronged." 51. Opposing this contention, Mr. Sankarasubbu submitted that the Quran holds supremacy over the Constitution of India inasmuch as Article 25 of the Constitution of India guarantees freedom of religion and the edicts in the Quran, which is the holy book of the Muslims, can be propagated freely. This Court is unable to countenance this specious argument, because, all scriptures and holy books, be it of any religion, are subordinate to the Constitution of India. This Court is unable to countenance this specious argument, because, all scriptures and holy books, be it of any religion, are subordinate to the Constitution of India. Article 25 of the Constitution of India begins with a caveat "Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Fart..........". 52. As rightly pointed out by the trial Court, the Holy Quran contains so many passages for fostering peace and harmony, leaving out which, the accused have picked up the above passage in isolation and have included them in their articles so as to make a lay Muslim feel insecure in Coimbatore and thereby prepare him to take violence as a measure of self-protection. 53. As regards the article penned by M/s. Vaigai and Anna Mathew referred to above, they have nowhere referred to the issue in Kashmir as a Muslim and non-Muslim issue. There are no communal overtones in their article. Whereas, the impugned articles are aimed at pitting Muslims against non-Muslims and their objective being cautioning all Muslims in Coimbatore that they may face the fate of their brethren in Kosovo, when in reality, it was otherwise. The evidence of Marx (D.W. 1) is purely opinion evidence and does not fall within the scope of Section 45 of the Evidence Act to be treated as that of an expert. 54. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the act of the police in registering a case for sedition and communal disharmony, and that of the Government in according sanction, cannot be said to be totally misplaced. The executive has a duty to nip such activities in the bud. When they view these activities in praesenti, there are grounds for reasonable belief that the acts of the accused would attract Section 124-A, 153-A and 153-B IPC. However, when those acts are viewed from a little higher dimension by a judicially trained mind, in the backdrop of the test laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Schenck (supra), which has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal (supra), the proximate effect of the act may not measure up to the threshold required to sustain a prosecution under Section 124-A IPC. Unlike offences of physical violence and fraud, there is indubitably an element of subjectivity while examining sedition cases. Unlike offences of physical violence and fraud, there is indubitably an element of subjectivity while examining sedition cases. That is why, the Supreme Court, in Kedar Nath (supra) has rejected the literal interpretation of Section 124-A IPC laid down by Strachey, J. in the First Tilak trial (supra). In restoring the test propounded by the Federal Court in Niharendu Dutt Majumdar (supra), an appeal to violence has now been held to be an essential element of the offence. The argument of Mr. Sankarasubbu merits acceptance, because, the impugned articles fail the "clear and present danger test" propounded in Schenck (supra) and applied by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal (supra). The impugned articles also do not make a direct appeal to violence though they are critical of the Indian army. The emotional integration of we, Indians, by and large, is the secret of the success of the Indian State, despite its tumultuous political history. The terra firma of the Indian State is its robust Constitution and these impugned articles are surely not capable of dislodging it. Ex consequenti, the appellants have to be acquitted of the charge under Section 124-A IPC. 55. We may now notice the development of Section 153-A IPC which has a chequered history. As alluded to above in para 35, supra, the original section, as enacted by the Indian Penal Code Amendment Act (Act IV of 1898) was aimed solely at penalizing acts that promoted "class hatred" amongst different classes of her Majesty's subjects. More importantly, the original section had an explanation appended to it, which reads as under: "It does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this section to point out, without malicious intention and with an honest view to their removal, matters which are producing or having a tendency to produce feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects." 56. By Act 41 of 1961, the term "classes" was replaced with the expression "religious, racial or language group or castes or communities." and the explanation, supra, was omitted. More importantly, the section was expanded to now include "any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities and which are likely to disturb public tranquility." 57. More importantly, the section was expanded to now include "any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities and which are likely to disturb public tranquility." 57. Section 153-A IPC was, however, recast by the Criminal and Election Laws Amendment Act, 1969 (Act 35 of 1969) in the following manner: "153-A (1) Whoever-- (a) by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities; or (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquility, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. (2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1) in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine." By Act 31 of 1972, clause (c) was added to Section 153-A IPC, the details of which are not relevant to the discussion at hand. 58. 