JUDGMENT : SONGKHUPCHUNG SERTO, J. 1. Heard Mr. Subhash Chandra Keyal, learned standing counsel for the applicant CBI. Also heard Mr. Anil Kumar Bhattacharyya, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Binod Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Mishra, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Arinjoi Sandilya, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2. 2. By this application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the applicant CBI has prayed for condoning the delay of 184 days in filing the connected appeal against the acquittal judgment and order dated 22.8.2017, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Kamrup (Metro), Guwahati, in Sessions Case No. 9/1999 arising out of CBI Case No. RC-9/S/95-Kol, whereby the respondent No. 1 was acquitted from the charge under Section 302 of the IPC and the respondent No. 2 was acquitted from the charges under Section 302/114 IPC. Both the respondents have filed their affidavits objecting condonation of said delay made by the applicant CBI in preferring the connected appeal. 3. At the very outset Mr. Keyal, learned standing counsel referred to the reasons for the delay of 184 days in filing the appeal as given at paragraph Nos. 3 to 11 of the application. Contents of the said paragraphs reproduced herein below for easy reference:-- "3. That the Certified copy of the order dated 22nd August, 2017 was obtained on 22nd August, 2017 and thereafter the Comment of the Learned Special Counsel and proforma of limitation was received on 28th August, 2017. Thereafter, the file was placed before the Superintendent of Police/Head of the Branch for his comments who after perusal of the judgment and order and comments of Special Counsel gave his comments on 26th September, 2017 with an endorsement to put up the file to Dy. Legal Advisor for his comments. 4. That the file was put up before the Dy. Legal Advisor, who gave his comments on 4th October, 2017 and marked the file to Head of Zone, CBI, NE Zone, Guwahati. On 10th October, 2017, Head of Zone, CBI, NE Zone, Guwahati gave his comments and marked the file to Additional Director, CBI. 5. That the petitioner states that on 06th November, 2016 Additional Director marked the file to Director of Prosecutor for opinion. On the very day he marked the file to Additional Legal Advisor for his comments. On 10th October, 2017, Head of Zone, CBI, NE Zone, Guwahati gave his comments and marked the file to Additional Director, CBI. 5. That the petitioner states that on 06th November, 2016 Additional Director marked the file to Director of Prosecutor for opinion. On the very day he marked the file to Additional Legal Advisor for his comments. On 07th November, 2017, the file was returned to Director of Prosecutor by Additional Legal Advisor with a direction to the CBI, SCB, Kolkata branch to make available the translated copies of complete depositions of PW-35 (Angshuman Das) and PW-2 (Ms. Manju Dey) from Assamese language to English language at the earlier. 6. That the petitioner states that on 08th November, 2017, Director of Prosecution marked the file to Head of Zone, NE, Guwahati and on 15th November, 2017 the same was marked to Head of Branch, CBI, SCB, Kolkata to comply the direction of Additional Legal Advisor. On 22nd November, the file was sent to the Head of Zone, NE Guwahati along with the translated copies of deposition of PW-35 and PW-2 and Head of Zone, NE, Guwahati marked the file to the Director of Prosecution on 27th November, 2017. 7. That your petitioner states that on 30 the November, 2017, Director of Prosecution marked the file to Additional Legal Advisor for his comments. On 08th December, 2017 comments of Additional Legal Advisor was received by Director of Prosecution and on 11th December 2017, Director of Prosecution give his comments and marked the file to Special Director, CBI. Thereafter, on 03rd January, 2018 Special Director, CBI have his comments with recommendation for filing Criminal Appeal against the impugned order dated 22nd August, 2017 passed by Ld. Addl. Disstt. & Sessions Judge, No. 2, Kamrup(M), Guwahati and put up the file to Director, CBI for final approval. 8. That your petitioner states that on 04th January, 2018, Director, CBI approved the recommendation of Special Director, CBI and marked the file to Head of Zone, CBI, NE, Guwahati on 11th January, 2018 as Special Director was on tour. Thereafter the file was put before the Head of Zone, NE, Guwahati who after the perusal marked the file to Head of Branch (HOB), SCB, Kolkata for further action on 18th January, 2018. 9. Thereafter the file was put before the Head of Zone, NE, Guwahati who after the perusal marked the file to Head of Branch (HOB), SCB, Kolkata for further action on 18th January, 2018. 9. That your petitioner states that the proposal for filing of Criminal Appeal along with necessary annexure were sent to DoPT on 29th January, 2019. On 12th February, 2018, a letter was received from DoPT requesting for some additional documents for examination of proposal for filing of Criminal Appeal and the same was sent to DoPT on 15th February, 2018. 10. That your petitioner states that on 19th March, 2018 the approval of DoPT was received for filing of Criminal Appeal. The draft Criminal Appeal along with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act of delay was prepared by the branch and sent to Learned Special Counsel on 22nd March, 2018 for vetting and the vetted draft was received in the branch on 23rd March, 2018. On the same day the file was marked to Deputy Legal Advisor along with draft Criminal Appeal, leave application and application under Section 5 of Limitation Act by the Head of Branch for vetting. 11. That your petitioner states that on 23rd March, 2018 the file was marked to Head of Zone, NE, Guwahati by the Deputy Legal Advisor after vetting and on 26th March, 2018, Head of Zone, North East, Guwahati approved the draft Criminal Appeal long with application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and marked the file to Head of Branch, CBI, SCB, Kolkata for further necessary action. Thereafter, on 3rd April, 2018, Head of Zone, CBI, North East approved the draft criminal appeal along with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and marked the file to the Head of Branch, CBI, SCB, Kolkata for further necessary action. On 9.4.2018 the file received by the Head of Branch from Head of Zone, CBI, North East. Thereafter, on 3rd April, 2018, Head of Zone, CBI, North East approved the draft criminal appeal along with the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and marked the file to the Head of Branch, CBI, SCB, Kolkata for further necessary action. On 9.4.2018 the file received by the Head of Branch from Head of Zone, CBI, North East. Thereafter the petitioner contacted the ASGI of the Gauhati High Court who is dealing with the CBI cases for filing of the appeal the Hon'ble Gauhati High Court, thereupon the counsel advised the petitioner to come done to Guwahati after 17th April, 2018 as the High Court would be closed due to Bihu holidays and accordingly the petitioner deputed S.I. Sri Animesh Kumar to proceed to Guwahati on 18.04.2018 for handing over necessary papers to CBI counsel for preferring appeal." 4. After having referred to the above stated paragraphs, Mr. Keyal submitted that though the delay of 184 days has occurred, the same may be condoned in the interest of justice as the delay was not intentional or due to the negligence of the officers of the CBI. 5. Mr. Keyal after having submitted as such, in support of his submission placed few judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which are State of Jharkhand through S.P., CBI Vs. Lalu Prasad Yadav @ Lalu Prasad with State of Jharkhand through S.P., CBI Vs. Sajal Chakaraborty, State of Jharkhand through S.P., CBI Vs. Jagannath Mishra reported in (2017) 8 SCC 1 , wherein the learned counsel relies upon paragraphs 66 to 68. The second case which Mr. Keyal placed is State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok Ao & Ors. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752 and the relevant paras that he sought to rely are paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17. 6. Mr. A.K. Bhattacharyya, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 opposed the prayer of condonation mainly on two grounds. As submitted by learned Sr. counsel, the first ground is that the main case in which the respondents are acquitted was instituted in July, 1995 and since then about 24 years had passed and the best part of their lives have been spent in facing the trial. As submitted by learned Sr. counsel, the first ground is that the main case in which the respondents are acquitted was instituted in July, 1995 and since then about 24 years had passed and the best part of their lives have been spent in facing the trial. As such, it is submitted that the respondents should not be let to go through another period of litigation on the same matter, just because of the negligence and carelessness of the applicant. The learned Sr. counsel took us through the grounds or the reasons for the delay given by the applicant CBI and submitted that those cannot be considered as adequate reasons or explanations for condoning the delay. The learned Sr. counsel pointed out certain stages of the file process of the applicant and submitted that there were unnecessary delays because of the negligence on the part of the officers concerned and for all those, the applicant does not deserve any grace from this Court. 7. The second ground on which the learned Sr. counsel submitted that the application does not deserved to be allowed is, the affidavit filed by the applicant is incomplete as it did not disclose as to on what basis the reasons for the delay have been stated in the application 8. Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Sr. counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 stated that the CBI Manual, 2005 at paragraph 23.11 to 23.14 provides as to how appeal against acquittal and discharge has to be processed before it is filed and submitted that the applicant did not follow the same. According to the learned Sr. counsel Mr. Mishra, it is mandatory for the authorities of the CBI to follow the manual and since the concerned officers of the same organization have failed to follow the said manual, which is mandatory; they cannot ask for condonation of delay of such a long period. Mr. Mishra, by placing a chart before the Court demonstrated as to how the officers concerned of CBI, the applicant had processed the file in this case and it shows that the manual has not been exactly followed. While processing the file for filing of the appeal. 9. We have gone through the reasons given by the applicant for the delay in filing the appeal as given in the application and also compared the same with the record produced by Mr. Keyal. While processing the file for filing of the appeal. 9. We have gone through the reasons given by the applicant for the delay in filing the appeal as given in the application and also compared the same with the record produced by Mr. Keyal. We have also allowed the learned counsels appearing for the respondents Nos. 1 and 2, Mr. B.K. Singh and Mr. A. Sandilya to go through the relevant portion of the record in the presence of Mr. Keyal, learned Standing counsel. Admittedly, what has been stated in the application on the movement of the file in the decision making process is found in the record. 10. We have given our anxious consideration on the submissions of the learned counsels appearing for both the parties. It is true that a lot of delay has taken place in the decision making process however, on going through the reasons given for the delay in the application which are supported by record we are of the view that there has not been any negligence on the part of the officers concerned while taking the file through the decision making process. We agree with the learned Sr. counsel Mr. Mishra that the CBI manual has not been exactly followed but we also notice that they have not deviated from the manual. The only thing they have done is they had gone through a longer process which perhaps was to ensure that no wrong decision was taken on the matter. 11. From the very beginning the copy of the judgment was obtained on the same day the judgment was delivered and from there on the process started. We have also noticed that the file had to be processed from the bottom till the top and at some levels clarifications were sought and translated version of depositions of witness were also sought for. To state in short the process was long but it was vigorously followed up and monitored and the delays that had taken place was not because of any willful negligence, intention or due to irresponsible inaction of the concerned officers of the applicant. 12. At this stage we may reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the two judgments referred to by the learned Standing counsel of CBI. (i) The relevant paragraphs 66 to 68 in the case of State of Jharkhand (supra) are reproduced herein below:-- "66. 12. At this stage we may reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the two judgments referred to by the learned Standing counsel of CBI. (i) The relevant paragraphs 66 to 68 in the case of State of Jharkhand (supra) are reproduced herein below:-- "66. On the other hand, learned Solicitor General has submitted that delay deserves to be condoned. He has relied upon the decision of this Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty (2007) 7 SCC 394 in which it has been observed that in serious offences, prosecution is done by the State and the court of law should not throw away prosecution solely on the ground of delay. Mere delay in approaching a court of law would not by itself afford a ground for dismissing the case. He has also referred to Sajjan Kumar v. Union of India (2010) 9 SCC 368 to contend that a prosecution should not be quashed merely on the ground of the delay. The aforesaid decisions cited of Japani Sahoo and Sajjan Kumar (supra) are with respect to the delay in institution of the case not with respect to sufficient cause in filing of appeals. However, reliance on the State of Tamil Nadu v. M. Suresh Rajan (2014) 11 SCC 709 is apt in which the time consumed in taking opinion on change of Government was held to be sufficient cause so as to condone the delay. Reliance has also been placed on Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Subrata Borah Chowlek, etc. (2010) 14 SCC 419 in which there was a delay in filing the appeals in which this Court has observed that Section 5 owes no distinction between State and citizen. The Court has to ensure that owing to some delay on part of the machinery, miscarriage of justice should not take place. It is also contended that the power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be exercised to advance substantial justice by placing reliance on State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 752 . 67. It is also contended that the power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be exercised to advance substantial justice by placing reliance on State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 752 . 67. In view of the averments made in the applications we are satisfied that delay has been sufficiently explained and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, gravamen of matter and also the divergent views taken by the same Judge of the High Court in the same case vis-a-vis different accused persons on same question, we consider it our duty not to throw away petition on the ground of delay. The explanation offered by the CBI of movement of file so as to condone the delay so as to sub-serve the ends of justice, deserves to be accepted. No doubt about it that the CBI ought to have acted with more circumspection and ought to have followed the CBI Manual. It is regrettable that we are receiving majority of the special leave petitions filed in this Court barred by limitation not only on behalf of the Government but also by the other private litigants. Not only that the special leave petitions are preferred with the delay but in refiling also enormous time is consumed and this Court in order to advance substantial justice is not throwing away cases only on limitation. 68. Sufficiency of cause has to be judged in a pragmatic manner so as to advance cause of justice. No doubt about it that litigants are supposed to act with circumspection within limitation and that there should not be delay and laches and State machinery should not be differentiated vis-a-vis with the private individual in the matter of filing the appeals, petitions etc., however, in the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the averments in the applications, we deem it appropriate to condone the delay in filing the appeals in this court." (ii) The relevant paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 and 17 in the case of State of Nagaland (supra) are reproduced herein below:-- "7. The trial court noted that the ballistic report established that the bullets were fired from the guns of the accused-respondents. The trial court noted that the ballistic report established that the bullets were fired from the guns of the accused-respondents. A finding was also recorded that the respondent exceeded their power for opening fire, and this constituted misfeasance, but absence of the post-mortem report was held to have vitally affected prosecution case it was also held that the accused persons had fired with AK 47 and M 22 rifles in self defence. Therefore, benefit of doubt was given to them. A pragmatic approach has to be adopted and when substantial justice and technical approach were pilled against each other the former has to be preferred. 8. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy ( AIR 1998 SC 3222 ) it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have been resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case is sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels. 9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra ( 1975 (2) SCC 840 ) this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC) it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 (PC) it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari ( AIR 1969 SC 575 ) a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. 11. In State of Kerala v. E.K. Kuriyipe (1981 Supp SCC 72), it was held that whether or not there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay is a question of fact dependant upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In Milavi Devi v. Dina Nath ( 1982 (3) SCC 366 ), it was held that the appellant had sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. This Court under Article 136 can reassess the ground and in appropriate case set aside the order made by the High Court or the Tribunal and remit the matter for hearing on merits. It was accordingly allowed, delay was condoned and the case was remitted for decision on merits. 12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh ( 1984 (4) SCC 66 ), a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector Land Acquisition v. Katiji ( 1987 (2) SCC 107 ), a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice - that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub-serves the ends of justice - that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step-motherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned. 14. In G. Ramegowda, Major v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer ( 1988 (2) SCC 142 ), it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay. In litigations to which Government is a party, there is yet another aspect which, perhaps, cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected, but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of Government are collective and institutional decisions and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. The law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts, omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes with it. It was, therefore, held that in assessing what constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5, it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Government. Government decisions are proverbially slow encumbered, as they are, by a considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process of their making. A certain amount of latitude is, therefore, not impermissible. It is rightly said that those who bear responsibility of Government must have "a little play at the joints". Due recognition of these limitations on governmental functioning - of course, within reasonable limits - is necessary if the judicial approach is not to be rendered unrealistic. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned. 15. It would, perhaps, be unfair and unrealistic to put Government and private parties on the same footing in all respects in such matters. Implicit in the very nature of Governmental functioning is procedural delay incidental to the decision-making process. The delay of over one year was accordingly condoned. 15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay - intentional or otherwise - is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red-tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression "sufficient cause" should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism injustice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day's delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach injustice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. 16. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. 16. The above position was highlighted in State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and Ors. ( 1996 (3) SCC 132 ); and Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma ( 1996 (10) SCC 634 ). It was noted that adoption of strict standard of proof sometimes fail to protract public justice, and it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in the process of filing an appeal. 17. When the factual background is considered in the light of legal principles as noted above the inevitable conclusion is that the delay of 57 days deserved condonation. Therefore, the order of the High Court refusing to condone the delay is set aside." 13. From the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited by the learned counsels the most important factor that must be borne in mind while considering condonation of delay is whether sufficient explanation for the delay has been given or not. It is not the length of time that should take the pre eminence. Rather, it should be always whether sufficient cause has been shown or not. In this case while going through the relevant record placed before us, we have seen that the decision making process was followed vigorously and monitored and there is nothing to indicate or show or suggest that there was any willful negligence and deliberate inaction on the part of any officer or officials of the applicant CBI dealing with the matter. 14. It has also been made clear by the Hon'ble Apex Court that though there should not be any discrimination between a private party seeking for condonation of delay and a Government Department seeking for the same, certain latitude has to be given to the later because of pragmatic reasons. It is common knowledge that in the case of a private party it is easier and less time consuming to take a decision but in a Government machinery decision making process takes time as it has to go through different levels in the hierarchy. It is common knowledge that in the case of a private party it is easier and less time consuming to take a decision but in a Government machinery decision making process takes time as it has to go through different levels in the hierarchy. In this case we have seen both in the CBI Manual and the record placed before us that before taking a decision to file an appeal, the file has to go through different levels in the hierarchy of the organization. Taking a pragmatic view of the same we are also of the view that certain amount of latitude has to be given to the applicant while considering their prayer for condonation of delay. 15. One more thing that has occupied our mind while considering this application is that the appeal sought to be filed is against acquittal in a dual murder case. Therefore, we have to weigh between the procedural law and the public interest. Procedural law, as has been repeatedly stated by the Apex Court and the Courts in the Country, should sub-serve the purpose of substantial justice but should not stand on the way of the later or not to scuttle the process. If we were to dismiss this application, certainly it would not be in the interest of the public because it would mean letting a person charged of murder going scot-free even before he could complete going through the normal process of our criminal justice system. As stated in the case of Japani Sahoo Vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty reported in (2007) 7 SCC 394 at para 14 "a crime never dies", which means lapse of time is no bar to Crown in proceeding against an offence. A criminal offence is considered as a wrong against the State and the society, even though it has been committed against an individual. Therefore, normally, in serious offences, where prosecution is launched by the State, a Court of law has no power to throw away the same solely on the ground of delay. 16. Keeping the factual matrix of the case in view as well as the reasons for the delay, which has been already explained adequately and the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court; we are of the considered opinion that the delay of 184 days needs to be condoned in the interest of justice. 16. Keeping the factual matrix of the case in view as well as the reasons for the delay, which has been already explained adequately and the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court; we are of the considered opinion that the delay of 184 days needs to be condoned in the interest of justice. Accordingly, the delay is condoned and this application is allowed 17. Original record of the applicant CBI, placed before the Court by its standing counsel Mr. S.C. Keyal be handover to him.