JUDGMENT Dharam Chand Chaudhary, J. - In this appeal, judgment dated 3-12-2012, passed by learned single Judge is under challenge. The record reveals that the appellant-writ petitioner, a driver in the respondent-Corporation, was discharged during the probation period vide order dated 27.5.1996/30.7.1996, Annexure P-3, simply on the ground that his services were no longer required. No doubt, he was called upon to show cause to the memorandum Annexure P-1, issued to him. He has filed reply Annexure P-2 thereto. The order Annexure P-3, however, is simpliciter and casts no stigma at all on his future career. The Division Bench of this Court in Sunish Aggarwal v. State of H.P. & another,2019 1 HimLR 563 , a case where in the impugned order certain facts were recorded with regard to the unsatisfactory services rendered by the petitioner, has held as under: "28. Needless to say, during the period of probation employee remains under watch and his service and conduct is under scrutiny. In the case at hand petitioner came to be appointed as a Judicial Officer on 26.3.2010 on temporary basis for a period of two years on probation. The services rendered by Judicial Officer during probation are assessed not solely on the basis of judicial performance, but also on the probity as to how one has conducted himself or herself and as such arguments advanced by learned counsel representing the petitioner that during period of probation petitioner had cleared all departmental examination successfully in Higher Standard cannot be a ground to conclude that he was suitable for the post in question rather overall work and conduct of officer during probation is taken into consideration by the authority at the time of regularizing the services of the person, who was on probation. In the case at hand, record clearly reveals that Hon''ble Administrative Committee, while recommending discharge of the petitioner, took into consideration overall record of the petitioner. Mere recording of factum with regard to unsatisfactory service and even mentioning the same in the order would not amount to casting any aspersion on the petitioner nor it could be said that stating in the order that his service is unsatisfactory amounts to a stigmatic order." 2. It is not open to the person discharged from service during the probation period to claim an opportunity of being heard. It is not open to the person discharged from service during the probation period to claim an opportunity of being heard. This part of the judgment is also reproduced as under:- "Though we have no doubt in our mind that learned single Judge, while recording impugned judgment, has carefully perused record, but even for the sake of argument, it presumed that he failed to lift the veil behind the innocuously worded order of discharge, as has been argued by learned counsel representing the petitioner, even then there is no force in the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner because now, while deciding instant appeal, we have carefully examined the record, perusal whereof clearly suggests that discharge of the petitioner is not on the basis of discreet inquiry conducted by Registrar (Vigilance) on the complaint of fellow Judicial officer, rather discharge is on the decision of Hon''ble Administrative Committee, who, after having carefully considered all aspects of the matter, found petitioner not suitable to continue on probation. Mere recommendations of learned Administrative Judge, who had an occasion to peruse the discreet inquiry conducted against the petitioner by Registrar (Vigilance) to place the matter before Hon''ble the Chief Justice with the observation that the matter be taken to its logical end, cannot be a ground for the petitioner to conclude that allegations, contained in the inquiry conducted at his back, were made basis for his discharge, as such, he ought to have been afforded an opportunity of being heard." 3. The case in hand is on better footing as compared to Sunish Aggarwal''s case (supra) because misconduct, if any, on the part of the appellant-writ petitioner has not at all been discussed in the impugned order, which accordingly to us, on the face of it, is an order simplicitor qua discharge of the petitioner from service. 4. Therefore, when the point in issue in this appeal are squarely covered against the appellant-writ petitioner by the judgment ibid, there is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed.