JUDGMENT : T.V. ANILKUMAR, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the petitioner (wife) in O.P.No.747/2008 on the files of the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram. She filed the original petition for dissolution of marriage, against the respondent (husband) on the grounds of cruelty as well as desertion. She had also claimed declaration in respect of petition A and B scheduled properties, that those are properties though being acquired in the joint names of the spouses, exclusively owned by her. The Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram dismissed O.P.No. 747/2008 by the impugned judgment, dated 11.8.2015 on the solitary ground that the O.P. was barred by Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C., despite some of the findings with respect to other issues having been considered on merits and answered in favour of the appellant. 2. The appellant had formerly instituted O.P.No.726/2004 before the same Family Court for dissolution of her marriage with the respondent/husband on the same grounds of cruelty and desertion and also for a declaration that she is the exclusive title holder of petition A and B scheduled properties. That O.P. was dismissed for default through Ext.B2 judgment, on 30.5.2005. It is based on Ext.B2 judgment, that the court below dismissed the present O.P. by applying the legal bar provided under Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. However, on merits, the court below found that grounds of cruelty and desertion were proved while it held that the appellant/wife failed to prove exclusive title over petition B scheduled property acquired by virtue of Ext.A13 sale deed, dated 3.4.2000 in the joint names of spouses from her father. As regards the A schedule, it held that, the absolute title vested in her alone and the respondent/husband was only a name lender to Ext.A12 settlement deed, dated 19.1.1999 executed by her father in the names of both spouses. 3. As regards the A schedule, it held that, the absolute title vested in her alone and the respondent/husband was only a name lender to Ext.A12 settlement deed, dated 19.1.1999 executed by her father in the names of both spouses. 3. The appellant/wife is aggrieved by the impugned judgment in as much as it dismissed O.P.No.747/2008 on the solitary ground of the legal bar provided under Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. The respondent had filed the above Cross Objection challenging the findings entered by the court below on merits adjudicating upon the grounds for dissolution of the marriage as well as deciding the disputed title over petition A and B scheduled properties as if the court was bound to have dismissed the O.P. at the threshold itself solely based on the bar provided under Order IX Rule 9 of the Code. 4. Parties are Hindus, having solemnized their marriage on 7.5.1999. A female child born to them is now studying in IInd Std: The respondent/husband is a KSRTC driver. The appellant is an Assistant in the Agricultural Department. Appellant's case is that the respondent is a sadist by nature, who treated her with cruelty in various ways all throughout her life, ever since the date of marriage. The spouses shifted their residence to Thiruvananthapuram and while so she got an employment as Agricultural Assistant on 19.2.2004 in Thrissur. The respondent who was not happy over the appellant being employed, took an adamant stand requiring her to resign the job, which she refused. As a result, he deserted her and started living separately since 19.2.2004. He made allegations of illicit relationship connecting her with several persons and ultimately she was forced to file O.P.No.726/2004 for dissolution of marriage before the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram. According to her, quite unfortunately, the said O.P. was dismissed for non prosecution, on 30.5.2005. Even after dismissal of that case, she had to face various acts of cruelties at the hands of respondent, which compelled her to institute O.P.No.747/2008 again on the ground of cruelty based on various incidents occurred after dismissal of O.P.No.726/2004. 5. She has narrated three incidents in the O.P. and claimed desertion also as one of the grounds for dissolution. Even after dismissal of that case, she had to face various acts of cruelties at the hands of respondent, which compelled her to institute O.P.No.747/2008 again on the ground of cruelty based on various incidents occurred after dismissal of O.P.No.726/2004. 5. She has narrated three incidents in the O.P. and claimed desertion also as one of the grounds for dissolution. She said that on 14.5.2008, while she was travelling in a KSRTC Bus, somebody from behind snatched away her thali chain and when she made hue and cry, the Bus was taken to the Police Station at Poovar, where she found the respondent confessing to police that he was responsible for the incident. This incident is set up by the appellant as one of the acts of cruelties. Similarly, she has narrated another incident which happened at the night of 30.9.2007, when one Vijayambara Raj, a driver of the KSRTC Bus at Poovar was murdered by someone by setting fire to the Bus while he was sleeping inside the vehicle. The respondent made a widespread propaganda to the public that the appellant was responsible for the incident, as it was in fact a vain attempt on his life by the appellant. It was alleged by him that she mistook the deceased for the respondent as she hoped that the respondent was attending night duty on 30.9.2017. She was shocked by the respondent's propoganda which lacked any ring of truth. Another alleged incident of cruelty is that, on 1.4.2008 the minor daughter in her custody was removed by force and taken to a hidden place causing great mental pain and harassment to her. 6. According to the appellant, desertion is also one of the grounds available for divorce since there was no reunion of spouses after 19.2.2004. She has also an allegation that petition A and B scheduled properties standing in the joint names of spouses acquired under Exts.A12 and A13 registered deeds exclusively belonged to her and the respondent is only a name lender. On all these grounds aforementioned, the appellant sought dissolution of the marriage and also a declaration of the exclusive right over petition A and B scheduled properties. 