ORDER : 1. This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue Writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the first respondent in issuing Memo No.5028/M/III(I)/2016 dated 08.11.2016 holding that petitioner’s application dated 09.01.2008 for grant of mining lease for limestone over an extent of Ac.31-04 cents in Sy.Nos.28 & 31 of Rambhadrunipalli Village, Sanjamala Mandal, Kurnool District cannot be considered in view of the enactment of Section 10(A)(1) of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 (for short ‘MMDR Amendment Act, 2015’) as illegal, arbitrary and contrary to Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, and set-aside the same and further direct the first respondent to reconsider the application dated 09.01.2008 of the petitioner taking into consideration the recommendation of the third respondent dated 04.12.2008. 2. The petitioner submitted an application to the third respondent/Assistant Director of Mines & Geology for grant of mining lease to extract of limestone over an extent of Ac.31-04 cents in Sy.Nos.28 & 31 of Rambhadrunipalli Village, Sanjamala Mandal, Kurnool District. The third respondent had conducted a survey and raised objection with regard to Sy.No.28 and therefore, the petitioner had withdrawn the same from the applied area. The Tahsildar granted ‘No Objection Certificate’ dated 24.10.2008 in respect of 5-42 hectares in Sy.No.31. The third respondent had issued recommendation for grant of mining lease for a period of 20 years in an extent of 5-42 hectares in Sy.No.31 subject to conditions of Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 and Minor Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and also subject to condition that the grantee should not disturb the natural water stream in the applied area vide his inspection report dated 04.12.2008. Thereafter, another Memo dated 29.10.2010 was issued by the second respondent/Director of Mines holding that the area is overlapping and therefore the petitioner was constrained to file W.P.No.31004 of 2011 and this Court was pleased to grant interim order on 06.01.2012 directing the respondents to consider petitioner’s application. Thereafter, WPMP was dismissed because of the issuance of impugned memo dated 08.11.2016. 3. The petitioner specifically contended that, a perusal of the impugned memo shows that the petitioner’s application has been rejected mainly on the ground that the same cannot be considered in view of the enactment of Section 10(A)(1) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. Thereafter, WPMP was dismissed because of the issuance of impugned memo dated 08.11.2016. 3. The petitioner specifically contended that, a perusal of the impugned memo shows that the petitioner’s application has been rejected mainly on the ground that the same cannot be considered in view of the enactment of Section 10(A)(1) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. A perusal of Section 10(A)(1) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 shows that all applications received prior to the date of commencement of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, shall become ineligible. However, a reading of sub-section (2)(c) shows that, in case if approval is already granted or a Letter of Intent is issued prior to the commencement MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, the lease can be granted within two years from the date of commencement of the Act with the same terms and conditions. 4. In the light of inspection report of the third respondent dated 04.12.2008, wherein, specific recommendation for grant of lease has been made with certain conditions, the same has to be construed as a Letter of Intent within the meaning of Section 10A(2)(c) of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, therefore, the impugned memo is contrary to the said provision, thereby, the petitioner is entitled to claim mining lease and the rejection of the same by the third respondent by applying Section 10A(1)(a) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the provisions of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 and requested to set-aside the Memo No.5028/M/III(I)/2016 dated 08.11.2016 and consequently, direct the first respondent to grant mining lease based on the recommendation made by the third respondent. 5. The third respondent/Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kurnool District, filed counter admitting about pendency of application for grant of mining lease dated 09.01.2008 and issue of Memo impugned in this writ petition, including the recommendation for grant of mining lease, vide Inspection Report of the third respondent to contend that, MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, was amended by Act No.10 of 2015, which came into force on 12.01.2015, the petitioner is not entitled to claim mining lease, in view of bar under Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Act, 1957. It is further contended that, Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Act, 1957 is not applicable to the instant case, as Letter of Intent was not granted in favour of the petitioner. It is further contended that, Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Act, 1957 is not applicable to the instant case, as Letter of Intent was not granted in favour of the petitioner. It is further submitted that, specific recommendation for grant of mining lease with certain conditions cannot be considered as Letter of Intent and finally requested to dismiss the writ petition. 