ORDER : This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby and where under, the writ in the nature of certiorari has been sought, for setting aside the notice dated 22.08.2017 and order dated 03.10.2017 (final decision taken by the authority). 2. The case in brief, as per the pleading made by the petitioner in the writ petition is that a shop has been allotted by the Ranchi Municipal Corporation, under the Jharkhand Shops and Establishment Act, 1953 for carrying out business, the petitioner has started his business in the name and style of Manoj Kirana and inspection has been conducted by the authority of the Ranchi Municipal Corporation, wherein he has been found doing some irregularities with respect to misbranding of the edible oil and, therefore, by invoking jurisdiction, conferred under Section 482/466 of the Jharkhand Municipal Act, 2011, the allotment of the shop, which has been granted on yearly license basis, has been cancelled with immediate effect. 3. The main ground taken by the petitioner is that before taking aforesaid decision by the authority of the Ranchi Municipal Corporation, show cause notice has been issued which has been duly responded, but in one line, it has been found not satisfactory and, therefore, the impugned order has been passed on 03.10.2017. It is submitted that when the show cause notice has been issued, it has got substantial meaning i.e. the same is to be considered by the authority by active application of mind and if the order stipulates that it is not satisfactory, the order will be said to be without any reason and it is settled that order without any reason cannot be said sustainable in the eye of law which will also be said to be in violation of principle of natural justice. Further argument has been advanced that so far as the trade license is concerned, the matter is pending before the authority under the provision of Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006 wherein a proceeding under Section 52. 4. Mr. Prashant Kr. Further argument has been advanced that so far as the trade license is concerned, the matter is pending before the authority under the provision of Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006 wherein a proceeding under Section 52. 4. Mr. Prashant Kr. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the Ranchi Municipal Corporation submits that it is not a case where it can be said there is violation of principle of natural justice, rather a show cause notice was issued which has been responded by the petitioner and after going across the same when the authorities have found that it is not satisfactory the decision has been taken by cancelling the license of allotment of aforesaid shop, hence there is no infirmity in the same. It has been submitted that Ranchi Municipal Corporation has acted in pursuance to the recommendation of Sub Divisional Officer, Ranchi since on inspection it has been found that the petitioner is dealing with misbranding of the food products i.e. edible oil and therefore, the Ranchi Municipal Corporation has acted on the said recommendation. 5. Mr. Yogesh Modi, associate counsel of learned A.A.G for the State respondents submits that it is case where the petitioner has been involved in illegal trade practice by selling out edible oil by adopting practice of misbranding to which the proceeding under Section 52 of the Food Safety & Standards Act, 2006 is lying pending. 6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and upon appreciation of their rival submissions and after going through the order passed by the Ranchi Municipal Corporation dated 03.10.2017 it is evident that the Sub Divisional Officer, on inspection has found that the petitioner was dealing with misbranding of product and, therefore, has made recommendation before the Ranchi Municipal Corporation for cancelling the shops which has been allotted in favour of the petitioner by the Ranchi Municipal Corporation on yearly license basis, the Ranchi Municipal Corporation has issued show cause notice asking the petitioner to give response in pursuance thereto, the petitioner has submitted his reply. The Additional Municipal Commissioner, Ranchi has passed an order dated 03.10.2017 as contained in letter No.2290 whereby and whereunder the authority on the basis of the allegation of misbranding of the edible oil alleged violation of the provision of Section 3 (Zf) (C) (i) of the Act, 2006 has cancelled the license of allotment of the shop. The Additional Municipal Commissioner, Ranchi has passed an order dated 03.10.2017 as contained in letter No.2290 whereby and whereunder the authority on the basis of the allegation of misbranding of the edible oil alleged violation of the provision of Section 3 (Zf) (C) (i) of the Act, 2006 has cancelled the license of allotment of the shop. It is evident that the reference of show cause has been made in the aforesaid order, but it has been said to be non-satisfactory. 7. There is no dispute in the position of law that show cause notice if issued, the authority is to consider and consideration always means the active application of mind with respect to the appreciation of the factual aspect, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Chairman, Life Insurance Corporation of India And Others Vs. A. Masilamani, reported in (2013) 6 SCC 530 where at para 19 it has been laid down as referred hereunder: “19. The word “consider” is of great significance. The dictionary meaning of the same is, “to think over”, “to regard as”, or “deem to be”. Hence, there is a clear connotation to the effect that there must be active application of mind. In other words, the term “consider” postulates consideration of all relevant aspects of a matter. Thus, formation of opinion by the statutory authority should reflect intense application of mind with reference to the material available on record. The order of the authority itself should reveal such application of mind. The appellate authority cannot simply adopt the language employed by the disciplinary authority and proceed to affirm its order.” 8. It is equally settled that an order without any reason will be said to be not sustainable and in violation of Principle of natural justice it is because of the reason that if response of the show cause is given the reason is to be reflected on the face of it. Reference in this regard has been made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in The Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. Vs. The Union of India And Another, (1976) 2 SCC 981 , wherein it has been held as under: 6. Reference in this regard has been made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in The Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Co. of India Ltd. Vs. The Union of India And Another, (1976) 2 SCC 981 , wherein it has been held as under: 6. Before we part with this appeal, we must express our regret at the manner in which the Assistant Collector, the Collector and the Government of India disposed of the proceedings before them. It is incontrovertible that the proceedings before the Assistant Collector arising from the notices demanding differential duty were quasi-judicial proceedings and so also were the proceedings in revision before the Collector and the Government of India. Indeed, this was not disputed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this Court ending with N.M. Desai v. Testeels Ltd.1. But, unfortunately, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reasons in support of the order made by him confirming the demand for differential duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law. The Collector in revision did give some sort of reason but it was hardly satisfactory. He did not deal in his order with the arguments advanced by the appellants in their representation dated December 8, 1961 which were repeated in the subsequent representation dated June 4, 1965. It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a Court of law. But the order of the Collector could have been a little more explicit and articulate so as to lend assurance that the case of the appellants had been properly considered by him. It is not suggested that the Collector should have made an elaborate order discussing the arguments of the appellants in the manner of a Court of law. But the order of the Collector could have been a little more explicit and articulate so as to lend assurance that the case of the appellants had been properly considered by him. If courts of law are to be replaced by a administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their orders and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audialterampartem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law. The Government of India also failed to give any reasons in support of its order rejecting the revision application. But we may presume that in rejecting the revision application, it adopted the same reason which prevailed with the Collector. The reason given by the Collector was, as already pointed out, hardly satisfactory and it would, therefore, have been better if the Government of India had given proper and adequate reasons dealing with the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants while rejecting the revision application. We hope and trust that in future the customs authorities will be more careful in adjudicating upon the proceedings which come before them and pass properly reasoned orders, so that those who are affected by such orders are assured that their case has received proper consideration at the hands of the Customs Authorities and the validity of the adjudication made by the Customs Authorities can also be satisfactorily tested in a superior tribunal or court. In fact, it would be desirable that in cases arising under customs and excise laws an independent quasi-judicial tribunal, like the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal or the Foreign Exchange Regulation Appellate Board, is set up which would finally dispose of appeals and revision applications under these laws instead of leaving the determination of such appeals and revision applications to the Government of India. An independent quasi-judicial tribunal would definitely inspire greater confidence in the public mind. In S. N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 , it has been held as under : 39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice “is to prevent miscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action”. As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework where under jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underly-ingsuch a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underly-ingsuch a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. In Krishna Swami Vs. Union of India And Others, (1992) 4 SCC 605 , it has been held as under: 46. The question then is the scope of judicial review of the admission of the motion by the Speaker. Articles 32, 131 to 136 entrust in express terms judicial review to the Supreme Court; in particular Article 32 as the ultimate repository and guardian of the rights and liberties of the people. The Constitution is the fundamental law of the land. It limits, as its touchstone, the powers and functions of the organs of the State, viz. the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. The Constitution also demarcated and delineated the powers and functions of these organs which implies that each organ would maintain a delicate balance with self-imposed restrictions for smooth functioning of the parliamentary democracy to establish an egalitarian social order under rule of law. Judicial review thus is an incident of and flows from the Constitution to securing and protecting the welfare of the people as effectively as it may, according justice — social, economic and political in all the institutions of national life. Court is the living voice of the Constitution which stands against any winds that blow as a haven of refuge to those who might otherwise suffer due to their helplessness, inability, non-conformity, handicaps, exploitation, victims of prejudice or public excitement etc. The paramount duty of the court is to protect their rights and translate the glorious and dynamic contents of the Directive Principles and the fundamental rights as a living law, making them meaningful to all manner of people. In Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. etc. Vs. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and another, AIR 1994 SC 2696 , it has been held as under : 42. It has been urged on behalf of the employers that sub-sec. In Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. etc. Vs. Meenakshi Mills Ltd. and another, AIR 1994 SC 2696 , it has been held as under : 42. It has been urged on behalf of the employers that sub-sec. (2) of S. 25N does not prescribe any guidelines or principles to govern the exercise of the power that has been conferred on the appropriate Government or the authority in the matter of grant or refusal of permission for retrenchment and in the absence of such guidelines or principles, it will be open to the appropriate Government or authority to take into account matters having no bearing or relevance to the legitimate need of the employer to reorganise his business and which may even be opposed to such need and it has been pointed that it would be permissible to pass the order by taking into consideration the state of unemployment in the industry or the state of unemployment in the State. It has also been submitted that the requirement that reasons should be recorded in the order that is passed by the appropriate Government or authority would not provide any protection against arbitrary action because in the absence of principles governing the exercise of the power, there is no touchstone to assess the validity of those reasons. We find no substance in this contention. We have already dealt with the nature of the power that is exercised by the appropriate Government or the authority while refusing or granting permission under sub-sec. (2) and have found that the said power is not purely administrative in character but partakes exercise of a function which is judicial in nature. The exercise of the said power envisages passing of a speaking order on an objective consideration of relevant facts after affording an opportunity to the concerned parties. Principles or guidelines are insisted with a view to control the exercise of discretion conferred by the statute. There is need for such principles or guidelines when the discretionary power is purely administrative in character to be exercised on the subjective opinion of the authority. The same is, however, not true when the power is required to be exercised on objective considerations by a speaking order after affording the parties an opportunity to put forward their respective points of view. The same is, however, not true when the power is required to be exercised on objective considerations by a speaking order after affording the parties an opportunity to put forward their respective points of view. That apart, it cannot be said that no guidance is given in the Act in the matter of exercise of the power conferred by sub-sec. (2) of Section 25-N. 49. We are also unable to agree with the submission that the requirement of passing a speaking order containing reasons as laid down in sub-sec. (2) of S. 25N does not provide sufficient safe-guard against arbitrary action. In S. N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 : ( AIR 1990 SC 1984 ), it has been held that irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review, the recording of reasons by an administrative authority by itself serves a salutary purpose. viz. it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision making (p. 612) (of SCC): (at p. 1995 of AIR). 9. Admittedly, the provision of Section 482 of the Jharkhand Municipal Corporation Act, 2011 confers power upon the authorities of the Ranchi Municipal Corporation to cancel the license or a permission granted under the Act or rules or the regulation can be suspended or revoked by the Municipal Commissioner or the Executive Officer or the Officer by whom it was granted, if he is satisfied that it has been secured by the grantee through misrepresentation or fraud, or if any of the restrictions or conditions of license or permission, for the contravention of any rule, provision has been made that before making any order of suspension or revocation, an opportunity should be given to the grantee of the license or the permission to show cause why it should not be cancelled or revoked. The provision of Section 482 of the Jharkhand Municipal Corporation Act, 2011 is quoted here in below:- 482. The provision of Section 482 of the Jharkhand Municipal Corporation Act, 2011 is quoted here in below:- 482. Signature, conditions, duration, suspension, revocation, etc., of licences and permissions- (1) Whenever it is provided in this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder that a license or a permission, in writing, may be granted for any purpose, such license or permission shall be signed by the Municipal Commissioner or the Executive Officer or by any other officer empowered to grant such license or permission under this Act or the rules or the regulations made there under and shall specify the following particulars in addition to any other particulars required to be specified under any other provision of this Act or the rules or the regulations made there under :- (a) the date of the grant of license or permission, (b) the purpose and the period, if any, for which it is granted, (c) restrictions or conditions, if any, subject to which it is granted, (d) the name and address of the person to whom it is granted, and (e) the fee, if any, paid for the license or the permission. (2) Except as otherwise provided in this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder, for every such license or permission, a fee may be charged at such rate as may, from time to time, be fixed by the municipality, and such fee shall be payable by the person to whom the license or the permission is granted. (2) Except as otherwise provided in this Act or the rules or the regulations made thereunder, for every such license or permission, a fee may be charged at such rate as may, from time to time, be fixed by the municipality, and such fee shall be payable by the person to whom the license or the permission is granted. (3) Save as otherwise provided in this Act or the rules or the regulations made there under, any license or permission granted under this Act or the rules or the regulations made there under may, at any time, be suspended or revoked by the Municipal Commissioner or the Executive Officer or the officer by whom it was granted, if he is satisfied that it has been secured by the grantee through misrepresentation or fraud, or if any of the restrictions or conditions of license or permission has been infringed or evaded by the grantee, or if the grantee has been convicted for the contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or the rules or the regulations made there under relating to any matter for which the license or the permission, as the case may be, was granted : Provided that – (a) before making any order of suspension or revocation, an opportunity shall be given to the grantee of the license or the permission to show cause why it should not be suspended or revoked; and (b) every such order shall contain a brief statement of the reasons for the suspension or the revocation of the license or the permission, as the case may be. (4) When any such license or permission is suspended or revoked, or when the period for which such license or permission was granted has expired, the grantee shall, for the purposes of this Act and the rules and the regulations made there under, be deemed to be without a license or permission, as the case may be, until such time as the order suspending or revoking the license or the permission, as the case may be, is rescinded or until the license or the permission, as the case may be, is renewed. (5) Every grantee of any license or permission granted under this Act shall, at all reasonable times while such license or permission, as the case may be, remains in force, if so required by the Municipal Commissioner or the Executive Officer or the other officer by whom it was granted, produce such license or permission, as the case may be. Thus it is evident as contained under Section 482 of the Jharkhand Municipal Corporation Act, 2011, the same is to be exercised by the authority for revocation and cancellation of the license. Section-466 confers power to the authority to use in contravention of license which speaks as follows:- 466. Power to stop use of premises used in contravention of licenses. (1) If the Municipal Commissioner or the Executive Officer is of the opinion that any premises is being used for a non-residential purpose without a license under this Act or otherwise than in conformity with the terms of a license granted in respect thereof, he may stop the use of any such premises for any such purpose for a specified period by such means as he may consider necessary. (2) If a person continues to use a premises in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1), the Municipal Commissioner or the Executive Officer may, notwithstanding any other action that may be taken against such person under this Act, levy on such person a continuing fine in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 465.” 10. Herein in the instant case, an allegation has been levelled by Sub Divisional Officer of misbranding of the edible oil and, therefore, there is alleged of provision under Section 3 (ZF)(C)(i) of the Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006 and, therefore, the license has been cancelled forthwith. 11. The question which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is violation of principle of natural justice since the response of the petitioner has not been considered by the respondents by not appreciating the facts. This Court is in agreement with the ground taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner for the reason of the settled position of law since show cause notice can not be a formality rather it has to be considered by the authority by applying its active mind. This Court is in agreement with the ground taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner for the reason of the settled position of law since show cause notice can not be a formality rather it has to be considered by the authority by applying its active mind. But here in the impugned order only in one line i.e. the reply is not satisfactory, the order has been passed as such, the same is without any reason reflecting from its face the consideration of response, therefore applying the settled position of law as indicated, the order dated 03.10.2017 quashed. It is also settled that on technical ground, no one can be allowed to take advantage and as such, the matter needs to be considered by the authority afresh and, therefore, the Ranchi Municipal Corporation is directed to take fresh decision by considering the reply already submitted by the petitioner by dealing with the issues by passing a speaking order within four weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order. 12. Needless to say that this order or the order passed by Ranchi Municipal Corporation will not affect the proceeding pending before the competent authority under the provision of Food Safety and Standard Act, 2006. 13. The opening of the shop in question will depend upon the final decision to be taken by the authority of Ranchi Municipal Corporation and under Food Safety and Standard Act. 14. The writ petition is accordingly, disposed of with the aforesaid observation and direction.