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2019 DIGILAW 369 (GAU)

Swapna Hazarika v. State of Assam

2019-03-20

ACHINTYA MALLA BUJOR BARUA

body2019
JUDGMENT : ACHINTYA MALLA BUJOR BARUA, J. 1. Heard Mr. C.P. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. D. Saikia, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the authorities in the Education Department assisted by Mr. N. Sarma and Mr. P.N. Sarma, learned counsel for the authorities under the SSA. 2. All the writ petitions were preferred on the similar set of facts based on the same set of laws and claiming the same relief and accordingly, all of them are taken up together for its final consideration. For the sake of brevity, only the facts as depicted in the WP(C) 6880/2017 are referred on an understanding of the parties that the same would suffice for adjudication for the other writ petitions also. 3. In the year 2004, the Govt. of Assam in the Elementary Education Department adopted a scheme by the name of 'Education Guarantee Scheme Centre' in short referred to as (EGS)) in the various districts of the State. It is stated that the said scheme was adopted to support and strengthen, as well as to improve the quality of education in the State, more particularly in the rural and isolated areas. The purport of the EGS was that persons would be appointed as Shiksha Mitras and Additional Shiksha Mitra on contractual basis and they would partake the activity of imparting education to those children who were left out of the mainstream educational process and bring them to a level where they can be accommodated in the system of education being provided. Accordingly, about 5015 EGS centres were created all over the State and in the process, the present petitioners were appointed as Shiksha Mitra. 4. It is also stated that such engagement of the petitioners as Shiksha Mitra were done under the Axom Sarba Sikhsa Abhijan Mission (in short SSA). In the year 2012, the EGS centres so created were upgraded to lower primary schools. Upon such upgradation, an issue had arisen as to whether the Shiksha Mitras so engaged earlier would continue to remain in employment and their engagement be converted to that of an Assistant Teacher in the upgraded lower primary schools. In the resultant situation, litigations were preferred by the Shiksha Mitras making a claim that upon the EGS centres being upgraded, their engagement be converted to that of an Assistant Teacher in the upgraded lower primary schools. In the resultant situation, litigations were preferred by the Shiksha Mitras making a claim that upon the EGS centres being upgraded, their engagement be converted to that of an Assistant Teacher in the upgraded lower primary schools. Amongst others, the said claim received the consideration of this Court in its judgment dated 07.02.2012 in Rumi Gogoi Hazarika Vs. State of Assam and Ors, reported in (2012) 4 GLT 1001, wherein, a conclusion was arrived that such persons who were engaged as Shiksha Mitra under the EGS cannot claim any right to continue in service, nor they can seek regularization under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (in short Right to Education Act, 2009). It is stated that the said adjudication of 07.02.2012 in Rumi Gogoi Hazarika (supra) holds the field and it had attained its finality as regards the claim of Shiksha Mitra for being allowed to continue and be regularized as Assistant Teacher upon the EGS centres being upgraded. After the legal right claimed by the Shiksha Mitras got finally adjudicated, results whereof was against them, a meeting was held by the Minister of Education, Assam with the Shiksha Mitras. The said meeting was held in the new conference hall of the SSA Assam on 20.06.2012, which was chaired by the Minister of Education Assam. The minutes of the meeting are made available as Annexure-G to the additional affidavit of the writ petition. The minutes of the meeting with the Siksha Mitras held on 20.06.2012 provided that the following resolutions, amongst others, were taken:- i. In 2012, 2013 and 2014 three special TET will be conducted for Siksha Mitras. However, after 2014, no special TET will be conducted as the relaxation given to Assam by NCTE is applicable till March, 2015. ii. All eligible Siksha Mitras as per NCTE norms will appear in the three special TET which will be conducted by Elementary Education Deptt, Assam. Siksha Mitras will not claim for any further favour and special relaxation beyond 2014. iii. Education (Elementary) Deptt, Govt. of Assam will move Govt. of India for relaxation of marks for Siksha Mitras from 50% to 45%. The decision in this regard will depend entirely on NCTE and Govt. of India. Siksha Mitras will not claim for any further favour and special relaxation beyond 2014. iii. Education (Elementary) Deptt, Govt. of Assam will move Govt. of India for relaxation of marks for Siksha Mitras from 50% to 45%. The decision in this regard will depend entirely on NCTE and Govt. of India. Hon'ble Minister, Education emphasised that the Siksha Mitras must obtain graduation by 2014 as in states like Arunachal and Meghalaya requests for relaxation of qualification have already been turned down. The Siksha Mitras qualifying in TET will be accommodated in the contractual teacher posts under SSA. iv. SSA, Assam has a sanction of around 3000 positions of Education Volunteers in Non Residential Special Training Centres (NRSTCs). Effort will be made to accommodate the Siksha Mitras in these NRSTCs wherever possible. v. Age bar will be relaxed for Siksha Mitras for contractual engagement as teacher if so required, as per Government norms Special consideration will be made for further relaxation up to 2014. 5. As per the provisions of the minutes of the meeting of 20.06.2012, a special TET (Teachers Eligibility Test) was held in the year 2012, wherein, all the petitioners herein along with others Shiksha Mitras had participated. It is stated that in the special TET held in the year 2012, although many such Shiksha Mitras were successful and have in the meantime been engaged as contractual teachers, but the present petitioners were unsuccessful. The present petitioners relied upon the further provision of the minutes dated 20.06.2012, more particularly Clause-1 thereof, wherein, it was provided that the special TET would be conducted in the year 2012, 2013 and 2014, which according to the petitioners provide for a further opportunity to be given to them for successfully attempting a special TET also in the subsequent years of 2013 and 2014. 6. Another special TET was held in the year 2014, wherein, the present petitioners had participated. But the result thereof was declared sometime in the year 2017 and all the petitioner were declared to be successful. 7. In the aforesaid circumstance, an advertisement was issued by the Mission Director, SSA, Assam dated 07.09.2017 for recruitment of Assistant Teacher on contractual basis from amongst the TET qualified candidates comprising of Shiksha Mitras. But the result thereof was declared sometime in the year 2017 and all the petitioner were declared to be successful. 7. In the aforesaid circumstance, an advertisement was issued by the Mission Director, SSA, Assam dated 07.09.2017 for recruitment of Assistant Teacher on contractual basis from amongst the TET qualified candidates comprising of Shiksha Mitras. The said advertisement carried a condition that a candidate for the purpose must not be less than 18 years of age and not more than 43 years of age as on 01.01.2007, by providing that relaxation of upper age limit will be applicable for SC, ST, ST(H), PH candidates for another five years as per Govt. of Assam Office Memorandum No. ABP.06/2016/04 dated 03.03.2016. The advertisement of 07.09.2017, more particularly, the eligibility condition prescribed in Clause-1 of the criteria, wherein the upper age limit of 43 years as on 01.01.2017 was imposed, is being assailed in this batch of writ petitions. 8. Mr. C.P. Sarma learned counsel leading the argument on behalf of the writ petitioners mainly contend that the minutes of the meeting held on 20.06.2012 with the Minister of Education, Assam constitutes a policy decision of the Govt. of Assam and hence all such provisions thereof are binding on the authorities in the Elementary Education Department including the SSA. According to Mr. Sarma as the minutes of 20.06.2012 provided that a special TET would be conducted for the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, all the petitioners had a legal right under the policy to avail all the aforesaid three opportunities. 