ORDER : G. Shyam Prasad, J. 1. This civil revision petition is arising out of the order dated 06.06.2019 passed in E.A. No. 118 of 2016 in E.P. No. 7 of 2016 in O.S. No. 9 of 1984 on the file of the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Tanuku. 2. The parties are arrayed in this revision petition as they are arrayed in the execution petition as petitioner and respondent. 3. The short point that arises for consideration in this civil revision petition is that whether the order passed in EA No. 118 of 2016 is perverse and is liable to be set aside? 4. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for petitioner and respondent. 5. The execution application referred to above is filed by the revision petitioner, who is the judgment debtor. The respondent is a decree holder in a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale. 6. Original Suit No. 9 of 1984 was decreed on 30.06.1994 granting the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff with a direction to the respondent to execute registered sale deed within ONE month's time. On appeal preferred by the defendant, the appeal was dismissed on 29.04.2014. The present execution petition is filed on 8.09.2016. 7. The grievance of the petitioner is that the execution petition is filed beyond the Limitation imposed under the decree of one month. It is the case of the revision petitioner that the appellate court simply confirmed the judgment of the trial court, but, no time limit is fixed for execution of the decree. It is the main contention of the petitioners that the respondent cannot file the execution petition beyond Limitation for execution of the decree at his whims and fancies. 8. It is further argued that the execution petition was filed after 2 years 4 months of the passing of the decree by the respondent, without seeking for extension of time showing any sufficient cause for depositing the amount on 27.10.2015. It is the specific case of the petitioner that as per Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act the respondent ought to have filed an application for extension of time for execution of the agreement of sale. 9. It is the specific case of the petitioner that as per Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act the respondent ought to have filed an application for extension of time for execution of the agreement of sale. 9. Placing reliance on the above section it is argued that the respondent was not diligent enough to prosecute his decree after the disposal of the appeal and therefore the decree became in executable. The noncompliance of the condition imposed in the decree of depositing of the balance of sale consideration within one month's time, without seeking for extension of time under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, amounts to recession of contract, therefore, the execution petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. The points arise for consideration in this revision is as follows: 1. Whether there is a recession of contract? 2. Whether the respondent is required to seek for extension of time under Section 28 of Specific Relief Act? 3. To what relief? Point No. 1. 11. The learned counsel for petitioner contended that under Section 28 of Specific Relief Act, the respondent has to obtain permission for extension of time for execution of specific performance of agreement of sale. Section 28 of the said Act is relevant to refer to here for better appreciation of the facts of the case. 12. Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act reads as under: 28. Rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed.- (1) Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether, as the justice of the case may require. (2) Where a contract is rescinded under sub-section (1), the court- (a) shall direct the purchaser or the lessee, if he has obtained possession of the property under the contract, to restore such possession to the vendor or lessor, and (b) may direct payment to the vendor or lessor of all the rents and profits which have accrued in respect of the property from the date on which possession was so obtained by the purchaser or lessee until restoration of possession to the vendor or lessor, and if the justice of the case so requires, the refund of any sum paid by the vendee or lessee as earnest money or deposit in connection with the contract. (3) If the purchaser or lessee pays the purchase money or other sum which he is ordered to pay under the decree within the period referred to in sub-section (1), the court may, on application made in the same suit, award the purchaser or lessee such further relief as he may be entitled to, including in appropriate cases all or any of the following reliefs, namely:- (a) the execution of a proper conveyance or lease by the vendor or lessor; (b) the delivery of possession, or partition and separate possession, of the property on the execution of such conveyance or lease. (4) No separate suit in respect of any relief which may be claimed under this section shall lie at the instance of a vendor, purchaser, lessor or lessee, as the case may be. (5) The costs of any proceedings under this section shall be in the discretion of the court. 13. When we consider the Limitation in respect of a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale, Part 2 of the Limitation Act, 1963, deals with the contracts. As per Article 54 of the Limitation Act, for specific performance of a contract, 3 years from the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused. 14. For specific performance of agreement of sale the Limitation for filing the suit is within three years. The suit was filed well within the time. Suit was decreed. Appeal was preferred and disposed of. 14. For specific performance of agreement of sale the Limitation for filing the suit is within three years. The suit was filed well within the time. Suit was decreed. Appeal was preferred and disposed of. Immediately after the disposal of the appeal the respondent did not file execution petition within one month or a reasonable time was given, as contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner. 15. The execution petition was filed sometime after passing the decree for payment of the balance of sale consideration by the executing court. The Executing Court has numbered the petition on consideration of the plea of extension of time. 16. Admittedly the decree for specific performance of agreement passed in favour of the respondent has attained finality. No second appeal has been preferred against the orders passed by the first appellate court disposing of the first appeal confirming the judgment of the trial court in favour of the respondent. There is no dispute with regard to this fact. 17. The only dispute is with regard to the executability of the decree. The contention raised by the petitioner is that the respondent has not sought for extension of time to perform his part of contract of depositing the balance of sale consideration for the petitioner to execute the registered sale deed. The time fixed by the trial court was over and the appellate court has not fixed any time for execution of the registered sale deed, or for payment of the balance of consideration except confirming the judgment of the trial court. 