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2019 DIGILAW 368 (ORI)

Pradeep Majhi v. Union of India

2019-04-30

B.R.SARANGI

body2019
JUDGMENT : B.R. Sarangi, J. 1. The petitioner, who was working as RT/GD in Group Centre of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Bhubaneswar, has filed this application seeking to quash order dated 09.11.2010 in Annexure-2, which has been purported to be issued under proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule-5 of Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 terminating him from service'. by paying one month's notice pay; and further seeks for direction to the opposite parties to reinstate him in service with all consequential service and financial benefits as due and admissible to him in accordance with law. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in hand; is that the petitioner, pursuant to the advertisement issued by the opposite parties, participated in the process of selection and having become successful, after undergoing different rigorous tests, was appointed as RT/GD of CRPF, pursuant to which he joined on 18.04.2010. The petitioner thereafter undergone a training conducted by the authority and on successful completion of training, the authority submitted progress report. But all on a sudden, the petitioner was issued with the order of termination from service under proviso to, sub-rule (1) of Rule-5 of Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 on 09.11.2010 in Annexure-2. Hence this application. 3. Mr. H.S. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the impugned order of termination dated 09.11.2010 in Annexure-2 has been issued without assigning any reason and without complying the principles of natural justice. By issuing such order of termination, the petitioner faced a civil and evil consequence, for which the principles of natural justice were required to-be followed. It is further contended that the definition of temporary service as provided under sub-rule (d) of Rule-2 of 1965 Rules, having not been satisfied, the action taken by the authority under proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule-5 of Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 cannot sustain in the eye of law and the order so passed by the authority should be quashed. 4. Mr. A.K. Bose, learned Asst. Solicitor General of India appearing for the opposite parties though admitted, that the petitioner was selected and enlisted temporarily as constable (General Duty) on 18.04.2010 by the Group Centre, CRPF, Bhubaneswar against the existing vacancy of Western Sector j37 Bn. 4. Mr. A.K. Bose, learned Asst. Solicitor General of India appearing for the opposite parties though admitted, that the petitioner was selected and enlisted temporarily as constable (General Duty) on 18.04.2010 by the Group Centre, CRPF, Bhubaneswar against the existing vacancy of Western Sector j37 Bn. CRPF and was allotted nine digit Force No. 105043741 and dispatched to Recruit Training Centre, CRPF, Avadi (Tamilnadu) for Basic Training, but contended that in terms of para-3.1 of GOI, MHA,. Dept. of Personnel and Administrative Reforms OM No. 180011j9(s)/78-Estt(8) dated 02.07.1982, it was essential to get the character and/antecedents of the candidates verified after his appointment in government service to assess whether he has got any adverse antecedents or not and whether there are any facts about him on records which would render him unsuitable for employment in government job. Accordingly, the verification Roll (CRPF form No. 25) duly filled up by the petitioner was sent to the District Magistrate, Sonepur (Subarnapur) District, Odisha under information to Superintendent of Police, Sonepur (Subarnapur) and in compliance of the same, verification reports of his character and antecedents were received from both the authorities, i.e., S.P. and District Magistrate Sonepur (Subarnapur) on 15.08.2010 and 03.09.2010 respectively. As per the said verification, it is found that the petitioner was involved in Rampur P.S. Case No. 9 dated 06.03.2017 under Sections 498(A)/304(B)/302/34 IPC read with Section 4 of D.P. Act in. which the petitioner was arrested and forwarded to the Court along with other co-accused persons and charge sheet had also been submitted against them. Since the case was sub-judice and the petitioner did not disclose said fact in the verification roll at para No. 12(a) and (b), he was found unsuitable for continuing employment in the government job. Accordingly, his service was terminated w.e.f. 09.11.2010 under the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule-5 of Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 due to suppression of factual information in the verification roll. Thereby, no illegality or irregularity has been committed by the authority in passing such order so as to warrant interference of this Court. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Sukhen Chandra Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 6110 of 2008, arising out of SLP (C) No. 23875 of 2005). 5. This Court heard Mr. To substantiate his contention, he has relied upon the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Sukhen Chandra Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 6110 of 2008, arising out of SLP (C) No. 23875 of 2005). 5. This Court heard Mr. H.S. Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A.K. Bose, learned Asst. Solicitor General appearing for the opposite parties and perused the record. Pleadings having been exchanged, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being, disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 6. The factual matrix as delineated above are not disputed. Admittedly, the petitioner was issued with termination, order on 09.11.2010 in Annexure-2 terminating him from service under the proviso to sub-rule (1) to Rule-5 of Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 by giving notice pay. But the order impugned dated 09.11.2010 does not speak anything basing upon which the petitioner was terminated from service. In other words, the order of termination was issued without assigning any reason and what weighed in the minds of the authority to issue such termination order is also not available in the order itself. As such, the order has been passed simply terminating the service of the petitioner by paying notice pay of one month. Interest of justice requires that the authority, while passing the order of termination, must indicate as to what prompted him to take such a drastic step against the petitioner. To put it otherwise, the order itself must reflect the reason as to why the order of termination has been issued against the petitioner. But a perusal of the order impugned would evident that it does not spell out any reason whatsoever. 7. Franz Schubert said: "Reason is nothing but analysis of belief." In Black's Law Dictionary, reason has been defined as a: "faculty of the mind by which it distinguishes truth from falsehood/good from evil/and which enables the possessor to deduce inferences from facts or from propositions." In Wharton's Law Lexicon, reason has been defined as - The very life of law, for when the reason of a law once ceases, the law itself generally ceases, because reason is the foundation of all our laws. It means the faculty of rational thought rather than some abstract relationship between propositions and by this faculty, it is meant the capacity to make correct inferences from propositions, to size up facts for what they are and what they imply, and to identify the best means to some end, and, in general, to distinguish what we should believe from what we merely do believe. In Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, JT (2003) Supp. 2 SC 354; it has been held that 'Reason' is the heartbeat of every conclusion, and without the same it becomes lifeless. Similar view has also been taken in State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, JT (2004) 2 SC 172. In Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 it has been held that reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject-matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial and reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and conclusions reached. The reasons assure an in built support to the conclusion and decision 8 reached. Recording of reasons is also an assurance that the authority concerned applied its mind to the facts on record. It is vital for the purpose of showing a person that he is receiving justice. Similar view had also been taken in Uma Charan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1915 ; in Patitapaban Pala v. Orissa Forest Development Corporation Ltd. & another, 2017 (I) OLR 5 and Banambar Parida v. Orissa Forest Development Corporation Limited and others, 2017 (I) OLR 625 and Saroj Kumar Mishra v. Chairman, Coal India Ltd., 2017 (Supp,-I) OLR 483. 8. In CIT v. Walchand & Co. (P) Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1435 the apex Court observed: "The practice of recording a decision without reasons in support cannot but be deprecated." 9. In Siemens Engg. Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 the apex Court held that the rule requiring reasons to be recorded by quasi-judicial authorities in support of the orders passed by them is a basic principle of natural justice. In Siemens Engg. Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 1785 the apex Court held that the rule requiring reasons to be recorded by quasi-judicial authorities in support of the orders passed by them is a basic principle of natural justice. Hon'ble Justice Bhagwati (as he then was), speaking for the Court, observed as follows: "If courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as Indeed, In some kinds (Jf cases, with the proliferation of Administrative Law, they may have to be so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their, orders and give, sufficiently, clear and explicit re sons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals exercising quasi-judicial function will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law." The same view has been reiterated in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 . 10. In S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 the apex Court observed: "Except in cases where the requirement of recording reasons has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions must record reasons in support of their decisions/The considerations for recording reasons are (1) such decisions are subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 as well as supervisory jurisdiction. Of the High Courts under Article 227 (2). it guarantees consideration by the adjudicating authority; (3) it introduces clarity in the decisions; and (4) It minimizes chances of arbitrariness and ensures fairness in the decision-making process." In view of the law discussed above, since the order impugned in Annexure-2 has been passed without assigning reason, the same cannot sustain in the eye of law. 11. Admittedly, the petitioner has joined under the CRPF and, as such, CRPF Act, 1949 is applicable to him. 11. Admittedly, the petitioner has joined under the CRPF and, as such, CRPF Act, 1949 is applicable to him. In exercise of powers conferred by section 18 of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949, the Central Government makes the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955. Procedure has been envisaged under Rule-10 to Rule-18 with regard to Recruitment, Enlistment Standards, Health Certificate, Recruiting Roll, Verification, Plural marriages, Period of Service, Discharge and Discharge Certificate. But the order impugned does not say about any provisions of CRPF Act and Rules framed thereunder. Perusal of order impugned would evident that action has been taken in pursuance of proviso to sub-rule (1) to Rule-5 of Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, which reads as follows: "5. Termination of temporary service: (1)(a) The services of a temporary Government servant shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the Government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the Government servant; (b) the period of such notice shall be one month. Provided that the services of any such Government servant may be terminated forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing them immediately before the termination of his services, or as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of one month. NOTE: The following procedure shall be adopted by the appointing authority while serving notice on such Government servant under clause (a). (i) The notice shall be delivered or tendered to the Government servant in person. (ii) Where personal service is not practicable, the notice shall be served on such Government servant by registered post, acknowledgement due at the address of the Government servant available with the appointing authority. (iii) If the notice sent by registered post is returned unserved if shall be published in the Official Gazette and upon such publication, it shall be deemed to have been personally served on such Government servant on the date it was published in the Official Gazette. (iii) If the notice sent by registered post is returned unserved if shall be published in the Official Gazette and upon such publication, it shall be deemed to have been personally served on such Government servant on the date it was published in the Official Gazette. (2)(a) Where a notice is given by the appointing authority terminating the services of a temporary Government servant, or where the service of any such Government servant is terminated either on the expiry of the period of such notice or forthwith by payment of pay plus allowances the Central Government or any other authority specified by the Central Government in this behalf may, of its own motion or otherwise, reopen the case, and after calling for the records, of the case and after making such inquiry it deems fit: (i) confirm the action taken by the appointing authority; (ii) withdraw the notice; (iii) reinstate the Government servant in service; or (iv) make such other order in the case as it may consider proper. Provided that except in special circumstances; which should be recorded in writing, no case shall be re-opened under this sub-rule after the expiry of three months: (i) from the date of notice, in a case where notice is given; (ii) from the date of termination of service, in a case where no notice is given. (b) Where a Government servant is reinstated in service under sub-rule (2) the order of reinstatement shall specify; (i) the amount or proportion of pay and allowances, if any, to be paid to the Government servant for the period of his absence between the date of termination of his services and the date of his reinstatement; and (ii) whether the said period shall be treated as a period spent on duty for any specified purpose or purposes." 12. As per above provisions, the service of temporary government servant shall be liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given either by the government servant to the appointing authority or by the appointing authority to the government servant and the period of such notice shall be one month or the termination can be done forthwith by payment to him of a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances, for the period of the notice at the same rates at which he was drawing then immediately before the termination of his services. The procedure has been prescribed for such termination as per the note of Section-5 as enumerated in clause-(i) to (iii). But fact remains, Rule-2(d) defines temporary service, which reads as follows: "2. Definitions: In these rules, unless the context otherwise requires: (d) "temporary service" means the service of a temporary Government servant in a temporary post or officiating service in a permanent past under the Government of India." 13. The term "temporary service", as defined above, would mean service of a temporary government servant in a temporary post or officiating service in a permanent post, under the Government of India. Therefore, the petitioner, who was selected and appointed as RT/GD and undergone training, his services cannot be termed as temporary service. More particularly the definition of temporary service clearly spelt out that a temporary government servant in a temporary post or officiating service in a permanent post and, as such, the petitioner was neither holding a temporary post nor officiating the service in a permanent post. If he was not holding temporary service within the meaning of sub-rule-(d) of Rule-2, consequentially sub-rule (i) of Rule-5 of 1965 Rule cannot have any application to the petitioner. Thereby, the order impugned cannot sustain in the eye of law. 14. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the opposite parties, in paragraphs-4 and 5 whereof it has been pleaded as follows: "4. That before relying to the averments as stated in the writ application, this deponent most humbly and respectfully begs to state that Shri Pradeep Majhee (herein after called as petitioner) son of Shri Lala Majhi of village and post-Badkerley, P.S.S. Rampur, District-Sonepur, State-Odisha was enlisted temporarily as Constable (General Duty) on 18.04.2010 by this Group Centre, CRPF, Bhubaneswar against the existing vacancy of Western Sector/37 Bn. CRPF. He was allotted nine digit Force No. 105043741 and further dispatched to Recruit Training Centre, CRPF, Avadi (Tamilnadu) for Basic Training. In terms of para-3.1 of GOI, MHA, Dept. of Personnel and administrative reforms OM No. 180011/9(s)/78-Estt(8) dated 02.07.1982, it is very much essential to get the character and antecedents of the candidates verified after his appointment in Govt. service to assess whether he has got any adverse antecedents or not and whether there are any facts about him on records