6. During hearing, Sri C. Raghu, learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that, when the application was made long prior to commencement to MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, the third respondent cannot reject the application, based on the amendment to MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. Moreover, on account of lethargic attitude of the officials of the department, the petitioner shall not be made to suffer. Even otherwise, the recommendation made by the third respondent shall be treated as a Letter of Intent for all practical purposes to consider the application of this petitioner under Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 and placed reliance on the judgment of Karnataka High Court in Smt. A.V. Shakuntala v. Union of India, W.P.Nos.36461-36463 of 2016 & batch dated 01.12.2016, to contend that, when a Letter of Intent is issued expressing their intention to the Government to grant lease, it would fall within the ambit of Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 and rejection of the application on the ground of amendment i.e. Section 10A(1)(a) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 is an illegality and requested to set-aside the same. 7. Whereas, learned Government Pleader for Mines and Geology would contend that the recommendation made by the third respondent is only a correspondence between the first respondent and third respondent and it can never be construed as Letter of Intent for the purpose of granting mining lease based on Section 10A(2)(c) of the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. Apart from that, the petitioner’s application was pending by the date of the amendment came into force. Therefore, the application of this petitioner is deemed to have been invalid and consequently not entitled to claim mining lease, based on such application. Moreover, the respondents cannot be compelled to grant mining lease in favour of this petitioner, contrary to the provisions of law and requested to dismiss the writ petition. 8. It is an undisputed fact that this petitioner applied for grant of mining lease for extraction of limestone on 09.01.2008. Moreover, the respondents cannot be compelled to grant mining lease in favour of this petitioner, contrary to the provisions of law and requested to dismiss the writ petition. 8. It is an undisputed fact that this petitioner applied for grant of mining lease for extraction of limestone on 09.01.2008. His application was rejected vide Memo No.5028/M/III(I)/2016 dated 08.11.2016. Thus, rejection took place after eight years from the date of application and the reason assigned for rejection is that the petitioner’s application dated 09.01.2008 for grant of mining lease for extraction of limestone over an extent of Ac.31-04 cents in Sy.Nos.28 & 31 of Rambhadrunipalli Village, Sanjamala Mandal, Kurnool District, is invalid, in view of Section 10A(1)(a) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. The memo issued by the second respondent is extracted herein for better appreciation of the case, in view of the specific contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and it is extracted herein: GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH INDUSTRIES AND COMMERCE [M-III] DEPARTMENT Memo No.5028/M/III(I)/2016 Dated 08.11.2016 Sub: Mines & Minerals – Mining Lease application field by Sri G. Lakshmi Narayana Reddy for grant of Lime Stone (C.G) over an extent of 31.04 Acres in Sy.Nos. 28 & 31 of Ramabhadrunipalli Village, Sanjamala Mandal, Kurnool District – Reg. Ref: 1. From Sri G. Lakshmi Narayana Reddy Mining Lease application dated 09.01.2008. 2. From the O/o the Director of Mines and Geology, GoAP., Hyderabad File No.7534/R4-2/2009 *** Sri G. Lakshmi Narayana Reddy is hereby informed, after careful examination, that his application, dated 09.01.2008 for grant of Mining Lease for Limestone (C.G) over an extent of 31.04 Acres in Sy.No.s.28 & 31 of Ramabhadrunipalli Village, Sanjamala Mandal, Kurnool District, cannot be considered in view of the enactment of Section 10(A)(1) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. 2. The Director of mines and Geology, Govt. of A.P., Hyderabad is requested to take further necessary action in the matter accordingly. B. SREEDHAR SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT (M&G) To Sri G. Lakshmi Narayana Reddy S/o Kesava Reddy Thimmypalli Village Tadipatri Mandal Ananthapuram District Copy to: The Director of Mines & Geology, AP, Hyderabad The Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kurnool Dist. 9. After issue of Memo impugned in this writ petition, the petitioner made representation dated 27.12.2016 for reconsideration of his application for grant of mining lease and receipt of the same was acknowledged by the first respondent, but no orders were passed. 9. After issue of Memo impugned in this writ petition, the petitioner made representation dated 27.12.2016 for reconsideration of his application for grant of mining lease and receipt of the same was acknowledged by the first respondent, but no orders were passed. There is no dispute with regard to issue of memo impugned in the writ petition, but the only question is whether recommendation made by the third respondent for grant of mining lease of an extent of 5-42 hectares in Sy.No.31, subject to certain conditions can be construed as a Letter of Intent to comply with Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 and MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 was amended by Act No.10 of 2015 which came into force on 26.03.2015. 10. In view of the specific contentions raised, it is appropriate to extract Section 10A of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, for better appreciation of the case: “10A. (1) All applications received prior to the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, shall become ineligible. 10. In view of the specific contentions raised, it is appropriate to extract Section 10A of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, for better appreciation of the case: “10A. (1) All applications received prior to the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, shall become ineligible. (2) Without prejudice to sub-section (1), the following shall remain eligible on and from the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015:— (a) applications received under section 11A of this Act; (b) where before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015 a reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence has been granted in respect of any land for any mineral, the permit holder or the licensee shall have a right for obtaining a prospecting licence followed by a mining lease, or a mining lease, as the case may be, in respect of that mineral in that land, if the State Government is satisfied that the permit holder or the licensee, as the case may be,— (i) has undertaken reconnaissance operations or prospecting operations, as the case may be, to establish the existence of mineral contents in such land in accordance with such parameters as may be prescribed by the Central Government; (ii) has not committed any breach of the terms and conditions of the reconnaissance permit or the prospecting licence; (iii) has not become ineligible under the provisions of this Act; and (iv) has not failed to apply for grant of prospecting licence or mining lease, as the case may be, within a period of three months after the expiry of reconnaissance permit or prospecting licence, as the case may be, or within such further period not exceeding six months as may be extended by the State Government; (c) where the Central Government has communicated previous approval as required under sub-section (1) of section 5 for grant of a mining lease, or if a letter of intent (by whatever name called) has been issued by the State Government to grant a mining lease, before the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, the mining lease shall be granted subject to fulfillment of the conditions of the previous approval or of the letter of intent within a period of two years from the date of commencement of the said Act. Provided that in respect of any mineral specified in the First Schedule, no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted under clause (b) of this subsection except with the previous approval of the Central Government. 11. According to Section 10A(1), all applications received prior to the date of commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, shall become ineligible. The Legislature has carved out an exception to subsection (1) of Section 10A, as amended by MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. According to it, Clause (c) is an exception to Section 10A(1), which supports certain applications made prior to commencement of Amendment Act for grant of mining lease before the commencement of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015. Such applications cannot be rejected in view of Section 10A(1). Therefore, the expression “Letter of Intent (by whatever name called)” assumes importance for deciding the real controversy. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner mainly contended that, when an application is pending before the authorities concerned, for grant of mining lease for the last more than eight years prior to commencement of MMDR Act, 1957, rejection of petitioner’s application is unwarranted and the recommendation made by the third respondent shall be treated as a Letter of Intent. If that is treated as a Letter of Intent, the case of this petitioner would fall within Clause (c) of Section 10A(1) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, thereby, the petitioner is entitled for grant of mining lease. The third respondent/Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kurnool District, on inspection, made a recommendation on 04.12.2008 for grant of mining lease in an extent of 5-42 hectares in Sy.No.31, subject to certain conditions. The third respondent/Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kurnool District, on inspection, made a recommendation on 