ORDER : 1. Vide order dated 05.04.2019, Special Civil Application No.6621 of 2019 arising from the same award was dismissed. For convenience, the entire order is reproduced herein. “1. Denial of full relief claimed by the petitioner workmen for termination of his service, by the judgment and award rendered in Reference (CGITA) No. 744 of 2004, 742/2004, 743/2004, 745/2004, 746/2004, 747/2004 and 763/2004 by Central Government Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour Court, Ahmedabad (for short “CGITA”) has given rise to this petition. 2. The Tribunal considered the relevant facts; submissions and reached to the conclusion of awarding the lump-sum compensation of Rs.10,000/- to each of the workmen inter alia, with the following reasons. “7. Issue No. I and II: The burden of proof of these issues was lying on the second party workmen. The second party submitted the affidavits of all the workmen namely Ganpat R. Rathod worked as Khalasi, Mohan C. Vasava worked as Khalasi, Haresh J. Patel worked as Khalasi, Ibrahim A. Patel worked as Fitter, Dalpat B. Parmar worked as Khalasi, Siraj M. Sha worked as Khalasi and Vinod M. Pate worked as Fitter wherein they have reiterated the averments made in the statement of claim. Ganpat R. Rathod in his cross-examination has stated that he was 55 years old at the time of his cross-examination on 02.05.2011. He was not issued any appointment letter by ONGC. He did not try to search any job. He has failed to explain as to how he sustained his family. Vinod M. Pate, Haresh J. Patel, Mohan C. Vasava, Ibrahim A. Patel, Dalpat B. Parmar and Siraj M. Sha reiterated in his cross-examination whatever has been stated by Ganpat R. Rathod in his cross-examination. 8. The first party examined one Rash Behari Sinha vide affidavit Ex. 20 who reiterated the averments made in the written statement and more specifically stated that these workmen were working on job contract for a short period intermittently on fixed period basis. After the cessation of the tenure, they were not engaged by ONGC. All of them did not complete 180 working days. The first party has also examined Pushkar Bisht vide affidavit Ex.23 wherein he has stated on oath that ONGC erstwhile Oil and Natural Gas Commission of the Government of India, is now a company of the Government of India, registered under the Companies Act, 1956. All of them did not complete 180 working days. The first party has also examined Pushkar Bisht vide affidavit Ex.23 wherein he has stated on oath that ONGC erstwhile Oil and Natural Gas Commission of the Government of India, is now a company of the Government of India, registered under the Companies Act, 1956. It has its own rules and regulations relating to recruitment, promotion and other service conditions of its employees which have a statutory force. Hence all appointments are to be appointed as contingent/casual hands, their names are to be first sponsored by the employment exchange. They are to be appointed on term basis and issued appointment letter on their appointment as per the Administrative/Executive instructions of ONGC. Further a record of register is to be maintained in respect of those contingent workers who had put in one year continuous services in ONGC and their cases are considered for regular posts as and when vacancies arise after following the prescribed procedure laid down in R & P regulation. Their service conditions are for contingent employees of the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation. Therefore, if any person is to be appointed or engaged by ONGC, either against a regular post or against a casual vacancy, it should be only in accordance with the rules prevailing in the corporation and not otherwise. The first party also stated that the requirement of the employees by the corporation is regulated by statutory regulation, i.e. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (R&P) Regulation 1980 which is produced by ONGC by separate list. The corporation is required to follow the procedure prescribed under the regulation for filling up the vacancies. The first party further stated that the concerned workmen were engaged for fixed period and accordingly Ganpat R. Rathod from 01.02.1990 to 30.04.1990, Haris J. Patel from 01.04.1990 to 30.06.1990, Dalpat B. Parmar from 01.04.1990 to 30.06.1990, Ibrahim Ahemad Patel from 02.01.1989 to 31.03.1989, Mohan C. Vasava from 01.05.1989 to 30.06.1989, Shiraj A. Sha from 01.02.1990 to 30.04.1990 and thereafter these workers were never appointed by ONGC at any point of time in his cross-examination, he has not stated contrary to his examination-in-chief. 9. The first party has submitted the copy of the Modified Recruitment and Promotions Regulations 1980 vide Exh.25 and also the original copies of employment on contract basis of all the aforesaid workmen vide Ex.26 to 31. 9. The first party has submitted the copy of the Modified Recruitment and Promotions Regulations 1980 vide Exh.25 and also the original copies of employment on contract basis of all the aforesaid workmen vide Ex.26 to 31. These contracts state as under: “I am prepared to work at a monthly rate of Rs.808.24/Rs,669.24. I further certify that I have not worked in the commission previously and if at a later date if it is found that I had worked in any sections of ONGC, my services may be terminated without any notice and I will not prefer any claim. I further state that I will not claim any employment in the ONGC on the basis of the work done by me as per this agreement. I understand that my office hours will be the same as applicable to other regular employees of the ONGC. I shall not refuse to work beyond this time if sometimes it is necessary to do so for work without claiming any extra amount/remuneration for the same.” 10. I heard the arguments of learned counsel of both the parties and considered the evidence lead by both the parties. The evidence reveals that all these workmen were engaged on contract basis on 01.02.1990 and were discharged on 01.10.1991 orally. It is an admitted fact that all these workmen were not appointed on any post in ONGC whatsoever through a due process of recruitments rules i.e. Modified Recruitment and Promotions Regulations 1980. Thus on the basis of the applications of all the workmen, these persons cannot be said to be casual or regular employee. It