JUDGMENT : J.J. MUNIR, J. 1. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, is a special Act, enacted for the dedicated purpose of preventing atrocities against members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, making the practice of such atrocities criminal offences punishable under this Act, establishing Special Courts (that includes Exclusive Special Courts) for the trial of such offences, extension of relief and bringing about rehabilitation of victims of offences; of course, with the preamble to the Act, acclaiming to it a facilitative charter with the addition of words “and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. 2. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, is also a special Act, dedicated to the welfare of another special class of citizens: 'children'. This Act also bears a penal character and concerns itself with offences against children, and its preamble ambitiously proclaiming it to be “An Act to protect children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography and provide for establishment of Special Courts for trial of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. The preamble to this Act is far more elaborate, and, speaks in minute detail about its aspirations. The Court would revert to it at an appropriate stage during the course of this order, as some argument on its basis was advanced by learned counsel, to persuade the Court to answer the question involved here, in one way. 3. Before proceeding further, it would be profitable to determine the abbreviated nomenclature in relation to the principal statutes involved. The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, shall be hereinafter referred to as the 'SC/ST Act'. The SC/ST Act was amended by The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Amendment Act, 2015, which is hereinafter referred to as the 'SC/ ST Amendment Act'. The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, shall be hereinafter referred to as the 'POCSO Act'. 4. The SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act are both penal statutes and are designed to cater to the needs of two special classes of citizens, both of whom are entitled to protection approved by the Constitution, one stemming from social disabilities and the other innate to human nature and development. 4. The SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act are both penal statutes and are designed to cater to the needs of two special classes of citizens, both of whom are entitled to protection approved by the Constitution, one stemming from social disabilities and the other innate to human nature and development. The SC/ST Act is founded on the vestiges of an abolished social hierarchy, whereas the POCSO Act gives effect to a constitutional concern of universal application to all citizens irrespective of their class, social, economic or any other, created by human intervention: it addresses childhood. It is this checker board of protection that brings in subject citizens in the common domain of both the Acts, and a fortiori, a conflict of jurisdiction in those matters, where the differential regimes cannot supplement and complement. Speaking in more real terms, the conflict would arise in cases where the victim is a member, say of a scheduled caste, and at the same time, a child. 5. In this bail application, offences under the SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act are both charged against the applicant. The SC/ST Act postulates a trial of offences under the said Act by an Exclusive Special Court to be established by the State Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette for one or more districts. In districts where the number of cases under the Act under reference are fewer, the State Government is empowered with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, to specify for such districts, the Court of Session to be a Special Court. Thus, offences under the SC/ST Act, have to be tried either by a Special Court or an Exclusive Special Court, notified or established under it by virtue of the provisions of Section 14 of the said Act. The SC/ST Act is given overriding effect over any other law for the time being in force, so far as provisions inconsistent in such other laws with the provisions of the SC/ST Act are concerned. The SC/ST Act is given overriding effect over any other law for the time being in force, so far as provisions inconsistent in such other laws with the provisions of the SC/ST Act are concerned. It is needless to say that offences under the Penal Code or some other special statutes, if charged against an accused along with an offence under the SC/ST Act, would be tried by the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court under the said Act, to the exclusion of jurisdiction of courts of ordinary criminal jurisdiction. 6. Under the POCSO Act, there are envisaged Special Courts for the trial of offences under the said Act, that are brought into being by designation, to be made through a notification in the Official Gazette, by the State Government in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, for each district. The Special Court to be designated under the POCSO Act as aforesaid, is mandated to be a Court of Session, which alone can try offences under the Act last mentioned. Section 28 of the POCSO Act provides for the creation and jurisdiction of Special Courts under this Act, and, further provides, vide clause (2) of Section 28 that the Special Court while trying an offence under the Act aforesaid, shall also try an offence with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, the Code), be charged at the same trial. Thus, offences under the Penal Code or under other special statutes that may be tried together under the Code, are to be tried by the Special Court designated under the POCSO Act, where an offence under the said Act, is also charged. The provisions of Section 42-A of the POCSO Act give to it overriding effect vis-à-vis provisions of any other law to the extent of the inconsistency. 7. The provisions of Section 42-A of the POCSO Act give to it overriding effect vis-à-vis provisions of any other law to the extent of the inconsistency. 7. Now, in this application, since offences under the SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act are both charged against the applicant, as they are in all matters connected to this application, where there is a competing regime of Special Courts under the two Acts, claiming exclusivity of jurisdiction under both Acts, not only in the matter of their right to try offences under the respective Acts, but also to determine bail pleas in relation to offences under the two statutes, the issue that has generally arisen is as to which of the two Special Courts, that is to say, the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court established or notified under the SC/ST Act, or the Special Court designated under the POCSO Act would have jurisdiction to determine the bail plea of the applicant in the first instance. A further issue that has arisen is that assuming that the Special Court under the POCSO Act, would have jurisdiction to determine the bail plea in the present crime, where offences under the SC/ST Act are also charged, whether the finality attached to the order of a Special Court under the SC/ST Act, granting or refusing bail, by virtue of Section 14-A(2) thereof, would also attach to the order of Special Court under the POCSO Act. The following questions based on the facts and issues above detailed, therefore, are required to be determined: (i) Whether the Special Court under the POCSO Act would have jurisdiction, to the exclusion of the Special Court under the SC/ST Act, to hear and determine the bail plea of an accused against whom offences, both under the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act are charged, arising out of the same crime? (ii) Whether an order declining bail to an accused passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act, in a crime where he is charged of committing offences, both under the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act, is final and appealable under Section 14-A(2) of the SC/ST Act? 8. (ii) Whether an order declining bail to an accused passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act, in a crime where he is charged of committing offences, both under the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act, is final and appealable under Section 14-A(2) of the SC/ST Act? 8. Heard Sri Rajeev Lochan Shukla and Sri Chetan Chatterjee, learned Amicus Curiae, Sri Amit Kumar and Sri Dheeraj Singh, learned counsel appearing in some of the bail applications, who have addressed the Court on the questions of law involved and Sri S.K.Pal, learned Government Advocate assisted by Sri Indrajeet Singh Yadav and Sri J.B. Singh, learned Additional Government Advocates appearing on behalf of the State. 9. This matter was heard on 14.11.2018, 19.11.2018, 28.11.2018, 29.11.2018 and 03.12.2018 when orders were reserved. 10. It has been mooted by learned counsel generally appearing for the bail applicants that the jurisdiction to hear a bail plea in a case involving offences, both under the SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act, cannot be separated from the jurisdiction of the court, under whichever Act it is held to have jurisdiction, involving offences under both Acts last mentioned, to try, determine, grant remand, and do all other acts that a court of criminal jurisdiction is required to do under the Code in relation to a case over which it has jurisdiction. It is urged that the Special Court under either of the two Acts last mentioned that is generally held to have jurisdiction, in relation to matters involving offences under both statutes, would have jurisdiction to determine the bail plea also. The power to grant bail, it is submitted, is ancillary to the jurisdiction of the criminal court to try a case, and, therefore, all that has to be examined to answer the first question is to determine under the law as to which of the Special Courts, constituted or notified under the two statutes under reference would generally have jurisdiction in a cause involving offences, both under the SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act. 11. Sri S.K.Pal, learned Government Advocate, and Sri Chetan Chatterjee, in particular, have seriously disputed the aforesaid proposition urged by learned counsel appearing for the applicants. 11. Sri S.K.Pal, learned Government Advocate, and Sri Chetan Chatterjee, in particular, have seriously disputed the aforesaid proposition urged by learned counsel appearing for the applicants. Sri Chatterjee has been at pains to demonstrate with reference to high authority and principles involved that in the case of a special statute giving finality to an order passed by a Special Court created under it and dealing with offences envisaged there, the general power of criminal courts to grant bail is lost in favour of the special regime under such statute, where the right to bail is circumscribed by limitations not only on the power of the Special Court, but the right of the accused and the jurisdiction of a court of superior jurisdiction, to entertain his bail plea. He submits that where, like Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, an appeal to the High Court is provided, with finality attached to the order of the Special Court under the Act last mentioned, notwithstanding whatever be the special statute under which an offence is tried by such a Special Court, the power to grant bail in the first instance flows from the NIA Act; a fortiori whatever be the offence under whatever law, tried by a Special Court under the NIA Act, an appeal alone is the remedy from an order granting or refusing bail, that is otherwise final. The power to grant bail available to courts otherwise empowered under special statutes or the general law, that are being tried by the Special Court under the NIA Act, stands displaced. 12. Sri Chatterjee submits that it is, therefore, of prime importance to determine, the source of power to grant bail in a case where offences under both the SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act are involved, whichever the Special Court held entitled to try a case involving offences under both statutes. Sri Chatterjee, therefore, proposes a clear dichotomy in the matter of power to grant bail and the jurisdiction to try a case by a Special Court, involving offences under both the special statutes, where one of them provides for an exclusive source of power to grant bail in respect of offences under it, and also provides for a special procedure in relation to the regulation of such power, including the right to remedies against orders passed in the exercise of power to grant bail. Shri Chatterjee submits, therefore, that whichever be the Special Court held to have jurisdiction to try a case involving offences under both the statutes, the power to grant bail would come from and be regulated by the provisions of the SC/ST Act, including the available remedies to any person aggrieved by the determination of a bail plea. The issue raised in these submissions would be dealt with at the appropriate stage, in the course of this order. 13. The Court has considered the issues involved and submissions advanced. The foremost matter to be considered about which the parties are not directly at issue is about which of the two Special Courts--the one under the POSCO Act or the SC/ST Act--would have jurisdiction to try a case where offences under both the statutes are charged at a common trial, in accordance with the provisions of the Code. 14. Conflict of jurisdiction between two special Acts operating in the same field, both carrying non obstante clauses, is not a new phenomenon to confront courts. When the question does arise as to which special statute would prevail generally, or over a certain part of the rights and liabilities regulated, the procedure or jurisdiction provided, there are no thumb rules to determine the conflict. There are, however, well settled principles for guidance to be applied in such situations, in order to resolve which of the two special enactments would prevail. The first and the more pervasive of the principles to be applied, is to look to the object and the purpose of the enactments that operate in the same field. Here, it has to be the endeavor of the Court to find out the legislative priority. It has to be discerned by the Court where in the compete and conflict between two special statutes, the legislative priority lies. This conflict can arise between two provisions of the same statute, and that is why it is commonplace to come across statutory phraseology that seeks to obviate the conflict by wording the non obstante clause in one of the two provisions in the same statute saying, “notwithstanding anything in this Act or any other law for the time being in force …..”. 15. 15. The test of looking to the object of the two special statutes to determine which of the two would prevail, in cases where there is a conflict between the two, is the more enduring one to guide. The other that is invariably applied, or may be alongside the first, is to see which of the two special statutes, both carrying non obstante clauses was enacted subsequent in point of time. It is a dependable principle that a subsequent legislation is enacted by the legislature with knowledge of the provisions of the earlier special statute. Thus, it is presumed that if a subsequent statute gives overriding effect to a particular provision, that impinges upon the field occupied by an existing special statute, the legislature is presumed to have intended the subsequent enactment to take precedence over the former. But, it may not be always so. There the wider tests relating to the objects of the two legislations is to be applied alongside, in order to arrive at a construction that resolves the conflict, giving fullest effect to the legislative intent. 16. It is in the aforesaid background of facts and fundamental legal principles adumbrated above, that the submissions of learned counsel appearing for the parties, and the learned Amicus Curiae, may be considered with reference to the first of the two questions formulated supra. The learned counsel appearing for the applicants have relied heavily upon the provisions of Section 28(2) of the POCSO Act, to submit that the Court constituted under the said statute is invested with exclusive jurisdiction to try offences, other than those under the POCSO Act, about which provision is made under Section 28(1) of the said Act, wherever the accused may be charged under the Code with such offences, at the same trial. They submit that wherever it is permissible under the Code to try an accused for an offence under the POCSO Act, and under any other law, special or general, at the same trial, exclusive jurisdiction would lie with the Special Court under the POCSO Act, and not with any court under any other law. They have further referred to the provisions of Section 42-A of the POCSO Act, that gives overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act, over those of any other law, to the extent that provisions of such other law are inconsistent. 17. They have further referred to the provisions of Section 42-A of the POCSO Act, that gives overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act, over those of any other law, to the extent that provisions of such other law are inconsistent. 17. The learned counsel for the applicants acknowledge that Special Courts constituted under the SC/ST Act have been invested with exclusive jurisdiction to try offences under the said Act by virtue of Section 14 thereof, and further, by dint of Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, overriding effect has been given to the said Act over anything inconsistent contained in any other law for the time being in force. The learned counsel, have emphasized here that elementary principles of construction would resolve this conflict in favour of the provisions of the POCSO Act to the extent there is inconsistency between the SC/ST Act, and the POCSO Act, inasmuch as the POCSO Act is a subsequent legislation, which was enacted with the former statute in the contemplation of legislature. According to them, this principle alone is certain enough to invest jurisdiction with the Special Court constituted under the POCSO Act, also in relation to offences under the SC/ST Act, where both are charged together at the same trial. 18. Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, learned Amicus Curiae has, on the said issue, argued in tandem with the learned counsel appearing for the applicants, but he has elaborated his submissions on this score, and said more with reference to the test based on the object of the two special legislations. Sri Shukla submits that both the special Acts have certain unique provisions in the matter of reporting of offences, taking of cognizance, investigation and trial. Both the statutes envisaged Special Courts constituted under the respective legislation that are conferred with separate and special powers, regarding which in his submission, it would be gainful to refer to certain provisions of the POCSO Act, and the SC/ST Act. 19. Sri Shukla has elaborately referred to the provisions of Section 28 of the POCSO Act and Section 14 of the SC/ST Act, that deal with the creation (by whatever name called, e.g. designation, notification or specification) of Special Courts under the two statutes under reference. 19. Sri Shukla has elaborately referred to the provisions of Section 28 of the POCSO Act and Section 14 of the SC/ST Act, that deal with the creation (by whatever name called, e.g. designation, notification or specification) of Special Courts under the two statutes under reference. The provisions of Section 28 of the POCSO Act, and Section 14 of the SC/ST Act, are being quoted in extenso: “Section 28 -Designation of Special Courts.–(1) For the purposes of providing a speedy trial, the State Government shall in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, designate for each district, a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under the Act: Provided that if a Court of Session is notified as a children's court under the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005(4 of 2006) or a Special Court designated for similar purposes under any other law for the time being in force, then, such court shall be deemed to be a Special Court under this section. (2) While trying an offence under this Act, a Special Court shall also try an offence [other than the offence referred to in sub-section (1)], with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974), be charged at the same trial. (3) The Special Court constituted under this Act, notwithstanding anything in the Information Technology Act, 2000(21 of 2000), shall have jurisdiction to try offences under section 67B of that Act in so far as it relates to publication or transmission of sexually explicit material depicting children in any act, or conduct or manner or facilitates abuse of children online.” “Section 14. Special Court and Exclusive Special Court.–(1) For the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, establish an Exclusive Special Court for one or more Districts: Provided that in Districts where less number of cases under this Act is recorded, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for such Districts, the Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act: Provided further that the Courts so established or specified shall have power to directly take cognizance of offences under this Act. (2) It shall be the duty of the State Government to establish adequate number of Courts to ensure that cases under this Act are disposed of within a period of two months, as far as possible. (3) In every trial in the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court, the proceedings shall be continued from day-to-day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded in writing: Provided that when the trial relates to an offence under this Act, the trial shall, as far as possible, be completed within a period of two months from the date of filing of the charge sheet.” 20. He has further drawn the attention of the Court to the provisions of Section 42-A of the POCSO Act and Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, in particular detail, which as already noticed give overriding effect to the respective statutes. He has further drawn the attention of the Court to the provisions of Section 42-A of the POCSO Act and Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, in particular detail, which as already noticed give overriding effect to the respective statutes. In order to better appreciate his submissions, it would be profitable to quote the provisions of Section 42-A of the POCSO Act and Section 20 of the SC/ST Act: “Section 42-A - Act not in derogation of any other law.– The provisions of this Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force and, in case of any inconsistency, the provisions of this Act shall have overriding effect on the provisions of any such law to the extent of the inconsistency.” “Section 20 -Act to override other laws.–Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.” 21. Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that the Parliament while enacting the POCSO Act has elaborately set out its statement of Objects and Reasons, a reading of which shows that children, have been treated as a class unto themselves, without the fetters of caste in keeping with the United Nations Convention on the rights of children, that was ratified by India on 11.12.1992. The thrust of the enactment, as would appear from the statement of Objects and Reasons, is to specifically protect children from sexual assault, sexual harassment, and pornography, with full regard to the safeguarding of their interest and well being at every stage of the judicial process with special child friendly procedures for reporting, recording of evidence, investigation and trial of offences. The learned Amicus Curiae has elaborately referred to the Objects and Reasons of the POCSO Act, which may be quoted in verbatim: “Statement of Objects and Reasons.—Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia, confers upon the State powers to make special provision for children. The learned Amicus Curiae has elaborately referred to the Objects and Reasons of the POCSO Act, which may be quoted in verbatim: “Statement of Objects and Reasons.—Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia, confers upon the State powers to make special provision for children. Further, Article 39, inter alia, provides that the State shall in particular direct its policy towards securing that the tender age of children are not abused and their childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and they are given facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. 2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children, ratified by India on 11th December, 1992, requires the State Parties to undertake all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent (a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual activity; (b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; and (c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials. 3. The data collected by the National Crime Records Bureau shows that there has been increase in cases of sexual offences against children. This is corroborated by the ‘Study on Child Abuse: India 2007’ conducted by the Ministry of Women and Child Development. Moreover, sexual offences against children are not adequately addressed by the extant laws. A large number such offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they adequately penalised. The interests of the child, both as a victim as well as a witness, need to be protected. It is felt that offences against children need to be defined explicitly and countered through commensurate penalties as an effective deterrence. 4. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a self contained comprehensive legislation inter alia to provide for protection of children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography with due regard for safeguarding the interest and well being of the child at every stage of the judicial process, incorporating child-friendly procedures for reporting, recording of evidence, investigation and trial of offences and provision for establishment of Special Court for speedy trial of such offences. 5. The Bill would contribute to enforcement of the right of all children to safety, security and protection from sexual abuse and exploitation. 6. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various provisions contained in the Bill. 7. 5. The Bill would contribute to enforcement of the right of all children to safety, security and protection from sexual abuse and exploitation. 6. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various provisions contained in the Bill. 7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.” 22. Sri Shukla, the learned Amicus Curiae has emphasized that the provisions of Section 42-A of the POCSO Act, permit the Special Courts established under the said Act, to implement provisions of other enactments also, insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. He submits that all safeguards and benefits, which the SC/ST Act provides or confers on the subject, can be as efficaciously provided by a Special Court under the POCSO Act. By contrast, he submits that a Special Court under the SC/ST Act does not carry any such analogous provision that may enable a Special Court under the said Act to extend safeguards and provide benefits, that are envisaged under the provisions of the POCSO Act. In this connection, learned Amicus Curiae has referred to the provisions of Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, to fortify his submission. 23. Learned Amicus Curiae has gone on to submit that the SC/ST Act, as amended by SC/ST Amendment Act, is not dedicated to children alone; it caters to the aspirations of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in general, which clearly inhibits the application of the SC/ST Act to the wider and broad based beneficial provisions for the welfare of children enshrined under the POCSO Act. In this regard, he has specifically referred to the provisions of Sections 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 of the said Act. He has, in particular, drawn attention of the Court to the provision of Chapter VI of the POCSO Act, that specifically carries provisions relating inter alia to the recording of statement of a child by the police, the recording of the statement of a child under Section 164 of the Code by the Magistrate, additional provisions regarding statement of a child to be recorded by the police or the Magistrate, and, the medical examination of a child, all of which is oriented to be done in a child-friendly atmosphere. Sri Shukla, learned Amicus Curiae submits that all these factors when taken into account would show that the specific child-friendly provisions cannot obtain in proceedings before the Special Courts or the Exclusive Special Courts under the SC/ST Act, that would directly infringe the rights of a special class (the children), for whose protection the POCSO Act has been enacted. It is further contended that the overlapping in case of children, to whom the SC/ST Act also applies, would be deprived of a special benefit, in case it were held that the Special Court under the SC/ST Act would have jurisdiction in such matters. It has also been strenuously urged by Sri Shukla, that in case trial of an offence under the SC/ST Act, were to be held before the Special Court under the POCSO Act, all safeguards contemplated under Section 14 of the SC/ST Act, as amended by SC/ST Amendment Act, and all beneficial provisions under the said Act to which a child subject to it, would be entitled can be conveniently afforded by the Special Court under the POCSO Act. To emphasize his point, he says that it is not vice versa. 24. Sri Shukla, learned Amicus Curiae has, in support of the overriding jurisdiction of the Special Court, POCSO Act over that of the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court under the SC/ST Act, impressed upon the Court that it is so by dint of the interplay between Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, and, Sections 28(2), 33(1) & 42-A of the POCSO Act. He submits that looking to the provisions of Section 28(2) of the latter Act, in particular, it is evident that a Special Court under the POCSO Act is not only empowered to try an offence under that Act, but has jurisdiction while trying an offence under the POCSO Act, also to try an offence with which the accused may be charged at the same trial, under the Code. It is the learned Amicus Curiae's submission that the triumvirate of Sections 28(2), 33(1) & 42-A of the POCSO Act, clearly invests the Special Court with jurisdiction to try an offence under the SC/ST Act. It is the learned Amicus Curiae's submission that the triumvirate of Sections 28(2), 33(1) & 42-A of the POCSO Act, clearly invests the Special Court with jurisdiction to try an offence under the SC/ST Act. By contrast, he submits that Section 20 of the SC/ST Act while giving overriding effect to the said Act vis-à-vis any other law inconsistent with it for the time being in force, does not carry any provision pari materia to Section 28(2) of the POCSO Act, that may empower the Special Court, or the Exclusive Special Court under the SC/ST Act specifically to try an offence, in addition to offences under the said Act, with which the accused may be charged at the same trial under the Code. 25. The learned Amicus Curiae has further submitted that any doubt, if at all based on the provisions of Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, is resolved on an application of the reputed principle of construction, that the legislature while enacting a subsequent legislation, is presumed to be aware about all existing laws on the Statute Book. He submits, therefore, that the SC/ST Act that was enacted in the year 1989 when pitted against the POCSO Act, enacted in the year 2012, it is to be presumed that the legislature while giving overriding effect to the provisions of the POCSO Act, and to the jurisdiction of the Special Court constituted under it over any other law for the time being in force by virtue of Sections 42-A, 28(2) and 33(1) had the provisions of Section 20 of the SC/ST Act in contemplation. And, yet it was provided in the POCSO Act that to the extent of inconsistency with any other law for the time being in force, the provisions of the POCSO Act would prevail. Also, the Special Court envisaged under the POCSO Act was invested with powers to try offences under other laws in force, at the time of its enactment, with which an accused could be charged at the same trial under the Code. He submits, therefore, that the provisions of the POCSO Act generally to the extent of inconsistency of the provisions of the SC/ST Act, would work to exclusion of the latter, and specifically, the Special Court, POCSO Act would have jurisdiction to try offences under the SC/ST Act, and not contrariwise. 26. He submits, therefore, that the provisions of the POCSO Act generally to the extent of inconsistency of the provisions of the SC/ST Act, would work to exclusion of the latter, and specifically, the Special Court, POCSO Act would have jurisdiction to try offences under the SC/ST Act, and not contrariwise. 26. Sri Shukla, learned Amicus Curiae has placed reliance in support of his contention on a Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in The Registrar (Judicial) vs. Krishna Swami Naidu & another, 2017 CriLJ 4519. 27. It may be recorded here that so far as the issue of jurisdiction of the Special Court under the SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act, in relation to a case where an accused is charged with offences under both statutes, amongst others is concerned, the learned counsel appearing for the applicants in the present and the various connected bail applications, Sri Pal, the learned Government Advocate, Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla and Sri Chetan Chatterjee, the two learned Amicus Curiae, are hardly at any serious issue. All of them have generally supported the submissions of Sri Shukla to the end that it is the Special Court under the POCSO Act, that would have jurisdiction to try a case against an accused involving offences under both the statutes under reference. But that does not absolve this Court of its duty to determine the question and the issue about jurisdiction to try as aforesaid, inasmuch as there is no cavil of doubt about the principle that jurisdiction as to subject matter cannot be conferred by consent of parties. It is a matter for the Court to decide, bearing in mind the facts and the law applicable. This makes it for this Court, so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, an inquisitorial exercise with the seeming adversaries speaking in one voice. 28. Looking to the objects of the SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act, as enshrined in the Statements of their Objects and Reasons set out in the respective statutes, it is all too obvious that both the statutes are dedicated to serve the interest of a special class of citizens, when offences of the same kind are committed against one or the other class, as that committed against any other citizen of the country. It does well to remind that Article 15(3) of the Constitution empowers the State to make special provisions for children, besides women, and Article 15(4) empowers the State to make any special provision for the advancement of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. A legislation framed making special provision for children, or for the advancement of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, would not be open to challenge on ground of invidious discrimination between citizens by the State, that is otherwise forbidden by clauses (1) and (2) of Article 15. In addition, Article 17 of the Constitution abolishes untouchability and forbids its practice in any form. It further mandates that the enforcement of any disability, arriving out of untouchability, shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law. 29. Likewise, under Article 39(f) of the Constitution, it is embodied in the Directive Principles of State Policy, that the children are given opportunities and facilities, to develop in a healthy manner, in conditions of freedom and dignity, that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation, besides moral and material abandonment. It is in fulfillment of the aforesaid obligation also, that the POCSO Act has been enacted. It predicates a legislative endeavour that is in the nature of affirmative action by the State, and not just a negative postulate to restrain, prevent, or abjure offences against children. The Statement of the Objects and Reasons of the POCSO Act bear specific reference to the Constitutional provisions, the mandate of which is the raison d'être of its enactment. It is of relevance to mention that in order to realize the rights of the child in its all encompassing fullness, their Lordships of the Supreme Court bestowed consideration upon the fact that the Special Courts under the POCSO Act were not set up in many states until the year 2013, and issued directions to that end in Exploitation of Children Orphanages, in re vs. Union of India and others, (2014) 2 SCC 193 , where it was held and directions issued, in the following terms: “24. Ms Indira Jaising, learned Additional Solicitor General and Ms Aparna Bhat, learned amicus curiae have together submitted before us that the main reason for issuing various orders by this Court is to ensure that the provisions for protection of child rights as well as provisions for proper facilities to children in education as also health, are implemented. Ms Indira Jaising, learned Additional Solicitor General and Ms Aparna Bhat, learned amicus curiae have together submitted before us that the main reason for issuing various orders by this Court is to ensure that the provisions for protection of child rights as well as provisions for proper facilities to children in education as also health, are implemented. It is but obvious that the rights of children can be secured adequately only if the monitoring and controlling provisions contained in the three Acts, namely, the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act, 2005; the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 read with the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, are fully implemented. 25. This Court has issued a series of directions to ensure compliance and implementation of the aforesaid Acts. We have in the earlier part of this order, directed all the States to ensure that the regulatory and monitoring bodies under these Acts are constituted and made functional within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order. In addition to the above, it is necessary that the States provide further detailed information with regard to the measures adopted and the action taken with regard to improving the conditions of children in various shelter homes, etc. around the country, to eliminate trafficking of children under the garb of education and other promises, like employment, etc. 26. We are informed that in all the States, children homes have been set up by the States as also by the non-government organisations. We are also informed that some individuals have also been permitted to open such homes. Therefore, it is necessary that each State conducts a detailed survey with regard to Government/NGO/privately run and controlled children homes and find out as to how many children's homes/fit institutions/observation homes/shelter homes/special homes are working in their respective States. 27. All these institutions are required to be registered under various provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Let a status report be submitted by all the States indicating as to whether any of such institutions are unregistered. 27. All these institutions are required to be registered under various provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Let a status report be submitted by all the States indicating as to whether any of such institutions are unregistered. In case of unregistered institutions, the status report should also indicate as to what protective measures have been taken by the State Government or the local authority within which such institutions are located, to prevent any abuse of the inmates of these institutions. This indeed is a very serious concern. We, therefore, direct all the States to take utmost care in preparation of the status report. 28. The States shall also indicate the measures which have been taken for implementation of the scheme under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 as also the measures which have been taken to eradicate trafficking of children. Under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, the States are required to set up Special Courts. The status report shall also indicate as to what measures have been taken by the States for setting up of Special Courts. In case the Special Courts have been set up, the status report shall indicate the number of such Special Courts established. In the event, Special Courts have not been established, the status report should indicate the maximum time-limit within which such courts will be established. The status report shall also indicate the capacity of the children homes, separately for boys and girls, and it shall also indicate as to whether the standards with regard to the nutrition and hygiene are being maintained. 30. The aforesaid directions and the guidance of their Lordships indicate the importance of the POCSO Act, besides other legislations introduced to achieve the object of providing the child with an atmosphere where he/ she can develop his/ her personality to the fullest, unhindered by the stultifying harsh conditions in society that can irreversibly damage and dent a child's path of development. 31. The Statement of the Objects and Reasons of the SC/ST Act, though not explicit in its reference, is no less revealing of its import to fulfill the Constitutional aspirations of removing social disabilities, that are encountered by a class of citizens: the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 31. The Statement of the Objects and Reasons of the SC/ST Act, though not explicit in its reference, is no less revealing of its import to fulfill the Constitutional aspirations of removing social disabilities, that are encountered by a class of citizens: the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. This object it seeks to achieve by not only proscribing and punishing actions derogatory to individuals hailing from these classes, but conferring certain benefits, in the event of an individual becoming victim of an offence envisaged under the Act; here affirmative action is limited to that kind of relief. 32. Both the Acts are without doubt penal statutes. They operate almost in the same field, to achieve the same end, but with different subjects: in one case the child; and, in the other, members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. As noticed in the opening part of this order, the issues involved and the questions framed, have arisen in the context of that class of citizens, who are subject to the regime of both the statutes, that is to say, the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act. They are children who are members of one or the other Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and happen to become victims of offences separately punishable under both legislations. Both legislations being special laws, carrying non obstante clauses already detailed hereinbefore, the problem also noticed in the opening part of this order arises. It has been said there that when a conflict of this kind arises between two statutes operating in the same field, the most dependable test is to look at the objects of the two legislations and find out where the legislative priority lies. Here, in the most tangible terms, what has to be determined is whether the interest of the child vis-à-vis his status as a child is placed higher in legislative priority, or is it subordinated to his status as a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. This Court thinks, that the legislative priority is in favour of the child, for childhood is native to human development and requires common traits, needs and aspirations to be attended to, irrespective of the social class to which the child may belong. Childhood emanates from human nature, whereas the social class is a byproduct of social conditions, historical, geographical etc. This Court thinks, that the legislative priority is in favour of the child, for childhood is native to human development and requires common traits, needs and aspirations to be attended to, irrespective of the social class to which the child may belong. Childhood emanates from human nature, whereas the social class is a byproduct of social conditions, historical, geographical etc. It is but logical that the legislature has accorded priority to the subject that is an inseparable part of human development, and is common to all classes of citizens. 33. The intention of the Legislature to give overriding effect to the POCSO Act to the extent it is inconsistent with the SC/ST Act, or for that matter any other law for the time being in force is very clearly pronounced by the provisions of Section 42A, that have been introduced by Act 13 of 2013 w.e.f. 03.02.2013. The said provision clearly indicates that in the first place the POCSO Act is in addition to the existing provisions of any other law for the time being in force, and not in derogation thereof. The provision, however, limits this supplementary role for the POCSO Act vis-à-vis other statutes to all situations where the provisions of the other law are not inconsistent with the said Act, and mandates that in case of any inconsistency between the provisions of the POCSO Act and any other law for the being in force, the provisions of the Act under reference, shall have overriding effect. The provisions of Section 42-A of the POCSO Act, therefore, makes allowance for the operation of any other law alongside itself so long as there is no inconsistency between the two. By contrast, the provisions of Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, carries a non obstante clause in unqualified terms, giving overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act over any other law for the time being in force, or any custom or usage or any instrument, having effect by virtue of any other law. By contrast, the provisions of Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, carries a non obstante clause in unqualified terms, giving overriding effect to the provisions of the said Act over any other law for the time being in force, or any custom or usage or any instrument, having effect by virtue of any other law. Notwithstanding the unqualified exclusion of any other law for the time being in force under Section 20 of the SC/ST Act, bearing in mind the higher priority of the object of the POCSO Act, that is welfare of children cutting across all barriers of caste and creed, would give it overriding effect over the SC/ST Act that is designed to cater to the needs of a class of citizens, identifiable by their caste, that is a byproduct of social conditions. Generally speaking, a legislation that caters to the needs of a class horizontally oriented (as the terms horizontal and vertical are understood in the law relating to reservation), would always have a higher object to achieve, when pitted against legislation that has for its object, the interest of a class vertically oriented, inasmuch as, both kinds of classifications being permissible under Article 15 of the Constitution, a horizontally oriented class that is the subject of legislation, is closer to the fundamental rule of equality before law and equal protection of laws, enshrined in Article 14. 34. The overriding effect given to the provisions of the POCSO Act vis-à-vis the SC/ST Act is also the inevitable conclusion going by the reputed canon of statutory construction that while construing the provisions of two legislations, the later enactment in point of time, is to be presumed as one that the legislature has enacted with knowledge of the provisions of the former, and, therefore, a non obstante clause in the subsequent legislation, may be regarded as overriding in effect, over a similar clause in the subsequent legislation. The SC/ST Act was enacted in the year 1989, whereas the POCSO Act was enacted in the year 2012. Section 42-A that has given the POCSO Act overriding effect over all other laws for the time being in force to the extent of inconsistency with its provisions, but otherwise to supplement the existing laws operating in the same field. This clearly shows that the legislature has enacted it, intending to give it overriding effect vis-à-vis the SC/ST Act. Section 42-A that has given the POCSO Act overriding effect over all other laws for the time being in force to the extent of inconsistency with its provisions, but otherwise to supplement the existing laws operating in the same field. This clearly shows that the legislature has enacted it, intending to give it overriding effect vis-à-vis the SC/ST Act. The fact that SC/ST Amendment Act, while amending the SC/ST Act did not further provide to give the said Act, overriding effect vis-à-vis laws operating at that time, clearly shows that the overriding effect given by the non obstante clause introduced in the POCSO Act vide Act No. 13 of 2013, was legislatively intended to prevail over the SC/ST Act. 35. In the context of what has been said above, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in KSL and Industries Limited vs. Arihant Threads Limited and other, (2008) 9 SCC 763 may be referred to with profit. In the said decision Their Lordships were confronted with the non obstante clause in Section 22 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, and an identical non obstante clause in Section 34 (2) of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. In the said decision, principles governing resolution of conflict between non obstante clauses in two statutes operating in the same field, were elaborately enunciated in the judgment of Hon'ble C.K. Thakker, J. where it is held: “70. I am thus at a point where two statutes employ non obstante clause having “overriding effect”. Such a conflict, as laid down in several cases, may be resolved by judiciary on various considerations: such as the policy underlying the enactments, the language used, the object intended to be achieved, or mischief sought to be remedied, etc. One of the tests applied by courts is that normally a later enactment should prevail over the former. The courts would also try to reconcile both Acts by adopting harmonious interpretation and applying them in their respective fields so that both may operate without coming into conflict with each other. In resolving the clash, the court may further examine whether one of the two enactments is “special” and the other one is “general”. The courts would also try to reconcile both Acts by adopting harmonious interpretation and applying them in their respective fields so that both may operate without coming into conflict with each other. In resolving the clash, the court may further examine whether one of the two enactments is “special” and the other one is “general”. There can also be a situation in law where one and the same statute may be held to be a “special” statute vis-à-vis one legislation and “general” statute vis-à-vis another legislation. On the basis of one or more tests, the court will try to salvage the situation by giving effect to non obstante clause in both the legislations. 89. From the above discussion, in my judgment, the law is fairly well settled. A provision beginning with non obstante clause (notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained therein in any other law for the time being in force) must be enforced and implemented by giving effect to the provisions of the Act and by limiting the provisions of other laws. But, it cannot be gainsaid that sometimes one may come across two or more enactments containing similar non obstante clause operating in the same or similar direction. Obviously, in such cases, the court must attempt to find out the intention of the legislature by examining the nature of controversy, object of the Act, proceedings initiated, relief sought and several other relevant considerations. 90. From the case law referred to above, it is clear that courts have applied several workable tests. They, inter alia, include to keep in view whether the Act is “general” or “special”, whether the Act is a subsequent legislation, whether there is reference to the former law and the non obstante clause therein. The above tests are merely illustrative and by no means they should be considered as exhaustive. It is for the court when it is called upon to resolve such conflict by harmoniously interpreting the provisions of both the competing statutes and by giving effect to one over the other.” 36. The above tests are merely illustrative and by no means they should be considered as exhaustive. It is for the court when it is called upon to resolve such conflict by harmoniously interpreting the provisions of both the competing statutes and by giving effect to one over the other.” 36. In the decision of their Lordships under reference, while there was no issue about the principles enunciated, in the application of those principles to the two statutes involved, that is to say, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985, (for short, the SICA) and Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, (for short, the RDDB Act) their Lordships comprising the two Judge Bench, differed on how the principles well settled, would work in the statutory context of the non obstante clauses in Section 22 of the SICA and Section 34(2) of the RDDB Act. Hon'ble Altamas Kabir, J. (as His Lordship then was) differed from the construction placed by Hon'ble C.K. Thakker, J., more with reference to the facts of the case before their Lordships vis-à-vis the provisions of Section 34 of the RDDB Act. That necessitated the issue to be placed before a three Judge Bench. 37. Their Lordships on a reference to the three Judge Bench, decided the issue of conflict, in KSL & Industries Ltd. v. M/S Arihant Threads Ltd & Ors, (2015) 1 SCC 166 , reviewing the fundamental principles of resolution of conflict between two Special Acts, both carrying non obstante clauses, with reference to the object of the two legislations. Reliance was placed on the provisions of Section 34 of the RDDB Act to conclude, that notwithstanding the SICA being an existing legislation when the RDDB Act appeared on the statute book, the provisions of the SICA would prevail, as the non obstante clause in Section 34 (2) specifically provides that the later enacted RDDB Act, shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of the SICA. The three Judge Bench of their Lordships in KSL & Industries Ltd. (supra) held thus:- “47. In a later case [Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71 ] the question arose in the context of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 and SICA. The three Judge Bench of their Lordships in KSL & Industries Ltd. (supra) held thus:- “47. In a later case [Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71 ] the question arose in the context of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 and SICA. It was contended that in view of the special provisions contained in SICA no proceedings could have been initiated under the Special Court Act. The Court observed that though Section 32 of SICA contained a non obstante clause, there was a similar non obstante clause in Section 13 of the Special Court Act. The Court observed: (Solidaire case [Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71 ], SCC p. 73, para 9) “9. … This Court has laid down in no uncertain terms that in such an event it is the later Act which must prevail.” This Court in Solidaire case [Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2001) 3 SCC 71 approved the observations of the Special Court to the effect that if the legislature confers a non obstante clause on a later enactment, it means that the legislature intends that the later enactment should prevail. Further, it is a settled rule of interpretation that if one construction leads to a conflict, whereas on another construction two Acts can be harmoniously construed, then the latter must be adopted. 48. In view of the observations of this Court in the decisions referred to and relied on by the learned counsel for the parties we find that, the purpose of the two enactments is entirely different. As observed earlier, the purpose of one is to provide ameliorative measures for reconstruction of sick companies, and the purpose of the other is to provide for speedy recovery of debts of banks and financial institutions. Both the Acts are “special” in this sense. However, with reference to the specific purpose of reconstruction of sick companies, SICA must be held to be a special law, though it may be considered to be a general law in relation to the recovery of debts. Whereas, the RDDB Act may be considered to be a special law in relation to the recovery of debts and SICA may be considered to be a general law in this regard. Whereas, the RDDB Act may be considered to be a special law in relation to the recovery of debts and SICA may be considered to be a general law in this regard. For this purpose we rely on the decision in LIC v. Vijay Bahadur [ (1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111] . Normally the latter of the two would prevail on the principle that the legislature was aware that it had enacted the earlier Act and yet chose to enact the subsequent Act with a non obstante clause. In this case, however, the express intendment of Parliament in the non obstante clause of the RDDB Act does not permit us to take that view. Though the RDDB Act is the later enactment, sub-section (2) of Section 34 thereof specifically provides that the provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the other laws mentioned therein including SICA. 49. The term “not in derogation” clearly expresses the intention of Parliament not to detract from or abrogate the provisions of SICA in any way. This, in effect must mean that Parliament intended the proceedings under SICA for reconstruction of a sick company to go on and for that purpose further intended that all the other proceedings against the company and its properties should be stayed pending the process of reconstruction. While the term “proceedings” under Section 22 of SICA did not originally include the RDDB Act, which was not there in existence. Section 22 covers proceedings under the RDDB Act. 50. The purpose of the two Acts is entirely different and where actions under the two laws may seem to be in conflict, Parliament has wisely preserved the proceedings under SICA, by specifically providing for sub-section (2), which lays down that the later Act, RDDB shall be in addition to and not in derogation of SICA. 51. We might add that this conclusion has been guided by what is considered to be one of the most crucial principles of interpretation viz. giving effect to the intention of the legislature. The difficulty arose in this case mainly due to the absence of specific words denoting the intention of Parliament to cover applications for recovery of debts under the RDDB Act while enacting Section 22 of SICA. giving effect to the intention of the legislature. The difficulty arose in this case mainly due to the absence of specific words denoting the intention of Parliament to cover applications for recovery of debts under the RDDB Act while enacting Section 22 of SICA. As observed earlier, the obvious reason for this absence is the fact that SICA was enacted earlier. It is the duty of this Court to consider SICA, after the enactment of the RDDB Act to ascertain the true intent and purpose of providing that no proceedings for execution or distraints or suits shall lie or be proceeded with. Undoubtedly, in the narrower sense an application for the recovery of debt can be giving a restricted meaning i.e. a proceeding which commences on filing and terminates at the judgment. However, there is no need to give such a restricted meaning, since the true purpose of an application for recovery is to proceed to the logical end of execution and recovery itself, that is by way of execution and distraint. We thus have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that Section 22 clearly covers and interdicts such an application for recovery made under the provisions of the RDDB Act. We might remind ourselves of the oft quoted statement of the principles of contextual construction laid down by this Court in RBI v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. [ (1987) 1 SCC 424 : AIR 1987 SC 1023 ] , wherein this Court has observed: (SCC p. 450, para 33) “33. Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With these glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place.” 52. Moreover, we have found nothing contrary in the intention of SICA to exclude a recovery application from the purview of Section 22, indeed there could be no reason for such exclusion since the purpose of the provision is to protect the properties of a sick company, so that they may be dealt with in the best possible way for the purpose of its revival by BIFR. In State of Punjab v. Okara Grain Buyers' Syndicate Ltd. [ AIR 1964 SC 669 ], the Court articulated the importance of preserving the beneficent purpose of the statute and observed: (AIR p. 677, para 14) “14. … We shall therefore proceed to examine the provisions of the Act on the footing that the test for determining whether the Government is bound by a statute is whether it is expressly named in the provision which it is contended binds it, or whether it ‘is manifest that from the terms of the statute, that it was the intention of the legislature that it shall be bound’, and that the intention to bind would be clearly made out if the beneficent purpose of the statute would be wholly frustrated unless the Government were bound.” 53. Having answered the reference, we hold that the provisions of SICA, in particular Section 22, shall prevail over the provision for the recovery of debts in the RDDB Act. In these circumstances, as already directed by the two-Judge Bench [KSL and Industries Ltd. v. Arihant Threads Ltd., (2008) 9 SCC 763 ] of this Court, the judgment and order dated 23-2-2006 [Arihant Threads Ltd. v. Stressed Assets Stabilisation Fund, WPs (C) Nos. In these circumstances, as already directed by the two-Judge Bench [KSL and Industries Ltd. v. Arihant Threads Ltd., (2008) 9 SCC 763 ] of this Court, the judgment and order dated 23-2-2006 [Arihant Threads Ltd. v. Stressed Assets Stabilisation Fund, WPs (C) Nos. 2041-42 of 2006, decided on 23-2-2006 (Del)] of the High Court of Delhi is set aside. As far as the writ petitions are concerned, whether on the ground that Section 22 of SICA acts as a bar to the recovery proceedings under the RDDB Act or whether the protection of SICA is not available to the appellant Company since the recovery proceedings under the RDDB Act had been concluded, the writ petitions would have to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. The present appeal is allowed.” 38. It is to be borne in mind also, that in construing two non obstante clauses in the two legislations, the policy underlying the enactments and the object intended to be achieved are important guides to resolve the conflict. It is also a settled principle that both statues have to be harmoniously construed, as far as possible. Taking into consideration the object of the SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act where speedy trial and special remedies are common, amongst others, there are definitely added special features to be found in the POCSO Act, that is designed to cater to the special needs of children as victims of crime, while they go through the process of investigation and trial of the offender. It equally applies to children of whatever social background, whether they hail from a Scheduled caste or a Scheduled Tribe or not. The SC/ST Act by contrast caters to the requirements of those classes, but not the specific requirements of children of those classes of citizens. The amendment brought to the SC/ST Act by SC/ST Amendment Act does not at all address the issue of child victims of crimes under that Act. On the other hand, the POCSO Act carries special provisions in matters of investigation and trial, whether the child be the victim, which is generally the case under the said Act, or the offender. The amendment brought to the SC/ST Act by SC/ST Amendment Act does not at all address the issue of child victims of crimes under that Act. On the other hand, the POCSO Act carries special provisions in matters of investigation and trial, whether the child be the victim, which is generally the case under the said Act, or the offender. Section 33 of the POCSO Act provides for the procedures and the powers of the Special Court, where very minute niches of a child's psyche have been taken care of, by providing that questions put to the child by counsel for the accused during examination-in-chief, or cross-examination, are to be routed through the Special Court, and not put directly. The Special Court is enjoined to create a child-friendly atmosphere by allowing a family member, a guardian, a friend or relative, in whom the child reposes trust, to remain present in court during proceedings. There are a slew of minutely worked out provisions, tailor-made to the needs of a child during court proceedings engrafted under Sections 34, 35, 36, 38 and 39 of the Act. 39. The SC/ST Act does not address these concerns for the child. At the same time the concerns for members of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, embodied in that Act, like award of compensation and to all other rights provided for the victims and witnesses by Chapter IVA, both substantive and procedural, can be as efficaciously provided to the victim of an offence under the SC/ST Act by the Special Court under the POCSO Act, as may be done by the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court, SC/ST Act. However, a Special Court under the SC/ST Act does not have the kind of infrastructure, procedure, personnel and training that are postulated by Section 33 to 38 of the POCSO Act, available at the command of the Special Court under that Act. Thus clearly, the POCSO Act is more special, between the two special statutes, and application of its provisions to a child, who is a victim of offences both under the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act would conveniently realise the objects of both legislations, in the case of a common subject. 40. In this connection, the decision of the Madras High Court in The Registrar (Judicial), in re (supra) may be gainfully referred to: “50. 40. In this connection, the decision of the Madras High Court in The Registrar (Judicial), in re (supra) may be gainfully referred to: “50. Keeping in view these settled principles of interpretation, if we look into the main object of the SC & ST Act, it is Act to check and deter crimes against the persons belonging Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes committed by non scheduled castes and non scheduled tribes. Yet another object is to provide speedy trial. The main object of the POCSO Act is to provide for protection of children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and pornography with due regard for safeguarding the interest and well being of the child at every stage of the judicial process incorporating child friendly procedures for reporting, recording of evidence, investigation and trial of offences and provision for establishment of Special Courts for speedy trial of such offences. 56. If the act of the accused is an offence under the POCSO Act and also an offence under the SC & ST Act, the Special Court under the POCSO Act alone shall have jurisdiction to exercise all the powers including the power to remand the accused under Section 167 of the Code, to take cognizance of the offences either on a police report or on a private complaint and to try the offender. The said Special Court shall have jurisdiction to grant all the reliefs to the victim for which the victim is entitled to under the SC & ST Act.” 41. There is a further authority of the Andhra Pradesh High Court on the issue in State of A.P. Through P.S.Kowdipally vs. Mangali Yadagiri, 2016 Cri LJ 1415 AP HC. It has been held as under: 18. From a reading of the judgments referred to above, it is clear that when there are two different enactments containing two non-obstante clauses, the Court has to see the object and purpose of the two enactments and the legislation which is later in point of time. 19. A perusal of both the enactments would show that POSCO Act is a self contained legislature which was introduced with a view to protect the children from the offences of sexual assault, harassment, pornography and other allied offences. It was introduced with number of safeguards to the children at every stage of the proceedings by incorporating a child friendly procedure. A perusal of both the enactments would show that POSCO Act is a self contained legislature which was introduced with a view to protect the children from the offences of sexual assault, harassment, pornography and other allied offences. It was introduced with number of safeguards to the children at every stage of the proceedings by incorporating a child friendly procedure. The legislature introduced the non-obstante clause in Section 42A of the POSCO Act with effect from 20.06.2012 giving an overriding effect to the provisions of the POSCO Act, though the legislature was aware about the existence of non-obstante clause in Section 20 of the SC/ST Act. 20. Applying the test of chronology the POSCO Act, 2012 came into force with effect from 20.06.2012 whereas SC/ST Act was in force from 30.01.1990. The POSCO Act being beneficial to all and later in point of time, it is to be held that the provisions of POSCO Act have to be followed for trying cases where the accused is charged for the offences under both the enactments. 21. The reference is thus answered holding that where an accused is tried for offences under both the enactments, the appropriate Court to try the offence would be the Court designated under Section 28 of the POSCO Act.” 42. In view of what has been said above, the logical conclusion is that in a case where offences both under the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act are charged together, the Special Court POCSO Act alone would have jurisdiction to try a case against an accused, charged with offences under both statutes, provided under the Code, the accused can be charged in relation to the offence at the same trial. 43. The Court would now venture to examine if the jurisdiction of the Special Court under the POSCO Act to try a case against an accused, charged with offences under both statutes would ipso facto invest that court with power to hear and determine a bail plea by the accused also; or that power would in such a case vest with the Special Court/ Exclusive Special Court SC/ST Act in view of the provisions of Section 14-A(2) of the SC/ST Act. This would further involve exploring an answer to the corollary, that in the event the power to determine a bail plea in a case of this kind is held to vest in the Special Court POSCO Act, whether an order of that court declining bail, would be appealable under Section 14-A(2) of the SC/ST Act, or the accused would have a right to apply further for bail under Section 439 of the Code to the High Court. 44. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant in this application and all connected matters, and Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, learned Amicus Curiae have urged in unison that an application under Section 439 of the Code would in the first instance lie before the Special Court POSCO Act, and an accused failing before that Court, would have further remedy before this Court in the concurrent jurisdiction under Section 439. Sri S.K.Pal, the learned Government Advocate has joined hands with Sri Chetan Chatterjee, learned Amicus Curiae who have thrown up a serious challenge to the said proposition and submitted that in a case where an accused is charged before the Special Court POSCO Act, with offences under the said Act, and the SC/ST Act, the power to grant bail would not be available under Section 439 of the Code; it would not be available even to this Court. 45. The thrust of the submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the applicants and Sri Rajiv Lochan Shukla, is that once it is held that jurisdiction to try a case involving offences both under the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act, lies with the Special Court, POCSO Act, the procedure in relation to bail applications determined by the said Special Court, in any other case, that it has jurisdiction to try under the POCSO Act, would also apply to a bail application that has added offences under the SC/ST Act. According to learned counsel for the applicants, finality to a bail order attaches under Section 14-A(2) of the SC/ST Act, with a right to appeal to this Court, when the bail application is dealt with by a Special Court under the SC/ST Act, but not otherwise. According to learned counsel for the applicants, finality to a bail order attaches under Section 14-A(2) of the SC/ST Act, with a right to appeal to this Court, when the bail application is dealt with by a Special Court under the SC/ST Act, but not otherwise. It is submitted that no appeal is envisaged from an order of the Special Court, POCSO Act, under Section 14-A(2) of the SC/ST Act and, therefore, the procedure as to bails under Sections 439 of the Code, would apply notwithstanding some offences charged, being under the last mentioned Act. 46. They have again drawn inspiration from the Division Bench decision of the Madras High Court in The Registrar (Judicial), in re (supra) and have placed reliance on paragraph 56 (supra) where it is held that the Special Court under the POCSO Act, trying a case under both the special statutes “alone shall have jurisdiction to exercise all the powers including the power to remand the accused under Section 167 of the Code, to take cognizance of the offences either on a police report or on a private complaint and to try the offender.” They submit that the power to grant bail is a facet of the power to remand. That being invested with the Special Court, POCSO Act, besides all powers as to cognizance and trial, according to the procedure applicable to the exercise of jurisdiction by that Court, no different procedure would be applicable in matters of bail in a case where the accused is remanded to custody by the Special Court, POCSO Act, involving one or more offences charged under the SC/ST Act. It is submitted that the provisions of Section 14-A(2), cannot be imported into the proceedings of a case held in accordance with the POCSO Act. 47. Sri Chetan Chatterjee, mounting a vitriolic challenge to the aforesaid submissions canvassed on behalf of the applicants, has submitted that the crux of the matter is: wherefrom does the Court draw its power to grant bail? He submits that in a case involving an offence under the SC/ST Act, there is no source of power for the Court to grant bail, whatever Court might be held to have jurisdiction over the matter, except that under Section 14-A(2) of the Act, last mentioned. He submits that in a case involving an offence under the SC/ST Act, there is no source of power for the Court to grant bail, whatever Court might be held to have jurisdiction over the matter, except that under Section 14-A(2) of the Act, last mentioned. He submits that it is a fallacious proposition to co-relate the power to remand, and to grant bail, tracing them to a common origin. It is urged that the power to grant bail may be a facet of the power to remand, but the two need not, in the context of varying statutory regulation, be derived from a common source; moreso, exercised according to a common procedure. Elucidating his point Sri Chatterjee submits that under the SC/ST Act too, there is no specific provision for remand by the Special Court or the Exclusive Special Court, constituted under that Act. The SC/ST Act is not a self contained Code. It being a penal statute, is made workable by application of all procedure envisaged under the Code, subject of course, to its special provisions by virtue of Section 4 (2) of the Code. But, the power to grant bail being one that is specifically regulated by Section 14-A(2), and to the extent that it is so regulated, excludes the provisions of the Code, including those of Section 437 and 439. 48. Furthering his submission that the source of power to grant bail under the SC/ST Act, that is different from the Code, which otherwise applies to bail in a matter of which the Special Court under the POCSO Act has seisin, learned Amicus Curiae submits that while the POCSO Act would generally prevail over the provisions of the SC/ST Act, and offences charged under both the special statutes would no doubt be triable by the Special Court, POCSO Act, but in the matter of grant of bails in such cases, provisions of Section 14-A(2) SC/ST Act that are specifically designed to protect the interests of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in the trial of a criminal case where they are victims, would apply to orders granting or refusing bails passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act. It would give finality to orders passed on bail applications by that Special Court, and afford the party aggrieved the remedy of an appeal, contemplated under Section 14-A(2), last mentioned. It would give finality to orders passed on bail applications by that Special Court, and afford the party aggrieved the remedy of an appeal, contemplated under Section 14-A(2), last mentioned. The provisions of Section 439 would have no application, that are otherwise available, by virtue of the Code, governing bails disposed of by the Special Court, under the POCSO Act. 49. Rather, non-conservative and ambitious as this submission of Sri Chatterjee appears, it draws inspiration from the decision of a Division Bench of the Guwahati High Court in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh vs. National Investigation Agency, 2012 SCC OnLine Gau 591: (2013) 1 Gau LR 374. Sri Chatterjee submits that in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), the appellant was charged with offences, amongst others, under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, which was amended by the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008 w.e.f. 31.12.2008. Besides, effecting many other changes and additions to the principal statute, the Amending Act, in particular, also introduced Section 43D, placing restrictions vide the proviso to sub-Section (5) of Section 43D on the Court's power to grant bail. The restriction introduced was in terms that an accused charged under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (as amended) shall not be released on bail, or on his own bond, if the Court, on perusal of the case diary, or on the report made under Section 173 of the Code, is of opinion that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. It is pointed out that at the same time when the Amending Act aforesaid, brought in Section 43D, another enactment, the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (for short, the NIA Act), also came into force w.e.f. 31.12.2008. It empowered the Central Government to create a Special Investigation Agency, called the National Investigation Agency, for the investigation and prosecution of offences, under statutes specified in the Schedule to the NIA Act. Section 11 of the NIA Act confers powers on the Central Government to establish Special Courts. 50. It is also provided that so long as the Special Court has not been constituted under the NIA Act, the Court of Sessions would be the Court before which the accused shall be produced, in case he is arrested in connection with an offence, that the National Investigation Agency is investigating. 50. It is also provided that so long as the Special Court has not been constituted under the NIA Act, the Court of Sessions would be the Court before which the accused shall be produced, in case he is arrested in connection with an offence, that the National Investigation Agency is investigating. Such a Special Court or the Court of Sessions, alone would have the power to remand the accused to custody of whatever kind, or to grant bail. It was held that the power of the Special Court or the Court of Sessions, dealing with an offence investigated by the National Investigation Agency, to grant bail, would be traceable to Section 437 of the Code, subject to all limitations, that are applicable to a Magistrate. To add to it, would be adherence to the conditions, in the understanding of this Court, enumerated under Section 34D (5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (as amended), hedging in the right of an accused to bail. The order passed by the Special Court as aforesaid, or the Sessions Court, when dealing with an offence investigated by the National Investigation Agency, granting or refusing bail, would be appealable under Section 24(4) of the NIA Act. 51. The attention of the Court has been drawn, to an earlier decision relating to the same crime as the one dealt with in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra), where one of their Lordships constituting Division Bench, sitting singly, had dealt with the issue involved earlier, in the context of the NIA Act, and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (as amended), while considering a bail application made by a co-accused. This was in Redaul Hussain Khan and others vs. State of the Assam and others, 2009(3) GLT 855, where squarely the issue was whether the applicants who were charged with an offence punishable under Section 120B, 121, 120A IPC read with Section 25(1B)(A) Arms Act, and Sections 17, 18 and 19 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (as amended), and shorn of details, the investigation whereof was transferred to the National Investigation Agency by the Central Government, had a right to maintain their bail applications under Section 439 of the Code, before the High Court. 52. 52. In deciding the aforesaid issue, the Court in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra) undertook a cautious analysis of the provisions of Section 437 of the Code vis-à-vis those of Section 439, in the matter of their applicability to a bail application, filed before a Special Court constituted under the NIA Act. It was done to trace the source of power of the Special Court, constituted under the said Act. In reaching its conclusion on the issue, apart from looking to the relevant statutory provisions in the NIA Act, the Court looked into the statutory provisions of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (since repealed), the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, the provisions of the NIA Act, and the provisions of the NDPS Act. The Court after reference to authority deciding the issue, in the context of provisions pari materia to those of the NIA Act, in substance held that a Special Court constituted under the NIA Act, or a Sessions Court discharging the functions of the Special Court, in the interregnum, notwithstanding the fact that the Special Court may be conferred with all powers of the Court of Sessions, would be a 'Court', other than the High Court or Court of Sessions, within the meaning of Section 437(1) of the Code. It was on all that reasoning concluded, that the Special Court under the NIA Act, has for its source of power to grant bail, the provisions of Section 437 of the Code; not Section 439. 53. It would be profitable to refer to what the Court said in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra) while reaching conclusions on the issue as above detailed. It was held: “63. The question, therefore, is this: When a person, arrested in connection with a Scheduled offence, is, on being taken into custody, brought, or pursuant to the fact that he is wanted in connection with a Scheduled offence, appears, before a Special Court, when a Special Court stands constituted under the NIA Act, or before a Court of Session, when the Special Court has not been constituted, what is the source of power, if any, of the Special or of the Court of Session, as the case may be, to consider an application for bail, if such an accused applies for bail. Will a Special Court or Court of Session exercise powers in respect of such an application for bail under Section 437 or 439 of the Code or under some other provisions of the NIA Act? In order to reach a correct answer to this question, one has to carefully analyse the provisions of Section 437 vis-à-vis Section 439. With this end in view, both these sections are reproduced hereinbelow: 437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence. -(1). When any person accused of, or suspected of, the commission of any non-bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer in charge of a police station or appears or is brought before a Court other than the High Court or Court of Sessions, he may be released on bail, but-(rest of the text of the statutory provisions of Section 437 and 439 of the Code quoted in the report, omitted). 64. From a careful reading of the provisions contained in Section 437(1), what becomes transparent is that Section 437(1) gives power to grant bail to a court 'other than the High Court or Court of Session'. Admittedly, a Special Court, under the NIA Act, is not a Court of Session and even the Court of Session, while acting as the Special Court under the NIA Act, does not, as already discussed above, act as a Court of Session. The Special Court is also not a High Court, for, a Special Court, as defined in Section 2(h), is a Court, which is constituted, under Section 11, by the Central Government or, under Section 22, by a State Government. The expression, 'a Court other than the High Court, or the Court of Session', has very wide meaning and includes, within its ambit, not only the Magisterial Courts, but all such Courts, including a Special Court, which do not fall within the expressions, 'the High Court' or 'the Court of Session'. …......... 65. It is also well to remember that merely because of the fact that a Court of Session can function as a Special Court if Special Court is not constituted under a special law, it does not follow that the Court of Session, which exercises the powers of the Special Court, would become a Court of Session. …......... 65. It is also well to remember that merely because of the fact that a Court of Session can function as a Special Court if Special Court is not constituted under a special law, it does not follow that the Court of Session, which exercises the powers of the Special Court, would become a Court of Session. In the given scheme of a 'special law', a Court of Session, as already pointed out in A.R. Antulay (supra), may become a Court of original jurisdiction with no trappings of the Court of Session. In such circumstances, merely because of the fact that a Sessions Judge exercises the jurisdiction of a Special Court, the Special Court would not be treated, or would not be deemed, to have become, a Court of Session. When the Special Court, in the case at hand, falls within the expression, 'a Court other than the High Court or the Court of Session', which appears in Section 437(1), it logically follows that a Special Court would run all the limitations, which are imposed by Section 437 on the powers of a Court, covered by Section 437, in respect of granting of bail. Logically extended, this will mean that, amongst other limitations, as specified by Sub-section (1) of Section 437, a Special Court would not be able to release a person on bail if there appears a reasonable ground for believing that he has been guilty of offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life except when a case is covered by the proviso to Section 437(1), which says that even such an accused person may be released, if the accused person is a woman or is sick or is infirm or if, for any other special reason, the Special Court considers it just and proper to release such a person. 68. In Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), which the learned Public Prosecutor has relied upon, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the question as to whether Section 439 of the Code could be invoked by a person accused of an offence under the TADA? Yet Anr. question, which arose, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), was as to whether the source of power of the Designated Court to grant bail was Section 20(8) of the TADA, which I have quoted above, or Section 437 of the Code. 71. Yet Anr. question, which arose, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), was as to whether the source of power of the Designated Court to grant bail was Section 20(8) of the TADA, which I have quoted above, or Section 437 of the Code. 71. It is worth noticing that the Apex Court pointed out, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), that the jurisdiction and power of a Designated Court are derived from the TADA and it is the TADA that one must, primarily, look to, for the purpose of deciding the question as to whether the Designated Court's power to grant bail is relatable to Section 437 or 439 and/or whether the High Court has the power to invoke its jurisdiction, under Section 439 or 482, to grant bail under the TADA, and, having examined the entire scheme of the TADA, the Apex Court, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), concluded that the source of the power of a Designated Court to consider bail is traceable to Section 437 and not Section 439 inasmuch as the Designated Court falls within the expression, "a Court other than the High Court or the Court of Session". 72. Similarly, in the case at hand, one has to, primarily, look into the provisions of the scheme of the NIA Act in order to determine if the power of the Special Court, or the Court of Session, as the case may be, in respect of grant of bail, is relatable to Section 437 or 439 and/or whether the High Court has the power to grant bail to an accused, under the NIA Act, by invoking its jurisdiction under 439 of the Code. 77. What emerges from the above discussion is that it is the Special Court under the NIA Act, or the Court of Session, when the Special Court has not been constituted, where an accused is required to be produced if he is arrested in connection with an offence punishable under the NIA Act and, upon his production, it is the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, which shall have the power to grant bail. The source of power of the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, to consider an application for bail is traceable to, and governed by, the provisions of Section 437 of the Code and while considering such an application for bail, the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, will not exercise the power of bail as if it is considering an application for bail under Section 439 and, consequently, the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, would have all the limitations, which a Magistrate has, while deciding an application for bail, under Section 437 of the Code.” (Emphasis by Court) 78. Having, thus, settled the fact that under the NIA Act, the Special Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, exercises the power to grant, or refuse bail, by taking recourse to Section 437 of the Code and not any other provisions of the Code, not even Section 439 thereof, or under any of the provisions of the NIA Act, let me, now, turn to the question as to whether a High Court, within the scheme of the NIA Act, can take resort to Section 439 of the Code, particularly, when the Court of Session, while acting as a Special Court, under the NIA Act, is denuded of its power contained in Section 439. 82. The Supreme Court pointed out, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), that it all depends on the scheme of a particular enactment as to whether the power of the High Court and/or of the Court of Session to grant bail, under Section 438 and 439, exists or not. The Apex, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), upheld the view expressed by the High Court that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail under Section 439 or under Section 482 of the Code. The relevant observations, made in this regard, at para 22, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), read: 22. Upon that view, the court in Balchand Jain case held that Rule 184 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971, does not take away the power conferred on a Court of Session or a High Court under Section 438 of the Code to grant anticipatory bail. Upon that view, the court in Balchand Jain case held that Rule 184 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Rules, 1971, does not take away the power conferred on a Court of Session or a High Court under Section 438 of the Code to grant anticipatory bail. We have been referred to the decision of R.S. Pathak, C.J. speaking for a Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Ishwar Chand v. State of Himachal Pradesh holding that Rule 184 did not affect the jurisdiction and power of the High Court under Sections 438 and 439 of the Code which were independent of the power of the special tribunal to try an offence for contravention of an order made under Section 3 of the Defence and Internal Security of India Act, 1971. Both these decisions are clearly distinguishable. The view expressed in Balchand Jain case is not applicable at all for more than one reason. There was nothing in the Defence and Internal Security of India Act or the Rules framed thereunder which would exclude the jurisdiction and power of the High Court altogether. On the contrary, Section 12(2) of that Act expressly vested in the High Court the appellate jurisdiction in certain specified cases. In view of the explicit bar in Section 19(2). there is exclusion of the jurisdiction of the High Court. It interdicts that no appeal or revision shall lie to any court, including the High Court, against any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Designated Court. The Act by Section 16(1) confers the right of appeal both on facts as well as on law to the Supreme Court. Further, while it is true that Chapter 33 of the Code is still preserved as otherwise the Designated Courts would have no power to grant bail, still the source of power is not Section 439 of the Code but Section 437 being a court other than the High Court or the Court of Session. Any other view would lead to an anomalous situation. If it were to be held that the power of a Designated Court to grant bail was relatable to Section 439 it would imply that not only the High Court but also the Court of Session would be entitled to grant bail on such terms as they deem fit. Any other view would lead to an anomalous situation. If it were to be held that the power of a Designated Court to grant bail was relatable to Section 439 it would imply that not only the High Court but also the Court of Session would be entitled to grant bail on such terms as they deem fit. The power to grant bail under Section 439 is unfettered by any conditions and limitations like Section 437. It would run counter to the express prohibition contained in Section 20(8) of the Act which enjoins that notwithstanding anything in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under the Act or any rule made thereunder shall, if in custody, be released on bail unless the conditions set forth in Clauses (a) and (b) are satisfied. Lastly, both the decision in Balchand Jain and that in Ishwar Chand turn on the scheme of the Defence and Internal Security of India Act, 1971. They proceed on the well recognised principle that an ouster of jurisdiction of the ordinary courts is not to be readily inferred except by express provision or by necessary implication. It all depends on the scheme of the particular Act as to whether the power of the High Court and the Court of Session to grant bail under Sections 438 and 439 exists. We must accordingly uphold the view expressed by the High Court that it had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail under Section 439 or under Section 482 of the Code. 83. Thus, in no uncertain words, the Apex Court, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), held that with regard to bail, under the TADA, the High Court's jurisdiction, under Section 439 as well as Section 482 of the Code stood excluded. 85. What surfaces from the above discussion is that Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), held, in categorical terms, that neither the Designated Court nor the High Court could have exercised power to grant bail by taking recourse to Section 439 of the Code and whereas the Designated Court's source of power to grant bail was traceable to Section 437, the High Court's power to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code stood wholly excluded. The Supreme Court also held, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), that an order of bail, being an 'interlocutory order', was also not an appealable order, under Section 19(1), to the Supreme Court. 86. Thus, if a Designated Court happened to refuse to grant bail to an accused under TADA, neither any of the provisions of the Code nor any of the provisions of the TADA could have been resorted to for the purpose of granting bail by the High Court. In fact, a person, arrested under the TADA, had no remedy if the Designated Court refused to grant him bail except, perhaps, approaching the High Court under Article 226 and/or 227 or, in an appropriate case, the Supreme Court seeking to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 136. In fact, in Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon (supra), the Supreme Court exercised its power, under Article 136, to issue certain directions to the Designated Court. 54. The Court in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra) in the last leg of the analysis did a comparison of the provisions of Section 34(4) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act and Section 21(4) of the NIA Act to buttress His Lordship's conclusion that the power of the High Court under Section 439 of the Code stood excluded in favour of the special provisions of the NIA Act that envisages exercise of powers to determine a bail plea, in the first instance under Section 437 of the Code, and in the case of either party being aggrieved by the grant or refusal of bail, would have the remedy of an appeal to the High Court provided under Section 21(4) of the Act, last mentioned. It was held in Redaul Hussain Khan (supra) in this context thus: “101. It is, now, imperative to point out that Section 21(4) of the NIA Act is in no way different from Section 34(4) of the POTA. Both the provisions are not only similar, but also same. Hence, the provisions, contained in Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, and the provisions, contained in Section 34(4), of the POTA, can be given one and the same meaning. Both the provisions are not only similar, but also same. Hence, the provisions, contained in Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, and the provisions, contained in Section 34(4), of the POTA, can be given one and the same meaning. Situated thus, it becomes clear that when a person is forwarded to a Special Court, where the Special Court is constituted, or to the Court of Session, where no Special Court is constituted, the accused can make an application for bail; but this application would fall under Section 437 and not under Section 439, though even a Court of Session, in the absence of constitution of a Special Court, may be the Court to which such an accused is forwarded. An accused, who has been taken into custody in connection with any offence under the NIA Act, cannot apply to the High Court seeking bail, under Section 439 of the Code, without making any application to the Special Court or Court of Session, as the case may be, under Section 437 nor can the accused, on rejection of his application for bail by the Special or the Court of Session, as the case may be, under the NIA Act, apply to the High Court to invoke the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 439. However, an accused may, in terms of provisions of Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, prefer an appeal to the High Court, against an order passed by the Special Court, or the Court of Session, as the case may be, refusing to enlarge him on bail. .... .” 55. This Court has carefully examined the contention of Sri Chetan Chatterjee, learned Amicus Curiae to the effect that the Special Court under the POCSO Act, would draw for its source of power to grant bail upon the provisions of Section 437 of the Code, as the Special Court is not a Court of Sessions within the meaning of Section 437(1) of the Code. Even if it were so, this Court does not think that the power of the High Court to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code would stand excluded, once the Special Court under the POCSO Act has determined a bail plea in the first instance. Even if it were so, this Court does not think that the power of the High Court to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code would stand excluded, once the Special Court under the POCSO Act has determined a bail plea in the first instance. The submissions of the learned Amicus Curiae to the contrary based on the decisions in Jayanta Kumar Ghosh (supra) and Redaul Hussain Khan (supra) would not lead to the conclusion mooted by him. This is so because the conclusions in the aforesaid decisions, and other authorities that the decisions under reference have depended upon, are based on the particular provisions of those statutes, and the manner they operate to confer jurisdiction upon the Special Courts under those Acts to deal with a bail plea, and also upon the High Court, in cases where a person aggrieved seeks remedy there. A reading of the relevant provisions of Section 14(3) of the TADA Act shows that the same had not generally applied the provisions of the Code, relating to all matters in the exercise of its jurisdiction by a Designated Court, under the said Act. Instead, by a legal fiction, the Parliament had provided that “a Designated Court shall, for the purpose of trial of any offence, have all the powers of a Court of Session and shall try such offence as if it were a Court of Session so far as may be in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code for the trial before a Court of Session.” see Section 14(3) of TADA Act, 1987. Thus, provisions relating to bail, amongst others, would not apply to a Designated Court. Again, by virtue of Section 19(1) and (2) of the TADA Act an appeal lay as a matter of right from any judgment, sentence or order of a Designated Court to the Supreme Court, except an interlocutory order. An appeal or revision to any Court from a judgment, sentence or order, including an interlocutory order of a Designated Court was barred by virtue of Sub-Section (2) of Section 19 of the TADA Act, except that provided to the Supreme Court from a final order. An appeal or revision to any Court from a judgment, sentence or order, including an interlocutory order of a Designated Court was barred by virtue of Sub-Section (2) of Section 19 of the TADA Act, except that provided to the Supreme Court from a final order. It was in view of this scheme of the Act under reference, that the power of the High Court under Section 439 of the Code was held excluded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Usman Bhai Daud Bhai Menon vs. State of Gujarat, (1988) 2 SCC 271 . 56. Likewise, under the SC/ST Act, Section 14 provides for the establishment of a Special Court, or Exclusive Special Court to try offences under the said Act. It makes no provision, even by fiction, that a Special Court under the SC/ST Act for the purpose of trial shall have all the powers of a Court of Session, or shall try such offences, as if it were a Court of Session. It does say that the Courts established under the Act shall have power to directly take cognizance of offences under the Act last mentioned. This is stipulated by the proviso to Section 14(1) of the SC/ST Act. The Act by virtue of Section 14A(1) provides for an appeal from any judgment, sentence and order, that is not interlocutory, passed by a Special Court, or an Exclusive Special Court, to the High Court, both on facts and law. By virtue of Section 14A(2) with a non obstante clause, excluding the provisions of the Code, an appeal has been provided to the High Court against the order of a Special Court or Exclusive Special Court, granting or refusing bail. It is in the context of these statutory provisions under the SC/ST Act, that the powers under Section 439 have been held to be excluded for the Special Court, because it would be on the terms of Section 14 read with Section 437(1), “a Court other than the High Court or the Court of Session” see section 437(1) Cr.P.C., and, for the High Court because from the order of Special Court or Exclusive Special Court, an order granting or refusing bail, has been made appealable to the High Court, under Section 14A(2). The position is almost identical on the terms of Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, and Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (as amended). The position is almost identical on the terms of Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, and Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (as amended). 57. By contrast, the provisions of Section 31 of the POCSO Act are very differently worded, and import all the provisions of the Code to proceedings before the Special Court, under the said Act on omnibus terms, except to the extent that it is otherwise provided. It eloquently says that the provisions of the Code would apply to proceedings before the Special Court under the POCSO Act, including the provision as to bail and bonds. It is also made explicit that for the purpose of proceedings before the Special Court, that would include provisions relating to bail and bonds, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Session. In this connection, it would be gainful to refer to the provisions of Section 31 of the POCSO Act, that read: “31. Application of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to proceedings before a Special Court.—Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) (including the provisions as to bail and bonds) shall apply to the proceedings before a Special Court and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions and the person conducting a prosecution before a Special Court, shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.” 58. On the clear terms of the provisions of Section 31 of the POCSO Act, there can be little doubt that by the first part of its mandate, the provisions of the Code have been made applicable to all proceedings before the Special Court, including bail, and by the second part, a fiction has been created, whereby a Special Court for the purpose of all its proceedings, shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions. The entire gamut of proceedings under the POCSO Act, are to be governed by the Code, including those relating to bail. If the fiction were not there in the latter part of Section 31, it could be said that the Special Court is a Court, other than the Court of Session or the High Court, within the meaning of Section 437(1) of the Code. If the fiction were not there in the latter part of Section 31, it could be said that the Special Court is a Court, other than the Court of Session or the High Court, within the meaning of Section 437(1) of the Code. It could then also be said that its power to grant bail would be governed by Section 437, and not sourced to Section 439. But, all possible debate about that, and further about the power of this Court to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code, where it is refused by a Special Court under the POCSO Act, stands excluded by the legal fiction in the latter part of Section 31 of the said Act. Those proceedings have been clarified by the legislature, to include expressly, the provisions as to bail provided under the Code. There can be little doubt, therefore, that Special Court under the POCSO Act would exercise powers to grant bail under Section 439 of the Code. Its source of power to deal with a bail plea, would not be traceable to Section 437. 59. There is still one submission of Sri Chatterjee, that is required to be dealt with. He has made a tenuous effort to suggest that Section 20 of the SC/ST Act read with Section 14A(2), would make orders of the Special Court under the POCSO Act, while dealing with a bail plea involving one of the offences under the former Act, appealable to the High Court. He submits drawing support from the decision in Registrar (Judicial), in re (supra) that on a harmonious construction of the provisions of the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act, the former Act would prevail generally; but that has an exception. According to him, the amended provisions of the SC/ST Act, introduced vide SC/ST Amendment Act, being a later enactment in point of time to the POCSO Act, the conscious omission by the legislature in not employing the words “similar purposes” as figure in the proviso to Section 28(1) of the POCSO Act, do show that the Special Court, POCSO Act, would have jurisdiction to try an offence under the SC/ST Act, but it does not exclude the applicability of Section 14A(2) to such a Special Court, when in seisin of an offence under the SC/ST Act. It is submitted that just as in the case of the NIA Act, the provision as to appeal from orders of the Special Court under that Act, applies to the exclusion of Section 439 of the Code, likewise the provisions as to appeal in cases under the SC/ST Act, would apply to a Special Court under the POCSO Act, limited for the purpose of bail. 60. This Court is afraid that the aforesaid argument is fallacious. There is no mechanism under the two statutes, that is to say, the SC/ST Act and the POCSO Act, whereby the provisions of Section 14A(2) giving finality to a decision of the Special Court under the SC/ST Act may apply to a like decision of the Special Court, POCSO Act, while the latter Court decides a bail plea, in relation to a case where one or more of the offences charged, is under the SC/ST Act. There is no such statutory conduit, whereby the provisions of Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST Act, for the limited purpose of determining a bail plea by the Special Court, POCSO Act, where one of the offences charged in a case is under the SC/ST Act, may be transplanted into the scheme of the POCSO Act. The submission is, therefore, not acceptable to this Court. 61. On an added note, it may be mentioned that an appeal by its essential characteristic, is a creature of statute. It postulates a Court or Authority of first instance, and another of appellate jurisdiction empowered by law to hear appeals from the Court or Authority of the first instance. It also postulates specific orders, from which the statute provides appeals. It is not that every order of a Court or Authority of first instance, would be appealable to the Appellate Court or the Authority, because by law some orders are made appealable. This being the essential characteristic of an appeal, it is almost impossible to hold that an order of the Special Court under the POCSO Act determining a bail plea, would appealable under Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST Act. This being the essential characteristic of an appeal, it is almost impossible to hold that an order of the Special Court under the POCSO Act determining a bail plea, would appealable under Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST Act. That could alone have happened in case, there were a provision under either of the two statutes, creating a legal fiction that the Special Court, POCSO Act, while determining a bail plea in a case where one of the offences charged was under the SC/ST Act, would be deemed to be a Special Court under the said Act, for the limited purpose of deciding the bail plea. 62. In view of what has been said above, the questions as set out in paragraph 7 (supra), are answered thus: (A) Question No.(i) stands answered in the affirmative in terms that where in a case, offences both under the POCSO Act and SC/ST Act are charged arising out of the same crime, that under the Code may be tried at the same trial, the Special Court, POCSO Act, would have jurisdiction to determine the bail plea of an accused to the exclusion of the Special Court, SC/ST Act; (B) Question No.(ii) stands answered in the negative in terms that where an order declining bail to an accused is passed by the Special Court, POCSO Act, in a crime involving offences, both under the POCSO Act and the SC/ST Act, that order would not be final, and appealable under Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST Act; an application under Section 439 of the Code would alone be maintainable before the High Court. 63. This Court places on record both appreciation and gratitude for the valuable and erudite assistance rendered by Sri Rajeev Lochan Shukla and Sri Chetan Chatterjee, learned Amicus Curiae. This Court also places on record its appreciation for the good assistance and industry of Sri S.K.Pal, the learned Government Advocate, as well as that of Sri Indrajeet Singh Yadav and Sri J.B.Singh, learned Additional Government Advocates, all of whom very ably put froth the State's stand in the matter. Sri Amit Kumar and Sri Dheeraj Singh Advocates, learned counsel appearing for the applicants in some of the connected Bail Applications, who have very ably put forth the applicants' stand, are no less to be appreciated for their invaluable assistance. 64. It is, accordingly, held that this bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. is maintainable. Sri Amit Kumar and Sri Dheeraj Singh Advocates, learned counsel appearing for the applicants in some of the connected Bail Applications, who have very ably put forth the applicants' stand, are no less to be appreciated for their invaluable assistance. 64. It is, accordingly, held that this bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. is maintainable. This order will govern all connected matters. Put up on 22.02.2019 for orders along with connected matters in the Additional Cause List before the appropriate bench.