7. The respondent denied all the allegations and questioned the very maintainability of the original petition. On all these grounds aforementioned, the appellant sought dissolution of the marriage and also a declaration of the exclusive right over petition A and B scheduled properties. 7. The respondent denied all the allegations and questioned the very maintainability of the original petition. He denied that he had ever been cruel to her but only offered to live with her, provided she also co-operated for a re-union. He said that he never prevented the appellant from attending any job at all, but only stayed with her in Thrissur for 1 ½ months ever since she joined as Agricultural Assistant in the Department on 19.2.2004. According to him, PW2, the elder sister of appellant is the real cause for the matrimonial break down and for their strained relationship. The alleged incident of snatching of the thali chain inside the Bus was denied by him as false. He denied of having alleged that the appellant was responsible for the death of Vijayambara Raj. On the other hand, the appellant was truly suspected following the statement made by the wife of the deceased before the police. He took the minor daughter only because the child pressed him and volunteered to see 'Veega land', a tourist place. But the girl's desire was short-lived by the intervention of police on appellant's complaint. In respect of the petition A and B scheduled properties, he claimed half right, since according to him, he was not a mere name lender but a co-owner in law. He claimed to have paid consideration for joint purchase of B schedule in his name and in the name of the appellant. 8. The court below examined the appellant as PW1 and marked Exts.A1 to A16 on her side. PWs 2 to 6 were cited to prove various incidents of cruelties on the appellant, alleged to have been committed by the respondent. The respondent denied all the allegations against him and testified as CPW1 before the court below. On his side, he produced and got Exts.B1 to B6 marked. 9. The court below found the original petition as being hit by order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. and consequently unsustainable under law. However, on an appraisal of the evidence on record, it held that, the appellant succeeded in proving the grounds of cruelty and desertion. On his side, he produced and got Exts.B1 to B6 marked. 9. The court below found the original petition as being hit by order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. and consequently unsustainable under law. However, on an appraisal of the evidence on record, it held that, the appellant succeeded in proving the grounds of cruelty and desertion. But even then, according to the court below, a decree for dissolution cannot be granted because of the statutory bar operating against institution of a fresh O.P. on the same cause of action on which former O.P.No.726/2004 was instituted. The finding with respect to petition A schedule is that, the appellant succeeded to prove that the respondent was only a name lender to Ext.A12 settlement, dated 19.1.1999. But a different view was taken with respect to Ext.A13 sale deed, dated 3.4.2000, holding that respondent failed to prove consideration for the transaction and therefore appellant alone had acquired exclusive title over the same. The court below, however, refused to grant any relief in respect of petition B schedule, because of the alleged bar under Order IX Rule 9. 10. One of the major contentions raised by the appellant is that, the second O.P. for divorce and declaration was not based on the same cause of action upon which O.P.No.726/2004 was instituted before the Family Court. According to learned counsel, the bar under Order IX Rule 9 operates only when the institution of subsequent litigation is based on the same cause of action, which is not the situation in the case on hand. Another contention is that, the court below was not justified in invoking the bar under Order IX Rule 9 in as much as no plea based on such bar was ever taken by the appellant in her pleadings. 11. On the other hand, the cross objector/ respondent submitted through his counsel that, after the Family Court having found that the proceeding is hit by Order IX Rule 9, erred in adjudicating the issues relating to cruelty and desertion on merits and in entering into a definite findings thereon. As regards the finding on declaratory relief also, same plea was canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent. 12. As regards the finding on declaratory relief also, same plea was canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent. 12. The points, in view of the rival submissions, arising in this appeal for consideration are the following; (i) whether bar under Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. applies to the facts of the present case? (ii) whether findings of the court below on the grounds of cruelty and desertion are correct? (iii) whether the finding on the declaratory relief in respect of petition A and B scheduled properties is also correct? 