18. Mr. M.R. Srinivas the learned counsel for revision petitioner relied on the following judgments in support of his contention and argued that since the respondent has not filed any appeal under Section 28 for extension of time for execution of the decree, as the decree became unexecutable. 19. In a case of V.S. Palanichamy Chettiar Firm v. C. Alagappan and others MANU/SC/0049/1999, wherein, in para-17 of its judgment, held as under: "17. The agreement of sale was entered into as far back on February 16, 1980 about 19 years ago. No explanation is forthcoming as to why the balance amount of consideration could not be deposited within the time granted by the court and why no obligation was made under Section 28 of the act taking extension of time of the period. The agreement of sale was entered into as far back on February 16, 1980 about 19 years ago. No explanation is forthcoming as to why the balance amount of consideration could not be deposited within the time granted by the court and why no obligation was made under Section 28 of the act taking extension of time of the period. Under Section 54 of the Limitation Act 3 years. It is prescribed for filing the suit for specific performance of contract of sale from the date of this agreement or and the cause of action arises. Merely because a suit is filed within the prescribed period of limitation does not absolve the 20 plaintiff from showing as to whether he was ready and willing to perform his part of agreement and if there was a non-performance was that on account of any obstacle put by the vendor or otherwise. Provisions to grant specific performance of an agreement on the points stringent. Equitable considerations come into play court has to see all the attendant circumstances including either when he has conducted himself in a reasonable manner under the contract of sale. That being the position of law for filing the suit for specific performance in the court as a matter of personnel oh extension of time for making payment of balance amount of consideration in terms of a decree after 5 years of passing of the decree by the trial court and 3 years of its confirmation by the appellate court. It is not the case of the respondent decree holder that on account of any fault on the part of the vendor judgment debtor, the amount could not be deposited as per the decree. That being the position if no type is granted that would be going beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing of the suit for specific performance of this agreement though this provision may not be strictly applicable. It is nevertheless an important circumstance to be considered by this court that apart no explanation whatsoever is coming from the decree holder respondents as to why they did not pay the balance amount of consideration as per the decree except to what the High Court itself thought fit to comment which is certainly not borne out from the record. It is nevertheless an important circumstance to be considered by this court that apart no explanation whatsoever is coming from the decree holder respondents as to why they did not pay the balance amount of consideration as per the decree except to what the High Court itself thought fit to comment which is certainly not borne out from the record. Equity demands that discretion be not exercised in favour of the decree holder respondents and no extension of time be granted to them to comply with the decree." 20. In a case of Surinder Pal Soni v. Sohan Lal (D) thru LR and others, 2019 (5) ALT 259 (SC), wherein, in para-8 of its judgment, held as under: "8. According to the High Court, the time frame for the deposit of the balance sale consideration was implicit in the decision of the trial court which had ordered a execution of the sale deed within 2 months from the date of the judgment upon deposit of the remaining sale consideration the High Court held that the judgment in decree had not been stated during the pendency of the 1st appeal is on the mere filing of an appeal did not amount to previous day under Order 41 Rule 5 of the civil code of civil procedure 1990 and is it is not open to the appellant to seek the execution of the decree on account of the laps of the period stipulated in the decree for its execution. The High Court has relied upon the provisions of Section 28 of the specific relief act. It also observed that no application for the announcement of time had been filed by the appellant stop the correctness of this view police for determination in the present appeal." 21. This Court is of the view that in the instant case, the facts are different. The respondent decree holder has filed execution petition after obtaining permission for deposit of the balance of sale consideration, the respondent deposited the sale consideration before the executing court and the same has been accepted and received. 22. The learned counsel' for revision petitioner placing reliance on paragraph 15 of the judgment submits that the decree of the trial court merges with that of the appellate court. 22. The learned counsel' for revision petitioner placing reliance on paragraph 15 of the judgment submits that the decree of the trial court merges with that of the appellate court. Therefore, the time fixed by the trial court of one month for depositing the balance of sale consideration comes into operation after the dismissal of the first appeal. 