9. It is contended that although the special TET was not held in the year 2013 but it having been held in the year 2014, the petitioners would be governed for all purpose by the provisions of law as it stood in the year 2014, which would also include the provisions of Clause 3 of the minutes that the Shiksha Mitras who qualified in the TET would be accommodated in the post of contractual teacher under the SSA and Clause 10 that their age bar would be relaxed for the contractual engagement if so required as per Govt. norms with special consideration to be made for further relaxation up to 2014. According to Mr. norms with special consideration to be made for further relaxation up to 2014. According to Mr. Sarma had the results of the said TET held in the year 2014 been declared immediately thereafter their age considerations would have been as it stood in the year 2014 and that along with the further provision for relaxation as per Govt. norms as provided in Clause-10, they would have qualified for being engaged as contractual teachers. But as because there was a considerable delay in the declaration of the results, which infact was so done in the year 2017, their age continued to advance in between and consequently, imposing the same age bar of 43 years as on 01.01.2017 in the advertisement dated 07.09.2017 would be arbitrary and discriminatory. 10. According to Mr. Sarma, such arbitrary and discriminatory provision in the advertisement dated 07.09.2017 would be acceptable only if the authorities in the Elementary Education Department do relax the age of the petitioners suitably so as to overcome the hardship. Mr. Sarma contends that the aforesaid requirement of relaxing the upper age limit in respect of the petitioners flows from the policy decision as contained in the minutes dated 20.06.2012. 11. Mr. Sarma makes an alternative contention that even if the minutes of the meeting of 20.06.2012 is not a policy decision, it definitely would be a promise on the part of the Govt. of Assam in the Elementary Education Department and as the advertisement dated 07.09.2017 provides for an upper age limit which is contrary to the promise contained in the minutes dated 20.06.2012, therefore, there is a breach of promise on the part of the said authorities. Accordingly, the petitioners seek to make out a case of promissory estoppels in their favour and that based upon such promise, there was also a legitimate expectation on their part which had been violated by the provision of Clause 1 of the criteria in the advertisement dated 07.09.2017. 12. As regards the claim that the minutes dated 20.06.2012 constituted a promise on the part of the authorities in the Elementary Education Department and that a legitimate expectation was in favour of the petitioners, pursuant to such minutes, Mr. C.P. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in paragraph 2, 4, 5 and 8 of Surya Narain Yadav and Others Vs. C.P. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in paragraph 2, 4, 5 and 8 of Surya Narain Yadav and Others Vs. Bihar State Electricity Board and others reported in (1985) 3 SCC 38 wherein, it was held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not really based on the principle of estoppels, but it is a doctrine evolved by equity in order to prevent injustice. In the said matter before the Supreme Court certain trainee engineers had stood by the Bihar State Electricity Board to keep up generation and distribution of electricity, although they became age bar in the meantime by foregoing other alternative employment opportunities and in the circumstance were accepted by the Supreme Court that they form a specific class of their own for the purpose of being meted a different consideration as regards the question of age bar. 13. Reliance has also been placed on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in paragraphs 24 and 33 of its judgment rendered in M/s. Motilal Padmapat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 409 , wherein it was provided that if by acting upon the promise, the promisee had altered its position, the Government would be bound and the promise would be enforceable at the instance of the promisee. 14. As regards a promise being meted out by the State authorities, reliance has also been placed upon paragraph-30 of the judgment rendered in S.V.A Steel Re-Rolling Mills limited and others Vs. State of Kerala and others, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 186 , wherein it had been held that before laying down any policy which would give benefits to the citizens, the State must think about the pros and cons of the policy and also that it has the capacity to give the benefits and without doing so, no such assurance be given because it would not only be in violation of the principles of promissory estoppel, but it would also be unfair and immoral on the part of the State not to act as per its promise. 15. 15. Further reliance has been placed on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in paragraph-19 of Manuel Sons Hotels Private Limited -vs- State of kerala and others, reported in (2016) 6 SCC 766 , wherein a view was taken that the doctrine of promissory estoppels is a doctrine whose foundation is that an unconscionable departure by one party from the subject matter of an assumption and which had been adopted by the other authority as the basis of some course of conduct, act or omission, should not be allowed to pass muster and that of paragraph-20, wherein a view was taken by differentiating from the English authorities from the Indian law that promissory estoppels can be the basis of an independent cause of action in which detriment does not need to be proved and it is enough that a party has acted upon the representation made. 16. As regards the contention of hardship and relaxation of the Rules, reliance has been placed by Mr. CP Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioners on the proposition of the Supreme Court laid down in paragraph-14 of Sandeep Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Punjab and others, reported in (1997) 10 SCC 298 , wherein a view was taken that the power of relaxation even if generally included in the Service Rules, could either be for the purpose of mitigating hardships or to meet special and deserving situations and that the relaxation must get a pragmatic construction so as to achieve effective implication of a good policy of the Government. 17. Further reliance has been placed on the propositions laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 26 and 30 of its judgment rendered in Ashok Kumar Uppal and others Vs. 17. Further reliance has been placed on the propositions laid down by the Supreme Court in paragraphs 26 and 30 of its judgment rendered in Ashok Kumar Uppal and others Vs. State of J&K and others, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 179 , wherein it was held that in order to meet any emergent situation, where injustice may have been caused, or likely to be caused to any individual employee or class of employees, or where the Rules may have become impossible to be complied, under the service jurisprudence as well as under the administrative law, such a power necessarily has to be conceded to the employer, particularly the State Government or the Central Government, who have to deal with its employees and in such event, the Government can in exercise of the power to relax the Rules, where hardship or injustice has been caused to any such individual or class of employees. 18. A further contention has also been raised by Mr. Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioners by relying upon the provision of paragraph-47 of the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in State of Punjab Vs. NESTLE India Ltd., reported in (2004) 6 SCC 465 , wherein it was provided that when the higher authorities including the Finance Minister in its budget speech had granted exemption to milk from the purview of purchase tax and where the overall benefit to the State economy and public would be greater if such exemptions were allowed and the authorities having passed on the benefit of exemption by providing various facilities and concessions for the upliftment of the milk producers, it would be inequitable to allow the State Government now to resile from its decision to exempt milk from the purview of purchase tax. 19. The core contention of Mr. D. Saikia, learned Additional Advocate General for the State of Assam is that the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 neither constitutes a policy of the Elementary Education Department of the Government of Assam nor the same constitutes a promise by the department to the petitioners that their upper age limit for being appointed as a contractual teacher would invariably be relaxed by the authorities without reference to any established procedure of law. 20. According to Mr. 20. According to Mr. Saikia, a particular procedure as provided under the Rules is required to be followed in order to enable the State authorities to take a policy decision and the manner in which the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 were entered, the required procedure for adopting a policy was absent and as a result, the contents of the minutes of 20.06.2012 cannot be called to be a policy at all. 21. As regards the alternative contention of Mr. CP Sarma, that the minutes of the meeting of 20.06.2012 had held out a promise by the authorities in the Elementary Education Department to the writ petitioners that their age would be suitably condoned upon being successful in the special TET Examination to be conducted, Mr. Saikia contends that the essential ingredients to construe a promise is absent in the minutes of 20.06.2012 and therefore, there is no enforceable promise by the authorities in the Elementary Education Department, which can be enforced by the petitioners in the guise of a promissory estoppel. 