13. We are dealing with points 1 to 3 jointly for the sake of convenience. 14. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the question of maintainability of the O.P., based on the bar under Order IX Rule 9, did not in fact, arise for consideration before the trial court for want of necessary pleadings in the defence statement, does not appear to be sound. Though a very specific plea of bar based on Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C. was not raised in the objection, the respondent had filed before the court below I.A.No.818/2012 pressing for an early hearing and adjudication of O.P. on the question of maintainability based on the bar under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C. But the court below deferred the question to the later stage of the proceeding through its order dated 13.9.2012. The correctness of this order was not challenged by the appellant then and there. Since a specific objection as to maintainability based on Order IX Rule 9 was taken in the I.A.No.818/2012, appellant cannot now complain that the issue as to maintainability did not arise from the pleadings of the respondent before the trial court. Even otherwise also, maintainability based on pure question of law could be raised at any stage of the trial proceeding. 15. No doubt, the bar under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C. is applicable to proceedings initiated under the provisions of Hindu Marriage Act also in as much as the provisions of the C.P.C. are applicable to such proceedings also by virtue of Section 21 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. This legal position has been settled as early as in Sarala v. Nalinakshan [1991 KHC 363]. 16. This legal position has been settled as early as in Sarala v. Nalinakshan [1991 KHC 363]. 16. The sole question that arises for consideration here is, whether Ext.B2 judgment of the Family Court, Thiruvananthapuram dismissing Ext.B1 O.P.No.726/2004 filed by the appellant on the grounds of cruelty and desertion precludes institution of the present O.P. on identical grounds under the Hindu Marriage, Act, 1955. It is indisputable that Ext.B1 O.P. was dismissed on 30.5.2005 for default and therefore itself the bar under Order IX Rule 9 could be pressed into service, provided the cause of action for the institution of successive litigation is also the same. 17. In Ext.B1 O.P., desertion of the appellant was taken as one of the grounds for divorce. The allegation was that the respondent deserted the appellant on 19.2.2004, the moment she declared to him that she was not prepared to resign her job. There is no case for any of the spouses that the conjugal company between them was at any later point of time revived and they lived together. In the absence of such plea of reunion, a fresh or recurring cause of action for dissolution of marriage on the ground of desertion cannot be said to have subsequently emerged at all. In this subsequent O.P. also, the date of desertion alleged is 19.2.2004 as if there was no continuing cause of action and therefore it could be indubitably held that the appellant has allowed the ground for divorce on the same facts that constituted desertion as on 19.2.2004. In other words, the original petition for dissolution of marriage to the extent it proceeded on the ground of desertion is by all means barred by order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. 18. However, we have to strike a different view in so far as the ground of cruelty alleged by the appellant is concerned. The three incidents which the appellant has alleged in the subsequent O.P. are clearly distinct and different from those alleged in O.P.No.726/2004. The incidents on 3.9.2007, 1.4.2008 and 14.5.2008 are fresh, having occurred after dismissal of O.P.No.726/2004. The acts of cruelty could vary and even multiply depending on the facts and circumstances in which the spouses are placed. The three incidents which the appellant has alleged in the subsequent O.P. are clearly distinct and different from those alleged in O.P.No.726/2004. The incidents on 3.9.2007, 1.4.2008 and 14.5.2008 are fresh, having occurred after dismissal of O.P.No.726/2004. The acts of cruelty could vary and even multiply depending on the facts and circumstances in which the spouses are placed. Each of the new incidents in their life would give rise to different and recurring cause of action leading to subsequent action for dissolution, keeping the bar under Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. at bay. 