Research › Search › Judgment

Orissa High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 354 (ORI)

Prasanta Naik v. Subhendu Mohapatra

2019-04-25

D.DASH

body2019
JUDGMENT D. Dash, J. - The petitioner by filing this revision has assailed the judgment dated 07.11.2013 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in Crl. Appeal No. 10/01/18 of 2009/13 confirming the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27.03.2009 read with the subsequent order dated 17.3.2012 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Sundargarh in ICC Case No. 19 of 2007 (T.C. NO. 514 of 2007), convincting the petitioner (accused) for offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act and sentencing him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay compensation of Rs. 8,90,000/ - (Rupees eight lakh ninety thousand). 2. The facts of the case are as under:- The opposite party No. 1 as the complainant states that accused had taken friendly loans from time to time to the tune of Rs. 6,30,000/- from him with promise to pay. But he did not pay the same despite repeated demands. Ultimately in order to discharge the debt and liability, the accused issued a cheque of Rs. 6,30,000/-bearing No. 13341 dated 6.3.2007 drawn on his account with Bolangir Anchalika Grama Bank, Sundargarh. The cheque being presented by the complainant on 23.03.2007, the same bounced back with an intimation as to dishonour of the same for insufficient fund in the account of the accused. So, on 05.04.2007, the complainant in terms of the proviso to Sub-section (1) of section of the N.I. Act, issued notice to the accused demanding payment of the said sum and as the accused did not respond, the complainant has been lodged. The case of the accused is that of complete denial and false implication. 3. The trial court on analysis of evidence of the complainant examined as P.W.1 and one Dipak Kumar Mallick examined as D.W. 1 from the side of the accused as also on going through the documentary evidence let in by the complainant which are the cheque, Ext.1, intimation slip given by the Bank, Ext.3, demand noticed, Ext.6 etc. has found the accused to be guilty for commission of offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act. It had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. Being aggrieved by the same on the score that there ought to have been imposition of fine and compensation, the complainant carried Criminal Revision No. 1101 of 2009 to this Court. It had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months. Being aggrieved by the same on the score that there ought to have been imposition of fine and compensation, the complainant carried Criminal Revision No. 1101 of 2009 to this Court. The accused filed the appeal before the concerned Sessions Judge, which has come to be disposed of by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sundargarh on 07.11.2013. Before said disposal of the criminal appeal in disposing the revision, this Court in disposing the revision, directed the Trial Court to hear the case afresh only with regard to passing the order as to imposition of fine and payment of compensation in the light of the decision cited therein in case of R. Vijayan vs. Baby & Another, 2011 (50) OCR (SC) 795. The Trial Court then in continuance of its earlier order of sentence dated 27.03.2009 has passed an order awarding compensation of Rs. 8,90,000/- in favour of the complainant to be paid by the accused with the stipulation that payment of the same by the accused, within two months, it would stand for realization through process of law. The memorandum of appeal presented by the accused then being amended, the said order of compensation was also brought within the subject matter of that pending appeal and was thus also assailed therein. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the only question that arises for consideration in this revision is as to whether this accused has been able to rebut the presumption as available under section 139 of the N.I. Act in respect of issuance of the cheque in question i.e. Ext.1 which has been dishonoured and for subsequent nonpayment of the said amount as demanded by the complainant, the complaint has been lodged. It was his submission that the settled position of law is that the presumptions available under Sections 118-Aand 139 of the N.I. Act are rebuttable in nature and in order to rebut the said presumptions what is needed is to raise a probable defence and for that purpose, without even disproving the existence of consideration by the defence by leading the evidence, the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant would well be relied upon and the standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probability with drawal of inference from the material on record as well as with reference to the circumstance upon which the defence places reliance. Accordingly to him, as per the settled law, it is not necessary that the defence must disprove the prosecution case in its entirety and the initial burden as above is discharged by the accused the burden shifts to the complainant so as to establish the subsisting debt and liability as on the date of the demand of payment of the money covering under the cheque. It was his submission that here in the case when the evidence of RW.1, the complainant is appreciated keeping in mind, the above settled law which has not been done by the Courts below, the accused can be said to have rebutted the presumptions as available under sections 118(a) and 139 of the N.I. Act. In this connection, he having invited the attention of this Court to the deposition of P.W. 1 as at para-14, 15, 16 as well as 18 and banking upon those, he submitted that both the Courts below have committed patent illegality in not taking into consideration said vital parts of the evidence of P.W.1 to hold that the presumption as above has been rebutted and instead in a light hearted manner have proceeded to record the finding to the contrary against the accused. In support of the above submission, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon several judgments of the Apex Court which have been discussed hereinafter. He therefore submitted that the findings of the Courts below suffer from the vice of perversity in the sense that without going for a critical analysis of evidence of P. W. 1 which itself negate a case that the being the holder of the cheque had received the cheque for consideration for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. He therefore submitted that it is a fit case to set aside the finding of conviction in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. 