22. It is further contended that the minutes of 20.06.2012 did not result in any legitimate expectation on the part of the petitioners for a condonation of their age, inasmuch as, the essential ingredients required for it to be a legitimate expectation is absent. A further contention of Mr. Saikia is that the minutes of 20.06.2012 merely provided that the special TET examination would be conducted in the years 2012, 2013 and 2014, where in the present case, it was conducted in 2012 and 2014 in a circumstance, where the petitioners have no grievance of it having not been conducted in the year 2013 and from that point of view, the provision of the minutes of 20.06.2012 had been carried out by the authorities by holding the special TET in the year 2014. According to Mr. Saikia, it is another factor that the results were not declared up to 2017, but that by itself will not make it a case where it can be said that the provisions of the minutes of 20.06.2012 were not carried out by the authorities. 23. Another contention of Mr. Saikia is that in the meantime, the age relaxation for appointment to Government service would be governed by the Office Memorandums of 03.03.2016 and 18.04.2018, wherein the upper age limit had been enhanced up to 43 years and 44 years respectively. 23. Another contention of Mr. Saikia is that in the meantime, the age relaxation for appointment to Government service would be governed by the Office Memorandums of 03.03.2016 and 18.04.2018, wherein the upper age limit had been enhanced up to 43 years and 44 years respectively. According to Mr. Saikia by having enhanced the upper age limit to 43 years and 44 years respectively up from 38 years, which prevailed in the year 2014, there is already a general relaxation being made available to all class of prospective employees and therefore, there remains no further right of the petitioners to claim any relaxation beyond what has already provided in 2016 and 2018 and the said enhancement fulfils the requirement of considering further enhancement as per the minutes of 20.06.2012. 24. In order to substantiate his contention that the minutes of 20.06.2012 does not constitute a policy, Mr. Saikia relies upon the proposition laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Jitendra Kalita and others Vs. State of Assam and others, reported in 2006 (2) GLT 654, wherein in paragraphs 18, 19, 20 and 21, an elaborate discussion had been made as to how a policy decision can be taken by the Government. A specific reliance had been made to the provisions in paragraph-20, wherein it is provided that though the executive power of the State vests in the Governor, he does not, unless the Constitution expressly conferred on him, personally take the decision and the decisions are taken according to the rules of business at different levels and ultimately, the decision rests with the authority specified in the business rules, although it is expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. Accordingly, Mr. Saikia refers to the relevant provision of the Assam Rules of Executive Business, 1968 to substantiate as to in what manner a policy decision is taken by the Government and to that effect, specific reference is made to Part-II of the Assam Rules of Executive Business, 1968. 25. By relying upon the provision, Mr. Saikia submits that the manner in which the minutes dated 20.06.2012 was taken, does support the contention that it was a policy decision of the Government. 26. Mr. Saikia also raises a contention by relying upon the provisions of Paragraph-52 of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Shimntt Utsch India Private Limited and another Vs. Saikia submits that the manner in which the minutes dated 20.06.2012 was taken, does support the contention that it was a policy decision of the Government. 26. Mr. Saikia also raises a contention by relying upon the provisions of Paragraph-52 of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Shimntt Utsch India Private Limited and another Vs. West Bengal Transport Infrastructure Development Corporation Limited and others, reported in (2010) 6 SCC 303 , wherein it had been held that the Government has a discretion to adopt a different policy or alter or change its policy to serve public interest and make it more effective and the choice in balancing the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy lies with the authorities. Accordingly, it is contended that even if the minutes of 20.06.2012 is construed to be a policy, but because of the change in circumstance and the lapse of time, the change in the policy cannot remain unwarranted. 27. Contentions have also been raised by Mr. Saikia that the aspect of upper age limit and its relaxation were earlier governed by the OM No. ABP.513/79/09 dated 27.03.1980 of the Personal (B) Department and OM No. ABP.73/89/17 dated 04.01.1992 of the same Department by stating that at the relevant point of time when the minutes of 20.06.2012 was entered, the provisions contained in the aforesaid two notifications were holding the field. Mr. Saikia contends that by the judgment and order dated 03.08.2015 in Pranab Kumar Deka and others Vs. State of Assam and others, reported in 2015 (4) GLT 103, the aforesaid two notifications were interfered and set aside. The said two notifications governing the upper age limit and the relaxation thereof having been set aside, the resultant situation would be that the prior notification dated 31.05.1951 issued under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India would now govern the field. 28. Accordingly, the provision of the minutes of 20.06.2012 would now have to be read with that any relaxation if required to be made under the said minutes, would be as per the provisions of the notification dated 03.05.1951. 29. As regards the contention that there was a promise in the minutes of 20.06.2012, which had been resiled by the respondent Elementary Education Department, Mr. Saikia relies upon the pronouncement of the Supreme Court rendered in paragraph-35 of State of Bihar and others Vs. 29. As regards the contention that there was a promise in the minutes of 20.06.2012, which had been resiled by the respondent Elementary Education Department, Mr. Saikia relies upon the pronouncement of the Supreme Court rendered in paragraph-35 of State of Bihar and others Vs. Kalyanpur Cement Limited, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 274 , wherein certain circumstances were enumerated which were required to be fulfilled in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel. By relying upon the same, Mr. Saikia submits that in the instant case, the requirement of altering the position by relying on the promise were not satisfied in the present and further that it is possible for the Government to resile from its promise when public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were to carry out the promise. 30. Reliance has also been placed on the provision of paragraph 182 of the Judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in Monnet Ispat and Energy Limited -Vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2012) 11 SCC 1 , wherein the principles that must guide a Court where the issue of applicability of promissory estoppels arises, had been laid down, more particularly, the provisions of 182.4, where the requirement of altering its position pursuant to the promise and 182.7 where the result to be achieved and the public good at large, are also relevant considerations. Contentions were also raised by Mr. D. Saikia, by relying upon the proposition laid by the Supreme court in paragraph-80 in its judgment rendered in Vikas Sankhala and Ors. Vs. Vikas Kumar Agarwal and Ors., reported in (2017) 1 SCC 350 , wherein it is held that passing of the TET examination is a condition of eligibility of appointment of teacher and without it a candidate would not be eligible for being considered for appointment. By relying upon the same, it is the contention that merely being successful in the TET examination does not confer a right on a candidate to be appointed. It is also contended by Mr. D. Saikia by relying upon the proposition laid down by the supreme Court in paragraph-24 of Dani Belo Vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2011) 2 GLT 686 and paragraph-10, 12 & 14 of State of Gujarat Vs. It is also contended by Mr. D. Saikia by relying upon the proposition laid down by the supreme Court in paragraph-24 of Dani Belo Vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh and Ors. reported in (2011) 2 GLT 686 and paragraph-10, 12 & 14 of State of Gujarat Vs. Arivndkumar T. Tiwari and Ors., reported in (2012) 9 SCC 545 that a condition of recruitment provided under the Rules cannot be relaxed. 