is also noteworthy that all these workmen have crossed the eligibility age of recruitment to any post in ONGC and some of them have already passed the superannuation age. 11. Thus on the basis of the applications of all the workmen, these persons cannot be said to be casual or regular employee. It is also noteworthy that all these workmen have crossed the eligibility age of recruitment to any post in ONGC and some of them have already passed the superannuation age. 11. The second party relied on Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adayapak and others, 2013(139) FLR 541 wherein the apex court has held that if action taken against the employee by the employer found to be ultra-vires of the relevant statutory provisions or principles of natural justice, such action cannot be said to be justified but in this case, the undertaking and contract executed by the workmen reveals that they were engaged for 90 days and they themselves in their applications stated that on the basis of this engagement, they will not claim any employment in ONGC on the basis of work done by them as per this agreement. Thus this agreement itself is an estoppel against the workmen for seeking any relief. 12. The second party further relied on Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation [ (2010) 3 SCC 192 ], which has no relevance with this case. They further relied on Letters Patent Appeal No. 2290 of 2010, Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation v. Dharmendra B. Vegad, wherein the Gujarat High Court has held that the provisions of the Limitation Act do not apply in the Industrial Disputes. Thus on this very ground, the reference cannot be said to be time barred. 13. The second party further referred Agriculture Produce Market Committee v. Kanubhai Laxmanbhai Patel, 2009(2) LLJ 41 Guj., wherein it has been held that the benefit of Section 25(h) cannot be denied to retrenched workmen on the ground that their appointment was not regular or there was no sanctioned post but in this case, the workmen themselves have giving undertaking that their services may be terminated at any time without any notice and they will not prefer any claim or claim of employment in ONGC on the basis of the work done as per their agreement. Secondly, the workmen have failed to prove that there were vacant sanctioned posts at the time of their oral termination of contract employment. Secondly, the workmen have failed to prove that there were vacant sanctioned posts at the time of their oral termination of contract employment. They have further referred Devinder Singh v. Municipal Counsel, Sanaur, (2011) 6 SCC 583, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated the ratio of Umadevi Case wherein it was held that persons appointed on contractual basis without following the procedure for regular recruitment cannot be regularised into permanent or regular service but has observed as under: “the appellant was appointed on six-monthly contracts from 02.05.1995, then from 01.11.1995 and lastly from 01.05.1996 for six months i.e. till 31.10.1996, by resolutions passed by the Municipal Council from time to time. He was terminated without complying with Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act on 30.09.1996 i.e. one month before his contract would have expired. Could not the respondent Municipal Council have simply (a) let the contract expire in the first place, by waiting for another month, if it did not require the appellant's services any longer or (b) alternatively, have reinstated him for one month, since that is all that the appellant was entitled to upon reinstatement.” The agreement reveals that these workmen were initially engaged on 01.02.1990 to 30.04.1990 but were permitted to continue till 01.10.1991 when they were terminated orally without giving any notice. Thus on the basis of the aforesaid law, these workmen at the most may be said to be entitled for one month wages i.e. Rs.887/- plus admissible dearness allowance if any. 14. The first party advocate has not referred any judgment of higher courts but has argued that they were contract employees on a fixed term basis but he has failed to explain as to why they were permitted to continue in the employment after 30.04.1990. 15. It is noteworthy that these workmen have either surpassed the age of superannuation or likely to attain the age of superannuation, therefore, no further relief of reinstatement can be given as their appointments was dehors the recruitment rules. However, as a principle of equity and justice, each of these workmen namely Ganpat R. Rathod, Mohan C. Vasava, Haresh J. Patel, Ibrahim A. Patel, Dalpat B. Parmar, Siraj M. Sha and Vinod M. Pate may be given a lump-sum compensation of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) within 60 days from the publication of this award.” 3. However, as a principle of equity and justice, each of these workmen namely Ganpat R. Rathod, Mohan C. Vasava, Haresh J. Patel, Ibrahim A. Patel, Dalpat B. Parmar, Siraj M. Sha and Vinod M. Pate may be given a lump-sum compensation of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand) within 60 days from the publication of this award.” 3. It would appear that the issue of delay of 10 years was specifically raised in the cross-examination of the workman. The issue of legality of the appointment of the workman was also specifically raised and dealt with in the impugned award. 4. Factual finding was returned on appreciation of the facts and the evidence on record that the workmen were engaged on contract basis on 01.02.1990 and were discharged on 01.10.1991, orally. An admitted fact that the workmen were not appointed through the due process contemplated in the recruitment rules and the finding in this regard was returned that the workmen were not the casual or regular employees of the respondent. It would also appear that several judicial pronouncements were considered, and eventually, in the judgment of CGITA, the workmen were held entitled to compensation and nothing more. This court, however, does not find any specific finding rendered by CGITA in relation to the breach of Section 25F, 25G and 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act. In fact the finding recorded in para 13 would show that the workmen were bound by the undertaking that their services may be terminated at any time without notice. 