which would render him unsuitable for employment in Govt. job. service to assess whether he has got any adverse antecedents or not and whether there are any facts about him on records which would render him unsuitable for employment in Govt. job. Accordingly, the verification Roll (CRPF form No. 25) duly filled up by. Shri Pradeep Majhi was sent to the District Magistrate of Sonepur (Subarnapur) District, Odisha under information to the Superintendent of Police of District Sonepur (Subarnapur) and Officer in charge of police station S. Rampur for verification of his character and antecedents vide GC CRPF, Bhubaneswar letter No. V.I-16J2010-EC-V-GCB dated 17.05.2010. Copy of the letter dated 17.05.2010 is filed herewith as Annexure-A/1 for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. In turn, verification report of his character and antecedents were received from both authority, i.e., S.P. and D.M. of district Sonepur (Subarnapur) vide their letters No. 2085 DIB dated 15.08.2010 and No. 8499 dated 03.09.2010 respectively. Copy of the letter dated 15.08.2010 and 03.09.2010 is filed herewith as Annexure-B/1 and C/1 respectively. As per verification reports the petitioner was found involved in Rampur P.S. Case No. 9 dated 06.03.2.017 under Section 498(A)/304(B)1302/34 IPC and read with Section 4 of D.P. Act in which Shri Pradeep Majhi was arrested and forwarded to the Court along with other co-accused persons and charge sheet had also been submitted against them. Since the case was sub-judice and the petitioner did not disclose this facts in the verification roll at para No. 12(a) and (b), he was found unsuitable for continuing employment in the government job as per rule. Copy of the verification roll furnished by the petitioner is filed as Annexure-D/1 for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. Accordingly, services of Shri Pradeep Majhi was terminated w.e.f. 09.11.2010 under the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule-5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service Rules, 1965 due to suppression of factual information in the verification roll vide GC, CRPF, Bhubaneswar Termination order No. D.V.-312010-GCB-EC-V dated 09.11.2010. Copy of the order dated 09.11.2010 is filed herewith as Annexure-E/1 for kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court. 5. That in reply to the averment made in paragraph-1 of the writ application, it is humbly submitted that the petitioner was enlisted as constable (general duty). on 18.04.2010 purely on temporary basis and had to be continued subject to satisfactory verification of his character and antecedents, date of birth, education certificate, caste certificate, residential certificate etc. 5. That in reply to the averment made in paragraph-1 of the writ application, it is humbly submitted that the petitioner was enlisted as constable (general duty). on 18.04.2010 purely on temporary basis and had to be continued subject to satisfactory verification of his character and antecedents, date of birth, education certificate, caste certificate, residential certificate etc. from the concerned authority. This aspect was clearly mentioned in his appointment order to this effect that in case any discrepancy is found in the character and antecedents, date of birth, education certificate, caste certificate, residential certificate etc. during the verification from the authority concerned, the services shall be terminated. Copy of the letter of appointment of the petitioner is filed herewith as Annexure-F/1 for kind perusal of this Hon'ble Court. As per. verification reports received from the S.P. and D.M. of District Sonepur (Subarnapur), the petitioner was found involved in Rampur P.S. Case No. 9 dated 06.03.2007 under Section 498(A)/304(B)/302/34 IPC and read with Sections of D.P. Act, in which Shri Pradeep Majhi was arrested and forwarded to the Court along with other co-accused persons and charge sheet had also been submitted against them. Since the case was sub-judice and the petitioner did not disclose this facts in the verification roll at para No. 12(a) and (b) he was found unsuitable for continuing employment in the government job as per rule. Accordingly, the services of the petitioner was terminated w.e.f. 09.11.2010 under the proviso to sub-rule (1) of Rule-5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 due to suppression of factual information in the verification Roll vide GC, CRPF, Bhubaneswar Termination Order No. D.V.-312010-GCB-EC-V dated 09.11.2010. So action taken by this department according to the eye of law and nothing was illegal/arbitrary." 15. The reasons, which have been assigned in above quoted paragraphs-4 and 5, are not made available in the order of termination dated 09.11.2010 in Annexure-2 issued against the petitioner. Therefore, the order impugned has to be adjudged on the basis of the contents available therein. Subsequent explanation given in the counter affidavit cannot be taken into consideration. The reasons, which have been assigned in above quoted paragraphs-4 and 5, are not made available in the order of termination dated 09.11.2010 in Annexure-2 issued against the petitioner. Therefore, the order impugned has to be adjudged on the basis of the contents available therein. Subsequent explanation given in the counter affidavit cannot be taken into consideration. Therefore, the opposite-parties are precluded from supplementing or supplanting any other reasons, bereft of reasons available in the order impugned, by way of filing counter affidavit, in view of the law laid down by the apex Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16 , wherein the apex. Court held as follows : "Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older." 16. Following the ratio decided in Gordhandas Bhanji (supra), the apex Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi,: AIR 1978 SC 851 , further held in paragrapgh-8 of the judgment as follows: "....... when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow old." Similar view has also been taken in Bhikhubhai Vithlabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 4 SCC 144 . 17. If the reasons, which have been assigned in paragraph-4 and 5 of the counter affidavit, are taken into consideration, then with all fairness, the opposite parties could have complied with the principles of natural justice because the sole of natural justice is fair play in action. 17. If the reasons, which have been assigned in paragraph-4 and 5 of the counter affidavit, are taken into consideration, then with all fairness, the opposite parties could have complied with the principles of natural justice because the sole of natural justice is fair play in action. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 , the apex Court held that natural justice, another name of which is common sense justice, is the name of those principles which constitute the minimum requirement of justice and without adherence to which justice would be a travesty. Natural justice accordingly stands for that fundamental quality of fairness which being adopted, justice may not only be done but also appears to be done. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818 , the meaning of 'natural justice' came for consideration before the apex Court and the apex Court observed as follows: "The phrase is not capable of a static and precise definition. It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula. Historically, "natural justice" has been used in a way "which implies the existence of moral principles of self evident and unarguable truth". "Natural, justice" by Paul Jackson, 2nd Ed., page-I. In course of time, judges nurtured in the traditions of British jurisprudence, often invoked it in conjunction with a reference to "equity and good conscience". Legal experts of earlier generations did not draw any distinction between "natural justice" and "natural law". "Natural justice" was considered as "that part of natural law which relates to the administration of justice." In Nagarjuna Construction Company Limited v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (2008) 16 SCC 276 , the apex Court held as follows: "The rule of law demands that the power to determine questions affecting rights of citizens would impose the limitation that the power should be exercised in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Thus, whenever a man's rights are affected by decisions taken under statutory powers, the court would presume the existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural justice. It is important to note in this context the normal rule that whenever it is necessary to ensure against the failure of justice, the principles of natural justice must be read into a provision. It is important to note in this context the normal rule that whenever it is necessary to ensure against the failure of justice, the principles of natural justice must be read into a provision. Such a course is not permissible where the rule excludes expressly or by necessary intendment, the application of the principles of natural justice, but in that event, the validity of that rule may fall for consideration." 18. The principles of natural justice have been clarified by the apex Court to the extent that principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted, by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice. 19. Principles of natural justice are principles ingrained into the conscience of men. Justice being based substantially on natural ideals and human values, the administration of justice here is freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. Principles/rules of natural justice are not embodied principles/rules. Being means to an end and not an end in them, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules (principles). 20. The essential principles of natural justice are that (i) the persons whose rights are to be affected must be given notice of the case/or the charges which he is to meet; (ii) he must be given an opportunity to make representation, explain the allegations made against him, and have his say in the matter; and (iii) the authority conducting the proceedings must not be biased and should act in good faith. Considering the above principles and applying the same to the present context, it appears that while passing, the order impugned in Annexure-2 dated 09.11.2010, the opposite parties have not followed the principles of natural justice as discussed above. 21. The reliance placed by learned Asst. Considering the above principles and applying the same to the present context, it appears that while passing, the order impugned in Annexure-2 dated 09.11.2010, the opposite parties have not followed the principles of natural justice as discussed above. 21. The reliance placed by learned Asst. Solicitor General on the judgment of the apex Court in Union of India, v. Sukhen Chandra Das (Civil Appeal No. 6110 of 2008, arising out of SLP (C) No. 23875 of 2005) is distinguishable to the extent that the same was decided on the facts and circumstances of said case only and is not applicable to the present case. 22. On a critical analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as the rules governing the field and also the settled position of law applicable to the subject-matter of the case, this Court arrives at a conclusion that the order of termination issued by the authority in Annexure-2 dated 09.11.2010 cannot sustain in the eye of law and is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, the same is hereby quashed. The opposite parties are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service and grant all consequential service and financial benefits as due and admissible to him in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, preferably within, a period of four months from the date of passing of the judgment. 23. The writ petition is thus allowed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.