58. Section 153-B which deals with imputations and assertions prejudicial to national interest was inserted by Act 31 of 1972 in the backdrop of the 43rd Report of the Law Commission of India on "Offences against national security" and it reads as follows: "153-B. Imputations, assertions prejudicial to national-integration.-- "(1) Whoever, by words either spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise,- (a) makes or publishes any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India as by law established or uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India, or (b) asserts, counsels, advises, propagates or publishes that any class of persons shall, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, be denied or deprived of their rights as citizens of India, or (c) makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal concerning the obligation of any class of persons, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, and such assertion, counsel, plea or appeal causes or is likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will between such members and other persons, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. (2) Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (1), in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine." 59. The nature of the offence is discernible from its three limbs. The first limb punishes making or publishing of any imputation that any class of persons cannot, by reason of their being members of any religious, racial, language or regional group or caste or community, bear true faith and allegiance to the Constitution of India or uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India. The second limb punishes a person who "asserts, counsels, advises, propagates or publishes" that any class of persons, by reason of they being members of a religious, racial or language or regional group, be denied or deprived of their rights as citizens. The second limb punishes a person who "asserts, counsels, advises, propagates or publishes" that any class of persons, by reason of they being members of a religious, racial or language or regional group, be denied or deprived of their rights as citizens. The third limb of Section 153-B, which falls for consideration in this case, punishes a person who "makes or publishes any assertion, counsel, plea or appeal" which has the effect of causing or is likely to cause disharmony or feelings of enmity or hatred or ill-will between members of a religious, racial, language or regional group and other persons. 60. It may be noticed that clause (c) includes within its sweep, even a "plea or appeal" unlike clauses (a) and (b) which is confined to "making and publishing" and "assert, counsel, advise, propagate or publish". Thus, the width of clause (c) of Section 153-B is far wider in its scope and is aimed at nipping in the bud, any act that causes disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will between members of a group and other persons. The ingredients of the offence are thus different and distinct in all three limbs. The threshold limits are also different and there is no scope to apply the clear and present danger doctrine here since the offence of sedition and the offence under Section 153-B are distinct having different ingredients. 61. The essential premise of Section 153-B IPC is to prohibit all acts whose effects are prejudicial to national integration. After all, Article 51-A(c) enjoins a citizen to uphold and protect the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India. 62. As rightly contended by Mrs. Kritika Kamal, the averments in the two impugned articles should be seen in the backdrop of the situation that was obtaining in Coimbatore at the relevant point of time. To recapitulate, huge explosives were detonated in Coimbatore to coincide with the visit of Mr. L.K. Advani, BJP leader, to the city. Coimbatore became a cauldron of communal commotion. In the impugned articles, after comparing the plight of the Kosovo Muslims with the locals, the author has relied upon an isolated verse from the Holy Quran to create fear in the minds of the local Muslims that they could also face extinction and that they should be prepared like warhorses to jump into the battlefield. In the impugned articles, after comparing the plight of the Kosovo Muslims with the locals, the author has relied upon an isolated verse from the Holy Quran to create fear in the minds of the local Muslims that they could also face extinction and that they should be prepared like warhorses to jump into the battlefield. This Court is of the view that a complete reading of the impugned articles is bound to instill a feeling of insecurity in the minds of ordinary Muslims. The oft-repeated assertion that the Indian army is attacking Muslims and raping their womenfolk is, in the opinion of this Court, bound to create despondency and fear and as a sequel, excite passions and whip up ill-will and hatred against Non-Muslims as a measure of self-protection. 63. Coming to the individual overt acts of the accused, the prosecution has proved beyond cavil the seizure of the May 1999 and June 1999 SIM newsletters containing offending articles from Shah Jahan (A.5) near the mosque on 25.06.1999 and also the seizure of the copies of the same newsletters along with hand written scripts from the office of SIM. The prosecution has also proved the recovery of stickers calling for jihad from the office of SIM after the arrest of Samimul Islam (A.1). When Samimul Islam (A.1) and Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2) have been shown as the editor and editor in charge, respectively, of the SIM newsletter, they cannot plead ignorance of the impugned articles that were written by the deceased accused, viz., S.H.M. Mohideen. 