31. It is also contended by Mr. Saikia that providing for an upper age limit for recruitment is a condition of recruitment under the Rules and the same can be relaxed only by following the required procedure as prescribed under the Rules. According to Mr. Saikia, the aspect of age relaxation provided under Clause 10 of the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 also provides that age bar would be relaxed for the Shiksha Mitras for contractual engagement as teachers as per the Government norms. Further provision that special consideration will be made for further relaxation up to 2014 would also have to be understood to mean that any relaxation beyond the relaxation provided under the prevailing government norms would also have to be done only by following the procedure prescribed for the purpose and it cannot be that the Government authorities in the guise of special consideration have been vested with a jurisdiction to relax the age in an unregulated manner up to any extent. 32. A contention has also been raised by Mr. D. Saikia, learned senior Additional Advocate General that the Office Memorandums of 03.03.2016 and 18.04.2018, wherein the upper age limit had been enhanced up to 43 years and 44 years respectively in respect of Government servant. Policy Decision : 33. A policy as defined in the Black Law's Dictionary is a general principle by which a Government is guided in its management of public affairs or the legislature in its measures. From the provisions as enumerated above, it can be culled out that in order to be a policy of the Government certain procedural requirements are required to be fulfilled and such procedure involves the subject matter of the policy being processed through various levels of the executive and ultimately being placed for a consideration and approval before the Cabinet. From the provisions as enumerated above, it can be culled out that in order to be a policy of the Government certain procedural requirements are required to be fulfilled and such procedure involves the subject matter of the policy being processed through various levels of the executive and ultimately being placed for a consideration and approval before the Cabinet. The Rules of Executive Business of the Government of Assam provides for the various procedures that are to be undergone before the subject matter of the policy is placed before the Cabinet for its approval. Only upon such procedure being followed and the matter being considered and approved by the Cabinet would result in a policy decision of the Government. 34. In paragraph-20 of the Full Bench Judgment in Jitendra Kalita (supra) it has been held as under:- "Though constitutionally the executive power of the State vests in the Governor, he does not, unless the Constitution expressly conferred on him, personally take the decision. The decisions are taken according to business rules at different levels and ultimately the decision rests with the authority specified in the business rules and is expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor. " 35. In the context of the above concept as to what is a policy, when we look into the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012, an opinion can be formed that no such procedure was adopted in arriving at a decision contained in the minutes. 36. Further it is taken note of that the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 provides that after a thread bare discussion on the issues involved, certain resolutions as indicated therein were taken. The discussion referred in the minutes would have to be construed to be a discussion between the participants of the meeting, which comprises, amongst others, of the Minister of Education, Assam, who had chaired the meeting and the Mission Director, SSA, an Officer-on-Special Duty, SSA, Assam, the SPO, P&M, who was the In-Charge of the EGS etc. Composition of the participants of the meeting is also an indicator that the required procedure for arriving at a policy decision as prescribed in the Rules of Executive Business, Assam were not followed in the meeting dated 20.06.2012. 37. It is also noticed that in the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012, after a thread bare discussion, certain resolutions were taken. 38. 37. It is also noticed that in the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012, after a thread bare discussion, certain resolutions were taken. 38. The expression resolution has been defined in the Black Law's Dictionary to be 'A formal expression of the opinion or will of an official body or public assembly.......' The minutes of 20.06.2012 was signed by the Ministry of Education, Assam in his own capacity and from the copy of the minutes brought on record in the writ petition, it is noticed that no other participant had signed the same. From the said aspect, it has to be understood that the resolutions contained in the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 are the opinion or the will of the Minister of Education. From the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 can be held to be not a result of it being subjected to the procedure required for arriving at a policy decision and secondly, it being the expression of the opinion or the will of the Minister of Education, Assam, in his own capacity, it cannot be concluded that the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 be also construed to be a policy decision of the Government of Assam. Promissory Estoppel/Legitimate Expectation: 39. As regards the contention of the petitioners that the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 had held a promise and, therefore, by not honouring the promise, the doctrine of promissory estoppel would be applicable, we have to examine the various provisions laid down by the Supreme Court in respect of the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 40. In Surya Narain Yadav (supra) in paragraph- 2, 4, 5 and 8, it has been held as under:- "2. ..... and had left the Board, they were told to come back under the temptation of getting permanently employed under the Board; (3) when the Board was reeling under a strike of its employees, these trainee engineers had stood by the Board to keep up the generation and distribution of electricity and had been assured of absorption...." 4." ....the Board was aware of the position that these trainee engineers formed a special class and very peculiar circumstances warranted a definitely special treatment in regard to them. Yet it is unfortunate that a statutory body like the Board has failed to stand up to its representations made from time to time to a group of engineers who had spent years of their valuable life for qualifying themselves as engineers and who believing the representation of the Board and acting upon the same continued to remain in the employment of the Board as trainee engineers foregoing opportunities available to seek other employments and in the process have become age-barred for any public employment." 5. "........ Admittedly, the trainee engineers before us formed a specific class and from time to time the Board treated them as members of a class and in its resolution of April 26, 1979, recognized this fact......." 8. "The Board in our view is, therefore, bound to regularise the appointments of the appellants who had been taken as trainee engineers initially and have continued to be in the employment of the Board." 41. From the aforesaid facts and circumstance in which the decision was rendered in Surya Narain Yadav (Supra), it is noticed that the engineers involved therein had formed a special class for an age relaxation, inasmuch as, when some of them upon getting age barred for government employment had left the service of the Board, they were told to come back under a temptation that they would be permanently employed under the Board and by doing so, the engineers had kept up the generation and distribution of electricity of the Board by acting upon the assurance that they would be absorbed. 42. In the instant case, no materials have been produced that the petitioners had at any stage desired to leave their engagement as Siksha Mitras but were required to come back at the instance of the respondent authorities so that the system of providing education does not collapse. Infact on the other hand, the claim of the petitioners for absorption as Assistant Teachers had been rejected in Rumi Gogoi Hazarika (supra) and even after such rejection the petitioners continue to press with the respondent authorities to absorb them as Assistant Teachers. 43. Due to the converse factual matrix in the present case, it cannot be said that the petitioners form a special class and hence, their claim for age relaxation by relying upon the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Surya Narain Yadav (Supra) is unacceptable. 44. 43. Due to the converse factual matrix in the present case, it cannot be said that the petitioners form a special class and hence, their claim for age relaxation by relying upon the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Surya Narain Yadav (Supra) is unacceptable. 44. In M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugra Mills (supra) in paragraphs-24 & 33, it has been held as under:- 24." ....where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promises and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promises, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution...." 33. ......We do not think that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is necessary for the promise to show that he suffered detriment as a result of acting in reliance on the promise. But we may make it clear that if by detriment we mean injustice to the promisee which could result if the promisor were to recede from his promise then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise...... It would therefore, be correct to say that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppels it is enough to show that the promise has, acting in reliance on the promise, altered his position and it is not necessary for him to further show that he has acted to his detriment......" 45. In Manuelsons Hotels Private Limited (supra) in paragraph-19, it has been held as follows:- 19. "we must never forget that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a doctrine whose foundation is that an unconscionable departure by one party from the subject matter of an assumption which may be of fact or law, present or future, and which has been adopted by the other party as the basis of some course of conduct, act or omission, should not be allowed to pass muster. And the relief to be given in cases involving the doctrine of promissory estoppels contains a degree of flexibility which would ultimately render justice to the aggrieved party....." "Since an estoppel will not arise unless the party claiming the benefit of it has adopted the assumption as the basis of action or inaction and thereby placed himself in a position of significant disadvantage if departure from the assumption be permitted, the resolution of an issue of estoppel by conduct will involve an examination of the relevant belief, actions and position of that party." 46. In State of Bihar Vs. Kalyanpur Cement Ltd. (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs-34 and 35 has held as under:- "34. The doctrine of promissory estoppel as developed in the administrative law of this country has been eloquently explained in Kasinka Trading v. Union of India by Dr. A.S Anand, J., in the following words: "11. The doctrine of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel is well established in the administrative law of the country. To put it simply, the doctrine represents a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice. The basis of the doctrine is that where any party has by his word or conduct made to the other party an unequivocal promise or representation by word or conduct, which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing as well as intending that the representation, assurance or the promise would be acted upon by the other party to whom it has been made and has in fact been so acted upon by the other party, the promise, assurance or representation should be binding on the party making it and that party should not be permitted to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so, having regard to the dealings, which have taken place or are intended to take place between the parties." "12. It has been settled by this Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government also particularly where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. It has been settled by this Court that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government also particularly where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. The doctrine, however, cannot be pressed into aid to compel the Government or the public authority 'to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make'. There is preponderance of judicial opinion that to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and that bald expressions, without any supporting material, to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. In our opinion, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in the abstract and the courts are bound to consider all aspects including the results sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine, the courts have to do equity and the fundamental principles of equity must forever be present to the mind of the court, while considering the applicability of the doctrine. The doctrine must yield when the equity so demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation." "35. In our opinion, the aforesaid statement of law covers the submissions of Dr. Dhavan and Mr. The doctrine must yield when the equity so demands if it can be shown having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that it would be inequitable to hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation." "35. In our opinion, the aforesaid statement of law covers the submissions of Dr. Dhavan and Mr. Dwivedi that in order to invoke the aforesaid doctrine, it must be established that: (a) A party must make an unequivocal promise or representation by word or conduct to the other party; (b) The representation was intended to create legal relations or affect the legal relationship, to arise in the future; (c) A clear foundation has to be laid in the petition, with supporting documents; (d) It has to be shown that the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the promise; (e) It is possible for the Government to resile from its promise when public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise; (f) The Court will not apply the doctrine in abstract." 47. In Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph-32 and 33 has held as under:- "32. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is by now well recognised and well defined by a catena of decisions of this Court. Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 229 of the Constitution. The rule of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine has to be moulded to suit the particular situation. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. It is not a hard-and-fast rule but an elastic one, the objective of which is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. This doctrine is a principle evolved by equity, to avoid injustice and though commonly named promissory estoppel, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. For application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promisee must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by reliance on the promise." "33. Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. The Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary to law." 48. In Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development Corporation Federation (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph-45 and 46 has held as follows:- "45. Therefore, it is evident that the Court will not pass any order binding the Government by its promises unless it is so necessary to prevent manifest injustice or fraud, particularly, when government acts in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity. Estoppel does not operate against the government or its assignee while acting in such capacity." "46. The Government has inherent power to promote the general welfare of the people and in order to achieve the said goal, the State is free to exercise its sovereign powers of legislation to regulate the conduct of its citizens to the extent, that their rights shall not stand abridged." 49. The Government has inherent power to promote the general welfare of the people and in order to achieve the said goal, the State is free to exercise its sovereign powers of legislation to regulate the conduct of its citizens to the extent, that their rights shall not stand abridged." 49. In Monnet Ispat & Energy in paragraph 182 it has been provided as under: In Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd., in paragraph 182.1 to 182.7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows: 182.1. Where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is, in fact, so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to a low him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. 182.2. The doctrine of promissory estoppels may be applied against the Government where the interest of justice, morality and common fairness dictate such a course. The doctrine is applicable against the State even in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. However, the Government or even a private party under the doctrine of promissory estoppels cannot be asked to do an act prohibited in law. The nature and function which the Government discharges is not very relevant. The Government is subject to the rule of promissory estoppels and if the essential ingredients of this doctrine are satisfied, the Government can be compelled to carry out the promise made by it. 182.3. The doctrine of promissory estoppels is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also furnish a cause of action. In other words, the doctrine of promissory estoppels can by itself be the basis of action. 182.4. 182.3. The doctrine of promissory estoppels is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also furnish a cause of action. In other words, the doctrine of promissory estoppels can by itself be the basis of action. 182.4. For invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, it is necessary for the promise to show that by acting on promise made by the other party, he altered his position. The alteration of position by the promise is a sine qua non for the applicability of the doctrine. However, it is not necessary for him to prove any damage, detriment or prejudice because of alteration of such promise. 182.5. In no case, the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be pressed into aid to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. No promise can be enforced which is statutorily prohibited or is against public policy. 182.6. It is necessary for invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel that a clear, sound and positive foundation is laid in the petition. Bald assertions, averments or a legations without any supporting material are not sufficient to press into aid the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 182.7. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in abstract. When it is sought to be invoked, the court must consider all aspects including the result sought to be achieved and the public good at large. The fundamental principle of equity must forever be present to the mind of the court. Absence of it must not hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation. 50. When it is sought to be invoked, the court must consider all aspects including the result sought to be achieved and the public good at large. The fundamental principle of equity must forever be present to the mind of the court. Absence of it must not hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation. 50. This Court while examining some of the aforesaid proposition in its judgment and order dated 15.02.2018 in Arnab Kumar Kalita and 20 Others passed in WP(C) No. 7071/17 and WP(C) No. 73/2018, the following had been culled out: From the aforesaid pronouncements, it is discernible that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, amongst others, the following requirements be satisfied:- (i) To invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, clear, sound and positive foundation must be laid in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and bald expression, without any supporting materials, to the effect that the doctrine is attracted because the party invoking the doctrine has altered its position relying on the assurance of the Government would not be sufficient to press in to aid the doctrine. (ii) The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be inapplicable against the Government where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice and it is possible for the Government to resile from its promise when public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise. (iii) The party making the promise must make an unequivocal promise or representation by word or conduct to the other party. (iv) For the doctrine of promissory estoppel to be made applicable, the promisee must establish that he had suffered in detriment or had altered his position by relying on the promise. Even if we go by the proposition laid down in Motilal Padampat (supra), the promisee must atleast show that he had altered his position by relying and acting upon the promise. (v) If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts, it would be inequitable to bind the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government, and where if public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked and the Government can change the policy in the public interest. (vi) The Government has an inherent power to promote the general welfare of the people and in order to achieve the said goal, the State is free to exercise its sovereign power of legislation to regulate the conduct of its citizens to the extent that their rights shall not stand abridged. (vii) The doctrine of promissory estoppel is not a hard and fast rule, but an elastic one, where the objective is to do justice between the parties and to extend an equitable treatment to them. 51. The basic requirements, amongst others, to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppels the promisor must make an unequivocal promise or representation by word or by conduct to the other party and the promisee must establish that in furtherance of such promise being met, he had suffered in detriment or had altered his position by relying on the promisee. 52. When we examine the contents of the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012, no such unequivocal promise or representation by word or by conduct is noticeable except that three special TET's would be conducted for the Shiksha Mitras and that the Shiksha Mitras who qualify in the TET would be accommodated as contractual teachers under the SSA and that age bar would be relaxed for the Shiksha Mitras for contractual engagement as teachers as per Government norms and further that special consideration would be made for further relaxation up to 2014. 53. Although instead of three TETs to be held in 2012, 2013 and 2014, two TETs were held in 2012 and 2014 respectively, but no such grievance has been expressed by the petitioners against such non-holding of the TET in the year 2013. The provision that the successful Shiksha Mitras will be accommodated as contractual teachers would definitely have to be construed that after successful completion of the TET, such Shiksha Mitras would be subjected to the procedural requirement for being appointed as contractual teachers and it cannot be understood that merely by successfully qualifying the TET, such Shiksha Mitras would automatically be appointed as contractual teachers. 54. 54. Any such understanding that the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 had provided that upon successful completion of the TET, the Shiksha Mitras would automatically be appointed as contractual teachers would have to be rejected as the same would be in conflict with the provisions laid down by the Supreme Court rendered in Vikas Sankhala (supra) wherein it was held that passing of the TET examination is a condition of eligibility for being appointed as a teacher, without which a candidate would not be so eligible. Therefore, the provisions in the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 that upon successful completion of the TET, the Shiksha Mitras would be accommodated as contractual teachers would have to be understood that they would be so appointed only upon being subjected to a further procedural requirement for such appointment. In the facts and circumstance of the present case as narrated above, the petitioners who were earlier engaged as Siksha Mitras in the EGS had made a claim that they be absorbed as Assistant Teachers in the lower primary schools upon the EGS centres being controverted to lower primary schools and such claim was rejected in the judicial pronouncement in Rumi Gogoi Hazarika (supra). Upon such rejection, the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 had taken resolutions that they would be given another opportunity