23. In Kunhayammed and others v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359 : 2000 (6) ALT 5.1 (DN SC) explained the adoption of merger and it held as follows: "The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by inferior court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it either way - whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view." 24. This Court is of the view that in the instant case, the adoption of merger is applicable. In fact, there is no dispute with regard to the application of the doctrine of merger in this case. The decree of the trial court merges with the decree of the appellate court. In the decree of the trial court one month's time has been granted. In fact, the respondent made efforts to obtain a copy of the decree of the trial court as well as the appellate court and filed execution petition from the date of knowledge. The limitation for filing execution petition is within 3 years from the date of the disposal of the appeal. In fact, the respondent made efforts to obtain a copy of the decree of the trial court as well as the appellate court and filed execution petition from the date of knowledge. The limitation for filing execution petition is within 3 years from the date of the disposal of the appeal. The trial court fixed one month for performance of the part of the contract by the respondent. In view of the merger of the trial court decree with that of the appellate court decree and from the date of know ledge the respondent has taken permission from the executing court and deposited the amount of balance of sale consideration, and sought for execution of the decree. The reasons explained by the respondent for the delay in filing the execution petition have been considered by the trial court and accepted the deposit of the amount of balance of sale consideration. There is no prejudice caused to the petitioner. The trial court and the executing court have got discretion to extend the time. 25. The learned counsel for respondent placed reliance on O-XX Rule-12 CPC and submits that the limitation or execution of decree is three years. O-XX Rule-12 CPC reads as under: "Decree for possession and mesne profits: (1) Where a suit is for the recovery of possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, the Court may pass a decree- (a) for the possession of the property; (b) for the rents which have accrued on the property during the period prior to the institution of the suit or directing an inquiry as to such rent; (ba) for the mesne profits or directing an inquiry as to such mesne profits; (c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until- (i) the delivery of possession to the decree-holder, (ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment-debtor with notice to the decree-holder through the Court, or (iii) the expiration of three years from the date of the decree, whichever event first occurs. (2) Where an inquiry is directed under clause (b) or clause (c), a final decree in respect of the rent or mesne profits shall be profits shall be passed in accordance with the result of such inquiry. 26. (2) Where an inquiry is directed under clause (b) or clause (c), a final decree in respect of the rent or mesne profits shall be profits shall be passed in accordance with the result of such inquiry. 26. Rule-12A of Order-XX CPC reads as under: "Decree for specific performance of contract for the sale or lease of immovable property" Where a decree for the specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property orders that the purchase-money or other sum be paid by the purchaser or lessee, it shall specify the period within which the payment shall be made. 27. Placing reliance on the above provision, the learned counsel for petitioner submits that the decree in a case of specific performance has to be treated as a preliminary decree until the delivery of possession is ordered and affected. 28. In the instant case, the trial court has passed a decree granting specific performance stipulating one month time for execution of the registered sale deed. Subsequently, the appeal has been preferred and it was dismissed. Even after dismissal of the appeal the plaintiff has not come up to perform his part of contract of depositing the balance sale consideration within one month as stipulated in the decree passed in the original suit. In the appeal time has not been specified for performance of the contract by the plaintiff. Admittedly, some delay is occurred in filing a petition for execution of the registered sale deed to perform the part of contract of petitioner/defendant. 29. The learned counsel for petitioner has further argued that the delay is abnormal and therefore, the plaintiff has rescinded the contract. The non-performance on his part of depositing the amount within the stipulated time amounts to recession of contract. 30. This court is of the view that this is a peculiar case where the time stipulated in the decree passed in the suit was over, during the pendency of the appeal. In appeal no time has been specified for performance of the contract by the respondent. 31. The Limitation for filing a suit for specific performance is three years. The Limitation for execution of the decree in a case of specific performance of contract is three years. In appeal no time has been specified for performance of the contract by the respondent. 31. The Limitation for filing a suit for specific performance is three years. The Limitation for execution of the decree in a case of specific performance of contract is three years. Therefore, when there is no specific time fixed by the court for performance of the contract, it has to be reasonably presumed that within three years from the date of non-performance, the contract can be performed. 32. In view of the peculiar facts of the case, since the litigation is going on for the past 25 years in a suit for specific performance of agreement of sale, and that it has reached the stage of execution of the decree. This court is of the considered view that the delay caused by the respondent in non-deposit of the amount and the reasons thereof, have been considered by the executing court and has numbered the execution petition. There are reasons to defer with the findings of the executing court forthcoming for consideration. 33. Accordingly, the civil revision petition is dismissed confirming the order dated 06.06.2019 passed in E.A. No. 118 of 2016 in E.P. No. 7 of 2016 in O.S. No. 9 of 1984 on the file of the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Tanuku. No costs. Miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed.