ORDER : T. Rajani, J. 1. This application is filed seeking to insert Paragraph 8(a) to (d) after Paragraph 8 in the election petition and for consequential amendments. 2. The grounds, on which the said amendment is sought for to the election petition, are as follows: As per Section 33 of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (for short, "the Act"), a nomination paper complete in the prescribed form, signed by a candidate and by an elector of the constituency as proposer, should be delivered to the returning officer within the prescribed period. A candidate has to file an affidavit alongwith his nomination paper as prescribed in Form 26. The 1st respondent has deliberately filed a false affidavit in Form 26 by not disclosing the criminal case pending against him in CC No. 370 of 2012 and the charges were also framed as on the day of filing his nomination. As per Section 33(A) of the Act, it is incumbent upon every candidate, who is contesting election, to give information about his assets, criminal antecedents, and other affairs. The petitioner has suppressed the material information resulting in disinformation and misinformation to the voters. The 1st respondent, who is the returned candidate, has failed and neglect to disclose the information of pending criminal case against him. Hence, it is required that the same has to be incorporated in the election petition. 3. The 1st respondent filed counter contending that the EA seeking amendment is not maintainable. Section 80 of the Act mandates that no election shall be called, in question, except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Part-VI. Section 81 stipulates that an election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in sub-section (1) of Section 100 and Section 101 of the Act. A combined reading of the above provisions makes it clear that no further grounds can be available after the filing of the election petition, even by way of amendment. Once the election petition is filed, with the grounds, within 45 days as stipulated under Section 100, it is not permissible to seek inclusion of any other grounds subsequent to the filing of election petition. A crime was registered against the 1st respondent for the offences, which are not grave in nature. Once the election petition is filed, with the grounds, within 45 days as stipulated under Section 100, it is not permissible to seek inclusion of any other grounds subsequent to the filing of election petition. A crime was registered against the 1st respondent for the offences, which are not grave in nature. The purport of introducing Section 33-A of the Act is to inform the voter against the contesting candidate so that they can assess while exercising the franchise. Section 33-A(3) of the Act stipulates that such an affidavit shall be displayed to declare the said factum to the public. The non-disclosure is neither intentional nor wanton, but due to lack of advice. The same cannot be a ground for an amendment. So far as the conviction is concerned, the 1st respondent was convicted, but he preferred an appeal and by virtue of the orders dated 29.1.2018 passed in Crl.M.P. No. 31 of 2018 in Crl.A. No. 32 of 2018, the sentence and conviction were suspended. Hence, the 1st respondent does not suffer from any disqualification as contemplated under the Act. Hence, the petition is liable to be rejected. 4. Heard Sri B. Nalini Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner; Sri Prakash Buddarapu, learned Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent; Sri K. Mohana Rami Reddy, learned Counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 13; and the learned Government Pleader for General Administration Department appearing for the 14th respondent. 5. The Counsel for the petitioner contends that as the petitioner was not aware of the criminal case that was registered against the 1st respondent, he could not mention the said fact in the petition and that since he came to know about the pendency of the criminal case against the petitioner after filing of the EP, he had to seek amendment of the EP by way of this interim application. 6. The respondents' Counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1987 (Supp.) SCC 93, to draw support to his contention that no amendment can be sought to the election petition after the expiry of 45 days of the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 81 of the Act. 6. The respondents' Counsel relies on the judgment of the Apex Court reported in Dhartipakar Madan Lal Agarwal v. Rajiv Gandhi, 1987 (Supp.) SCC 93, to draw support to his contention that no amendment can be sought to the election petition after the expiry of 45 days of the period of limitation as prescribed under Section 81 of the Act. The Supreme Court in the above said judgment observed that the appellant's grievance, that in entertaining the preliminary objections and rejecting the election petition under Order VII Rule 11, the High Court deprived the appellant's opportunity to amend the petition and to make good the deficiencies of supplying the necessary particulars and the details of the corrupt practice alleged in the petition, is devoid of any merit. It observed that the appellant was free to file amendment application, but at no stage he expressed any desire to make any amendment application nor he made any application to that effect before the High Court. It was open to the appellant to have made that application but he himself did not make any such application. The allegations of corrupt practice as required by Section 83 were not complete and the same did not furnish any cause of action, any amendment made after the expiry of the period of limitation could not be permitted, which would amount to raising a new ground of challenge. It held that the amendment applications cannot be allowed after the expiry of 45 days of time. While holding as such, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "It must be borne in mind that the election petition was presented to the Registrar of the High Court, at Lucknow Bench on the last day of the limitation prescribed for filing the election petition. The appellant could not raise any ground of challenge after the expiry of limitation. Order VI Rule 17 no doubt permits amendment of an election petition but the same is subject to the provisions of the Act. Section 81 prescribes a period of 45 days from the date of the election for presenting election petition calling in question the election of a returned candidate. After the expiry of that period no election petition is maintainable and the High Court or this Court has no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation. Section 81 prescribes a period of 45 days from the date of the election for presenting election petition calling in question the election of a returned candidate. After the expiry of that period no election petition is maintainable and the High Court or this Court has no jurisdiction to extend the period of limitation. An order of amendment permitting a new ground to be raised beyond the time specified in Section 81 would amount to contravention of those provisions, and is beyond the ambit of Section 87 of the Act. It necessarily follow that a new ground cannot be raised or inserted in an election petition by way of amendment after the expiry of the period of limitation. The amendments claimed by the appellant are not in the nature of supplying particulars instead those seek to raise new grounds of challenge. Various paragraphs of the election petition which are sought to be amended, do not disclose any cause of action, therefore it is not permissible to allow their amendment after expiry of the period of limitation. Amendment applications are accordingly rejected." 7. The other ruling relied upon by the respondents' Counsel is rendered by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra Pradesh, passed in EA No. 823 of 2016 in EP No. 3 of 2014, dated 28.8.2017. The amendment sought for in the case dealt with by the said Court is also with respect to corrupt practices. In that background of facts, the Court held that the said amendment cannot be permitted. 8. The petitioners' Counsel, in answer to the contentions raised by the respondents' Counsel, with the support of the above judgments, relies on another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Sethi Roop Lal v. Malti Thapar, (1994) 2 SCC 579 , wherein the Supreme Court at Paragraphs 10 and 11, held as under: "10. The fascicules of sections appearing in Chapter-III of Part-VI of the Act lays down the procedure for trial of election petitions. Sub-section (1) of Section 87 thereof provides that subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure ('Code' for short). Sub-section (1) of Section 87 thereof provides that subject to the provisions of this Act and of any rules made thereunder, every election petition shall be tried by the High Court, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure ('Code' for short). That necessarily means that Order VI Rule 17 of the Code which relates to amendment of pleadings will a fortiori apply to election petitions subject, however, to the provisions of the Act and of any rules made thereunder. Under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code the Court has the power to allow parties to the proceedings to alter or amend their pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and it provides that all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. But exercise of such general powers stands curtailed by Section 86(5) of the Act, when amendment is sought for in respect of any election petition based on corrupt practice. Since Section 87 of the Act and, for that matter, Order VI Rule 17 of the Code is subject to the provisions of the Act, which necessarily includes Section 86(5), the general power of amendment under the former must yield to the restrictions imposed by the latter. 11. Indubitably, therefore, if the amendment sought for in the instant case related to corrupt practice we might have to consider the same in conformity with Section 86(5) of the Act as interpreted by this Court in the case of F.A. Sapal and accept the findings of the learned Judge as recorded in the impugned order; but then, the learned Judge failed to notice that the amendments, the appellant intends to bring in his election petition, do not relate to any corrupt practice and, therefore, it has to be considered in the light of Section 87, and de hors Section 86(5) of the Act. For the foregoing reasons the impugned order dated May 28, 1993 cannot also be sustained." 9. From the above judgment, it can be understood that if the amendment sought for relates to corrupt practice, Section 86(5) of the Act, becomes relevant. But if the amendment does not relate to any corrupt practice, it is Section 87 of the Act which holds the field. From the above judgment, it can be understood that if the amendment sought for relates to corrupt practice, Section 86(5) of the Act, becomes relevant. But if the amendment does not relate to any corrupt practice, it is Section 87 of the Act which holds the field. It would be beneficial to look into Sections 86(5) and 87 of the Act. Section 86(5) of the Act permits the High Court to amend the election petition with regard to the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition, as may, in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, but shall not allow any amendment of the petition, which will have the effect of introducing particulars of the corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. It can be seen that Section 86(5) of the Act pertains to an amendment in respect of the particulars pertaining to any corrupt practice. Section 87 permits the Court to apply the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to every election petition that shall be tried by the High Court. Hence it is clear that except for the amendment pertaining to the corrupt practice, any other amendment can be sought to as per the Code of Civil Procedure. 10. The Counsel for the petitioner draws the attention of this Court to the nomination form filed by the respondents, wherein at Column 5, the 1st respondent is supposed to disclose whether he is an accused of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more in a pending case. The 1st respondent has mentioned 'NIL' in Columns 'a' to 'f' under clause 5(i) of the nomination form, which pertains to the disclosure of the information with regard to the (a) FIR, (b) Sections of law for which he is charged, (c) Name of the Court, case number, date of order of taking cognizance, (d) Courts which framed charges, (e) Dates on which the charges were framed, and (f) Whether all or any of the proceedings have been stayed by any Court of competent jurisdiction. 11. There is no dispute that the 1st respondent figured as an accused in a criminal case, which ended in conviction. 11. There is no dispute that the 1st respondent figured as an accused in a criminal case, which ended in conviction. But the contention of the respondents' Counsel is that by virtue of the suspension of the judgment of conviction and sentence of the appellate Court, the respondents need not furnish the information as sought for. The argument of the 1st respondent's Counsel is based on the premise that the Column No. 5 in nomination form seeks only information with regard to the conviction of the candidate. But the information required by Clause 5 of the nomination form is not with regard to whether the candidate is convicted, but it is with regard to whether the candidate is an accused in any offence. Hence, it prima facie appears to be a case of suppression of the facts, which were to be mentioned in the nomination form. 12. The Counsel for the petitioner relies on another judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Kisan Shankar Kathore v. Arun Dattatray Sawant and others, 2014 (5) ALD 61 (SC) : AIR 2014 SC 2069 , in order to draw support to his contention that suppression of the information with regard to the 1st respondent being an accused in a criminal case would make the nomination form liable for rejection. The Supreme Court at Paragraph 38 of the said judgment held as follows: "38. When the information is given by a candidate in the affidavit filed alongwith the nomination paper and objections are raised thereto questioning the correctness of the information or alleging that there is non-disclosure of certain important information, it may not be possible for the returning officer at that time to conduct a detailed examination. Summary enquiry may not suffice. Present case is itself an example which loudly demonstrates this. At the same time, it would not be possible for the Returning Officer to reject the nomination for want of verification about the allegations made by the objector. In such a case, when ultimately it is proved that it was a case of non-disclosure and either the affidavit was false or it did not contain complete information leading to suppression, it can be held at that stage that the nomination was improperly accepted. Ms. In such a case, when ultimately it is proved that it was a case of non-disclosure and either the affidavit was false or it did not contain complete information leading to suppression, it can be held at that stage that the nomination was improperly accepted. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Election Commission, right argued that such an enquiry can be only at a later stage and the appropriate stage would be in an election petition as in the instant case, when the election is challenged. The grounds stated in Section 36(2) are those which can be examined there and then and on that basis the Returning Officer would be in a position to reject the nomination. Likewise, where the blanks are left in an affidavit, nomination can be rejected there and then. In other cases where detailed enquiry is needed, it would depend upon the outcome thereof, in an election petition, as to whether the nomination was properly accepted or it was a case of improper acceptance. Once it is found that it was a case of improper acceptance, as there was misinformation or suppression of material information, one can state question of rejection in such a case was only deferred to a later date. When the Court gives such a finding, which would have resulted in rejection, the effect would be same, namely, such a candidate was not entitled to contest and the election is void. Otherwise, it would be an anomalous situation that even when criminal proceedings under Section 125-A of the Act can be initiated and the selected candidate is criminally prosecuted and convicted, but the result of his election cannot be questioned. This cannot be countenanced." 13. The Counsel for the respondents argues that the involvement of the candidate in a criminal case would not make his application liable for rejection. The said contention need not be dismissed as incorrect. But as per the above judgment, it is not the fact that he was involved in a criminal case that renders the application liable for rejection, but it is the suppression of the fact of his involvement in the criminal case that renders the application liable for rejection, which, prima facie, is proved to have occurred in this case. 14. But as per the above judgment, it is not the fact that he was involved in a criminal case that renders the application liable for rejection, but it is the suppression of the fact of his involvement in the criminal case that renders the application liable for rejection, which, prima facie, is proved to have occurred in this case. 14. The ruling relied upon by the respondents' Counsel reported in Mahendra Pal v. Ram Dass Malanger and others, (2000) 1 SCC 261 , does not bear relevance to the facts involved in the case on hand, since the suppression of the information of the 1st respondent being involved in a criminal case came to the notice of the petitioner only before filing this application. 15. Hence, in view of the above, this Court opines that the amendment application deserves to be allowed. 16. With the above observations, this IA is allowed. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.