5. Learned counsel for the opposite party No. 1 submitted that the Courts below after going the evidence let in by parties have rightly come to the conclusion that the complainant has fulfiled all requirements as per the provision of section 138 of the N.I. Act and when nothing substantial has come from the side of the accused through hence so as to discard or disbelieve the version of the complainant, P. W. 1, the Courts below are correct in convicting the accused for offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act. He submitted that when the accused admits to have given the signed cheque to the complainant and thereafter prior to the lodging of the complainant did not reply to the notice of demand of payment made by the complainant when the cheque got dishonoured, no such fault can be found with the findings of the Courts below that the accused has failed to rebut the presumptions available under Section 118A and 139 of the N.I. Act. According to him, when the complainant has successfully proved the issuance of cheque which admittedly contains the signature of the accused and that cheque has bounced back without the collection of the amount stated therein, on the basis of the evidence on record, the Courts below have rightly returned the findings of guilt against the accused and there remains no such perversity calling for inference with the concurrent finding on that score in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Proceeding to explain the evidence of P.W.1 as highlighted by the learned counsel for the petitioner, he submitted that all those have been taken into consideration by the Courts below in their proper perspective and the ultimate conclusion being arrived upon just and proper appreciation of evidence in the backdrop of the rival case; further in the touchstone of settled position of law, the revision sans mertis. In support of his contentions, he has placed several decisions of the Apex Court which would come for discussion hereinafter. 6. In support of his contentions, he has placed several decisions of the Apex Court which would come for discussion hereinafter. 6. Before proceeding to delve upon the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties, it is felt apposite to take note of the settled position of law on those score as in the touchstone of the same, the contentions would stand to be so addressed. 7. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of a~a~M.S. Narayana Menon @ Manvi vs. State of Kerala and another" (2006) 35 OCR (SC) 43 : (2006) 6 SCC 39 (cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner) has held that the presumptions available under section 118 (a) and 139 of the N.I. Act would stand to hold the field as such that said cheque had been made or drawn for consideration and was with the holder for the discharge of debt or other liability, either in whole or in part unless and until upon consideration of the matter, the Court either believes that the consideration does not exist or considers the non-existence of the consideration so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that the consideration does not exist. It has further been held that for the said purpose the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant would be well relied upon. In the given facts and circumstances of the cited case, the accused having clearly said that nothing was due and the cheque was issued by way of security, in the absence of satisfactory proof about the existence of debt in respect of large part of the said amount; the defence being found to be acceptable as a probable one, the Apex Court has taken the view that the cheque has not been issued in discharge of the debt as the issuance of the cheque for security or for any other purpose does not attract the penal provision contained in section 138 of the N.I. Act. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, the Apex Court having found itself in agreement with the findings of the Trial Court that the accused has discharged the burden of proof in rebutting the presumptions in view of the fact that the complainant had no sufficient funds to advance such amount; the diary recording the transaction being not proved to show the subsistence of debt to a larger that too no such acceptable evidence coming on record as to the existence of any commercial or business transaction between the parties, those have been taken as the circumstances leading to the drawal of inference in favour of raising of the probable defence as sufficient to rebut the presumption. It has further been held therein that the Court may not insist upon the accused to disprove the existence of consideration by leading direct evidence as the nonexistence as leading of such-negative evidence neither possible nor contemplated and even if led is to be seen with due suspicion. The standard of proof evidently is preponderance of probabilities and the drawal of inference from the preponderance of probabilities not only from the materials on record but also reference to the circumstances upon which reliance on that score is placed, is permissible. The above positions have been reiterated in case of K. Prakashan vs. P.K. Surenderan; 2007 (3) Apex Court Judgments 429 (SC). 