'Cause of action' in its widest acceptation means the bundle of facts which are required to be pleaded and proved by a person who seeks to secure a relief from a court of law. In matrimonial litigations for divorce, acts of cruelty could be said to be recurring or continuing by nature. Recurring cause of action means that, which happens frequently or periodically and not that which occurs only once. The incidents of cruelty that gave rise to institution of O.P.No.726/2004 are not the same events on which the appellant instituted the action for dissolution of marriage. Both O.P.s rest entirely on distinct and different causes of action and therefore, in our opinion, Order IX Rule 9 relied on by the respondent cannot operate as a bar to the institution of the present O.P. 19. However, the position seems to be totally different as regards the cause of action referable to declaratory relief is concerned. In Ext.B1 O.P. as well as in the present O.P., cause of action for seeking declaratory relief in respect of petition A and B scheduled properties appears to be identical. The cause of action for the declaratory relief put forth by the appellant was based on the allegations that the appellant was the absolute owner of the petition A and B scheduled properties and that her father, the executant of Exts.A12 and A13 documents, conveyed the properties in the joint name of the spouses without intending to confer any right on the respondent, but intending only to treat him as a name lender. Same are the facts set out in the pleading of the appellant in the subsequent O.P. also. There is no substantial difference with respect to the pleadings as to the cause of action in both the O.Ps. Same are the facts set out in the pleading of the appellant in the subsequent O.P. also. There is no substantial difference with respect to the pleadings as to the cause of action in both the O.Ps. Applying the principles as to applicability of bar under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C. as laid down in Suraj Rattan Thirani and others v. Azamabad Tea Co. Ltd. and others [ AIR 1965 SC 295 ], we are satisfied that this O.P. is partially barred by Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C to the extent it sought to establish the title of appellant in respect of petition A and B scheduled properties. In short, the dismissal of O.P. by the impugned judgment to the extent it refused to grant the declaratory relief claimed by the appellant requires only to be upheld and Mat.Appeal dismissed in part. 20. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted in support of the cross objection that, the court below exceeded its jurisdiction by entering into findings on issues relating to desertion, cruelty and declaratory relief, even after being satisfied that the original petition itself was not maintainable under law by virtue of bar under Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. This submission does not seem to be sound and in tune with the policy of law enshrined in Order XIV Rule 2 of the C.P.C. It is an elementary principle that unless a case could be disposed on a preliminary point of pure question of law and jurisdiction, the court is obliged to enter definite findings on all issues. This principle has been given effect to in Order XIV Rule 2 of the C.P.C and in our opinion, the court below considered the bar to be a mixed question of law and fact and has rightly undertaken to discuss the facts and evidence and chosen to enter definite findings on the issues in the proceeding in compliance with Order XIV Rule 2 of the C.P.C. Therefore, the contention raised in the Cross Objection in that respect fails. 21. We have already concluded that appellant is not entitled to pursue the relief of dissolution of marriage based on desertion in as much as it was barred by Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. Therefore, dismissal of O.P., to this partial extent, needs only to be upheld. 22. 21. We have already concluded that appellant is not entitled to pursue the relief of dissolution of marriage based on desertion in as much as it was barred by Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. Therefore, dismissal of O.P., to this partial extent, needs only to be upheld. 22. The grounds constituting cruelty taken in this O.P. are far different from the earlier incidents narrated in Ext.B1 O.P. PW1, the appellant, said that respondent made a false and widespread propagation among the public that she was responsible for the murder of Vijayambara Raj, a KSRTC driver, who was sleeping inside the Bus on the night of 30.9.2007. If her allegation is true, the act of the respondent could be only gruesome and extremely atrocious giving sufficient ground for seeking dissolution on that short ground of cruelty. Exts.A1 and A2 newspaper reports, dated 13.10.2007 and 9.10.2007 respectively show that she was a suspect in connection with the incident of murder of Vijayambara Raj. She sought to plead to be innocent before the concerned authorities as could be seen from Exts.A3, A4 and A5 representations submitted before the Chief Minister, Women's Commission and Human Rights Commission. Her mental agony following the news reports was truly proved by her own testimony. She is very specific to the effect that the respondent propagated to the public that she targeted to kill him on the particular night but she missed. A neighbour of her examined as PW3 also said that he had heard from the public that the respondent had been propagating the appellant as being responsible for the death of Vijayambara Raj. PW3 said that respondent himself once personally told him that appellant was the person behind the murder of Sri.Vijayambara Raj. 23. The incident inside the Bus on 14.5.2008 where her 'thali chain' was allegedly snatched away by the respondent was also spoken to by her as PW1. CPW1, respondent denied the incident as false. The incident that occurred on 30.9.2007 was also denied by CPW1. He said that he did not snatch away her 'thali' inside the Bus and nor any such incident ever occurred. A false petty case, according to him, was charged against him in connection with alleged snatching of chain, by the police officials in Poovar station. Anyway, there is no