to be engaged as contractual teachers by subjecting themselves to the special TET and upon successful completion of the special TET they would be absorbed as contractual teachers as per procedure and the relaxation of their age bar would be considered as per government norms. Having availed the opportunities of the special TETs in the circumstance, as provided in the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012, the petitioners have not altered their position in any manner and they have merely availed an opportunity that was offered. As there was no alteration in the position of the petitioners, we are of the view that neither the principles of promissory estoppel nor that of the legitimate expectation is applicable in the present case. 55. As there was no alteration in the position of the petitioners, we are of the view that neither the principles of promissory estoppel nor that of the legitimate expectation is applicable in the present case. 55. But be that as it may, the meeting dated 20.06.2012 was held in the background where the claim of the Shiksha Mitras for being appointed as Assistant Teachers in lower primary schools after the EGS Centres where they were earlier working as Shiksha Mitras had been rejected by the judicial pronouncement dated 07.02.2012 in Rumi Gogoi Hazarika (supra). As the claim for being appointed as Assistant Teacher had been judicially rejected and such rejection had attained its finality, the provisions of the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 would have to be construed to be in the nature of an enabling provision so as to enable the unsuccessful Shiksha Mitras to avail the opportunity for being appointed as contractual teachers. The provisions of the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 being in the nature of an enabling provision, the Shiksha Mitras who seek to take advantage of the benefits of such provisions would also have to confine themselves to the requirement provided therein for availing such benefits. 56. In any view of the matter, all that the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 provides is that the Shiksha Mitras are given another opportunity to participate in a process for being appointed as contractual teachers which otherwise they are not entitled after the rejection of their claim in the judicial pronouncement in Rumi Gogoi Hazarika (supra). 57. It was absolutely a discretion vested on the Shiksha Mitras to either avail the opportunity or to forego and there was no compulsion nor any requirement in the minutes requiring them to alter their position in any manner to their detriment or otherwise in availing such opportunity. As has been culled out, one of the core requirements of invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppels is that the promisee must establish that he had suffered any detriment or had altered his position by relying on the promise. As has been culled out, one of the core requirements of invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppels is that the promisee must establish that he had suffered any detriment or had altered his position by relying on the promise. In the instant case, even if the provisions of the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 is not only considered to be an opportunity given, but also a promise, still we have not come across any material on record, which would help us in arriving at a conclusion that the petitioner Shiksha Mitras had suffered any detriment or had altered their position by relying on the promise. 58. Accordingly, the claim of the petitioners that by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppels, they are entitled for a relaxation of the upper age limit is found to be unacceptable. Relaxation of Age Bar: 59. The other provision in the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 that the age bar of the Shiksha Mitras for contractual engagement as teachers would be relaxed as per Government norms and a special consideration would be made for further relaxation up to 2014, also cannot be construed that such age relaxation would invariably be made across the board irrespective of the length of the period by which such Shiksha Mitras may be over-aged beyond the prescribed age limit. The provision would also have to be understood in the context that age relaxation would be considered within the acceptable parameters prescribed for relaxation of the age. 60. Without going to the aforesaid aspect that the enhancement of the upper age limit to 43 years, or 44 years as the case may be, had taken care of the requirement of Clause 10 of the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012, it would be apposite to examine as to what was the provision for age relaxation as it stood in the year 2014 which would otherwise have been made applicable to the case of the petitioners had the results of the TET of 2014 been declared in the same year itself and the recruitment process of contractual teachers would also have started in the same year. 61. We take note of that in the year 2014, the Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980 as stood partially modified by the Office Memorandum dated 04.01.1992 was in force. 61. We take note of that in the year 2014, the Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980 as stood partially modified by the Office Memorandum dated 04.01.1992 was in force. The Office Memorandum of 27.03.1980 is extracted below: "The 27th March, 1980 Office Memorandum Government have had under consideration for some time past the exercise of powers by the competent authorities under Notification No. AAP-34/50/27, dated 03.05.1951 in respect of relaxation of the age limit for recruitment to Civil Services or Civil posts in connection with the affairs of the State. 2. Government after due consideration are pleased to lay down the following revised principles for guidance in dealing with the cases for relaxation of age limit under the said Notification:- (1) Relaxation from the fixed age limit is to be granted only in the interest of fair dealing or in the public interest and one of these conditions must be satisfied before the age limit can be relaxed in favour of an individual candidate. (2) The relaxation is to be granted under the powers conferred in the Notification by the appointing authority. In the case of appointments made by the Governor, the appropriate Administrative Department will be responsible for granting the relaxation. In cases in which appointment is made by the Head of Department such Head will grant the relaxation. (3) In case of direct recruitment to the Lowest cadre or post through the Assam Public Service Commission as per provisions of the service Rules regulating recruitment to the various services and posts relaxation upto the age of 40 years may be granted in accordance with the procedure prescribed in sub-para (4) below. Such relaxation may be allowed only in case of those who are in the services of this State Government. In cases where the direct recruitment is not made through the APSC the relaxation may be allowed to those also who are not in the services of this State Government. Such relaxation may be allowed only in case of those who are in the services of this State Government. In cases where the direct recruitment is not made through the APSC the relaxation may be allowed to those also who are not in the services of this State Government. (4) In case in which recruitment is made through the Assam Public Service Commission, the Commission should be consulted before the rules are relaxed in the following manner:-The appointing authority when approached by a candidate for granting exemption, if it is satisfied that the case deserves consideration shall refer the case to the Assam Public Service Commission to consider it on merits notwithstanding the candidate exceeding the age limit and the Commission shall then not reject the candidate merely on the grounds of his being over-age. The commission shall make its final recommendation having regard to the fact of the candidate being overage and will state whether in its opinion this makes the candidate unsuitable for the appointment in question. 3. No reference to Personnel Department in individual cases either by the Administrative Department or Heads of Departments is necessary provided that the principles laid down above are followed by them. This supersedes Government OM No. AAP-34/50/26, dated 03.05.1951. OM No. AAP-135/61/1 dated 26.10.1961 and OM No. AAP-200/70/79 dated 15.03.73." 