64. As regards Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2), Mohammed Shah Jahan (P.W. 10), the Proprietor of Asia Graphics and Offset Printers, has identified him as the person who came to his office and paid money for printing the May and June 1999 issues of SIM newsletters. He has also submitted the diary (Ex. P.42) and identified the entries, viz., Exs. P.9 and P. 10 to show the amounts that were received as charges for printing the SIM newsletters. The defence was not able to make any serious dent in the testimony of this witness in the cross-examination. Further, this witness has admitted in the cross-examination that, though the name of Syed Mohammed (A.3) is written in his diary (Ex. P.42), he cannot identify him. This also adds to the credibility of this witness. 65. The defence was not able to make any serious dent in the testimony of this witness in the cross-examination. Further, this witness has admitted in the cross-examination that, though the name of Syed Mohammed (A.3) is written in his diary (Ex. P.42), he cannot identify him. This also adds to the credibility of this witness. 65. Coming to Syed Mohammed (A.3) and Khadar Bhaba (A.4), who are admittedly Administrator and Layout Designer respectively in the SIM newsletter office, there is no material to establish their complicity in the writing and publishing of the impugned articles in the SIM newsletter, except the fact that their names figured in the two newsletters. As a layout designer, Khadar Bhaba (A.4) would have mechanically structured the various articles in the SIM newsletter and as the administrator, Syed Mohammed (A.3), would have been responsible for the running of the office, for which, they cannot be mulcted with criminal liability and accordingly, they deserve acquittal. 66. Mr. Sankarasubbu contended that Shah Jahan (A.5) had resigned from the office of SIM newsletter as early as 10.04.1999, as could be seen from his resignation letter (Ex. P.50), which was seized by the police from the office SIM during the search on 14.07.1999 under search list (Ex. P.3) and as such, he would not have distributed the SIM newsletters on 25.06.1999 near the mosque. 67. Refuting this contention, Mrs. Kritika Kamal, submitted that though the resignation letter (Ex. P.50) shows that Shah Jahan (A.5) had submitted his resignation from SIM on 10.04.1999, yet, the evidence of Balasubramanian (P.W. 1), Vijay (P.W. 2) and Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14) clearly reveal that on 25.06.1999, he was distributing SIM newsletters outside the mosque and therefore, he had not completely disassociated himself from the activities of SIM. 68. No doubt, the fact that on 25.06.1999, Shah Jahan (A.5) was found distributing the May and June 1999 issues of SIM newsletters outside the mosque, has been satisfactorily established by the prosecution via the evidence of Balasubramaniam (P.W. 1), Vijay (P.W. 2) and Sundar Rajan (P.W. 14), however, from the possession of Shah Jahan (A.5), a letter of SIM addressed to him (A.5) was seized and it has been marked as Ex. P.27. A reading of the said letter (Ex. P.27. A reading of the said letter (Ex. P.27) shows that Shah Jahan (A.5) was appointed as sales agent-cum-distributor of SIM newsletters and he has been asked to remit the sale proceeds to the office. Concededly, the impugned articles were only part of the SIM newsletters which do contain other articles and write-ups too. Those articles and write-ups relate to ordinary religious topics and other allied news items. It is not the case of the prosecution that Shah Jahan (A.5) was distributing the two impugned articles alone in the form of pamphlets or leaflets. Therefore, this Court is able to infer that though Shah Jahan (A.5) had submitted his resignation vide Ex. P.50 from 10.04.1999, it was not accepted, because, he owed some dues to the SIM office. All these circumstances, when viewed cumulatively, lead this Court to an irresistible conclusion that Shah Jahan (A.5) cannot be mulcted with criminal liability under Section 153-B IPC and punished. In such perspective of the matter, Shah Jahan (A.5) deserves acquittal under Section 153-B IPC as well. 69. In view of the foregoing discussion: a. The conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court on A.1 to A.5 for the charge under Section 124-A IPC are set aside and they will stand acquitted of the said offence. b. The conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court on Syed Mohammed (A.3), Khadar Bhaba (A.4) and Shah Jahan (A.5) for the charge under Section 153-B IPC are set aside and as a sequitur, they will stand acquitted of this offence too. c. The conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court on Samimul Islam (A.1) and Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2) for the charge under Section 153-B IPC will stand confirmed. In the result, the criminal appeals are allowed in part, as indicated in paragraph 69, supra. The trial Court is directed to secure the presence of Samimul Islam (A.1) and Syed Abdur Rahman (A.2) and commit them to prison to serve out the remaining period of sentence, if any. Crl.M.P. SR. No. 59449 of 2019 will stand dismissed in view of the reasons stated in paragraph 7, supra.