independent witness brought forth before court to prove the incident dated 14.5.2008. A false petty case, according to him, was charged against him in connection with alleged snatching of chain, by the police officials in Poovar station. Anyway, there is no independent witness brought forth before court to prove the incident dated 14.5.2008. The incident of her minor daughter having been taken by force on 1.4.2008 was spoken not only by PW1 but by her elder sister also, who was examined as PW2. She testified that she had occasion to accompany her sister to police station at Poovar to lodge a complaint about the missing of her minor daughter. Respondent does not deny that he took the daughter from the custody of the appellant. It is not an ordinary incident of a father taking his own child from the custody of an estranged spouse, according to the appellant. 24. The incident assumes seriousness more because the child was kept in a hide out for a few days. Ext.A6 complaint to police and Exts.A7 and A8 draft advertisements to public broadcast through 'Dooradarshan' show that respondent wanted to put the appellant to mental pain. CPW1 said that he took the child only on her own accord and wish to visit a place called 'Veega land'. The overall effect of the incident is that the appellant was subjected to mental pain. A few other witnesses examined to prove the acts of cruelty are PW4, a coworker in Krishi Bhavan where the appellant had worked. PW6 is the brother of her own brother-in-law. PW5 is an employee of a nearby temple. The testimonies of PWs 4 to 6 have no relevance since the acts amounting to cruelty testified by them do not find any place in the original pleadings of the appellant. Taking the rebuttal oral evidence given by CPW1 into account and also the testimony of appellant along with the independent evidence of PWs 2 and 3, we are of the opinion that after dismissal of Ext.B1 O.P., the respondent has continued to treat the appellant with various acts of cruelty. There is substance in the testimony of the appellant that the cruel acts of the respondent have gone to such an extreme extent that a spouse cannot be expected to lead a normal and peaceful life with the respondent. She has expressed a very genuine apprehension that her life with him could hardly be safe. There is substance in the testimony of the appellant that the cruel acts of the respondent have gone to such an extreme extent that a spouse cannot be expected to lead a normal and peaceful life with the respondent. She has expressed a very genuine apprehension that her life with him could hardly be safe. We have been told that counsellings conducted through court and mediation centres to bring spouses together have miserably failed. We have sufficient reasons to assume that the relationship between the spouses has irretrievably broken and they can no longer resume and continue the conjugal company and lead a normal marital life. Taking all these facts into anxious consideration, we are of the opinion that appellant succeeded in proving that she is entitled to a decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of cruelty. The finding entered by the court below in this respect is, therefore, upheld. 25. As we already referred to above, the definite findings were entered into by the court below with respect to the declaratory relief over petition A and B scheduled properties though the O.P. claiming declaratory relief on the same cause of action was found to be barred by Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. Since declaratory relief cannot be re-agitated based on the same cause of action that arose in Ext.B1 O.P., the court below rightly found that the relief is barred by Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. In this respect, the Cross Objection filed by the respondent merits acceptance. Therefore, we do not undertake the exercise of examining the merit of the rival cases advanced by both sides as to the legal effect of Exts.A12 and A13 documents and we only hold that the appellant is precluded from pursuing the declaratory relief with respect to plaint A and B scheduled properties in view of the legal bar flowing out of Order IX Rule 9. The challenge in the appeal assailing the dismissal of O.P. as regards the declaration sought with respect to plaint petition A and B scheduled properties, is not sustainable. When the bar under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C. is applied, the findings entered on merits of the claim related to declaration have no relevance and are quite unsustainable. Thus, by allowing both the appeal and the Cross Objection in part, points 1 to 3 above are answered accordingly. When the bar under Order IX Rule 9 C.P.C. is applied, the findings entered on merits of the claim related to declaration have no relevance and are quite unsustainable. Thus, by allowing both the appeal and the Cross Objection in part, points 1 to 3 above are answered accordingly. In the result, both the Mat.Appeal and Cross Objection are allowed only in part. The appellant is granted a decree dissolving her marriage with the respondent on the sole ground of cruelty. Claim for dissolution on the ground of desertion is dismissed. Her plea for declaring petition A and B scheduled properties as her exclusive asset is turned down by virtue of statutory bar arising under Order IX Rule 9 of the C.P.C. It is made clear that this judgment will not stand in the way of her pursuing appropriate legal remedies if available under law, in respect of petition A and B scheduled properties.