04.12.2008 for grant of mining lease in an extent of 5-42 hectares in Sy.No.31, subject to certain conditions. The recommendation allegedly made by the third respondent is only an inspection report and at the end of the inspection report, the third respondent stated as follows: “In view of the above circumstances, the Mining Lease application of Sri S. Lakshmi Narayana Reddy for extraction of Cement Grade Limestone over an extent of 5.425 Hects in Sy.No.31 of Ramabhadrapalli Village, Sanjamala Madnal, Kurnool District, here by recommended for grant of Mining Lease for a period of 20 years subject to rejection of earlier applications mentioned in the above table and also subject to satisfaction of all other terms and conditions of MC Rules, 1960 and MM (D&R) Act, 1957, and subject to condition that the grantee should not disturb the natural position of water stream in the applied area.” 13. Taking advantage of the recommendation after the inspection report made by the third respondent, learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that, it is a Letter of Intent and demonstrated that it would fall within Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Act. 14. The meaning of “Letter of Intent” came up for consideration before the Apex Court in Dresser Rand S.A. vs. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. and K.G. Khosla Compressors Ltd, (2006) 1 SCC 751 , wherein, it was held that Letter of Intent generally indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract with the other party in. A letter of intent is not intended to bind either party ultimately to enter into any contract. The “Letter of Intent” referred in Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Act refers to the same expression “Letter of Intent (by whatever name called)”. Thus, clearly expresses the legislative intent that a broad interpretation ought to be afforded to the words ‘Letter of Intent’ contained in Section 10A(2)(c). The Supreme Court in Rishi Kiran Logistics Private Limited v. Board of Trustees of Kandla Port Trust and others, (2015) 13 SCC 233 relying upon the observations in Dresser Rand S.A. vs. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. and K.G. Khosla Compressors Ltd (referred supra) held that a letter of intent merely indicates a party’s intention to enter into a contract with the other party in the future. It need not contain a contractual arrangement with any specificity. Therefore, letter of intent means expression of interest to enter into a contract in future. In fact, there is no need to enter into a contract strictly speaking by the petitioner and third respondent to grant of mining lease is always subject to certain terms and conditions and unless the petitioner accepted these conditions, it will not create a contractual obligation between the petitioner and third respondent. Execution of valid contracts is a prerequisite to creation of any legally binding rights and obligations among the executing parties. However, before entering into definitive contract(s), parties often enter into a letter of intent so as to agree and specify upfront the key terms of the proposed transaction. The idea is to identify and address any major commercial issues between the parties, and at the same time demonstrate their commitment to the transaction. It is a well settled legal position under Indian laws that an agreement to 'enter into an agreement' is neither enforceable nor does it confer any rights upon the parties. It is also a well settled principle of law that a letter of intent generally indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract with the other party in future. A letter of intent is not intended to bind either party ultimately to enter into any contract. Such nonbinding letter of intent can however also take a hybrid form where parties agree to be bound by certain identified provisions such as confidentiality; exclusivity; costs/expenses; governing law/jurisdiction etc. Ordinarily, if a letter of intent or any other contractual document expressly confirms that no contractual obligations are created between the parties, then there is an assumption that no valid and binding contract has been created between the parties. However, it depends upon the language used in the Letter of Intent. The Courts have interpreted the expression ‘Letter of Intent’ in different situations. In Rajasthan Co-op Diary Federation Ltd v. Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing Service Pvt. Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 2679 of 1992, Decided on 17.09.1996, the Supreme Court observed as under: "The Letter of Intent merely expresses an intention to enter into a contract........ The Courts have interpreted the expression ‘Letter of Intent’ in different situations. In Rajasthan Co-op Diary Federation Ltd v. Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing Service Pvt. Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 2679 of 1992, Decided on 17.09.1996, the Supreme Court observed as under: "The Letter of Intent merely expresses an intention to enter into a contract........ There was no binding legal relationship between the appellant and the respondent 1 at this stage and the appellant was entitled to look at the totality of circumstances in deciding whether to enter into a binding contract with respondent 1 or not." 15. In Bhoruka Power Corporation Limited v. State of Haryana and Ors, AIR 2000 P&H 245 , Punjab and Haryana High Court observed that, with respect to binding nature of letters of intent that, if various steps had been taken for awarding the contract and considerable amounts spent, then a legitimate expectation was created that in the absence of any adverse factor, the contract would be awarded. 16. In Dresser Rand S.A. vs. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. and K.G. Khosla Compressors Ltd (referred supra), the Supreme Court while adjudicating as to whether the dispute was whether the letter of intent was a contract binding the parties, observed that, the letter of intent is only a prelude to the purchase order and not itself the purchase order... ...Clause (M) made it clear that the Letters of Intent were being issued subject to necessary approvals being given by the Authorities of the Indian Government. These provisions clearly indicate that the Letters of Intent were only a step leading to purchase orders and were not, by themselves, purchase orders......It is now well-settled that a Letter of Intent merely indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract with the other party in future. A Letter of Intent is not intended to bind either party ultimately to enter into any contract. 17. In Nikhil Adhesives Limited thro' Dharmeshbhai Dhirajbhai Pandya v. Kandla Port Trust, 2011 GLH (2) 283, Gujarat High Court considered the specific facts of this case, wherein, the tender issuing authority had cancelled the tender process in which a bidder had been identified as the highest bidder, which bidder had also been issued a letter of intent pursuant to selection of bids. The bidder challenged such cancellation by the tenderer inter alia on the ground that since a letter of intent had been issued in its favour, the bidder was entitled to a letter of allotment and award of the underlying contract in its favour and the Gujarat High Court held as follows: "The letter of intent issued by the Respondent was merely an expression of intention and imparting an information that the Petitioner stood highest bidder and on receipt of CRZ clearance, the formal letter of allotment would be issued. However, the Petitioner had not cooperated in the meantime for obtaining CRZ clearance and before any formal letter of allotment is issued, the earlier tender process stood cancelled. Even while canceling the earlier tender process, the Respondent Port Trust neither acted arbitrarily nor it would amount to any malafide exercise of discretionary powers....... The Respondent is well within its rights to take such a decision in the year 2010 keeping in mind the larger public interest...The letter of intent issued by the Respondent Port Trust on 12.01.2006, at best, can be said to be an agreement to issue the allotment letter and to execute the lease document in favour of the Petitioner subject to fulfillment of certain conditions. However, in absence of issuance of allotment letter, the said letter of intent cannot be enforced in the Court of law..... Such a letter of intent is not intended to bind either party ultimately to enter into any contract..." 18. In view of the law declared by various Courts referred supra, ‘Letter of Intent’ is only a step forward or in advance to enter into a contract between the parties. Here, the third respondent/Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kurnool, submitted his Inspection Report, making a recommendation to the first respondent for grant of mining lease in an extent of 5-42 hectares in Sy.No.31, as a part of procedure prescribed, under the MMDR Act and Rules framed thereunder. Here, the third respondent/Assistant Director of Mines and Geology, Kurnool, submitted his Inspection Report, making a recommendation to the first respondent for grant of mining lease in an extent of 5-42 hectares in Sy.No.31, as a part of procedure prescribed, under the MMDR Act and Rules framed thereunder. The submission of Inspection Report is only in the nature of the information submitted by the third respondent to the first respondent to proceed further on the application of this petitioner and such recommendation cannot be construed as Letter of Intent, since it was not issued to the petitioner expressing the interest of the first respondent or third respondent to grant mining lease in favour of this petitioner and it is only a step in the process of clearing the application of this petitioner as per Rules. Merely because a report is submitted to Respondent Nos. 1 and 3 as to complying with the procedural mandate, it would not amount to Letter of Intent, since the third respondent is not a competent person to issue such Letter of Intent, even assuming that it amounts to Letter of Intent or expressing interest to grant lease in favour of this petitioner, the first respondent alone is the competent authority to grant mining lease. Therefore, such recommendation made by the third respondent for grant of mining lease in an extent of 5-42 hectares in Sy.No.31 cannot be construed as Letter of Intent or expressing their interest to enter into a contract or grant lease in favour of this petitioner. In view of the meaning of ‘Letter of Intent’, it is pre-requisite to constitute a document as Letter of Intent and it s difficult to construe the recommendation made by the third respondent to first respondent as Letter of Intent. It is only an interdepartmental correspondence between the first and third respondents as a part of pre-grant procedure in terms of the Rules framed therein. Hence, I hold that the recommendation made by the third respondent is not a Letter of Intent and consequently it is difficult to bring the case of this petitioner within Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 to save the application of this petitioner. 19. Hence, I hold that the recommendation made by the third respondent is not a Letter of Intent and consequently it is difficult to bring the case of this petitioner within Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 to save the application of this petitioner. 19. As per Section 10A(1) of MMDR Act, 2015, when the application is pending before the authorities even prior to the Act came into force, such applicants are not eligible for grant of mining lease and the amendment was challenged before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and State of Andhra Pradesh in Coromandel Mining Exports Private Limited v. The Union of India, Unreported judgment in W.P.No.10364 of 2015 & batch dated 11.09.2015, wherein the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the amendments by MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. 20. As discussed above, the pre-grant procedural compliance by the third respondent making recommendations to the first respondent for grant of mining lease in an extent of 5-42 hectares in Sy.No.31 is not a Letter of Intent to attract Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015, to compel the respondents to grant lease in favor of this petitioner, extending benefit of Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. 21. Recommendation sent by respondent No.3 to respondent No.2 by way of memo is only an interdepartmental communication between two officers and it is a step towards granting mining lease. Interdepartmental communication is only for limited purpose of communicating from one officer to the other officer and it is not a conclusive decision taken by any officer. Even otherwise, such interdepartmental communication cannot be construed as a letter of intent. There is a lot of difference between notification and memo. Notification means only notifying particular Act or Rule in the Gazette of State. Only from the date of such publication in the Gazette, the rule enacted is deemed to have been came into force unless the rule otherwise specifies. 22. A memorandum, more commonly known as memo¸ is a short message or record used for internal communication in a business, and primary form of internal written communication. Therefore, the Unreported judgment in W.P.No.10364 of 2015 & batch dated 11.09.2015 memo is only internal correspondence between the two branches of the department or two offices, but that is not the communication to the public. Therefore, the Unreported judgment in W.P.No.10364 of 2015 & batch dated 11.09.2015 memo is only internal correspondence between the two branches of the department or two offices, but that is not the communication to the public. Communication to the public is only by way of Gazette notification of the State. The memo cannot be construed as an order, but it is only an interdepartmental communication. Hence, the memo cannot be said to be an executive order, but it is only a communication by the second respondent to the District Collector- cum-District Magistrate. 23. In Messrs. Ghaio Mal and sons v. State of Delhi and others, AIR 1959 SUPREME COURT 65, the Supreme Court had an occasion to decide an identical question of issuing memos. The Apex Court while decided the question as to whether the letter in question was the order of the Chief Commissioner or not and held as follows: “In the first place it is an inter-departmental communication. In the second place it is written with reference to an earlier communication made by the Excise Commissioner, that is to say, ex facie, it purports to be a reply to the latter's letter of August 31, 1954. In the third place the writer quite candidly states that he had been " directed to say " something by whom, it is not stated. This makes it quite clear that this document is not the order of the Chief Commissioner but only purports to be a communication at the direction of some unknown person-of the order which the Chief Commissioner had made. Indeed in paragraph 7 of the respondents' statement filed in the High Court on February 2, 1955, this letter has been stated to have " conveyed the sanction of the Chief Commissioner of the grant of license to the 5th respondent ". A document which conveys the sanction can hardly be equated with the sanction itself Finally the document does not purport to have been authenticated in the form in which authentication is usually made. There is no statement at the end of the letter that it has been written " by order of the Chief Commissioner ". For all these reasons it is impossible to read this document as the order of the Chief Commissioner.” 