JUDGMENT Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J. - Heard Mrs. M. M. Pal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. In this writ application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 12.05.2014 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2 at Dhanbad in Misc. Case No. 6 of 2012 whereby the restoration application preferred by the petitioner has been rejected. The petitioner is further aggrieved by the award dated 18.02.1999 passed in Reference Case No. 151 of 1987 by which the reference was disposed of and a No Dispute Award was rendered on the presumption of non-existence of any dispute between the parties presently. 3. A reference was made by the Central Government in terms of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act for adjudication by the Tribunal on the following terms: "Whether the action of the management of Argada Colliary of M/s. CCL, P.O. Argada District-Hazaribagh in denying regularization to S/Sri Raghu Gope and ninety-five others (Annexure - A) engaged in dispatch and S/Shri Idris Ansari and forty-one others (Annexure - B) engaged in loading when they are working for a number of years with the management through contractors and that the nature of job is permanent, is legal and justified? If not to what relief the concerned workmen are entitled?" 4. The petitioner had filed its written statement wherein it has been stated that ninety-six workers named in the schedule of the reference were engaged by the management of Argada colliery through contractor for breaking/screening and stacking of coal for dispatches to M/s Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited. It has been asserted that the said workers have been working since 1974 and performing the same job although the contractors have from time to time changed. The management of Argada Colliery had assured employment to the concerned workmen and since the work is permanent and perennial in nature, the workman concerned had several times agitated their grievance for regularization before the management. On account of the agitation the management decided to stop the contract and asked the consumer to make their own arrangement for breaking of coal in order to deprive the workmen from being regularized. 5. On account of the agitation the management decided to stop the contract and asked the consumer to make their own arrangement for breaking of coal in order to deprive the workmen from being regularized. 5. It has been claimed that the workmen concerned have been regularly engaged for the last nineteen years since the job is perennial and permanent in nature and since the workmen concerned were working directly under the supervision and control of the official of Argada colliery they have claimed regularization of their services. 6. The respondent has filed a counter affidavit in which the claim of the workmen concerned has been denied and it has been stated that there was never any employer employee relationship between the management and the workmen concerned. It has further been asserted that there is no evidence to prove that the workmen concerned were involved in the breaking, screening and stacking of coal for dispatch and in fact M/s. Heavy Engineering Limited which is the consumer had made arrangement for loading. It has also been claimed that the management of Argada colliery was not at all concerned with the issue as the coal was purchased by Heavy Engineering Limited and received by it. 7. After written statements and documents etc. were filed a submission was made by the counsel appearing on behalf of the workmen that he has not been receiving any instructions since long and, therefore, the learned Presiding Officer presumed that there was no dispute existing and reference was accordingly disposed of vide award dated 18.02.1999 as No Dispute Award. The petitioner had filed an application on 26.07.2012 for restoration of Reference Case No. 151 of 1987 which however was also rejected on 12.05.2014. 8. Mrs. M. M. Pal, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the reference case was adjourned on several occasions and both the parties were present on several occasions for which she has referred to the averment made in paragraphs - 25 and 26 of the writ application. Learned senior counsel further submits that the counsel who was representing the Union had expired long back on account of which the Union was not aware about the No Dispute Award passed by the learned Presiding Officer. Learned senior counsel further submits that the counsel who was representing the Union had expired long back on account of which the Union was not aware about the No Dispute Award passed by the learned Presiding Officer. It has been stated that on verification of record when it came to light the impugned order dated 18.02.1999 (No Dispute Award) has already been passed steps were immediately taken for restoration of Reference Case No. 151 of 1987 which however was not properly appreciated and it was rejected on 12.05.2014. Learned senior counsel submits that the dispute still exists and it was incumbent on the part of the learned Presiding Officer to decide the lis instead of presuming the non-existence of a dispute. 9. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has primarily rested his argument on the long delay in institution of the restoration case. It has been stated that since counsel who was appearing for the Union was not being given any instruction for a considerable length of time, the learned Presiding Officer did not have any option but to close the reference and declare it as a No Dispute Award. It has been stated that the restoration case has been filed after thirteen years without there being any plausible explanation and the reasons which have been given by the leaned Presiding Officer that he has become functus officio is perfectly justified which requires no interference. 10. The question which has been raised by the leaned senior counsel of the petitioner and opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent is as to whether the Tribunal could have adjudicated upon the dispute or could have simply passed a No Dispute Award. 11. Section 2(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines an award which means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial Dispute and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10(A); an industrial dispute as per Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or in terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person. 12. 12. In the case of Virendra Bhandari vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation And Others reported in (2002) 9 SCC 104 the question which was before the Hon''be Supreme Court was as to whether when on account of absence of the workmen the Tribunal had held that there was no industrial dispute the subsequent reference by the Government on the same question and adjudicating the matter and passing an award would make the second reference maintainable. In such context it was held as follows: "A perusal of the award made on the earlier occasion will clearly indicate that there is no adjudication of the dispute at all. All that was stated was that the parties concerned had not appeared before the Tribunal and in such an event, the Tribunal should have noted its inability to record the finding on the issue referred to it, not that the dispute itself does not exist. When there is no adjudication of the matter on merits, it cannot be said that the industrial dispute does not exist. If the industrial dispute still exists as is opined by the Government such a matter can be referred under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. What is to be borne in mind in proceedings of this nature is that the industrial disputes are referred to the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal for maintenance of industrial peace and not merely for adjudication of the dispute between two private parties. That aspect seemed to have been lost sight of by the Tribunal on the first occasion and by the High Court in the order under appeal. In this background, it was certainly permissible for the Government to have made the second reference on which occasion after inquiring into the matter, the Tribunal adjudicated the matter finally." As has been repeatedly stated above on account of absence of instructions given to the concerned counsel appearing for the Union the impugned order dated 18.02.1999 was passed. 13. It is clear that the matter has not been adjudicated upon and only on presumption a No Dispute Award has been passed. Taking a que from the case of Virendra Bhandari vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation And Others (supra) it can be observed that the Tribunal should have noted its inability to record a finding in absence of any instruction initiated to the counsel of the workmen concerned. Taking a que from the case of Virendra Bhandari vs. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation And Others (supra) it can be observed that the Tribunal should have noted its inability to record a finding in absence of any instruction initiated to the counsel of the workmen concerned. Not only was there absence of instruction but also proper diligence in the reference before as well as after the impugned order was passed. The Union which was espousing the cause of the workmen had a lackadaisical approach to the entire issue. The reference case was disposed of on 18.02.1999 and its restoration was filed on 26.07.2012 which would be after about a gap of more than thirteen years. This would reflect on the so called diligence on the part of the Union and filing of the restoration application was primarily to initiate a fresh cause of action before approaching this Court but the inordinate delay as indicated would not be washed away even if a fresh cause of action is shown to be executed by the Union. 14. The impugned order dated 18.02.1999 thus cannot be termed as a No Dispute Award on presumption but in the facts and circumstances of the case would be construed to mean that the Tribunal has not recorded any finding with respect to the non-existence of a dispute and the reference has been disposed of on account of inability of the Tribunal to record any finding on the issue referred to it due to absence of instruction from the Union to its concerned counsel. 15. This writ application accordingly stands disposed of with the aforesaid clarification in the impugned order dated 18.02.1999.