62. A reading of the said Office Memorandum goes to show that firstly the Office Memorandum of 27.03.1980 provides that the relaxation be allowed only in case of those who are in the services under the State Government where the recruitment is to be done through the Assam Public Service Commission and in case of direct recruitments which are not made through the Assam Public Service Commission, the relaxation may also be allowed to those who are not in service under the State Government. The further provision is that the Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980 had superseded the earlier Government Office Memorandums being OM No. AAP-34/50/26 dated 30.05.1951, OM No. AAP-135/61/1 dated 26.10.1961 and OM No. AAP-200/70/79 dated 15.03.1973. The Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980 also provided that the relaxation is to be granted only in the interest of fair dealing or in the public interest and one of the two conditions must be satisfied before the age limit can be relaxed in favour of an individual candidate. The Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980 also provided that the relaxation is to be granted only in the interest of fair dealing or in the public interest and one of the two conditions must be satisfied before the age limit can be relaxed in favour of an individual candidate. The Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980 provided that age may be relaxed up to the age of 40 years whereas by the subsequent Notification dated 04.01.1992, it was extended upto 45 years meaning thereby that the age can be relaxed upto the age of 45 years. 63. The Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980 was assailed in a writ petition resulting in the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2015 in Pranab Kumar Deka and Others Vs. State of Assam and Others reported in 2015(4)GLT 103. By the said judgment it was held that the earlier Government Notification No. AAP-34/50/27 dated 03.05.1951 was framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India and hence it could not have been superseded by the subsequent Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980. Accordingly the Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980 was struck down and as a consequence thereof, the Government Notification No. AAP-34/50/27 dated 03.05.1951 stood revived. 64. In the circumstance, had the result of the special TET held in the year 2014 been declared in 2014 itself and the consequential recruitment process would also have started in the same year, the claim of the petitioners for relaxation, even under Clause 10 of the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012 would have been made by applying the provision of the Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980 as modified by the Office Memorandum dated 04.01.1992 i.e., a relaxation maximum upto the age of 45 subject to the fulfillment of the condition that such relaxation is required in the interest of fair dealing or in the public interest. 65. But because of the intervening changes in the circumstances as because of the Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980 being struck down, the claim of the petitioner, under Clause 10 of the minutes dated 20.06.2012 would now have been considered under the Government Notification No. AAP-34/50/27 dated 03.05.1951. 66. The relevant provision of Clause 4 of the Notification dated 03.05.1951 is as under: "AAP.34/50/27, General rules for relaxation of age limits 3.5.1951 4. 66. The relevant provision of Clause 4 of the Notification dated 03.05.1951 is as under: "AAP.34/50/27, General rules for relaxation of age limits 3.5.1951 4. In pursuance of the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the Governor of Assam is pleased to make the following general rules regarding relaxation of the age limit for recruitment to civil services or civil posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Assam- (1) "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in rules regulating the maximum or minimum age of recruitment to a service or post in connection with the affairs of the State of Assam, the age limit may be relaxed in favour of any candidate or class of candidates only if (i) in cases in which the appointing authority is the Governor, or (ii) in other cases, the Head of the Department, considers this necessary in the interest of fair dealing or in the public interest. (2) In this rule 'Head of Department' means the authority who is declared to be the Head of the Department for the purpose of the Fundamental Rules and of the Subsidiary and Supplementary Rules made by the State Government, and includes a District and Sessions Judge. (3) In case in which recruitment is made through the Public Service Commission, the Commission shall be consulted before the rule is relaxed." 67. Clause 4.1 of the Notification dated 03.05.1951 also provides that the age limit may be relaxed in favour of any candidate or class of candidates only if the Head of the Department considers it necessary in the interest of fair dealing or in the public interest. 68. As the requirement of being in the interest of fair dealing or being in the public interest remains in the same terms as it existed even in the Office Memorandum dated 27.03.1980, from the said point of view it being also a provision in the Notification dated 03.05.1951, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the petitioners as because of the delay in declaring the results of the special TET held in the year 2014. It has further been taken note of that in the year 2016, the upper age limit for government service was enhanced to 43 years in the year 2016 and subsequently further enhanced to 44 years in the year 2018. It has further been taken note of that in the year 2016, the upper age limit for government service was enhanced to 43 years in the year 2016 and subsequently further enhanced to 44 years in the year 2018. In the resultant situation, the petitioners who had appeared in the TET held in the year 2014 and the results were declared in the year 2017 would now participate in a recruitment process having the upper age limit upto 43 years or 44 years as the case may be. On the other hand, had the result been declared and the recruitment process held in the year 2014 itself, they would have competed in a process where the upper age limit would have been as prescribed earlier. Accordingly, on a comparative assessment, it cannot be said that the petitioners are prejudiced from the said point of view as they would now compete in a recruitment process where the upper age limit is 43 years or 44 years as the case may be. 69. Further as it is the stand of the Government authorities in the Education Department that the relaxation of age would now be governed by the provisions of the Notification dated 03.05.1951 and the Notification dated 03.05.1951 being equally applicable for all classes of recruitments, the petitioners can still avail the benefits of such relaxation provided in the said Notification and for the purpose they do not need any resolution through the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012. In the resultant circumstances, although we are not inclined to accept the claim of any legal rights of the petitioners for a relaxation of the upper age limit as per the resolutions taken in the minutes of the meeting dated 20.06.2012, but still as the Notification dated 03.05.1951 is equally applicable to all, the petitioners may submit their respective applications for a consideration of their claim for relaxation of the upper age limit in terms of the said Notification. In doing so, the petitioners would also have to satisfy that such relaxation of the upper age limit is necessary in the interest of fair dealing or in the public interest. 70. In doing so, the petitioners would also have to satisfy that such relaxation of the upper age limit is necessary in the interest of fair dealing or in the public interest. 70. The requirement of satisfying the necessity in the interest of fair dealing would be that because of the conduct of the respondent authorities, the petitioners had lost certain entitlements which otherwise they would have had the benefit, had the conduct of the authorities not been adverse to them. A consideration of the aspect of being necessary in the interest of fair dealing would definitely not include the personal hardship that a prospective candidate may suffer because of being over age, as there would be many in the open market who would also like to have a Government employment, but for being overage and as because the Government employment was not available they are facing a personal hardship. In consideration of the necessity in the interest of fair dealing based upon a personal hardship or desire of a candidate, in our view would be a violation of Article 14 as it would be discriminatory against any such other prospective candidates who also seek a Government employment, but unable to get it for being overage, in the meantime. 71. Writ petition stands disposed of in the above terms.