8. In case of " K. Subramani vs. K. Damodara Naidu" 119 (2015) CLT 1 (SC), the same principles of law being restated in the given facts and circumstances, upon acceptance of the findings of the Trial Court that the complainant had no source of income to lend such huge amount of Rs. 14.00 lakh to the accused, has gone to thus hold that he has failed to prove that there was legally recoverable debt payable by the accused to the complainant. 9. 14.00 lakh to the accused, has gone to thus hold that he has failed to prove that there was legally recoverable debt payable by the accused to the complainant. 9. In a recent case of "Basalingappa vs. Mudibasappa" in Criminal Appeal No. 636 of 2019 arising out of SIP (Crl.) No. 8641 of 2018 disposed of on 9.4.2019 again by retierating the same principles of law as noted above, taking into consideration, the evidence on record, the Apex Court has summarizd those at para-23 of the judgment, which are as under "i) Once the execution of cheque is admitted section 139 of the Act mandate a presumption that the cheque was for the discharge of any debt or other liability. ii) The presumption under Section 139 is a rebuttable presumption and the onus is on the accused to raise the probable defence. The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption is that of preponderance of probabilities. iii) To rebut the presumption, it is open for the accused to rely on evidence led by him or accused can also rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be draw not only from the materials brought on record by the parties but also by reference to the circumstances upon which they rely. iv) That is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box in support of his defence, section 139 imposed an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. v) It is not necessary for the accused to come in the witness box to support his defence." Applying the proposition of law as noted above to the case at their hand by proceeding to raise the presumption under Section 139 of the Act taking note of the evidence of P. W. 1 (complainant) that he has no rememberance as to the fact whether the cheque was issued in relation to the loan of Rs. 25,000/- taken by the accused as well as his evidence that he reitred in 1997 receiving the monetary benefit of Rs. 25,000/- taken by the accused as well as his evidence that he reitred in 1997 receiving the monetary benefit of Rs. 8.00 lakh which he encashed an finding from his evidence that when the cheque had been issued on 27.2.2012, there is even no suggestion that a postdated cheque had been given to him in November, 2011 bearing the date, i.e. 27.02.2012; the evidence led by the complainant to have filed suit against one Balama Gouda for recovery of loan of Rs. 7,00,000/-indieating payment of Rs. 7,00,000/- in December, 2009, Rs. 4,50,000/- in 2010 and loan of Rs. 50,000/- for which he filed complaint in 2012, the Apex Court arrived at a conclusion that there was burden upon the complainant to prove his financial capacity. It has then said that when during the year 2010-11 as per the case of the complainant, he made payment of Rs. 18.00 lakhs and when he has failed to give satisfactory reply during cross-examination being questioned as to his financial capacity to pay Rs. 6.00 lakhs to the accused, the Apex Court, in view of all those, has said that the accused has been able to raise a probable defence shifting the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other assoicated facts. The Apex Court has also negated the view taken by the High Court as regards non-response by the accused to the notice of demand sent by the complainant prior to the lodging of the complainant as a circumstance in favour of the case of the complainant as to the legal liability of the accused. 10. In case of Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde; 2008 (1)Apex Court Judgments 412 (SC), although, the same principles of law have reiterated, yet those appear to have been little more elaboration. It has been said as under:- "34. We are not oblivious of the fact that the said provision has been inserted to regulate the growing business, trade, commerce and industrial activities of the country and the strict liability to promote greater vigiliance in financial matters and to safeguard the faith of the creditor in the drawer of the cheque which is essential to the economic life of a developing country like India. This however, shall not mean that the Courts shall put a blind eye to the ground realities. Status mandates raising of presumption but it stops at that. This however, shall not mean that the Courts shall put a blind eye to the ground realities. Status mandates raising of presumption but it stops at that. It does not say how presumption drawn should beheld to have rebutted. Other important principles of legal jurisprudence, namely presumption of innocence as human rights and the doctrine of reverse burden introduced by Section 139 should be delicately balanced. Such balancing acts, indisputably would largely depend upon the factual matrix of each case, the materials brought on record and having regard to legal principles governing the same." 11. In case of M/s Kumar Exports vs. M's Sharma Carpets ; (2009) 42 OCR (SC) 723:2009(1) Apex Court Judgments 487 (SC), the very same principles having been retierated as under :- "11. The use of the phrase "until the contrary is proved" in Section 118 of the Act and use of the words "unless the contrary is proved" in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of "may presume" and "shall presume" as given in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the Court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the on-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. However, the Court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the on-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the Court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case act upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act. The accused has also an option to prove the non-existence of consideration and debt or liability either by letting in evidence or in some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the statutory notice and evidence adduced by the complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue." 12. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, thereafter the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue." 12. In case of "Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan"; (2010) 46 OCR (SC) 562 : 2010(2) Apex Court Judgments 285 (SC) setting forth the principles, it has been highlighted that the standard of proof for rebuttal of presumption under Section 139 of the Act is that preponderance of probabilities and if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution would fail and for the purpose the accused can rely upon the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such defence. 13. In case of "Kamala S. vs. Vidyadharan M.J. & another;" 2007 (2), Apex Court Judgments 096 (SC), it has been said that the burden of proof on accused is not as high as that of the prosecution and the standard of proof in discharge of the burden is preponderance of a probabilities for which inference can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record but also from the reference to the circumstances upon which the accused najies upon. 14. In case of "Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar;" (2019) 74 OCR (SC) 87, 2019 (1) OLR (SC)-447 cited by the learned counsel for the opposite party No.1, the Apex Court being in complete agreement with the principles of law as settled in all those above referred cases in the facts and circumstances of said case, has further gone to say that even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumptions under section 139 of the N.I. Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt and the cheque that might be post-dated does not absolve the drawer of a cheque of the penal consequences of section 138 of the N.I. Act. The Apex Court, on the facts and circumstances coming to conclude that the finding of the High Court that the case of the complainant is highly doubtful and as such not prove beyond reasonable doubt as patently erroneous, has set aside the order of acquittal and restored the order of conviction passed by the Trial Court which stood affirmed by the appellate Court. 15. In case of Kishan Rao vs. Shankargouda; (2018) 71 OCR (SC) 662 : 2018 (II) OLR (SC)-733, the Apex Court with the above settled position of law when has found that the issuance of cheque containing the signature of the accused to have been dishonoured for insufficient funds leading to the drawal of presumption available under Section 139 of the Act further finding the same to have not rebutted either on the evidence of the complainant or through other evidence let in by the accused has set aside the order of the High Court by which the order of conviction had been annulled in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, 16. In case of Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao vs. Indian Renewable Energy; 2016 (II) OLR (SC)-1085, the answer has come that the dishonor of a post-dated cheque given for repayment of loan installments which is also described as "security" in the loan agreement is covered under section 138 of the N.I. Act being so issued for discharge of existing liability. Next question whether post-dated cheque issued by way of advance payment for the purchase order would be considered for discharge of legally enforceable debt has been answered. In that given case, the cheque was issued byway of advance payment for the purchase order which being cancelled and the payment of the cheque was stopped. In that situation, it has been held that the purchaser may be liable for breach of contract, when a contract provides that the purchaser has to pay in advance and cheque towards advance payment being dishonoured it would not given rise to the criminal liability under section 138 of the N.I. Act and therefore issuance of cheque towards advance payment would not be considered as discharge of any subsisting liability which depends on the nature of the transaction as to if on the date of the cheque liability or debt exists or the amount stands as legally recoverable. It has further been said that the accused in order to rebut the presumption under section 139 of the N.I. Act even without adducing evidence of his own can reply upon the material submitted by the complainant but mere statement of the accused is not enough to rebut the said presumption. 17. Reverting to the facts as obtained in this revision, at the risk of repeatation, it may be stated that the case projected by the complainant is that the accused is a friend of his brother and in view of that relationship, he used to take hand loans from the complainant at different time. In this way when the liability of the accused got mounted for nonpayment of the loan dues on demand could not clear the liability, he issued a cheque bearing No. 133341 dated 6.3.2007 for a sum of Rs. 6.30 lakh drawn on Bolangir Anchalika Grama Bank at Sundargarh with the assurance that on presentation of the cheque, it would be honoured. So here as per the case of the complainant, the accused as on the date of the issuance of cheque was having the liability to pay a sum of Rs. 6.30 lakh towards the unpaid amount of the hand loans taken by the accused from the complainant on earlier occassions. The accused has denied to have taken any loan from the complainant for the purpose of his business. The complainant (R W. 1) in his evidence has stated