5. On the issue of delay, it appears that, in absence of proper assistance, CGITA returned the finding that the reference was not time barred while relying upon Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation [ (2010) 3 SCC 192 ] and Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation v. Dharmendra B. Vegad decided in Letters Patent Appeal No.2290 of 2010. 6. As is evident from the impugned award, the appointment of the petitioner was only for a short duration and that too dehors the recruitment rules. 7. It is in the aforesaid factual backdrop; the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are required to be considered. 8. In the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, once the termination was held to be illegal, order of reinstatement must follow irrespective of legality of initial appointment of the workman. 7. It is in the aforesaid factual backdrop; the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner are required to be considered. 8. In the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, once the termination was held to be illegal, order of reinstatement must follow irrespective of legality of initial appointment of the workman. Reliance is placed on Anoop Sharma v. Executive Engineer, Public (Health Division No.1, Panipat (Haryana) [ (2010) 5 SCC 497 ] and Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. Hindalco Industries Limited [ (2014) 11 SCC 85 ]. 9. In the opinion of this court, the fallacy in the submission lies in the fact that no specific finding regarding the breach of Section 25F was recorded by the CGITA, and therefore, the submission that such finding was recorded is factually misconceived. 10. There is no universal rule that on finding the termination of workman in breach of Section 25F, the order of reinstatement with full backwages must follow. The relief, after such finding, would, as per the settled legal position, depend upon the nature of employment, duration of the employment and similar such factors. Concededly, in the instant case, the appointment of the petitioner was not made in accordance with recruitment rules. Furthermore, his appointment was for a short duration, however, no specific finding as to the duration of the petitioner’s appointment has been rendered by CGITA. The learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that each of the workmen had served for about three years with the respondent. Thus, even if that fact is taken into consideration, the appointment of the petitioner was of a short duration and the decision by the impugned award has been rendered on 31.08.2018. The question as to whether reinstatement of a person not appointed in accordance with law after about 17 or 18 years of his termination would be justified. In this regard the settled legal position is that, normally, the court would not order reinstatement and/or full backwages in such a situation. It is also settled legal position that in such cases the compensation would be the appropriate relief. The petitioner was employed with the salary of about Rs.700/- to Rs.800/- per month. The compensation awarded to the petitioner is Rs.10,000/-. This amount of Rs.10,000/- would come to about the salary of one year. It is also settled legal position that in such cases the compensation would be the appropriate relief. The petitioner was employed with the salary of about Rs.700/- to Rs.800/- per month. The compensation awarded to the petitioner is Rs.10,000/-. This amount of Rs.10,000/- would come to about the salary of one year. Thus the compensation cannot be said to be unreasonable particularly when the duration of the workman was not long and his appointment was de-hors the recruitment rules. 11. Reliance on Anoop Sharma and Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi (both supra) by the learned counsel for the petitioner is misconceived inasmuch as, both the cases deal with different set of facts than those available on the file of the case. Anoop Sharma (supra) indicates that in absence of pleadings as to initial illegal appointment of the workman, the court would not consider the said fact to non-suit the workmen. In the instant case, as indicated above, legality of the appointment of the workman constituted the principal contention and thus in facts, Anoop Sharma case (supra) could not be applied. 12. There can be no dispute as regards the legal proposition in Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi (supra). It can, however, be noticed that the workman there was continued for more than six years, and in the facts of that case, it was found that 2(oo) (bb) of the I.D. Act was not applicable because of Section 31 of Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956. In that case it appears that the services of the workman were terminated on expiry of the contract period and the contention was that the definition of retrenchment under UP.IDAct for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Section 6-N of U.P.ID Act would apply. In the facts of the case, Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi (supra) cannot be pressed into service. 13. In the instant case, as indicated above, without recording the finding as regards breach of Section 25F of the I.D. Act, the CGITA proceeded to award the compensation. This court would therefore proceed on the assumption the breach of Section 25F weighed with CGITA for the award of compensation. In the opinion of this court, as such, no error was committed and hence no case is made out for this court interfering with the award, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition fails and is dismissed.” 2. In the opinion of this court, as such, no error was committed and hence no case is made out for this court interfering with the award, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The petition fails and is dismissed.” 2. The learned counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that the captioned Special Civil Application i.e. Special Civil Application No.6623 of 2019, resting on the same facts as Special Civil Application No.6621 of 2019, must meet with the same fate as Special Civil Application No.6621 of 2019. 3. In view of the above position, for the reasons recorded in Special Civil Application No.6621 of 2019, this petition is also dismissed.