24. For the reasons stated above, the Apex Court held that, there was no valid order granting the L.2 license. For all these reasons it is impossible to read this document as the order of the Chief Commissioner.” 24. For the reasons stated above, the Apex Court held that, there was no valid order granting the L.2 license. The letter in question was an inter-departmental communication written with reference to an earlier communication made by the Excise Commissioner. Ex facie, it purported to be a reply to the Excise Commissioner’s letter. Hence, the letter is not an order, but only a memo and not required to comply with the requirements under Article 166(2) of the Constitution of India. 25. In view of the law declared by various Courts, such interdepartmental communication can never be construed as an order or Letter of Intent and the same cannot be described as letter of intent to bring it within clause 10 (a) (1) (c) of the Act. 26. The jurisdiction of Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India is limited and such power can be exercised only certain circumstances which are enumerated in “West Bengal Central School Service Commission v. Abdul Halim, 2019 (9) SCALE 573 ” wherein the Apex Court reiterated the following principles of judicial review. “It is well settled that the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not sit in appeal over an administrative decision. The Court might only examine the decision making process to ascertain whether there was such infirmity in the decision making process, which vitiates the decision and calls for intervention Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In any case, the High Court exercises its extraordinary jurisdiction Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to enforce a fundamental right or some other legal right or the performance of some legal duty. To pass orders in a writ petition, the High Court would necessarily have to address to itself the question of whether there has been breach of any fundamental or legal right of the Petitioner, or whether there has been lapse in performance by the Respondents of a legal duty. The High Court in exercise of its power to issue writs, directions or orders to any person or authority to correct quasi-judicial or even administrative decisions for enforcement of a fundamental or legal right is obliged to prevent abuse of power and neglect of duty by public authorities. The High Court in exercise of its power to issue writs, directions or orders to any person or authority to correct quasi-judicial or even administrative decisions for enforcement of a fundamental or legal right is obliged to prevent abuse of power and neglect of duty by public authorities. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137 . If the provision of a statutory Rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari. The sweep of power Under Article 226 may be wide enough to quash unreasonable orders. If a decision is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could have ever arrived at it, the same is liable to be struck down by a writ Court. If the decision cannot rationally be supported by the materials on record, the same may be regarded as perverse. However, the power of the Court to examine the reasonableness of an order of the authorities does not enable the Court to look into the sufficiency of the grounds in support of a decision to examine the merits of the decision, sitting as if in appeal over the decision. The test is not what the Court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the Court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken, which has led to manifest injustice. The writ Court does not interfere, because a decision is not perfect.” 27. The test is not what the Court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the Court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken, which has led to manifest injustice. The writ Court does not interfere, because a decision is not perfect.” 27. Since this Court cannot sit in appeal over the decisions of the first respondent while exercising extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is difficult to accept that the recommendation made by the third respondent to first respondent by way of Inspection Report to construe the same as Letter of Intent is not acceptable and on the other hand, when there is a specific bar in the Act itself to grant mining lease, invalidating the applications pending as on the date of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 (Act No.10 of 2015) came into force. Merely because, the application is pending for pre-grant procedural compliance, nothing is attributable to the respondents. Therefore, I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is liable to be dismissed and consequently, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed, holding that the Inspection Report is not a Letter of Intent to bring the petitioner’s case within the fold of Section 10A(2)(c) of MMDR Amendment Act, 2015. 28. In view of my foregoing discussion, writ petition is dismissed. No costs. 29. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand dismissed.