that the besides being a transporter, he is a business man and deals with consumer goods. He states that the accused is proprietor of "P. K. Leather" and engaged in supply of wearing appearels and leather articles to various organizations. He has stated that the accused is a permanent resident of the locality where he resides for his friendship with his brother, the complainant had the acquintance as he used to frequently visit his house. It is his evidence that the accused used to express his difficulties and problem in day to day life to him and some time use to take money from him on loan basis and return after few days and this has happened at many times. It is stated that at time come when the total liability of the accused stood at Rs. 6.30. So, he had issued the cheque. It is stated that at time come when the total liability of the accused stood at Rs. 6.30. So, he had issued the cheque. The cheque in question containing the signature of the accused has been proved and marked as Ext. 1. Now it is to be examined as to whether the findings of the Courts below holding that presumptions available under section 139 of the N.I. Act has not been rebutted by the accused is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there has been non-consideration of any relevant material evidence on that score in coming to that conclusion warranting interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. 18. As per the case of the complainant the liability upon the accused stood computed at Rs. 6.30 lakh as on the date of issuance of cheque i.e. 6.3.2007. The accused instead of coming to the witness box, has chosen to bring one Dipak Kumar Mallicj who claims to have been working under the accused as Supervisor in his Shoe Factory. It is his evidence that the accused for the purpose of manufacturing of shoes in his factory, some time used to go for purchase on credit and sometime on payment of cash and for that reason, three years back he had given a blank signed cheque to the complainant. The complainant in his evidence says that he started his business in the year 1988 by taking money from his father and friend but is not able to quote the quantum of loan taken from there. It is his further evidence that he was regularly taking loans and paying back to those friends. His evidence is to the effect that in running business, he has taken the loan from the Bank which had not been closed by then and chasing him for payment. As per the widence, the principal loan amount was Rs. 6.00 lakh. He has further stated to have purchased a truck with the borrowing from a private financier and to have been paying installments towards repayment of the same which was then continuing, in so far as the friendly loan to the accused is concerned, he has failed to state that how many times the accused had taken friendly loans and their quantum at different times so given. No such details have been provided as to how the total liability workout at Rs. 6.30 lakh as on 6.3.2007. No such details have been provided as to how the total liability workout at Rs. 6.30 lakh as on 6.3.2007. Thus there appears no satisfactory explanation as to how the complainant was having the ability of paying a sum of Rs. 6.30 lakh to the accused as on 6.3.2007. On the face of the evidence as already discussed, there was burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and on that score, his reply has not at all been satisfactory. The complainant thus is found to have failed to prove that a sum of Rs. 6.30 as the debt owing and due to him by the accused as on the date of issuance of the cheque has not been proved. Such evidence being considered, the accused is found to have been successful in raising a probable defence to hold that the burden of proof resting on his shoulder to rebut the presumption standing in favour of the complainant in support of his case has been discharged shifting the same upon the complainant which on the face of evidence is not seen to have been discharged. In the above state of affair in evidence, the accused cannot be held guilty for commission of offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act merely because of acceptance of the case that he has issued the cheque when it is his specific claim that nothing is due to the complainant from him and the cheque was issued as "security" for purchase of gum from the complainant's store for manufacturing in his shoe factory. On going through the judgments of the Courts below, it is seen that all such evidence have not all been dealt and to me it appears that the Courts below have remained under an erroneous impression that the presumption has to be rebutted by the accused by leading evidence from his side and further responding in that light right from the time of demand for payment made by the complainant before lodging of the complaint and thus there appears to be patent error in the said approach. So the finding returned by the Courts below based on which the conviction that has been recorded against the accused suffers from the vice of perversity particularly for non-consideration of the evidence on record as pointed out above which clearly create doubt in the mind as to the existence of the debt or subsistence of liability owning to the complainant and standing to be discharged by the accused. The Courts below are thus found to have committed manifest error in the case by going to hold the accused as guilty for commission of offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act in convicting him thereunder followed by imposition of sentence and award of compensation as aforestated. 19. Resultantly, the judgments of conviction recorded against the accused for commission of offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act and consequential order of sentence as also the direction for payment of compensation are set aside. 20. Accordingly, the revision stands allowed.